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11. Introduction
 
This is a study of authority among the Bentian, a small-scale, non-centralized society of
Indonesian Borneo. It is especially concerned with describing the use and constitution of
authority among the Bentian, although it is also intended to give a general ethnographic
account of this previously little-described population. As a study of authority, it differs
from most of its kind in being a general study of authority rather than being restrictively
concerned with the institutional exercise of authority or with political authority. It
represents a broad sociological analysis of how authority is bound up with action in social
life,  formal as well as informal. Its principal objective can be defined as an exploration,
in the society under investigation, of what is authoritative and why, and of how authority
is applied in, and established through, social processes of authorization.
In the present chapter I give an account of how I became interested in authority as a
dissertation topic, and describe my approach to authority. I will also provide an outline
of the study and a short description of the fieldwork upon which it is based.
Relatives, Government, and God
It was a speech given at a Bentian wedding that first gave me the idea to write about
authority. Speeches are, as far as I know, always given at Bentian weddings, usually by
men who stand up holding a white plate, a sign indicating their assignment to the task by
the sponsors, and the occasion's status as an instance of “tradition” (adat). Most of these
men are referred to as manti, that is, they are regarded as family or village leaders — and
as having some degree of authority. The explicit purpose of wedding speeches is said to
be to instruct the bride and bridegroom about how to lead a married life. What I found
striking about them was, however, that the speech makers usually seemed to take
advantage of the opportunity to also talk about whatever other topics they wanted to
address, often with very little reference to the subject that they were officially assigned
to consider. This frequently made these speeches appear inordinately long, especially as
they were given (as is customary) just before the principal meal was served to the guests.
The particular speech that gave me the idea to make authority the topic of my dissertation
was delivered at a wedding in which four men gave speeches, all of whom were more
concerned with other issues than marriage. Two of these speeches, which were given by
men from other villages than the one where the wedding took place, considered a land
right conflict with a neighboring logging company. One of these men, who was
unexpected and had not been invited to speak beforehand, but was asked to do so as soon
as he arrived because of his high manti status, made it his issue to explain that, despite
sometimes contrary appearances, the government (I., pemerintah), on the one hand, and
 In enumerating the three authorities, Ma Putup used the Indonesian words pemerintah and tuhan for      1
government and God, respectively. For what I have glossed as relatives, he did not use any single word
but gave a standardized list of kinship terms, mentioned  in quick succession (uma, ine, itak, kakah,
burok, tuo, ayu, ongan: see Appendix 1 for kinship terminology). When discussing the importance of
“relatives” in his speech he also sometimes more specifically talked about dali tuha, “the elders,” a
category which in some contexts is synonymous with that of the manti.  
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companies (I., perusahan), on the other, are not the same thing, and that challenging the
authority of the one, therefore, is not equivalent to contesting that of the other. The
second of these men, who like the first argued for resistance to logging company claims
on village lands, emphasized how the forest constitutes the foundation of “tradition”
(adat): “if the forest is destroyed, how is one then to obtain the plants needed for rituals,
and how is one to arrange any rituals whatsoever, if one is not able to make a living in
the first place?” The third speech, made by a man assigned to speak for the bridegroom's
party, consisted mainly of an account of the routines of his own everyday life at the
nearby logging camp, seemingly to legitimize the “non-traditional” life that he was
leading there, not cultivating a rice field, and working for the same logging company that
was criticized in the two first speeches. 
Even though the first three speeches were all obviously concerned with authority —
in the sense of representing attempts at exerting influence over the listeners and
authorizing one or another course of action — it was particularly the fourth speech, given
by a man representing the bride, that kindled my interest in the subject. In this speech, the
speaker (Ma Putup), most noted for his idiosyncratic shamanic skills, began by
addressing his favorite topic: official recognition of Kaharingan, the local religion. Ma
Putup explained that Kaharingan is just as much a religion as any other religion, and that
all people, regardless of religious affiliation, are equal before God. He then gradually
turned to a presentation of some general conditions pertaining to virtuous and successful
adult life, and consequently came to address the bridal couple much more than the other
speakers did. After explaining that there is a basic division of labor between husband and
wife that they should keep in mind, at the same time as they should be willing to
transcend this division whenever required, he declared that there are above all three
“authorities” or “lords” (tuhan), which they need to obey in their lives: relatives,
government, and God.  He pronounced the words slowly for effect, as if to convey an1
impression of the importance of these authorities. Having made this statement, he then
went on to compare these three categories, noting, among other things, that the
government and God are not always present, and thus cannot be taken into consideration
as much as relatives, but that, on the other hand, relatives, like the government, cannot
always observe what one is doing, whereas God sees everything.
It was particularly this statement — about the three principal authorities to be obeyed
— which upon recollection some six months after fieldwork, gave me the idea to treat
authority as the principal subject of my thesis. It initially did so for the particular reason
3that it enabled me to envision authority as an encompassing theoretical concept under
which I could subsume what I then conceived of as the three most promising candidates
for a dissertation topic, namely, kinship, politics, and religion. Originally, I had, in fact,
set out to make a study of ethnicity, but as it had turned out, I had not been able to collect
as much data on this subject as I had desired (a result, principally, of the relative
insignificance of ethnic identity and ethnicity as criteria for social action among the
Bentian: see Sillander 1995). As I also had collected much more data on some other
topics — particularly on kinship, politics, and religion — I realized that a study of
ethnicity would fall short of adequately utilizing my fieldwork material, particularly those
aspects of it which I had obtained through first-hand, long-term participant observation
of everyday life. When I, in addition, was advised, for the very same reasons, against
making a study of ethnicity at my institution when returning from fieldwork, I decided
on developing another principal topic for my dissertation. This was not to prove so easy,
however. In fact, I had been unable to do so — until pondering the significance in this
respect of the above-mentioned wedding speech.
Even though kinship, religion, and politics had all emerged as good alternatives for
a dissertation topic, I had not been able to choose one over another (in part because of a
concern with ethnographic documentation, motivated by the scarcity of previously
published information on the Bentian), nor had I found a way to integrate these, as they
appeared to me, disparate categories into a coherent and balanced whole. In fact,
developing a new theme had become quite a problem for me — which authority now
promised to solve. Here was a piece of indigenous discourse which suggested to me that
these analytical fields could indeed be integrated, that the analytical division implicated
by them had been misleading, maintaining a notion of separation, where there was in fact
no empirical justification for such a notion. More importantly, Ma Putup’s speech
suggested that authority — even though this obviously meant authority in a rather wide
sense of the term — is a centrally important issue in Bentian society, in a very wide range
of spheres, including those on which I had particularly good data.
As I now perceived it, a prominent aspect of Bentian social life was people’s concern
with trying to exert influence over each other, and with drawing upon, for this purpose,
one or another authority, authoritative principle, or technique of authorization, such as
religious ritual, formal speeches, government regulations, tradition, kin responsibilities,
or obligations to spirits. Social life in Bentian society — as no doubt in many others —
thus to a significant degree related, I understood, to authority. Ma Putup’s speech made
this evident to me. Doing some library investigations, I subsequently learned that
authority in anthropology, and even in the social sciences more generally, had not been
very much studied as a topic in its own right — even though allusions to or brief
discussions of the concept in the course of investigation of various other subjects are
commonplace. At least this was the case with respect to empirical analyses of authority
 Among the best-known theoretical discussions of authority we find the 1958 NOMOS (Yearbook of      2
the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy) volume Authority (1958a) edited by Carl
Friedrich which includes papers by Hannah Arendt, Talcott Parsons and E.A. Hoebel, and its successor
volume Authority Revisited (1987) edited by Roland Pennock and John Chapman including papers by
Steven Lukes, Joseph Raz, and William Connolly. Influential monographs on the subject include The
Functions of the Executive by Chester Barnard (1938), Tradition and Authority by Carl Friedrich
(1972), The Authority of Law by Joseph Raz (1979), The Practice of Political Authority by  Richard
Flathman (1980) and Richard Sennett’s Authority (1980). Richard De George’s The Nature and Limits
of Authority (1985) provides a general philosophical discussion of the concept which I have found
particularly useful for my purposes.  In psychology, Stanley Milgram’s Obedience to Authority (1974)
stands out as the most famous study of the subject, although Theodor Adorno’s et al. The Authoritarian
Personality (1950) is of course also an important contribution.  
 There are, of course, a lot of anthropological studies of  leadership and political authority,      3
particularly from Africa. Well-known examples are Evans-Pritchard’s The Nuer (1940) and Fortes’ The
Web of Kinship Ámong the Tallensi (1949), and their jointly edited African Political Systems (1940).
Some African studies also deal with authority in a more explicit and direct way, for example, Brown
(1961),  Gluckmann (1955), Lan (1985), and Middleton (1960). All these African studies deal,
however, restrictively or predominantly with political authority (a partial exception is Middleton, who
has a special interest in religious authority), in addition to considering complexly organized unilineal
societies very different from that of the Bentian. I have therefore found limited value in discussing these
references. There are, of course, also some studies of political authority closer to my area of
investigation, that is, from Southeast Asia. Particularly well-known and useful for my purposes are
those adopting what Errington (1987) refers to as a “centrist perspective,” for example, Anderson
(1972), Errington (1989), Geertz (1980), Tambiah (1985c), and Wolters (1982). However, to the extent
that these Southeast Asian studies deal with authority, they are again mainly concerned with its political
aspect, even though religion and kinship notably play a significant role in their analyses as central
factors contributing to political authority. This holds true also for Pye’s (1985) explicit and comparative
work on authority in Asia as a whole, as well as for Jackson’s (1980) study of Traditional Authority,
Islam, and Rebellion in Indonesia, and it also pertains to all those studies of indigenous legal systems
which have been conducted  in Southeast Asia  (e.g. Barton 1919; Dozier 1966; Just 2001; Schlegel
1970). In some relatively recent ethnographies of Southeast Asia (e.g. Atkinson 1989; Bowen 1991;
Keane 1997; Kuipers 1990; M. Rosaldo 1980; Rutherford 2003; Tsing 1993) other forms of authority
than political authority (e.g. religious, linguistic, oratorical) are also discussed, even though all of these
studies (each of which has notably influenced the present one in important ways) have treated authority
as just one subject alongside others, not as a principal topic.
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in the broad sociological sense in which I conceived of the term. There is, as might be
expected, a fair number of rather theoretical, philosophical analyses of the concept, or
basic nature of, authority, and quite a few sociological and political science studies,
including the most famous of all studies of authority, Max Weber’s discussion of
authority types in his Economy and Society (1978[1922]).   In anthropology, on the other2
hand, explicit general treatments of authority are rare (for one example, see Hoebel
1958), and even though ethnographies on the related subject of leadership, or authority
systems more generally, abound, I have come across no monograph on the role or
constitution of authority in informal social  processes outside authority systems.  One3
classic anthropological study explicitly dealing with authority in more than a cursory
manner which shares with this study a broad understanding of the concept is
Malinowski’s Freedom and Civilization (1947). Besides political authority, Malinowski
also discusses authority in the family, the authority of tradition, and the authority of
5magic and religion, and he makes the assertions that authority is functionally
indispensable in human society and a precondition for freedom (e.g. see
1947:178,185,233). 
Ma Putup’s speech also provided a rare local synthesis of what is authoritative in his
society, and a rather good one at that. The three categories of authority mentioned in his
speech are of great concern in most Bentians’ lives. People often feel compelled to
observe them, even when they do not for some reason want to, and they frequently do so
without conscious consideration of doing so. As his speech also suggested, it is difficult
— although not always impossible — to evade them. In this respect they are major
authorities among the Bentian. People also frequently turn to them for authority, to
authorize something which they have done or would like to see done by others. As this
indicates, they are major sources of authority in Bentian society. Precisely for this reason
their importance was often especially evident on such occasions as wedding speeches.
Then they were particularly likely to be expressly acknowledged and even celebrated, an
indication of the fact that these speeches, together with ritual speeches (given at religious
rituals), constitute a major forum for the display and exertion of the authority of the
manti, who in order to legitimate their own authority are conspicuously apt to invoke
these authorities. 
In Ma Putup’s case, the one authority which he was particularly concerned to invoke
was that of God, or more to the point, that of the spirits and the religious experts — of
which he was himself a representative — who act as intermediaries in the communication
with spirits. It was actually these agencies that he was primarily concerned with here,
even though he mainly talked about “God” (I., tuhan). When I reflected on the
significance of Ma Putup’s speech, it was also especially the spirits, or religious authority
in general, rather than the Almighty, which “God” signified to me. As I already
mentioned, much of Ma Putup’s speech actually consisted of a defense of the indigenous
Kaharingan religion (in which a supreme God plays almost no part) in the face of
government demands of conversion to an officially recognized religion (agama).  In
addition, it also represented an attempt to communicate to the bridal couple and the
audience more generally the importance of holding Kaharingan rituals as a means of
propitiating the spirits.
Besides providing a local synthesis of what is authoritative in Bentian society, Ma
Putup’s statement also, as already suggested, gave me an idea of how to integrate data
from the fields of kinship, religion, and politics within a single study. Indeed, it suggested
to me a very straightforward way in which this could be done: by structuring my study
in accordance with his threefold enumeration of authorities. Recognizing the importance
of the three authorities mentioned in his speech, and the fact that they corresponded,
roughly, to the three analytical fields on which I considered that I had particularly good
data, this solution felt so attractive that I have stuck to it. Consequently my analysis of
6authority is divided into three principal parts: one on “kinship authority,” another on
“religious authority,” and a third on “political authority.” Now, there are of course also
some other important authorities — and sources of authority — in Bentian society in
addition to those mentioned by Ma Putup. It has been my intention to also study such
authorities (in so far as their significance in social processes of authorization merits
interest) even though I have, in a sense, done so “through” Ma Putup’s authorities in that
I have discussed these other authorities within the three parts into which my analysis is
divided. Also, as already suggested, it has not been my intention to be true to Ma Putup’s
classification in a very literal sense, but rather to employ it as a heuristic device enabling
me to explore the significance of authority systematically in a wide range of social
spheres. This is most obvious in the case of  “government,” as my category of “political
authority” does in fact only partly deal with government authority: to an equal or greater
extent the chapter designated by this concept is about the authority of the manti and that
of customary law. Despite the fact that the past and present significance of the manti and
adat among the Bentian to a very important extent reflects government influence, these
two authorities, whose role as authorities in Bentian society is absolutely central, are
primarily seen as indigenous institutions — indeed, often as opposing forces with respect
to the government — and their authority also largely derives from other,  local sources
(e.g. from kinship, and the ancestors). Thus, a good case could be made for considering
them instead in the other principal parts of the study, and I have indeed found it necessary
to do so up to a certain extent. In practice the significance of  the various authorities that
I discuss is, of course, often overlapping or inseparable, and in the final instance, my
categorization of Bentian authority represents only one of many possible approaches and
perspectives on the subject. I believe that there are some particularly good grounds for
my theoretical understanding of authority, however, and it is to a presentation of this
understanding that we shall now turn.
Action, Authorship, and Authorization
Authority, as the word is used in this study, differs significantly from Max Weber's use
of the term, even though it  relates closely to his concept of action, and that of social
action in particular. My interest in authority, as already noted, regards authority
particularly as it is articulated with social action and interaction. “Social action” I
understand to be, following Weber, action oriented toward other people’s behavior or
expected behavior (cf. Weber 1978:22-24). Like Weber, I  recognize that social action
is always associated with a subjective dimension, or a “dimension of meaning.” This
consideration is of particular significance in respect to such social action which has to do
with authority (authoritative or authorizing action), and thereby, in fact, one which may
 In his Economy and Society, and elsewhere, Weber’s term Herrschaft has been variously translated      4
as domination or authority. Already from his famous above-cited definition of the word (in connection
with which it is glossed as “domination” in Economy and Society, 1978) it is evident that he is
specifically interested in authority in relations of domination, and through his development of his
famous authority types it becomes further clear that his interest is restricted to what he calls “legitimate
domination.” By contrast, I am interested in authority both within and outside relations of domination,
which implies that authority, in my understanding of the word, is not equivalent to, or even necessarily
associated with, domination.
 Despite taking action as the starting point of sociological analysis, Weber was, in fact, as noted by      5
Alan Dawe (1979:393) mainly concerned with explaining social systems. As Dawe observes, “he never
develops it [his ‘putative sociology of action’] beyond a few initial concepts because his particular use
of these concepts leads him straight to a sociology of social system.”
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be taken, as I will demonstrate, to expose certain limitations with Weber’s understanding
of authority.  By “authority” I primarily mean a capacity to influence or authorize
people's actions or views, or a source of authority having the capacity to influence or
authorize people’s actions or views. It should perhaps be explicitly noted here that I
understand such capacities and sources as not restricted to persons, but as also referring
to institutions, ideas, and practices. This reflects the fact that it is not so much
personalized or institutionalized authority that I am interested in as it is processes of
authorization; like Friedrich, I perceive that authority is, in fact, a “quality of
communication, rather than of persons” (1958b:36, orig. italics omitted). It can also be
added that, in addition to authority, I am to some extent concerned with its reverse side,
that is, with  “autonomy,” the capacity of persons to act uninfluenced by others or, in
other words, to retain discretion. 
My conception of authority is much more encompassing than Weber’s, who defines
authority (Herrschaft) as “the probability that a command with a given specific content
will be obeyed by a given group of persons” (1978:53).  This difference in perspectives,4
reflected by his definition, can partly be explained by the fact that I am not, in distinction
to him, specifically interested in authority in organizations, or formal structures of
leadership, but rather with authority in all spheres of social action, including informal
everyday life.  I thus see little reason to restrict my conception of authority to (or model5
this conception on) conditions pertaining to orders successfully issued. In my
understanding of the term, authority can be exerted even without any orders being issued
or implied (or analytically imaginable a posteriori). Obedience is not a central issue for
me, and I am not particularly concerned with what Richard De George (1985:22) calls
“executive authority,” that is, authority exercised by someone (or an institution) in the
capacity of holding a “right or power to act for or on someone else” (which is, however,
as De George notes, what most which has been written on authority concerns). My
interest in authority also includes what De George (1985:22) calls “non-executive
authority,” that is, “de facto authority” exerted by or deriving from someone (or
This is another respect in which my approach to authority differs from Weber’s. As Steven Lukes      6
has explained, Weber’s concern with authority is restrictively concerned with de jure authority, that is,
it attempts to explain authority “by reference to a set of rules prevalent in a given society,” rather than
“by reference to the beliefs and attitudes of those subject to authority” (1979:640). As Lukes (1987:64)
has observed, Weber is actually uninterested, unlike me, in the question of “When and why do men
obey?” as well as in, we may add, other aspects of what constitutes authority in practice.
 This is not the place to review the literature on such topics as margins, resistance and the subaltern,      7
which together have led to an immense increase of interest in domination as experienced “from below,”
as well as to an expansion of notions about what counts as “subordinated agency.” Resistance studies
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something) not holding such rights or power.  For me to talk about authority, it is in fact6
enough that someone — or something — influences someone in his or her actions or
views (in so far, it should perhaps be added, as that influence is significant in
authorization processes, a concept which I will discuss below). In fact, I also consider it
relevant to talk about authority in such cases as when a person who influences someone
else can be regarded as subordinated to that person. That is, I contend that authority can
also be exerted by persons who have rather little authority, generally speaking. In my
view, to assume that authority exists only as the property of those who hold some more
or less clearly defined authority position, entails a serious simplification of any
understanding of the workings of authority. Moreover, doing so would have political
implications: such narrow notions of authority are the stuff of ideologies that help
reproduce asymmetric social relations. 
What I am proposing here is what we could call a more “democratic” authority
concept. It is democratic in at least two respects. First, it refers to something which is not
limited to certain spheres of the society, or restricted to certain persons or positions, but
rather, extendable to all or most fields of interaction and categories of actors. Second, it
presupposes the possession of some degree of freedom by all actors involved in or
affected by the exertion of authority. The latter point was, of course, also recognized by
Weber who distinguished authority from power precisely on the grounds that the former,
unlike the latter, requires voluntary submission by the person subjected to authority (cf.
Weber 1978:53). It has also been acknowledged or perceived by many others, for
example, by Hannah Arendt (1958:83), and by Georg Simmel whose writings on
superordination and subordination (e.g. Simmel 1964:181-303) attest to the existence in
all relations of domination of some amount of freedom on the part of the subjugated.
More recently, the same point has been forcefully expounded by Michel Foucault (1980)
who asserts (unlike Weber) that power is preconditioned by the freedom of its subjects
— and more effectively exercised the more freedom they have. Within the two last
decades, a growing concern in and beyond the field of cultural studies with such topics
as “resistance,” “margins,” and “the subaltern,” has been paralleled by an increasing
general academic acceptance of (and attraction to) such views that ascribe agency to the
weak.   7
perhaps most notably include James Scott’s (1985, 1990) analyses of peasant everyday resistance, and
the works on youth and working class culture by the so-called Birmingham school of cultural studies
(e.g. Hall and Jefferson 1976; Willis 1977). In anthropology, the monographs of Comaroff (1985) and
Ong (1987) can be pointed out as influential examples of studies more directly concerned with the
topic. The term “subaltern” is most famously associated with Gayatri Spivak (1988a, 1988b) and other
Indian scholars associated with the subaltern studies school of history (e.g. Guha 1983, 1988). The
words “margins” and “marginality” have been of special concern in a predominantly American cultural
studies debate engaged in particular with such topics as ethnicity, postcolonialism, and gender (e.g.
Bhabha 1990; Ferguson 1990; Ginzburg & Tsing 1990). In anthropology, Anna Tsing’s (1993, 1994)
work on national integration and identity negotiation among the Meratus Dayaks of south Borneo (to
which I will have reason to make frequent further reference) is one of the better known localized
analyses of the experience and conditions of “speaking from the margins.” 
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What much of this interest in the subordinated as active agents adds up to is a
realization that power does not emanate from the superordinated, but is instead something
evolving from the relationship between super- and subordinated. Power, and its sister
phenomenon authority, are thus essentially relational in nature and derivation; they are
socially constructed in interaction between individuals performing social actions in the
Weberian sense. They do not come into being — and they would cease to exist —
without such mutually oriented action; they are dependent on the kind of practical
recognition of their existence that only such behavior can provide. As a consequence,
actors, including authoritative actors, should not be regarded as the authors of their
actions in any conclusive or definite sense, any more than authors of literary works
should be identified as the ultimate source of their meaning or origination. Authority does
not rest with the author, as Roland Barthes has taught us through his influential essay on
“The Death of the Author” (1977), and I think it is relevant to apply his argument
metaphorically to studies of authority relations in the social sciences. 
Authority, as I conceive of it here, is not something fixed. Rather, it moves, and it
obtains its energy from its movement; it needs to move to survive. In fact, authority
should, in my view, not be seen so much as an entity as it should be regarded as a process
— an essentially polymorph process which I will refer to with the general term of
“authorization.” There are many types of authorization, which is another way of saying
that authority moves in many ways. In the first place, we should note that authorization
can occur in the direction from the top down, as well as in the direction from the bottom
up, i.e. in both ways between the super- and the subordinated. The subordinated typically
authorizes the superordinated by obeying him or by becoming influenced by him. But it
also frequently happens that the superordinated authorizes the subordinated, by
delegating part of his authority to him. In fact, the second type of authorization is often
a practical precondition of the first; without it the subordinated would often be hard
pressed or altogether unwilling to submit to the superordinated’s authority. What is more
fundamental to note here, however, is that both super- and subordinated frequently need
the other to gain authority through authorization: the superordinated needs the
subordinated’s recognition of his authority to have it, and the subordinated needs the
      For this point I am indirectly indebted to Georg Simmel (1964:184) who says of authority that it8
“stems from the objectivity of norms and forces,” and who distinguishes prestige from authority on the
basis that prestige, in contrast to authority, “lacks the element of super-subjective significance... [and]
the identity of the personality with an objective power or norm.”
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superordinated to have his authority in order to employ it. Authority thus in both
instances presupposes transfer of authority: no movement, no authority. 
At the same time, as authority presupposes mutual dependency between the super-
and the subordinated, it also presupposes their inequality. So as not to collapse the
categories of super- and subordinated, and succumb to reductionism, we have to
recognize that authority, at least in so far as we are concerned with “embodied” or
“personalized” authority, presupposes hierarchy. Like movement, hierarchy can be seen
as built into such authority. Without hierarchy there would be no authoritative persons;
the superordinated’s authority derives precisely from that difference which distinguishes
the superordinated from the subordinated, or in other words, from that which the former
possesses, but the latter lacks. Not all interpersonal differences constitute sources of
authority, however. In fact, only that which counts as intersubjectively valuable or
extraordinary (i.e. as a scarce resource), and which thus has a “suprapersonal legitimacy”
has the capacity of functioning as a source of authorization.  However, in so far as8
something has such a suprapersonal legitimacy, it can also be used by the subordinated
against the superordinated. 
As already pointed out, I consider it relevant to talk about authority also in such
instances as when a subordinate influences a superordinate. Authority, in my view, is far
from the exclusive prerogative of the authoritative, and it can occasionally be used to
unauthorize the authoritative, so to speak, i.e. in such situations when the balance of
authority shifts. Less dramatically, a subordinate can also employ authority in order to
influence a superordinate without challenging the latter’s authority. He can, for instance,
draw on a different source of authority than that from which the latter’s authority derives.
In many societies and situations there is often a very thin line between superordinated and
subordinated, and much exertion or employment of authority does of course occur
between people who for most purposes regard themselves as equals. It is also largely
(although not exclusively) on such authorization that the present study will focus, as the
people studied can be regarded as comparatively egalitarian (and often regard themselves
as such). However, as we already know, they do have some weakly developed authority
positions (e.g. manti, and a couple of categories of religious experts), and I will naturally
pay some attention to these, in so far as the importance of their roles in authorization
processes merits interest.
Before going any further, I will now present a third, and centrally important sense in
which I will employ the term authorization. It is partly because of this type of
authorization that I consider it appropriate to deal specifically with authority, rather than,
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for instance, with power, in this study. Authorization in this sense is not something which
occurs between persons, but rather a process initiated — in the last instance, at least —
by the same person who is influenced by it. The term here refers to the process whereby
someone draws on a source of authority — whether that source is an authoritative person
or, more commonly, an authoritative institution, principle or value — so as to influence
— that is, to enable or legitimize — his own actions. A large part of my attention to
authority in this dissertation will regard authorization in this respect, which may well be
a process of central importance in social life in every human society, and which should
not, in my view, be disregarded in any study of authority, since it does not occur
independently from other forms of authorization (for instance, it draws on, and hence
adds to the importance of, sources which are available also for other forms of
authorization). I say “of central importance in social life” because similar, “other-
oriented” considerations pertain to such “self-authorization” as to those processes
whereby someone influences other people: the actions involved in both types of
authorization are social actions in the Weberian sense. Moreover, frames and models for
interpretation and evaluation of such actions are in both cases socially constructed within
moral communities (which is not to say, however, that the latter are ever entirely
undifferentiated or perfectly consolidated). Authorization of all types (including self-
authorization) is thus intimately bound up with social life in some very fundamental
ways.
My interest in authority as a broadly encompassing concept relating to both self-
authorization and instances when one influences someone else (“other-authorization”),
should basically be seen as an interest in those factors in society that influence people’s
actions. My basic concerns are very much with agency and its socio-cultural
determinants, and it is against the background of these concerns that my interest in
authority should be primarily understood , that is, as an interest in how authority affects
agency, or as an interest in the role played by authority in the process referred to by
Berger and Luckmann (1967)  as “internalization.” This is another reason why I have a
particular interest in self-authorization, and why authority interests me especially as
“sources of authorization,” rather than as authority in the more restricted sense of
embodied or personalized authority. A general study of how authority affects agency
cannot be restricted to the authority deriving from authority positions; indeed, it cannot
even be restricted to how people exert authority, not even if it would then extend its
interest to those who hold no special authority.  It has to study the whole range of sources
of authority available in the society — including authoritative values, institutions and
practices — and it has to investigate, not only how people use authority over each other,
but also how authority is employed — including unintentionally or unconsciously  —
for the legitimation and motivation of action and values.
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Free-floating, Objectified and Socially Mediated Authority
What I attempt to do in this study, then, can be described as an attempt to investigate all
the uses that Bentians commonly make of important sources of authority available in their
society. And as this implies, I will be centrally concerned with the sources of authority
upon which they commonly draw. I will also be very much concerned with the sorts of
authority that they use when drawing upon them, or how they, generally and variously,
employ authority, as well as with how authority is manifested and construed in social
action and interaction, or to put it concisely, with how authority is articulated with social
life.
In any society, there is, of course, a multitude of sorts — as well as sources — of
authority. Even in a small-scale society such as that of the Bentian, the complexity of
authority is remarkable in this respect. Partly for this reason, I have found limited general
value in Weber’s authority types for making sense of Bentian authority, even though they
have, as we shall see, proved valuable in many specific contexts. Another reason for this
is that the authority which Bentians frequently use in everyday life largely conforms to
an authority type that can be seen to have been left out from his classification. We can
call this authority type “value-rational authority” as the actions to which it pertains are
“value-rational” in Weber’s sense, that is, they are associated — tacitly, for the most part
— with certain basic values, beliefs or assumptions, which make them appear as
purposeful in themselves (cf. Weber 1978:24-26). Again, the limited value of Weber’s
categories of authority for my purposes has to do with the fact that the field of application
for which he primarily constructed these ideal types differs from that in which I will
apply my concept of authority. Weber was primarily interested in the types of legitimacy
by which authority systems — that is, institutions exerting institutionalized forms of
authority, such as states, armies and political organizations — can secure their authority
(his authority interest was thus, as De George, 1985:284, has noted, restricted to
executive authority). Weber noted that neither habit or material interest, nor affectual or
value-rational motives on the part of the members of such systems, are enough in
themselves, or in combination, to provide a solid ground for the authority of such
systems. In addition, he argued, all authority systems also need to establish their authority
on some basic conception of their legitimacy (or on some combination of such
conceptions), and he identified “legal,” “traditional,” and “charismatic” authority as the
three possible forms of (pure) legitimate authority, which vary in their qualities according
to the basic principle (legality, tradition or charisma) through which they and their leaders
maintain their right to exert authority (cf. Weber 1978:212-15).
In contrast to Weber, my interest in authority concerns the motives of individuals
rather than the legitimacy of systems. This is, of course, partly the result of choice, but
also the consequence of the fact that my ethnographic data only marginally include
      The term “objectification” holds an important position in Western philosophy, most famously, in9
the works of Hegel, Marx and Lukacs. I am here using the word in a more or less similar manner to how
Roger Keesing (1982) talks about “objectified culture.” In distinction from him, I am, of course, talking
about objectified authority, not culture, but in so far as that authority is culture, as it is in the case of 
“tradition” (adat) or kinship ideology, my usage differs little from his. To further clarify my usage, it
can be noted that I see objectified authority as such authority which is clearly recognized as authority,
or to some degree reified, that is, conceived in a fairly invariable and bounded way. Unobjectified
authority, on the other hand, is not reified, and for the most part not consciously employed as authority.
We can make a further distinction here between objectified authority and objectified use of authority.
“Objectified usage” primarily refers to such use of authority which is accompanied by at least some
degree of consciousness with respect to the activity’s status as being about or involving employment of
authority, whereas “objectified authority” refers to an authority or source of authority consciously
perceived as authoritative or authorizing.
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institutionalized authority of the sort investigated by Weber. Authority among the rather
egalitarian and loosely organized Bentian is generally “free-floating” in that it is in large
part not institutionalized in authority systems or positions and frequently not even
personalized. Much of it is neither particularly “objectified,” in the sense of being very
fixed or reified conceptually, or self-consciously identified and employed “as authority.”
However, even free-floating authority derives from sources which have a suprapersonal
legitimacy, which implies that such authority (like authority in general) presupposes the
existence of at least some conceptual hierarchies (i.e. some value-systems), even though
not always of some political or social ones. I will also be much concerned with sources
of authority in this study, which means that I will be dealing with some at least weakly
objectified authorities, since culturally constructed and intersubjectively perceived
sources of authority must have at least some degree of conceptual fixity. Some of the
more influential of these sources, moreover, such as customary law, the government, and
the manti, are those which are the most objectified, which points to the general fact that
the capacity of authority to authorize, is positively associated with the degree to which
it is objectified. In other words, even though authority can be rather free-floating in terms
of institutionalization and personalization, effective authorization frequently involves
some degree of (either preceding or concurrent) objectification.  9
Besides often involving objectification, effective authorization also — even when we
are speaking about relatively free-floating authority — tends to require some access to
what we could call “social resources.” This is another sense in which we can speak of
authority as profoundly social or intimately articulated with social life. I have already
argued that authority is social in that it presupposes socially constituted conceptual
hierarchies, in that the actions involved in all types of authorization are social actions, as
well as in that exertion or “possession” of authority requires social recognition. In
addition, there is reason to regard authority as social also because effective authorization
tends to demand the actor’s adequate maintenance of some number of social relations,
or his or her embeddedness in some particular social networks. In other words,
authorization tends to demand some amount of “social capital” in Pierre Bourdieu’s
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(1986) terms. This is perhaps especially evident among such residentially dispersed
swidden cultivators as the Bentian, for whom Anthony Reid’s (1983:8) characterization
of “control of men” (rather than land) as the “key to Southeast Asian social systems,” is
particularly appropriate. But authorization presupposes social capital also for other
reasons than those for which leaders need followers, or for which any Bentian
occasionally (at times of household rituals, for instance) needs some concentration of kin
and neighbors. Authorization presupposes social capital also because the availability of
authority is socially mediated. Actors are often most evidently connected with and
dependent on other actors in that they need their concrete presence (or mediating
influence) in order to obtain authority. Access to sources of authority and acquisition of
authoritative use of authority is more or less exclusively gained through other people —
through their information, guidance, and models. Without the mediation of authority
through other people, many aspects of authority would simply be absent from the actor’s
world, or at least much less relevant in it.
Even if authority may be seen as ultimately deriving from conceptual hierarchies or
the more or less extensively shared values which make up such hierarchies, authority
does not, if we look at it from the actor’s point of view, stem only from values or other
immaterial sources, but also from various sources in the material world, including, among
other things, ancestral objects, items of wealth, and authoritative persons. In practice,
sources of authority are frequently material, and even ideational sources of authority are
commonly associated with particular people or objects, and must in fact often be so, in
order to have some practical significance. To be truly persuasive, ideas and values tend
to have to be associated with some concrete material manifestations in the actor’s life-
world. Otherwise their salience in the recurrent bodily-spatial and interactional practices
which make up much of the actor’s everyday life is much more uncertain, as well as more
contingent on contextual factors and active implemental efforts. Consequently, their
incorporation as influential elements into the actor’s “habitus” is also much less likely,
as their ontological depth and degree of taken-for-grantedness largely depends on the
extent to which they are bound up with these practices. To use another term of
Bourdieu’s, without such socio-material mediation they are much less likely to become
“doxa,” that is, part of “what goes without saying and what cannot be said [i.e.
contested]” (Bourdieu 1977:170).
Like Bourdieu (1977, 1990) I believe that everyday practices are central in inculcating
the actor’s sense of the world, and that these practices are governed by a logic of their
own — a practical logic — which is not reducible to principles of formal logic, and
normally not guided by instrumental reason in any strict sense of the term (in so far as
they are, they more often conform to “tactics” rather than “strategics,” in de Certeau’s
[1984:35-37] terms). Following Bourdieu, I also regard the word “sense” as well-
designed to describe the dominant mode of the actor’s orientation to social life. This
      Schutz (1970:126) defines “working” as “action in the outer world, based upon a project, and10
characterized by the intention to bring about the projected state of affairs by bodily movements.” It may
be relevant to note here that Schutz conceived of working as central to “the constitution of the reality of
daily life” (1970:126), and that he applied the concept above all for routine actions, which he generally
considered as reasonable (and meaningful) but not as rational in a strict sense, in the respect that one
could speak of isolated rational acts, for instance. When I say that I am concerned with such
interactional practices classifiable as working, I mean to convey that the objects of my interest are
embodied and worldly interactional routine actions, that is, “things that people regularly do to (or with)
each other.”
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process is not as much premeditated and consciously organized as it is taken for granted
and structured by so called common-sense; it is characterized by what phenomenologists,
perhaps somewhat naively, call “the natural attitude to the world.” As part of my
vocabulary might already have suggested (e.g. life-world, bodily-spatial, everyday life),
the approach to authority taken in this study also owes much to phenomenology (e.g.
Merleau-Ponty 1962, 1968; Schutz 1962, 1970) and phenomenological or practice-
oriented anthropology (e.g. Bell 1992; Jackson 1996; Ortner 1984). This study is life-
world centered in that it focuses on everyday experiences and embodied, concretely
situated interactional practices, particularly those classifiable as “working,” as Schutz
(1970:126) understands this term.  The setting for and object of the analysis is local or10
localized social life as observable on the spot, in its spatio-temporal immediacy. My
approach is processual rather than structural. It is also decidedly micro rather than macro
oriented, if reference to this practically untenable distinction is allowed. This is to say,
I am interested in “structural factors” only in so far that these are demonstrably present
in the life-world. By  “present” I here primarily mean influential, either as resources or
constraints (objective or imagined), in processes of action and experience. The kind of
structural factors that I will be most concerned with are the fundamental values and
assumptions, on the one hand, and the socio-material preconditions, on the other, which
are bound up with everyday practices. My understanding of structure thus resembles that
of Giddens (1984), who understands this concept to mean mobile “rules and resources”
that exist only as implicated in agency (or what he calls the “structuration process”), for
example, as “memory traces” or as “instantiated in action” (1984:337). Structure in the
sense of what he calls “system,” on the other hand, a concept which corresponds to
“structure” in the more conventional, macro-level oriented, sociological understanding
of the term — Giddens defines system as “the patterning of social relations across time-
space” (1984:337) — will be of less concern in my study, although I will make some
particular references to structural factors in this sense in Chapter 5, with the objective of
showing how Bentian political authority has been influenced by external influences. The
Bentian’s position within the larger region of which they are part — particularly their
condition of marginality — has had a crucial importance for Bentian political authority.
However, for the most part, the approach of this study is action-oriented, and I believe
this to be an advantage over most authority studies which have tended to be concerned
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primarily with the structure (in a more conventional sense) of authority systems. As it
seems to me, my approach illuminates different things than a structural approach would,
and enables for this reason a new perspective on authority. 
Another frame of reference which has contributed to the development of the approach
of this study, especially to its preoccupation with social action, is the corpus of theory
known as “actor-network theory” or “the sociology of translation” (e.g. Law 1986, 1991).
I am influenced, in particular, by actor-network theory’s concept of power, but I also
share the theory’s basic view of the processual constitution of social phenomena,
including its insistence on treating social phenomena as effects rather than causes of
action. We cannot assume the pre-existence of social phenomena (e.g. power, capital,
roles, culture), or what Bruno Latour, with reference to power, has called its existence “in
potentia” (1986:264). We cannot treat such variables as explanatory or given, as
providing their own force, so to speak, but must instead see how their appropriation by
actors in society — which always involves “translation” — creates their importance and
energy. The reason that there is power in society is not that there is someone holding
power — in fact, as Latour, echoing Foucault, points out, one cannot really hold power:
it exists only when one exerts it, and even then one does not actually have it, as it is
others that are doing the job (1986:264-65). Just as authority cannot be said to rest with
the author, power cannot accurately be understood as the property (in either of the word’s
two meanings) of the powerful. Power does not simply emanate from the powerful —
that is, spread on its own account or by a force of its own, according to what Latour
(1986:264-65) calls a “model of diffusion” — and it is not simply transmitted (or
alternatively resisted) by those who submit to it, execute it or otherwise are affected by
it. Rather, power — and the same goes for authority — comes into being because it is
appropriated by actors, and in this process it is always translated, as the actors who
appropriate it do so for reasons and motives of their own. The continuous translation of
power in “actor-networks” is what fuels its extension in society (i.e. what actors do with
power is what provides it with its energy), and it is the size and control of such networks
which determine its scope. 
The concept of actor-network is important here also because it points to the
significance of what I above referred to as “socio-material mediation.” I consider
especially relevant the term “intermediaries” which Michel Callon (1986, 1991) uses to
refer to the constituents of such networks. Intermediaries are the people and objects
through which an actor’s influence (the effects of his actions) is translated, that is,
moderated and extended. Actor-network theory is, as is well-known, concerned with
abolishing the distinction between human and non-human factors in sociological analysis
— as epitomized in Callon’s concept of “free association” (1986:200-01) — and with
emphasizing the importance of material (e.g. technological) influences on interaction.
Without sharing actor-network theory’s sometimes more specific commitment to a study
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of non-human intermediaries, I subscribe to its view of the constitutive importance of
“networking” (to devise a concept fusing Schutz with Latour) in the broader material
sense, that is, including people. My notion of mediation or “intermediation” may in fact
be seen as primarily related to social association, although the word “social,” as used in
this connection (and throughout this study), has strong connotations of corporeality,
spatiality, and worldliness. In its concern with an originally social or intersubjective
materiality, conjoining body and world, the concept of “flesh” (la chair) of the later
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1968), comes, in a sense, very close to my understanding of “the
social.” Merleau-Ponty’s, Bourdieu’s and Foucault’s notions of the body have also all
influenced my materially oriented understanding of sociality (and by way of extension,
of authority), as has (with respect to another aspect of that sociality) Michel de Certeau’s
(1984, 1986) thoughts about the spatial constitution of practices. Even though “body” and
“space” are not important concepts in this study, the understanding of social action that
these approaches to these phenomena imply shares something significant with mine, as
does that of actor-network theory, and certain already mentioned proponents of practice
theory and phenomenology. This is an interest in the most immediate practical and
material contexts and conditions of action, and an assumption that these factors are
central in the constitution of agency. What this means is that my understanding of social
action is not restricted to the idealistic perspective or ideational approach commonly
associated with Weber, even though values and the meaning-dimension of social action
will, as already pointed out, occupy central positions in my analysis of authority. My
understanding of how ideational factors affect Bentians is also informed by the above-
mentioned influences in that I regard the recurrent socio-material mediation of ideational
factors as what above all makes for their importance. An important example of such
mediation is notably “discourse circulation” (i.e. the social transmission of public
representations), a phenomenon which, as Greg Urban (1996) has convincingly argued,
in itself bridges the ideational and the material spheres, or “the intelligible” and “the
sensible,” an observation which suggests that it may not be very wise to think of these
two categories as antithetical in the first place.
Power, Politics and Ethnographic Authority
In discussing actor-network theory’s influence upon my theoretical approach, I discussed
at some length some of the theory’s ideas about power because of their relevance for my
understanding of authority. Thus far, I have not made an attempt to distinguish the
concept of authority from that of power. Much of what I have said applies, in fact, to
power as much as to authority. This need not be a problem, however, as the distinction
between them will not be of any special concern in this study, and I will not deal much
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with power as opposed to or distinct from authority. It may be useful here, however, for
purposes of clarification, to say a few words about the relative importance and internal
relationship of power and authority in the society investigated.
Power is not a given in Bentian society. As is common among non-centralized
swidden cultivators in Southeast Asia, there is in Bentian society rather little
institutionalized and absolute power. Power, in the sense of an ability to impose one’s
will over someone despite resistance, is only rarely available to Bentians, including those
who hold the positions as manti or belian. Consequently, power has to be established
anew in situations and relations when it emerges. Typically, in order for it to come into
being, the element of authority is required. In other words, if one is to successfully
exercise power, the attempt to do so usually has to be authorized either through explicit
reference to a source of authority, or by the attempt being in some respect implicitly
authoritative. Thus, power and authority are frequently associated, a fact which makes
for the central importance of authority in Bentian social life and which makes Bentian
society an appropriate setting for a study of authority by making authorization processes
salient and observable.
Authority is not always associated with power, however. The invocation of authority
is not restricted to those situations in which power is exercised, or to other situations in
which attempts are made to influence the actions or views of other people. Authority does
not only pertain to politics, narrowly or broadly defined, but also to what could be called
the existential domain. This holds true particularly in respect to authority invoked in
processes of self-authorization which frequently serves the purpose of establishing
existential control or guidance — and of enabling agency — particularly in response to
crisis or uncertainty (obtaining “trust,” or “ontological security,” may be, as Giddens
[1991:194-96] has suggested, an important general function of authority, which
illuminates different attitudes toward authority in different societies). As Roger Keesing
has argued in respect to the Polynesian concept of mana — which in certain usages means
precisely “authority” (see e.g. Keesing 1984:143-47) — a basic concern which Bentian
authority addresses is “the essential unpredictability of human effort”(1984:148). The
broad conception of authority, and the generally wide field of inquiry of this study in part
reflects an attempt to incorporate authority used within a so called existential domain, and
so arrive at a less restrictively political understanding of authority. 
There are thus many concerns motivating the approach of this study, some theoretical,
some empirical. In addition to those so far discussed, at least one more theoretical
incentive should be mentioned. This incentive relates to the so called “crisis of
representation” within the discipline of anthropology, and the question of ethnographic
authority as addressed by James Clifford (1988). Like Clifford, I recognize a need to
reduce the “monological authority” of the author-anthropologist, and I understand a wide
field of inquiry as potentially contributing to such a reduction.
      Clifford (1988:45) uses the concept “directed writing” in referring to how Renato Rosaldo (who11
set out to do a synchronic study of Ilongot social structure) ended up writing a monograph on Ilongot
history as a result of having had to listen to endless narratives of local history in the field. 
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It is my contention that the trend of narrowing down subject fields in anthropology is not
all for the good, and that the corollary trend of a shift of emphasis from ethnographic
documentation toward theoretical discussion does not always yield results of greater
native as opposed to academic interest. Whether it does so or not is admittedly difficult
to determine, and it is, of course, perfectly possible for emphases of both kinds to yield
desirable results in this respect. The answer to the question is perhaps best determined
by the individual case at hand. In the case of this study, not writing a more restrictively
focused dissertation entails a closer correspondence between the subject of my study, on
the one hand, and my (analytically broad) field experience, on the other. In addition, a
rather broad topical focus, as well as a comparatively strong emphasis on ethnographic
documentation are, as already noted, motivated by the fact that previous (ethnographic
and other) data on the people studied are scarce. My concerns would probably have been
different if the object of study would have been, for instance, the Iban, Borneo’s most
famous Dayak group, about whom by now there exists an extensive ethnographic
literature, including some thirty or more dissertations. The division of the present study
into three principal analytical chapters mirroring the three principal authorities mentioned
in the wedding speech, may also be seen as reflecting my concerns in this respect, at the
same time as it is motivated, in part, by the possibility of reducing authorial authority
through what Clifford (1988:45) calls “directed writing,”  that is, through a focus on11
issues brought forward inductively, by native concerns.
Outline of the Study
The study is divided into six chapters, including an introduction, and a conclusion.
Chapter 2 consists of a general ethnographic description of the Bentian while Chapters
3, 4, and 5 provide the principal analytical chapters. 
Chapter 2 is quite detailed, for the reason that the Bentian and related groups have
been little documented. The general reader may choose to pass over part of the chapter
(i.e. the discussion of Luangan identity and subgroups, parts of the historical description
of Southeast Bornean regions, and the presentation of Bentian subsistence patterns).
However, a large proportion of the chapter has some bearing on my analysis of authority.
In particular, it provides information on the contexts in which kinship and government
authority function. The chapter begins by an introductory discussion of who the Bentian
are and where they live. It then turns to a discussion of the evolution of Bentian identity
over time and the nature of ethnic identification among them. This is followed by a
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presentation of the Luangan, a concept which designates a large number of loosely
connected but culturally and linguistically related subgroups including the Bentian and
their neighbors. As most Luangan subgroups have not formed the subject of
anthropological study or description in English, I give a brief presentation of them as well
as describe what it is that these groups share in ethnic, cultural and linguistic terms.
Giving an account of the Luangan is also part of an effort to describe the regional setting
of the Bentian, designed to provide an understanding of the articulation of Bentian
society with the larger world. I then turn to a presentation of Bentian history. Since little
historical information is available on the Bentian I attempt to provide an understanding
of their history by adding together relevant information available on the larger region of
which they are part (Southeast Borneo), which itself has been rather poorly described.
This historical description is particularly concerned with discussing the impact on the
Bentian of the different governments which, from early times up until the present, have
claimed authority in the region, and thereby significantly affected Bentian notions of
authority, particularly of political authority. I then turn to a discussion of the Bentian in
a more restrictively local setting, more precisely, to a description of Bentian subsistence
and residence and settlement patterns. This section primarily serves to familiarize the
reader with the Bentian’s local milieu and their general way of life, but it also (especially
the latter part on residence and settlement) provides an outline of their social
organization, thus offering essential information for the analytical chapters, especially the
one on kinship authority.
The three analytical chapters of this study (Chapters 3, 4, and 5) are based on the
threefold categorization of authorities discussed at the beginning of this introduction.
Chapter 3 considers “kinship authority,” a category which I define as “authority relevant
in and accruing from kinship relations.” Much of this chapter consists of the presentation
and analysis of an extended case study recounting the story of a young man who married
into the village which constituted my fieldwork base. The particular aim of the analysis,
and of the chapter as a whole, is to explore the strategical use of kinship ideology in
processes of authorization, but also to examine how kinship more generally
authoritatively affects people’s actions and life courses. Kinship ideology is a
fundamentally important local ideology governing the understanding and organization
of interpersonal relations. Chapter 3 is not only about kinship in a strict sense, however,
but it also contains some discussion of other forms of ideology regulating local
interpersonal relations, including such generally applicable principles or ideals as
reciprocity, sharing, respect, and autonomy. My understanding of kinship is broad, in line
with similarly broad Bentian conceptions of relatedness.
Chapter 4 deals with religious authority, a category that I define as  “authority
pertaining to or deriving from relations with so called supernatural agencies.” As this
definition indicates, the chapter is not only or primarily concerned with so called
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supernatural agencies, a concept under which I subsume various kinds of spirits, souls
and the ancestors, but with all forms of authoritative influence deriving from them,
directly or indirectly. Religious authority is exercised primarily by religious experts but
it is frequently employed or invoked also by ordinary people, for instance, when they
arrange rituals. The sources of religious authority consist, in addition to agencies, of
various notions, objects, and practices (especially rituals) which in one way or another
are associated with them. The aim of the chapter is to give an overview of all these
sources of religious authority as well as to examine how authority deriving from them is
constituted, employed and experienced. However, I will give principal attention to a
particular source of authority, namely, ritual, through which I will investigate all other
sources of religious authority, an approach motivated by my “action orientation,” and the
fact that it is principally in and through ritual that these sources are invoked and become
effective in Bentian society.
Chapter 5 considers “political authority,” a category which I define as “authority
exercised by or deriving from encompassing institutions concerned with the organization
of  supra-family concerns,” or as “secular authority deriving from beyond the sphere of
kinship.” This is a category which I conceive of as consisting principally of three
interconnected authorities/sources of authority: the manti, adat (customary law), and the
government, which together make up what I have labeled the “trinity of political
authority.” A major objective of Chapter 5 is to analyze how the importance of  manti,
adat, and government authority have varied during the course of history, in connection
with a process of generally increasing local and regional (and lately also national)
integration. A consistent topic in the chapter is the articulation of  “external authority”
with “internal authority.” The manti and adat form interesting case studies in this respect,
deriving their authority from both local and “foreign” sources. The problem of
marginality in relation to national and regional centers of the postcolonial state forms a
special subject of inquiry related to this topic, one which is important, among other
things, because it amounts to a stigma of “primitiveness” which profoundly affects  the
Bentian’s identity and relations with others. 
Description of Fieldwork
The fieldwork on which this study is based was conducted in two stages, from July
through December 1993, and between February 1996 and February 1997. My use of the
ethnographic present in this study primarily refers to the latter of these periods. Both
periods of fieldwork were carried out under the auspices of the Indonesian Institute of
Sciences (LIPI) and Universitas Indonesia (Jakarta), in co-operation with my partner
Isabell Herrmans, like myself a student of anthropology at the University of Helsinki.
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Most of the fieldwork was done among Bentians in the subdistrict (kecamatan) of
Bentian Besar of present-day West Kutai district (kabupaten) in the province of East
Kalimantan. A total time of about two months was spent among Bentians and other
Luangan groups in adjacent subdistricts of East and Central Kalimantan, more precisely,
those of Muara Pahu and Muara Lawa in West Kutai district, East Kalimantan, and those
of Gunung Purei and Teweh Timur in Barito Utara district, Central Kalimantan. A brief
visit to the fieldwork area was made also in August 1998 in connection with participation
in a conference in Palangkaraya, the capital of Central Kalimantan. Palangkaraya was
also visited in 1993 and 1996 for the purpose of investigating the administration of the
Hindu Kaharingan religion. I also spent some time in Samarinda, the capital of East
Kalimantan, and in Tenggarong, the capital of the Sultanate of Kutai, in order, among
other things, to investigate the Bentian’s downriver connections. In July 1994 I visited
Leiden for purposes of archival research.
The fieldwork carried out in 1993 was characterized by a regional approach
(motivated, in part, by my interest in ethnicity at that time). We stayed for shorter periods
in some fifteen villages in the above-mentioned districts, and no longer than a month in
any of them. During the 1996 fieldwork, on the other hand, we stayed for most of the
time in a small village of only some seventy inhabitants, accessible only by foot. There
we lived in a traditional unpartitioned lou (small longhouse), incorporated into the
household of the house owner, and in close proximity to several other local families who
moved in and out of the house, in between staying in their farmhouses. Almost all of our
research was conducted through participant observation and unstructured interviews
without the assistance of professional assistants. A substantial part of it consisted of
observation of, or took place during, ritual: more than one night in three involved
participation in rituals. Kaharingan ritual was notably also what had induced us to make
an anthropological study in south Borneo in the first place, and our interest in it
significantly shaped the character of our fieldwork also in some other important respects.
The desire to carry out fieldwork arose during a holiday trip to Kalimantan in 1991,
during which witnessing a Kaharingan curing ritual was a particularly influential
experience, and it was subsequently significantly fortified by the  reading of Joseph
Weinstock’s  article “Kaharingan: Life and Death in Southern Borneo” in Kipp’s and
Rodgers’ Indonesian Religions in Transition (1987). In 1992, when we made a one-
month trip to the upper Barito, Teweh and Bentian areas in order to identify a fieldwork
site, it was again the frequent ritual activity that we learned that characterized some
Luangans which occasioned us to settle for them rather than for the Ot Danum subgroups
that we also visited during the same trip. Finally, it was our interest in Kaharingan ritual,
and particularly that of Isabell who had made this the subject of her research, which
caused us to do most of our fieldwork in non-Christian Bentian villages. 
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Rituals and beliefs were notably also subjects which our informants were
comparatively comfortable with, while many other subjects were perceived as sensitive
and only reluctantly talked about. A general disinclination to address sensitive (and self-
evident)  topics in discourse and straightforwardly answer questions, combined with a
general social wariness and uneasiness, were, in our experience, conspicuous features of
local life which much contributed to our tendency to rely on participant observation
rather than any more formal methods. Information often simply had to be deduced from
practice. However, it seems that this was also to a remarkable extent how locals went
about learning things (including things religious such as cosmology) or were affected by
what happened in society. Much of what took place was not mediated by discourse (at
least not public discourse), and in many situations and areas of life no explicit or
explicable rules or script seemed to guide action. Rather, it seemed to us, things “just
happened,” or were brought about in some unscheduled way by the procession of events.
A principal experience — perhaps the principal experience — of our fieldwork was thus
that practice was important, both in the sense of determining the outcome of social life,
and as a source of information for the interpretation of social life — and this experience
has influenced my practice or action approach in this study as much as any prior or later
theoretical persuasions. On the other hand, also during our fieldwork there occurred fairly
frequent and rather conspicuous attempts to regulate this social “irregularity,” often by
rather structured means. It was here, as I later came to see it, that authority came into the
picture (and Bentian society became visible). For example, it was frequently as an aspect
of such attempts that kinship, ritual, and the government (or formal speeches), were
invoked. Thus, the importance of the sources of authority mentioned by Ma Putup in his
wedding speech was also brought home to us by practice, which was a principal  reason
why his speech appealed to me so much.
The fact that we mainly did fieldwork in Kaharingan communities has also affected
the representativeness of this study. The results apply primarily to upriver (Lawa) Bentian
communities, and particularly for the Kaharingan population in them, and they do not in
their entirety apply to all of the population in some downriver, predominantly Christian
communities where I have spent little time, and where lifestyles and value-orientations
seem to have changed significantly during the course of the last few decades. Stephanie
Fried’s (1995, 2003) account of the attempts by educated “Bentian authors” to defend
Bentian land rights, which is based on fieldwork in these communities, notably gives a
very different picture of the Bentian than this ethnography. Nevertheless, I do sometimes
talk about the Bentian in this study, and when I do so, I have usually meant to indicate
that the results are valid for all or most Bentians (although in some cases, which should
be apparent from the context, I refer more specifically  to the upriver or non-Christian
Bentians). When I talk about Bentians, on the other hand, in the indefinite plural form,
I do so in order to indicate that my information is, or may only be, valid for part of the
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Bentian. Frequently, I have abstained from talking about the Bentian, precisely in order
not to suggest a false generality of the observations discussed. An important lesson of the
“regional approach” which characterized much of my fieldwork was that one should be
careful in generalizing. Another benefit of this approach was that it enabled me to meet
a lot of people representing other Luangans than Bentians, thus providing me with an
opportunity to obtain valuable information on which I have largely relied in my
presentation of Luangan subgroups in Chapter 2. 
Where Indonesian terms appear, they are indicated with I. I have adopted standard
(modern) Indonesian spelling for Bentian words. One exception from this rule is that I
use double vowels to indicate long vowels (as in laang, “forest”). It should be noted that
I do not, with the exception of certain place and group names, indicate glottal stops,
which are profusely indicated in the unstandardized local writing (generally as q,
sometimes as k). I also do not distinguish between e as in English met and and e as in
English merge but render both sounds as e. My intention has been to give a comparatively
simple transcription of Bentian words and not indicate specific features where not
semantically significant.
      Joseph Weinstock's dissertation Kaharingan and the Luangan Dayaks (1983a) is perhaps the most12
important single work dealing with the Luangans as a whole. Other major works dealing with specific
Luangan subgroups in English are Stephanie Fried's dissertation on Bentian forestry and landright
conflicts (1995); two small books by Michael Hopes et al. (1996a, 1996b) on Benuaq traditional
religion and magic, and Christian Gönner’s (2001) book on Benuaq forestry. To my knowledge there
are almost no other publications in English on the Luangans or any Luangan subgroups, except for a
few articles by Fried (2000, 2003), Herrmans (2004), Massing (1982, 1983), Sillander (1995, 2002),
Weinstock (1983b, 1987), and two articles by Martinus Nanang (1988, n.d.). There is a little more
material in Indonesian, the accessibility of which is somewhat restricted. This material includes several 
Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri and other government reports of which at least one (Basrun
Gamas 1971) deals specifically with the Bentian, as well as a number of lower level university reports,
including a few University of Mulawarman publications on Bentian rattan cultivation (e.g. Budiono
1993; Mulya 1993). The greater part of these Indonesian reports consist of brief surveys, and all which
I have come across concern some specific Luangan subgroup(s), most frequently the Benuaq and the
Tunjung. Among the most substantial are Sarwoto Kertodipoero's book Kaharingan: Religi dan
Penghidupan di Pehuluan Kalimantan (1963) on the Dusun, L. Dyson's thesis Sistim dan Motivasi
Gotong Royong pada Sukubangsa Dayak Tunjung di Kabupaten Kutai (1979), and Yohannes Bonoh's
publication Belian Bawo (1984/85) on the Benuaq. A number of linguistic surveys of the Bawo,
Lawangan and Taboyan do also deserve notice (Morfologi dan Sintaksis Bahasa Lawangan 1992;
Morfologi dan Sintaksis Bahasa Tawoyan 1989; Struktur Bahasa Bawo 1989; Struktur Bahasa
Lawangan 1985; Struktur Bahasa Tawoyan 1992). Finally there is some Dutch (and German) material
from the colonial period. Most of this material consists of travel accounts or administrative reports of
government officials. As far as I know it does not include any major studies specifically concerned with
the Luangans or a Luangan subgroup. Among the most useful references for the Luangan in general are
Feuilletau de Bruyn (1934), Grabowsky (1888), Knappert (1905), Mallinckrodt (1974[1925], 1926,
1927, 1928), Schwaner (1854), and Te Wechel (1915). Of special interest for the Bentian is Knappert
(1905), Schwaner (1854) and an article by Witkamp (1928).
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2. The Bentian in an Ethnographic, Regional and Historical
Context
In this chapter I will present a general ethnographic account of the Bentian. I will also
briefly present the Bentian's neighbors, who, like most Bentians, recognize themselves
as belonging to the Luangan, a term designating a category of peoples who like the
Bentian have previously been poorly described.  Having provided a presentation of the12
Bentian and the Luangan, I then give an overview of regional history from early times up
until today, the aim of which is to place the Bentian in a larger, regional context, and to
describe the influence on them of precolonial, colonial and postcolonial governments.
After this historical overview I turn to a discussion of the Bentian's local milieu, more
precisely, to a description of their subsistence and settlement patterns. A principal aim
of this discussion is to provide an outline of Bentian social organization and its physical
foundations. Throughout the chapter I will give special attention to history and
geography. An underlying objective of the chapter is to demonstrate the importance of
history and geography for an understanding of authority among the Bentian, and to point
to their inseparability in a Bornean context, to the fact that the one cannot be accounted
for without consideration of the other.
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The Bentian: Location and Identity
In Borneo the so-called indigenous population (excluding the Chinese, Buginese, and
other, more or less recent immigrants) is commonly divided into two basic categories:
Malays and Dayaks, both of which are highly heterogenous, consisting of many different
subgroups. The Malays are — with a few exceptions — Malay-speaking Muslims who
mainly live along the coasts and the lower reaches of the larger rivers, and typically
subsist by fishing, trade, and wet rice cultivation. The Dayaks, on the other hand, are
mostly inland-dwelling dry rice cultivators who follow either Christianity or local
religions, and speak a large number of mutually unintelligible languages. Today, large
portions of both categories are occupied with wage labor, especially in the coastal cities,
but also in the interior, in the latter case often for logging and mining companies or on
plantations. Religious affiliation is the principal (and often only) marker distinguishing
Malays from Dayaks. For the Dayaks, adopting Islam is usually equivalent to becoming
Malay (masuk Melayu), and an unknown but large proportion of the Malays originated
as Dayaks, while the others presumably descended from Muslim or Hindu migrants from
Sumatra and Java (however, even those Malays who migrated to the island may in fact
ultimately originate from Borneo, according to current linguistic theory which places the
homeland of the “Malay language community” in Western Borneo: see e.g. Adelaar
1995; Collins 2001). Of a total Bornean population exceeding ten million (including
Indonesian Borneo, Malaysian Borneo, and Brunei), more than two thirds are Malays,
while only around two million are Dayaks. Most Dayak groups are small but there are
also some more populous groups, including the famous Iban in the northwest and the
Ngaju in the south, who both number over half a million.
The Bentian are a rather small group of Dayaks consisting of only 3000 to 3500
people. They are famous for their rattan which they cultivate as a cash-crop on their
swiddens in addition to rice and other subsistence crops. They live in a relatively remote
upriver area in the district (kabupaten) of West Kutai in the province of East Kalimantan
in Indonesian Borneo, close to the border with the province of Central Kalimantan, some
200-300 kilometers inland (see Map 1). Most Bentians live in the subdistrict (kecamatan)
of Bentian Besar, or “Great Bentian,” and their present-day self-identity is closely
connected to this fact. All in all, there are twelve villages with a Bentian majority, seven
of which are located within Bentian Besar (Dilang Puti, Suakong, Jelmu Sibak,
Sembulan, Sambung, Tende, Randa Empas, Tukuq) while three are situated in the
neighboring subdistrict of Muara Pahu (Penawang, Lendian, Kendisik). One village
(Tambaba) is located on the other side of the provincial border in Central Kalimantan,
in the subdistrict of Gunung Purei, which is part of Barito Utara district. However, this
village's inhabitants also used to live in what is now East Kalimantan and Bentian Besar
before they moved to their present location about a century ago. In addition to these 
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Map 1. The Bentian Area
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villages, there are minorities of Bentians living in a few other villages, most notably in
Benangin, a large village on the middle reaches of the Teweh River in Central
Kalimantan, and in Penarung, the only village with a non-Bentian (Benuaq) majority
within Bentian Besar, located downstream from Dilang Puti, the subdistrict capital. The
population in the Bentian villages varies from about seventy to seven hundred
inhabitants, who are rarely present in the villages all at once because of the dual type of
residence that most of them practice, spending a large part of the year on their swidden
fields.
The population density of Bentian Besar and adjacent subdistricts is very low. Bentian
Besar (1466 km , with a population of less than 3500 people) has only slightly over 22
inhabitants per square kilometer which makes it the subdistrict which had the lowest
population density of all subdistricts which were part of the district of Kutai before it was
subdivided into several smaller districts in 1999. In many respects Bentian Besar has
been a rather underdeveloped subdistrict, as has also the part of the subdistrict of Muara
Pahu where the other East Kalimantan Bentian villages are located. In government
statistics from the 1990s, many forms of information which were documented for other
Kutai subdistricts were lacking for Bentian Besar. At the time of my fieldwork, Bentian
Besar was also the only subdistrict in Kutai which did not yet have a government health
center (puskesmas), and throughout the 1990s the primary schools (SD) of several
villages were periodically closed as a result of a shortage of teachers willing to work in
the area. Few Bentians have an education above the six year primary school (to attend
secondary school, or SMP, children must move to the downstream center of Muara Lawa
in a neighboring subdistrict). Those who do mostly come from Dilang Puti (Bentian
Besar's subdistrict capital) or neighboring Suakong, a large, early Christianized village,
and have often left the area and moved to the coastal cities of Tenggarong or Samarinda.
Roads to most Bentian villages were only established in the 1990s, a fact which becomes
more significant if we consider that most rivers in the area are very shallow, and with the
exception of the lower half of the Lawa do not permit transportation by river. Electricity
was still lacking in most villages in the 1990s although at least one house in every village
had an individually owned gasoline fueled generator. Important changes nevertheless
affected the Bentian area in the 1980s and 1990s, which saw the coming of several
logging companies based or operating in the area, and the establishment, in 1995, of a
large transmigration site, housing 250 families, in the midst of Bentian Besar. Internal
transport in the area is nevertheless still difficult and restricted, and many villages in
Bentian Besar have little contact with the subdistrict capital (or the transmigration site),
and communicate more frequently with other centers outside the area.
All villages in Bentian Besar are located along the Lawa River, a tributary of the Pahu
River, which in its turn is a branch of the Mahakam, one of the largest rivers on the
island, and the main line of transportation in Kutai, connecting (through public river boat
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traffic) the interior with Tenggarong, the former district capital and residency of the
Sultan of Kutai, and Samarinda, the provincial capital of East Kalimantan, located in the
river delta at the mouth of the Mahakam (see Map 2). Those Bentian villages which
belong to the subdistrict of Muara Pahu are situated on the upper reaches of the Tuang
and Kelawit rivers, which, like the Lawa, are tributaries of the Pahu. Among Bentians as
well as among downriver Dayaks and Malays, the name Bentian is often used as a
designation for the Dayaks who live on the upper or uppermost reaches of the Lawa,
Tuang and Kelawit rivers, upstream from their downriver Benuaq Dayak neighbors. This
area may also be regarded as the Bentian homeland, as the Bentian (or at least most of
them) have been living there for as long as they remember. Sometimes, however, the
Bentian area is more narrowly defined as consisting only of the upper Lawa River basin,
a result of the fact that the Bentian Besar district, since it was established in the early
1960s, only covers this area.
The one Bentian village (Tambaba) which is situated in the province of Central
Kalimantan is located on the Kias River, a tributary of the Teweh River which, in its turn,
is an important branch of the Barito, the largest river in south Borneo. This village is thus
located on the other side of the watershed separating the Barito River system from the
Mahakam River system. Although the Bentian homeland is part of the latter river system,
the Bentian have long had frequent contacts with their neighbors on the other side of the
watershed and many of them do in fact consider themselves as having more in common
with their Dayak neighbors on the Teweh River than with their downriver Benuaq Dayak
neighbors in Kutai, even though Indonesian and western scholars, following widespread
Benuaq opinion, often have classified the Bentian as a Benuaq subgroup (e.g. Massing
1983:85). The perceived closeness between the Bentian and their Teweh River Dayak
neighbors is largely due to the short distance from the Bentian area to the Teweh River
(a day’s walk from the upper Lawa villages), but it is also related to the fact that
Bentians, like other Luangans, locate their ancestral homeland in the upper Teweh River
area.
Unlike most Dayaks, the Bentian do not conceive of themselves as a riverine people.
As among Bornean inhabitants in general, the upriver-downriver distinction nevertheless
provides the main principle of geographical orientation. The Bentian thus primarily
identify themselves as an upriver (daye) people, and they do so both in a wider
geographical context, in distinction to coastal peoples and peoples from the Barito and
Mahakam regions, and in a more restricted local setting, when distinguishing themselves
from their closest neighbors, the downriver Benuaq, and the Teweh River Luangan.
However, Bentians also sometimes distinguish themselves from these Dayak neighbors
by pointing out that the latter are “riverine people” (orang pantai, I.), while they
themselves are “inland people” (orang darat, I.). In addition, they also occasionally refer
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to themselves as a hill (bawo) people, a designation which points to the fact that transport
in their area was, and still is, mainly by foot. 
If asked about why they call themselves “the Bentian,” present-day Bentians usually
say that it is because they live in (or originate from) the Bentian Besar subdistrict. Lawa
River Bentians frequently define the Bentian as the people who live in Bentian Besar,
thus excluding Central Kalimantan Bentians and the Bentian of the Tuang and the
Kelawit rivers, but including the Benuaq who live within Bentian Besar. Another typical
answer is that the word “Bentian” signifies Dayaks who live on the uppermost reaches
of rivers (specified, if required, as the upper Lawa, Tuang and Kelawit rivers). Following
this line of reasoning, the ethnonym “Bentian,” like the great majority of Dayak group
names, may be seen as a local identity label (Babcock 1974:196; King 1988:238).
However, although closely connected with a particular locality, the word “Bentian” is not
derived from a specific toponym: there is no river or other landscape feature in the
Bentian's territory which carries the name “Bentian.” Before the subdistrict of Bentian
Besar was established, the ethnonym “Bentian” was only loosely associated with a
somewhat loosely demarcated inland area. The presence of certain mountains containing
caves in and near this area is, however, a matter of some significance for Bentian notions
of how identity and locality are connected. 
The name “Bentian” is also ascribed to a small and colorful bird (Erythura Prasina,
the Longtailed Munia), which purportedly lives in caves or crevices of some of the
mountains in the area. Normally not seen, this enigmatic bird sometimes invades Bentian
rice fields in great numbers at the time of the harvest (or more rarely, after planting). It
is also reported as one of the most dreaded pests of rice in other upland areas of Borneo
(see Smythies 1960:51,492-93, for the Kinabalu and Kelabit regions, and Tsing
1984:183,188-89, for the Meratus mountains), but it appears to have a rather localized
distribution, and the Bentian treat it as emblematic of their own area. However, Bentians
usually deny that the ethnonym is taken from the name of the bird (such a connection is
perceived as implying primitiveness), instead claiming that bird and people share the
same name because both live in the same area. The Bentian's relation to the bird is
nevertheless important, and it is elaborated in the special way in which they collectively
plant rice: long chains of men holding dibbling sticks followed by women scattering rice
seeds, covering the rice fields by moving in widely winding, interlocking circuits,
mimetically representing swarms of Bentian birds flying over the ripe rice fields, a
custom signified by the verb mementian, which is derived from the root word “Bentian”
(see Plate 19).
Interestingly, not all Bentians practice this custom, which is rather recent in many of
the communities where it is performed. It is said that a hundred years ago it was only the
people in a few upriver Bentian communities who planted rice in this way, while most
Bentians did so in the “ordinary” way, by walking in straight rows, back and forth along
      See particularly his map of the Barito region which extends to the Bentian area in Kutai. 13
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the lengths of the rice fields. The people who then planted rice in this way were the Bia,
Rana and Merayo communities of the upper Lawa. Significantly, these communities were
also collectively known as “the Bentian,” in contrast to the other communities in the
Bentian Besar area who were known by other designations and did not yet recognize
“Bentian” as a name for themselves. C.A.L.M. Schwaner's (1853) use of the term (based
on information that he obtained during his travels during 1843-1848) conforms to this
usage.  Until sometime in the early or mid-twentieth century, the ethnonym “Bentian”13
was also, according to informants, predominantly used with specific reference to these
communities. However, informants also said that they had started to employ the term in
a wider sense before that, more precisely, when traveling downstream to Tenggarong to
pay tribute to the Sultan of Kutai, even though they did not until recently use it in this
sense among themselves.
According to little-known information recorded by Stephanie Fried (1995:90), it was,
in fact, one of the sultans of Kutai who introduced the term “Bentian” as a designation
with a wider application, in a year when leaders from several communities in the Bentian
Besar area who visited him all reported that their rice fields had been attacked by the
Bentian bird. The Sultan then announced that “from now on your name will be Bentian,
since your place of residence is the bentian cave area” (Fried 1995:90). This event
possibly occurred sometime in the early nineteenth century, in a period when trade in the
region significantly increased and the first remembered Bentian contacts with the
sultanate were made (see below). The first documentation in the literature of use of the
term in this sense is probably assistant resident Dewall's report on Kutai which mentions
the “Bentican” (sic) (1849:84,132,133). Despite this usage, however, the term did not
gain any widespread local popularity before sometime in the mid-twentieth century.
When Europeans visited Dilang Puti, the present-day subdistrict capital, in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the people there were not described as Bentians,
but as unspecified Dayaks or “Benuaq” (see Bock [1881]:141-45; Knappert 1905:623-25;
Witkamp 1928:421-22). These observations correspond to what is remembered by the
village's inhabitants today, who claim that they indeed were not Bentians before very
recently. This fact is especially notable since these Bentians, due to the accessibility and
status of the subdistrict capital, have long been in a position in which they frequently
represent the Bentian and “Bentian-ness” to visiting outsiders. 
At the same time, however, the Kutai administration had (at least from the early
twentieth century) started to use the term “Bentian Besar” as a designation for an “area”
(wilayah) under its jurisdiction, an area which roughly corresponds to the present-day
subdistrict and in which local leaders receiving titles from the sultan were explicitly
      It is possible that it was as a result of Dutch influence, more specifically, a number of14
administrative reforms introduced after 1900, that a wilayah named Bentian Besar was first
established. However, the area may well have been attributed such status by the Kutai administration
before that, as it seems that the sultan was using the ethnonym Bentian in what I have called the wider
sense already in the nineteenth century. Further investigation would be required to resolve this issue.
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assigned to govern according to the letters which authenticated these titles.  Assumingly14
it was this exonymic usage of the term “Bentian” which gave rise to the remembered
early Bentian use of the term in the wider sense during downriver tributary visits. Thus
it seems that it was through external influence resulting from increasing regional
integration that a more general identification with the term gradually developed, an
assumption given further support by the more recently developing importance of a
general Bentian identity which has followed the establishment of the subdistrict of
Bentian Besar in the postcolonial period. Nevertheless, even today identification with the
term is still remarkably weak in many Bentian communities (such as Dilang Puti), and
traces of the original usage may be seen in that the upper Lawa Bentian are regarded by
themselves and others as the “real” or “original Bentian” (Bentian asli I., Bentian asar).
In addition, these Bentian communities are occasionally looked to as a model for
“Bentian-ness” by other Bentians, as in the case of mementian, the rice-planting custom,
even though the other Bentians are generally disinclined to identify with the upper Lawa
Bentians on account of the fact that they practice polyandry, leave their numerous water
buffaloes untied, and generally lead a relatively unmodernized, and hence stigmatized
life, considered to bring disrepute on the group as a whole. It is perhaps not entirely by
coincidence that the practice of mementian has spread in a manner roughly paralleling the
increasing importance of Bentian identity, even though the appeal of this custom also
derives from other qualities than from its capacity to function as a marker of Bentian-
ness, which is demonstrated by the fact that it has been adopted not only by Bentians, but
also by their neighbors on the upper half of the Teweh River. The custom of mementian
augments Bentian self-identity, and even if it is not yet regularly practiced in all Bentian
communities, a tendency to exaggerate the actual extent to which it is performed points
to its perceived symbolic value, which is enhanced by present-day Indonesian cultural
politics stressing the importance of objectified cultural tradition as an emblem of ethnic
identity.
The Luangan Category 
Like their Dayak neighbors, Bentians occasionally use the term “Luangan” as an
ethnonym. Together with these neighbors and a number of other, linguistically and
culturally related Dayak groups, the Bentians have also been classified by scholars as 
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Map 2. Southeast Borneo
      For approximate population figures for different Luangan subgroups in the late 1970s, see15
Weinstock (1983a:198-226). It is difficult to give more than very rough estimates for the population
numbers of the various Luangan subgroups or the Luangan as a whole as ethnic affiliation (suku) is
not specified in censuses. Moreover, intermarriage within the Luangan category and with other
groups, as well as a widespread indifference toward questions of ethnicity, makes ethnic
identification a rather unclear matter for many Luangans.
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belonging to an ethnic category labelled “Luangan” (Weinstock 1983a:198-226), or
“Lawangan” (Mallinckrodt 1927:579-85, 1928:28-30; Riwut 1958:220-221). This
category, which comprises a large number of people (more than 100,000, if all potential
candidates for subgroups are included) is distributed over a vast territory of around a
quarter of a million square kilometers.  Still, the Luangan, or at least the Luangan15
concept, is rather poorly known. Here I will provide a presentation of this somewhat
elusive category: Who are they, and what does it mean to be a Luangan for them? As
virtually all Luangans have been poorly studied, I will also briefly describe the Luangan
subgroups, using, unless otherwise stated, information that I have obtained during my
fieldwork.
The Luangan live in an area located between two of the major rivers of Borneo —
east of the middle reaches of the Barito, and south of the middle Mahakam (see Map 2).
The number of the groups seen as belonging to the category varies with the scholars who
have classified them, as does the degree to which the members of these groups recognize
Luangan identity. In some instances, the boundary between the subgroups or that with
other groups is also diffuse, and many individuals have multiple identities. Despite
considerable dialect variation, most Luangans speak closely related languages which,
with a few exceptions, are included in what Hudson (1967a) calls the “northeastern
division of the Barito language family.” As an example, we may note that the languages
of the Bentian and their closest Luangan neighbors, the Benuaq and the Teweh River
Luangans, are mutually intelligible, whereas the languages of the geographically most
distant Luangan subgroups (e.g. Dusuns, downriver Pasirese, Tunjung) are quite
incomprehensible to Bentians if they have no prior knowledge of them (which they quite
often have, however).
The Luangan Subgroups
Three attempts at comprehensive classification of the Luangan subgroups exist in the
literature: that of the Dutch colonial officer Jacob Mallinckrodt (1927:579-85, 1928:28-
30), who attempted to codify the adat (customary law) of the Dayaks of southeast
Borneo, that of the province of Central Kalimantan's famous Dayak governor, Tjilik
Riwut (1958:220-221), which can be seen as an extended version of Mallinckrodt's work,
      Weinstock (1983a:228), noting Mallinckrodt's inclusion of this group in his Lawangan category,16
also mentions the Bukit of South Kalimantan, the people studied and labelled Meratus by Anna Tsing
(1984,1993). He notes, however, that they should not really, on the basis of linguistic and cultural
evidence, be counted among the Luangan. Bawo Dayaks with whom I have spoken regard the Bukit as
different from themselves despite similarities in social organization and habitat. According to Tsing
(1984:40), the Meratus language is closely related to Banjar Malay, although it seems to me that there
is a sufficient amount of Luangan-related words in the language to postulate either a Luangan (or
possibly Maanyan) substratum, or extensive borrowing. Mallinckrodt (1927:584) regarded the Bukits of
the Tabalong area (who in fact identify as Bawo and speak a Luangan isolect) as remaining in their
original state, not having lost their original dialects and become influenced by the Malays like the
others. Dewall (1850:484) and Tsing (1984:22, following Ismail et al. 1977:10) have suggested that
there is a possibility that the Bukit might have originated as Banjar Malays, that is, that they have
adopted Dayak life-style and language influences, rather than the other way around.
      This group occupies the area of the upper Tabalong river (a tributary of the lower Barito) in17
South Kalimantan. According to my information and that of Mallinckrodt (1927:584), there are also
Bawo Dayaks living in the same area. It is possible that these Bawo and the group referred to as
Dusun Dayeh by Weinstock are actually one and the same group (or then there may be two groups
living in the same area). At any rate it seems that this Dusun category is different from the other
Luangan Dusuns in several, including locational and linguistic,  respects (cf. Weinstock 1983a:226). 
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and that of the American anthropologist Joseph Weinstock (1983a:198-226), who did
fieldwork in the upper Teweh area in 1979-81. 
Mallinckrodt was probably, as Weinstock (1983a:78-79) has pointed out, the first to
define Luangan as a tribal entity; he listed 21 subgroups in what he called the
Stammengroep der Lawangan. The classification of Weinstock includes a much smaller
number of subgroups, but by putting these together we arrive at a totality fairly closely
corresponding to the totality represented by Mallinckrodt's Lawangan concept (the main
difference between the classifications is that Mallinckrodt also lists what we could call
subdivisions of the subgroups mentioned by Weinstock). The terms “Luangan” and
“Lawangan” can also be regarded as nearly equivalent; if pronounced, the difference
between them almost disappears. So as not to make my presentation of the Luangan
unduly complicated, I will here only deal with Weinstock’s classification, even if it could
be argued that a more detailed classification would more faithfully conform to autonymic
usages. It includes the following subgroups: Tunjung, Benuaq, Bentian, Purei, Taboyan,
Pahu, Pasir, Bawo, Paku-Kerau (Lawangan), Malang, Bayan, Dusun Tengah, Dusun
Hilir, Dusun Dayeh.  I have indicated the approximate locations of most of these16
subgroups (and of some other southern Borneo Dayaks) on Map 2.
With the possible exception of the Dusun Dayeh,  the five last-mentioned Luangan17
subgroups are all so-called Dusun groups who live on the eastern banks of the Barito, and
it should be mentioning that they themselves and most Luangans distinguish them from
other Luangans. According to my knowledge there does, in fact, not exist any indigenous
classifications lumping together the Dusun with the other groups mentioned here. They
were also treated as a separate tribal group by Mallinckrodt (1927:585, 1928:30) on
precisely these grounds (even if he did also remark that they are really part of the
      Despite distinguishing themselves from the Malays and speaking a Luangan dialect, however, it18
appears that the Pasir Muslims do not identify as Luangans (Weinstock 1983a:201).
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Luangan, in terms of their beliefs regarding the afterworld, for instance). According to
Alfred Hudson (1967a), who conducted a lexico-statistical study of the peoples of south
Borneo, the Dusun are linguistically intermediate between the Luangan and the Ma'anyan
to the south. In comparison with the other Luangans, they have lived in nucleated villages
since long ago and they have not built any larger extended family houses for a long time,
and possibly never any longhouses.
“Paku-Karau” is a designation coined by Weinstock for a subgroup who live on the
Karau and Ayuh tributaries of the middle Barito. This group is better known as, and call
themselves, “Lawangan” (or “Lowangan”), and thus uses as an autonym the same term
that Mallinckrodt applied for the whole tribal group. It was probably also from the name
of this group that Mallinckrodt obtained the term for the larger category and much of his
information on the Lawangans actually regards this specific subgroup. Today the
Lawangan live intermixed with Ma'anyan settlers. Linguistically they are fairly closely
related to the Bentian, the Benuaq, some of the Bawo groups, and the people who
Weinstock refers to as “Taboyan” and “Purei”; together these groups may also be
regarded as forming the linguistic and geographical core of the Luangan.
“Bawo” is an ethnonym used by or for several different Luangan groups who have in
common residence in hilly, upriver territory (usually lacking navigable rivers), and a
rather loose social organization, characterized by more or less strongly persisting
residence in dispersed swidden houses and a weakly institutionalized hierarchy. Most of
these groups are, or used to be, regarded as primitive (primitif, I.) or backward
(terbelakang, I.) by their downstream Dayak and Malay neighbors. Many of them have
now become Muslims and some have been resettled by the Indonesian government.
Weinstock mentions only the Bawo of the upper Ayuh (a tributary of the middle Barito
region) but groups to which the term “Bawo” has been applied also live, or until recently
lived, in the following locations: the upper Tabalong (a lower Barito tributary), the upper
Bongan (a tributary of the Mahakam), and the upper Teweh and its tributary the Luang.
In addition, several upriver locations in the Pasir region should also be mentioned,
although the Bawo group occupying them is somewhat different linguistically from the
others, speaking a dialect more related to the Pasir language which is a relatively distinct
Luangan isolect. Weinstock applied the term “Pasir” to all Pasirese, a population
including the Bawo of Pasir, but also other downriver Pasirese, some of whom founded
the Pasir Sultanate. The great majority of these Pasirese (including the Bawo) are Muslim
today, but they have retained their Luangan-related language and to some extent regard
themselves as different from the Malays.18
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The term “Taboyan” Weinstock employed for the Luangan Dayaks who occupy the
Teweh and Montalat tributaries of the Barito. According to my information and historical
references (e.g. Schwaner 1853; Engelhard 1901; Mallinckrodt 1927,1928) this term used
to be recognized as an ethnonym only by the Luangans on the lower Teweh (downstrem
of Benangin) and the Montalat but not by the Bentian's neighbors on the upper Teweh
who even now do not commonly use this term. Like some other Luangans, the latter only
recognize more restrictive collective identities, which is the case also with the Purei, the
population of a single village on the Kias tributary of the upper Teweh, who Weinstock
(1983a:209), like Mallinckrodt (1928:29) before him, singled out as a distinct Luangan
subgroup. Both the Purei and the other Luangans of the upper half of the Teweh are very
similar to the Bentian in most respects. Indeed these people and the Bentian share a
consciousness of kind (strengthened by intermarriage), and even if they do not differ
much from the Taboyan of the lower Teweh in either linguistic or cultural terms, they do
conceive of a line of separation between themselves and the latter, who may be regarded
as intermediate in such terms between them and the Lawangans further south. The
Bentian and the upper Teweh Luangans have in common an upriver residence and a
comparatively dispersed settlement pattern not unlike that of the Bawo Dayaks, different
mainly in that they, in distinction to the latter, built extended family houses (lou) which,
particularly among the Bentian, sometimes took the form of small longhouses (Sillander
2002). The Bentian differ from their upper Teweh River neighbors mainly on account of
this fact, and with regards to some minor aspects of adat (custom) and culture reflecting
primarily a lesser degree of modernizing influence. The upper Teweh Luangan are
remarkable in that they are the least Christianized of all Luangans. As already indicated,
they also occupy the inner geographical center of the Luangan area, an area which
represents the landscape of Luangan mythology.
The Benuaq are the Bentian's downriver neighbors in Kutai and I will frequently have
opportunity to refer to them. They live on the Pahu River and its tributaries and on the
Bongan and Ohong river systems. In comparison with the Bentian, the Benuaq developed
a higher degree of stratification in preindependence days (this seems to be true also of the
Lawangan, who, like the Benuaq, usually occupy navigable rivers and locations more
accessible from the coast than those inhabited by the Bentian). The Benuaq also more
frequently built partitioned longhouses, some of which were comparatively large. These
and other minor differences (e.g. linguistic) distinguishing the Benuaq from the Bentian
reflect the Benuaq's location at the periphery of Luangan territory and their relative
proximity to the culturally distinct Central Borneo Dayaks, especially the Tunjung. The
Benuaq are actually a rather heterogenous Luangan subgroup in and by themselves.
According to oral history, some of them originated from the Teweh River area, whereas
another part is said to have originated in Kutai, according to some informants on the
lower Mahakam. It seems that identification with the Benuaq ethnonym also used to be
      Examples of such groups are the Daya of the upper Nyewatan and the Ohong of the river with19
the same name. In fact there are generally no Benuaq at the headwaters of the rivers that they occupy;
here we instead find, or at least used to find, other Luangan groups such as the Daya (Nyewatan), the
Bentian (Lawa, Tuang, Kelawit), and the Bawo (Bongan Kiri) and Luwangan (Bongan Kanan). This
is a situation which intrigued me, but for which I could elicit no interpretation from informants.
However, the word benua (or cognates) is a term used in Luangan and other Austronesian languages
to signify a village or territory (Fox 1993:12). I surmise that the ethnonym “Benuaq” may have had
some connection with the process of settling down in villages which began there in the nineteenth
century. For a period, this process entailed a situation in which the people at the lower and middle
reaches of some rivers became “village people,” while those at the upper reaches retained a more
dispersed swidden settlement. This could have motivated a conceptual distinction between the former
and the latter which would explain some aspects of the described ethnic distribution on these rivers. 
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much less extensive in the past, and that only membership in more restrictive local
groups was recognized. There are still groups within the area demarcated as the Benuaq
area by scholars who locals normally distinguish from the Benuaq and refer to with other,
more localized terms.  19
The Tunjung, who refer to themselves as “Tonyoi,” live on the middle Mahakam in
and around an area known as the Tunjung plateau. Their language is clearly different
from the other Luangan subgroups and apparently only distantly related. It is mainly in
interaction with the Tunjung that the Benuaq have adopted some central Bornean cultural
traits. However, the Tunjung have possibly been more influenced by the Benuaq than
vice versa. The Tunjung have adopted strong Luangan linguistic and cultural
characteristics. Perhaps most significantly, they have taken up Kaharingan ritual practices
and eschatological beliefs and it was on this basis that Weinstock included the Tunjung
in the Luangan category, even if they otherwise are quite different. Like the Benuaq, the
Tunjung are also internally heterogenous and it appears that they constitute an
amalgamation of two subgroups with separate origins (Knappert 1905:592). Another
interesting characteristic of the Tunjung which I will address later is that they maintained
close contacts with the Kutai sultanate. Some of their leaders were evidently Islamized
and they seem to have constituted something of a small sultanate in their own right
(Weinstock 1983a:126). This is true also of the last of the Luangan subgroups listed by
Weinstock, the Pahu of the area of the mouth of the Pahu River (see Map 2). Like the
Tunjung and some of the Benuaq, this group might also have originated in Kutai. It is
disputable, however, to what extent that we can still speak of “a group” in this case
because the Pahu are today Muslims who have become extensively assimilated by their
Kutai Malay neighbors. However, the Pahu were originally Dayaks who lived in
longhouses and spoke a Luangan related language up to the nineteenth century during
which they progressively became Islamized and adopted Malay identity and the Kutai
Malay dialect (see Dalton [1831a]:E4; Tromp 1889:278; Kumpulan 1979:253-55;
Weinstock 1983a:91).
      The Ot Danum and some Luangans who live close to the central Borneo cultural area built20
longhouses more frequently than the other Barito family Dayaks. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century,
massive longhouses surrounded by fortresses (benteng) were apparently  occasionally built (for
purposes of defense) also by many other Barito family Dayaks (see Knapen 2001:85-86; de Roy
1706:124; Müller 1857:226; Schwaner 1853:219, 1896:cxc-cxci; Weddik 1851:22).
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Luangan Identity and Origins
I have now presented the Luangan subgroups and briefly commented on what
distinguishes them from each other. Now we shall have a look at what unites them, apart
from the linguistic similarities to which I have already alluded. First of all, we should
perhaps note that the Luangan are not very different from the other major Dayak groups
of south Borneo, that is, the Ngaju, Ma'anyan and Ot Danum. In fact, together these four
groups make up the Barito language family described by Hudson (1967a) and besides
linguistic similarities there are also strong cultural affinities linking them and setting
them apart from other Dayaks. Foremost among these cultural affinities are religious
beliefs and adherence to the now officially recognized Hindu Kaharingan religion, a
central characteristic of which is secondary mortuary rituals. Other important features
which most of these Dayak groups have in common is their comparatively dispersed
settlement pattern, and the fact that they seldom built longhouses.  20
It is difficult to distinguish the Luangan from the other Barito family Dayaks on the
basis of objective linguistic or cultural criteria. Most Luangan characteristics are either
shared with these Dayaks or do not apply to the Luangan as a whole. Moreover, those
Luangans who live at the peripheries of the Luangan territory are sometimes more similar
to their non-Luangan neighbors than to many of the Luangans, culturally as well as
linguistically. On top of that, subjective criteria are equally unsatisfactory, as Luangan
identity is generally very weak and unexpressed among most Luangan subgroups. In fact
(and contrary to what one could be led to believe by Weinstock's ethnography), the term
“Luangan” is not even known by many of their members. The level of “tribal group
consciousness” is, in other words, very low among the Luangans, and identification with
more local categories such as the subgroup or more inclusive and general categories such
as Dayak or Indonesian, is much more common. What then allows us to talk about a
Luangan category?
According to Weinstock, the one thing which distinguishes the Luangans from the
other Dayaks of southern Borneo is their origin. When he replaced the term “Lawangan”
of Mallinckrodt with “Luangan,” his justification for this was, first, his finding that the
Luangans themselves use this term, and second, that they do so because they originated
from the river Luang, a tributary of the upper Teweh (1983a:viii,72-77). Weinstock found
evidence for his hypothesis of the common origin of the Luangan subgroups not only in
the fact that many of them look to the upper Teweh area as their ancestral homeland, but
      These groups include part of the Benuaq and the Lawangan. Some Bawos who subsequently21
moved to Pasir and the Tabalong area also used to live on the upper Teweh. 
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also in that they believe that the liau, one of the two souls of the dead, resides on Gunung
Lumut, a mountain in the vicinity of Sungai Luang. On gombok and kwangkai secondary
mortuary rituals, death shamans (warah, pengewarah) symbolically guide liau to Gunung
Lumut along real routes in this world. According to Weinstock, these routes are actually
reverse versions of those along which the different Luangan subgroups once migrated
from their original homeland to where they live now (1983a:73).
This hypothesis of Weinstock's is fascinating, but it is not confirmed by the
information that I have collected on migrations of Luangan subgroups. Routes of
migrations are usually much more circuitous and diverse than the routes to Mount Lumut
described in the chants of the death shamans (which tend to be as short and straight as
possible), and in some cases they deviate considerably from them. However, Weinstock's
assertion that Luangans look to the upper Teweh area as their ancestral homeland is not
incorrect, even if this does not necessarily mean, as I will argue, that they all originated
from this area. Most, if not all Luangans (including the Bentian), do actually postulate an
early origin from this area. However, only some actually claim to remember having
migrated from there in historical time.  The area in question is looked to as an ancestral21
homeland primarily because it was there that the protagonists of a particular corpus of
myths used to live. As I see it, it is this mythology, shared to a greater or lesser extent by
all Luangans, along with aspects of a religious tradition intimately bound up with it, that
provides the foundation of Luangan identity, rather than the fact or assumption of a
common origin from a specific location.
Adherence to the Kaharingan religion, and more particularly the traditional Luangan
version of Kaharingan, was also one of the principal criteria for Luangan identity
proposed by Weinstock (1983a:81-82). In fact he regarded this criteria as sufficient,
although not as critical for Luangan identity (Christian Luangans are also Luangans, in
his view). He illustrated his case with the Tunjung, who, as we know, are different from
the rest of the Luangan subgroups in terms of language and origin, but who nevertheless
consider themselves Luangans because they have adopted Luangan religious practices
and beliefs, including secondary mortuary rituals and the notion of Mount Lumut as the
final abode of the liau (1983a:82,85-87,198). What this shows, in my view, is that the
concept of “Luangan” is primarily a concept signifying identity with a religious tradition
rather than being an ethnonym, in the strict sense of the term. In any case, the Luangan
are certainly not an ethnic group, and it is doubtful even whether they qualify as an ethnic
category. Sociologically speaking, the Luangan are an aggregate of a large number of
widely dispersed local groups, which are not integrated within any over-reaching system
of regional organization, and whose members only vaguely conceive of themselves as a
      By “the central parts of the Luangan area” or “the central Luangan area” I intentionally refer to22
a somewhat imprecise referent, an area whose outer boundaries toward the peripheries are vague and
may vary somewhat in the different contexts in which I apply the concepts. Usually this area
comprises more or less of the upper reaches of those (or most of those) rivers whose headwaters
“meet” in the border area between Central and East Kalimantan (see Map 2). However, sometimes
(particularly when referring to Luangan mythology) I use these designations more restrictively to
what forms the approximate geographical and absolute cultural center within this area, that is, the
upper Teweh (and, to a lesser degree, the upper Telakei).
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totality distinct from other Dayaks. While it may be possible that most of these groups
share a common origin, it is normally not this aspect of commonality which is invoked
when the term is used. Instead, the possession of various attributes of religious identity
such as eating pork (an important marker of non-Muslim identity throughout Borneo),
the performance of a type of curing and thanksgiving/supplication rituals known as belian
luangan, and the carrying out of Luangan eschatological practices is what is implied by
the term “Luangan.”
The concept of Luangan seems to be primarily associated with a religious tradition
in its turn associated with the Luangans in the central parts of the Luangan area, or more
particularly, the upper Teweh area.  Except as the location of Luangan mythology, this22
somewhat vaguely demarcated area is also regarded as the area from where the Luangan
form of Kaharingan originated. It is a center of religious tradition, the importance of
which reaches beyond the Luangan. As an expression of its importance in this respect we
can regard the fact that the language of Luangan rituals closely resembles the Luangan
isolect spoken in the upper Teweh area. This, and not the respective local language, is the
one used by, for instance, Benuaq, Tunjung or Dusun shamans when they perform rituals,
and the same language is also employed as a ritual language among the Ma'anyans on the
lower Barito (Weinstock 1983a:41). Interestingly, the Ma'anyan also share some elements
of Luangan mythology located to the central Luangan area, despite the fact that they
claim a different origin from the Luangan, tracing their origin place to the Hulu Sungai
area of South Kalimantan (Hudson 1967b:15).
Exactly what in this central Luangan religious tradition has made it so popular as to
spread even beyond Luangan speakers is a complex question to which there appears to
be no simple answer. There is, however, one factor — we could perhaps call it a
geographical condition — which may explain the appeal of locating an ultimate origin
and ancestral mythology at the central parts of the Luangan territory. I suggest that this
area could have been attributed some of its significance because of the fact, recognized
also by Luangans, that there are a large number of important rivers — the Teweh,
Montalat, Ayuh, Karau, Tabalong, Kendilo, Telakei, Kelawit, Tuang, and Lawa — which
all have their headwaters there, and which run outward in all cardinal directions, toward
the Barito, toward the Mahakam, and toward the coast in Pasir, on the way cutting
through the whole of the Luangan territory, in the manner of the veins of a leaf (see map
      Weinstock erroneously refers to this place, of which he also provides a map, as “Neten Pali”23
(1983a:42,72). According to all my informants (Bentians and Teweh River Luangans), Neten Pali is
unambiguously the name of the first ancestral village in Luangan mythology, said to be located at the
headwaters of the Telakei River, in the interior of Pasir (its more precise location, which is haunted
by ancestral spirits, is actually between the heads of three rivers: the Telakei, Kendilo, and Tuung, a
tributary of the Teweh).
      Jerome Rousseau mentions that many groups claim to originate from Apo Kayan and that some24
of these claims seem “historically valid” while others are “unlikely” (1990:71). He also points out
that the central position of Apo Kayan “makes it a conceptually attractive place of origin,” and
further, that its status as a homeland for some powerful and dominant groups makes an assumption of
origin there “a way of dreaming of having been a conqueror” (1990:71).
      These people include the upper Teweh Luangan and the Bentians on the upper Lawa.25
Significantly, those Bentians who live downstream and thus further away from “the center” are less
familiar with the term and less inclined to use it as an autonym.
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2).  This area thus very manifestly constitutes a geographical center in the middle of the23
Luangan area, and on account of its hilly upland character, it may be likened to a plateau,
comparable in several respects to some other, more famous and elevated Bornean
plateaus such as the Apo Kayan in northern East Kalimantan and the Usun Apau in
eastern Sarawak. Significantly, there are also many Dayak groups who consider
themselves as having originated from these latter upland areas. While I do not mean to
contest the origin stories of these groups, it seems to me that there are special, “natural”
or inherent reasons why such plateaus are “good to think” as places of origin.24
Furthermore, such locations are obviously not always the ultimate places of origin of the
groups claiming to originate from them, even if they tend to be accredited with such
status. As Peter Metcalf implies, when he points out that the Berawan, like other groups
in central northern Borneo “take the period when they lived in the Usun Apau as their
historical datum,” such locations may serve as imaginary ancestral homelands provided
that the groups in question have some migratory connection to them (1982:25). The
geographical centrality of these areas both makes such connections likely and, perhaps
more importantly, makes attribution of origins from them attractive on account of the
widespread regional significance that this centrality ensures. An additional reason why
such areas appear attractive in this respect may be the conceptual and religious
significance of centers which is widespread in Southeast Asia, and is important also, as
we shall see, among the Bentian.
Interestingly, the central part of the Luangan territory is also the area where the term
“Luangan” is best known. In this area, unlike in the Mahakam and the Barito regions, the
word “Luangan” is part of everyday vocabulary, and here we find people who
occasionally use it as a primary autonymic designation.  However, the autonymic version25
of the concept is different from that of Weinstock and Mallinckrodt. In local usage the
term “Luangan” stands for Dayaks in general or, as I was often told in reply to questions
about its meaning, “people who eat pork.” As some informants liked to express it, the
      “Ngaju” was formerly used only in a strictly local sense to refer to upriver as opposed to26
downriver Dayaks; most often lower level ethnonyms such as “Kahayan” or “Katingan” were used
(Miles 1970:291-92). “Iban,” which according to Freeman (1960a:160) is a borrowing from the
Kayan, was not originally used as an autonym by the people today known by the term, who instead,
used to be named after the rivers along which they lived (Babcock 1974:193). “Land Dayak” is a
term which was created by the Brooke administration to refer to inland Dayaks in distinction to the
Ibans whom they called “Sea Dayaks” (Harrisson 1950:273).
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term is actually “nothing but a bahasa daerah (local language) version of the Dayak
concept of bahasa Indonesia (the national language).” According to these notions,
autonymic Luangan identity is thus not restricted to the tribal group entity described in
the literature; on the contrary, even Dayaks not familar with the term, such as the Ngaju
or the Kenyah, are upon inquiry said to be Luangans. What this suggests is, to use an
expression of Jérôme Rousseau's (1990:67), “a category defined by its center rather than
its boundaries.” Rousseau applies this expression to the Dayak ethnonyms “Kajang” and
“Kenyah” which in his view “refer first to a core of groups with shared cultural
characteristics and a common origin to which other groups are added” (1990:67). It
seems to me that the concept Luangan provides us with an essentially similar case, and
that we are dealing here, and perhaps more generally in Borneo, with a particular form
of ethnicity, one for which, as Rousseau indicates (1990:46), the scholarly emphasis on
ethnic boundaries, originating with Fredrik Barth, may be misleading. In fact, as the
statements above reveal, in so far as the Luangan concept relates to boundaries at all, it
is to boundaries between Dayaks and Malays. In other words, to the extent that we can
speak about an exclusionary aspect of Luangan identity, this aspect is concomitant to
religious identity, to being non-Muslim, which in the local context is equivalent to
following the Luangan version of Kaharingan (which is associated with the central
Luangan area). It is mainly with reference to behavior indicating adherence to this
tradition that the term is employed, and not as often in order to mark difference with
others as to express identity or continuity with the ancestral past. An exclusive tribal or
ethnic Luangan identity has so far been only weakly developed by the Luangans,
especially in the central parts of their territory. Interestingly, the most well articulated
formulations of a Luangan tribal group entity that I have come across were provided by
Luangans in downriver areas (where the concept is generally less known than in the
central area), by individuals who had some acquaintance with the ethnographic literature.
Ethnic identities were apparently not very important in precolonial Borneo or among
many Dayaks: up until this day they still seem to matter little. Many Dayak ethnonyms
familiar to us today are, in fact, relatively recent constructs. To take some of the best
known examples, none of the terms “Iban,” “Land Dayak,” or “Ngaju,” were originally
employed by these groups, at least not in the same sense that they are used now.  Instead,26
identification was primarily local, often with a particular river or river basin or some
other topological feature. It seems that the above-mentioned names, like many others,
      Headhunting, for instance, apparently occurred regardless of ethnicity. Victims were chosen27
both from without and within the group. The people of one river basin, however, usually did not take
each other's heads (King 1979:4). The critical factor in determining solidarities in this respect thus
seems to have been locality or geographical proximity, not ethnic identity (cf. Rousseau 1990:118).
      Weinstock (1983a:76-77) hypothesizes that the central Luangan area could have been the place28
where the Luangan ancestors first arrived in Borneo from over the seas, in a remote period when the
Pasir region to the east was still below sea level. As he provides no specific evidence supporting his
hypothesis (except imprecise geological data indicating the possibility of such a scenario), and as the
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became established largely as a result of usage by Europeans and other outsiders (in some
cases, like that of the Bentian, the coastal sultanates might have been involved). The
ethnic division of Borneo today, at least the one reported in the literature, is largely the
product of colonial and postcolonial administrators and ethnographers seeking to
establish exclusive and orderly categories, and classifying smaller entities within larger
totalities. In precolonial Borneo, however, it seems to have been the rule that local groups
had little sense of a more general identity. Broadly encompassing ethno-linguistic
categories such as “Luangan” or “Ngaju” were simply irrelevant in most situations of
interaction, and they had no organizational function. Solidarities were also primarily local
or regional rather than ethnic; common origin does not seem to have constituted a
particularly important criterion of commonality (Babcock 1974; King 1988; Rousseau
1990).  What this suggests is that it would be, as has been noted by Rousseau (1990:46),27
misleading to approach indigenous identities in Borneo with a nation-state modeled
notion of ethnicity emphasizing distinct boundaries and common origin, language and
culture, even if such a notion has been gaining increasing importance in the area in the
last few decades. Different conceptions of commonality, typically attributing paramount
importance to locality, continue to influence identity thinking and intergroup interaction
in Borneo. I will have reason to discuss Bentian conceptions of commonality on several
occasions below. How such conceptions operate in a more restrictively local context will
perhaps become a little clearer in the second section of this chapter, when I describe the
Bentian's relationship to their local milieu. 
Some Notes on Luangan Early History
Before I turn to a review of regional history, I will first say a few words about the earliest
period of Luangan (and Bentian) history. Very little is known about this subject, as is true
for Bornean prehistory in general. It should therefore be kept in mind that most of the
information that follows is conjectural.
Above I argued that it is not necessarily the case that all Luangans originated from the
central Luangan area. Where they ultimately came from must, however, remain an open
question as historical sources and oral history provide no basis for such guesses.  When28
theory fails to account for the cultural and linguistic similarities between the Luangan and the other
Barito family Dayaks (who do not locate their ancestral homeland in this area), I find it too
incomplete and insecurely substantiated to motivate further consideration at this stage.
      According to Peter Bellwood's somewhat conjectural but rather widely accepted multi-29
disciplinary reconstruction of Indo-Malaysian prehistory (1985:119-125,232-233), the Proto-
Austronesians lived in Taiwan, about 4000 years BC (their antecedents came from mainland China).
Some 3000 years BC a southward migration of the Proto-Malayo-Polynesians through the Philippines
began, branching off into the Western Malayo-Polynesians and the Eastern Malayo-Polynesians at
approximately 2000 BC. The former passed through Borneo, Java, and Sumatra, and finally reached
the Malay peninsula (about 500 BC) and Madagascar (about AD 500, from south Borneo). The latter
moved into the Lesser Sunda Islands and eastern Indonesia via Sulawesi (and were presumably
strongly influenced by and intermixed with Papuan Australoids), and then into Oceania and New
Zealand (AD 1-1000). 
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most Bentians arrived in their area is likewise impossible to say, although it is known that
the downriver Lawa Bentians at least in part arrived from the Teweh area and settled at
their present location only in the nineteenth century. We can reasonably assume,
nevertheless, that the Luangan as a whole share a common ancestry with the other Barito
family Dayak groups, although intermarriage and interaction could in some instances
account for the linguistic and cultural similarities with these groups, as it has in the case
of the Tunjung vis-à-vis the Luangan. If we have a look at the more remote past, the
Austronesian language of the Luangan indicates a common origin with other Borneans
and Indonesians from China via Taiwan and the Philippines.  According to prevailing29
prehistorical views, the Austronesians began to populate Borneo about 3000-4000 years
ago (Bellwood 1985). There they presumably encountered Australoid populations who
are assumed to have been living on the island since at least 35.000 B.C. Of these
Australoid populations there are today no remnants (unlike in some parts of the
Philippines and insular Malaysia), and it has been suggested that they gradually became
assimilated into Austronesian populations who took up a hunting and gathering lifestyle
and slowly moved into the interior (Sellato 1993). 
Even if the Austronesians evidently knew rice cultivation already before they arrived
in Borneo (Bellwood 1985; Blust 1976), it is widely accepted that rice cultivation was
and could not be conducted in the interior before the advent of iron tools enabled the
clearing of the rainforest (e.g. Avé & King 1986). Iron was known and extracted from
iron ores on the coasts of the island at least from the beginning of the second millennium
A.D. (Christie 1988), and possibly from the fifth century A.D. (Avé & King 1986:15),
but the process whereby the use of iron spread inland took several centuries, and in some
remote inland locations it apparently did not become available before this century (J.
Nicolaisen 1976; Sellato 1996a). Hence, early inland populations presumably lived from
hunting and gathering, with undomesticated sago (Eugeissona sp.) as their staple, as do
the remaining hunters and gatherers on the island. In time, and especially during the two
last centuries, these groups gradually settled and took up rice cultivation as they came
      The southeasternmost reference to hunters and gatherers in Southeast Borneo that I have found30
is for the upper Lahei, a tributary of the upper Barito (see Schulte 1917:393-394). These people were
apparently not Luangans, however, but a population related to the Ot Danum (see Mallinckrodt
1927:587, 589; Schulte 1917:380). A Benuaq informant also reported that some people of the upper
Nyewatan  (a tributary of the Pahu), on the other side of the Barito-Mahakam watershed and the
provincial border, descend from hunters and gatherers.
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under the influence of progressively inland moving rice cultivators, and colonial and
postcolonial governments (Sellato 1994). Throughout the central Borneo region it was
mostly hunters and gatherers who until recently occupied the most remote interior. This
does not seem to have been the case in the southeast, however (or in the northeast, in
Sabah), where the population of the Meratus mountain range and its northern extension
which makes up the central Luangan area appears to have been swidden cultivators for
as long back in time as there is any evidence or information of it.
The Bentian and other central Luangans say that they have grown rice on their
swiddens for as long as they remember, and they emphatically deny a hunting and
gathering past. Even though hunters and gatherers (often known as Ut or Ot) were living
on the upper Barito and some of its tributaries until recently, there is in historical times
no reliable evidence of such populations from within the confines of the area occupied
by the Luangans or from the rest of southeast Borneo, south of the Lahei river.  I have30
found no support for Weinstock's hypothesis that Bekumpai Malays taught the Luangan
rice cultivation only a couple of centuries ago, even though this evidently holds true for
some former hunting and gathering groups on the upper Barito, some of whom were
related to the Ot Danum (see Weinstock 1983a:142-45; Schwaner 1968:clxv; Sellato
1986:255). Similarly, there is no evidence confirming Sellato's (1994:17) suggestion that
the Bukit of South Kalimantan were hunters and gatherers, or the same suggestion by
Knapen (2001:97-98) regarding the Luangan. These hypotheses aside, all other data
(including all information that I have collected through interviews and all published
references that I am aware of) indicate that the Dayaks in the southeast (i.e. the Luangan,
Bukit, and the Ma’anyan) have been swidden cultivators since an indefinite period back
in time. In the absence of contrary evidence, it seems reasonable to assume that the highly
dispersed and mobile settlement pattern still to some degree maintained by some of these
groups reflects a “traditional” swidden cultivation lifestyle formerly more regionally
prevalent than today, rather than a hunting and gathering past. 
It is, in fact, conceivable that the Luangan were swidden cultivators even before they
started to grow rice. Bellwood (1985:240) suggests that tubers and fruit trees gradually
replaced cereals in the farming economies of the Austronesians as they settled along
equatorial latitudes in Southeast Asia. Sellato (1986:395-96; 1994:187) has proposed a
theory that there existed before the introduction of rice a “tuber culture” among some
Barito groups (i.e. the now non-existent Pin of the upper Mahakam, and the Siang and
Ot Danum of the upper Barito). He suggests that the representatives of this culture had
      The nulang arc category includes the Berawan, Kajang, Kelabit, Melanau, Lun Dayeh, and Lun31
Bawang.
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in common an economy based on sedentary horticulture (without rice), an unstratified
and loose social organization, and complex rituals including secondary mortuary
treatment of the dead. All these characteristics are to a lesser or greater extent shared by
the so-called Barito groups as whole, whose secondary mortuary rituals lead him to
suggest that these groups were connected to “an ancient center of Hinduized culture in
southern Borneo” (1994:11). This institution also leads him to infer a relationship
between the Barito groups and what he (following Metcalf 1975) calls the “nulang arc
groups,” a heterogenous category of Dayaks from northern Borneo who also used to
practice such rituals (Sellato 1994:189).  He goes on to propose that the Barito groups,31
together with the nulang arc groups, many of whom are or used to be highly or wholly
dependent on other cultigens than rice, may have represented a distinct form of traditional
culture, a horticulturalist lifestyle, which he distinguishes from two other traditional
cultures, a hunting and gathering culture, and a culture of stratified rice farmers
(represented most typically by the Kayan, who are believed to have introduced rice over
extensive areas in interior Borneo).
It is impossible to say, with our present knowledge of Bornean prehistory, how
widespread a horticulturalist culture of the kind described by Sellato ever was. However,
the theory seriously questions the accepted view of a universal Bornean transition from
hunting and gathering to rice cultivation, and it seems to me that a horticulturalist past
of the kind that Sellato envisages is at least as plausible as a hunter and gatherer past in
the Luangan case. The Luangans’ very loose and comparatively egalitarian social
organization, together with a reported preference for cassava (jabau) over rice among
some local groups, the cultivation of stands of sago (Metroxylon) in swampy areas near
villages and swiddens, and a relatively common complementing of rice with other
cultigens toward the end of the harvest year, are as much potential evidence for a
horticulturalist past as for a hunter and gatherer ancestry, and the complex ritual tradition
of the Luangan, which is particularly closely associated with some of the most loosely
organized Luangan subgroups (the Teweh River Luangans, the Bentian, and the Bawo),
certainly supports the former possibility more than the latter. However, as already
indicated, we do not really know whether or not the Luangan once were non-rice
horticulturalists. In fact, we perhaps cannot even rule out the possibility of ancient rice
cultivation among the Luangan. Recent archeological findings from coastal Sarawak
confirming the presence of rice in Borneo from as early as 2300 B.C. (Ipoi and Bellwood
1991; Beavitt et al. 1996) or even 2990 B.C. (Doherty 1998), indicate that rice cultivation
on the island is much more ancient than previously believed and possibly predates the
arrival of the Austronesians. Even if research in inland sites (Doherty 1998) significantly
      Tsing (1984:22-24) makes a similar remark with reference to the Meratus (Bukit), whose32
culture, she argues, may have appeared degenerated to early Western observers as a result of its
having been influenced by that of the Banjars.
      This, at least, seems to have been the case in the area where the Bentian live. On the Mahakam, on33
the other hand, where the Sultan of Kutai exerted his principal influence, the jurisdiction officially only
reached Gunung Sendawar, a hill located some distance upriver from Melak (the present-day capital of
kabupaten West-Kutai) (see e.g. Tromp 1890:729-30; Wortmann 1971a:51-52).
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has not discovered any rice, the results caution us against making conclusive judgments
regarding Bornean prehistory at this stage. We should at least not assume a unilineal
development. A significant merit of Sellato's hypothesis is that it indicates that
Austronesian adaptation to the Bornean rainforest environment could have followed
different paths of development in different parts of Borneo. It also points to the important
fact that the Dayaks in the south and southeast differ in some significant aspects from
their better-known counterparts in the central and northern parts of the island.
Interestingly, the reason that they have received less scholarly attention than these Dayaks
may be related to precisely some of those characteristics that set them apart from them,
such as the lack of longhouse residence, a relatively restricted engagement in
headhunting, a comparatively extensive interaction with coastal polities, and a seemingly
undistinctive and Malay-like physical appearance and culture profile. These attributes,
some of which we shall shortly attend to as I proceed to discuss the Bentian's regional
connections through history, may have made these Dayaks fit the scholarly vision of what
it means to be Dayak somewhat badly, and thus made them uninteresting.32
An Upriver Area at Several Peripheries: A Regional History of the Bentian 
In the late precolonial era, before the Dutch established colonial authority in south
Borneo, the Mahakam River system was part of the territory of the Sultanate of Kutai
while the Barito River system fell within the boundaries of the Sultanate of Banjarmasin,
both of which were located near the mouths of the respective main rivers in the two
regions, and thus strategically well positioned to control exports from the regions (see
Map 2). Like other so-called “traditional Southeast Asian polities” neither exerted much
effective authority in the more peripheral inland areas of their territories, even though
these in some cases extended all the way to the watershed which marked the boundary
between them.  The ancestors of the Bentian possibly gradually started to recognize the33
authority of the Kutai Sultanate after it moved to Tenggarong in 1782 and established the
institution of Erau, an annual royal ritual commemorating the founding of Tenggarong,
to which upriver people were invited to participate and pay tribute. However, it was only
in the mid-nineteenth century, under the reign of Sultan Aji Muhammad Sulaiman (1850-
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1899), that the process of integration became more significant, when Bentian leaders
(manti) more regularly started to visit the Sultan and, in connection with these visits,
received honorific titles such as Temanggung, Mangku, and Singa. These titles, usually
substantiated by a letter (surat) and an emblem (tanda pangkat, seluit) depicting the
Kutai coat of arms, authorized their holders to govern and, ideally, integrate their
followers, who until then had mainly been living in dispersed farmhouses on their
swidden fields, occasionally gathering in small, isolated “extended family houses” (lou),
which themselves were often located far apart from each other and any larger rivers. At
about the same time trade with the Kutainese expanded and more serious efforts of the
sultanate to integrate and relocate the dispersed population at the fringes of its territory
through special envoys ordering them to build villages and move downstream, became
increasingly common. The first villages in the Bentian area were established in the latter
half of the nineteenth century, in a period which Bentians remember as turbulent. 
As a result of several factors — the Bentian's comparatively dispersed settlement
pattern, the absence of navigable rivers in much of their area, as well as the general
remoteness of the area (before the time of motorized transportation, the journey by canoe
to Tenggarong took about a week, downstream, and about twice that time, upstream) —
the Bentian became integrated with the sultanate relatively late. They had a reputation as
an independent and even dangerous people, not subordinated to Kutai authority. In 1903,
the Dutch controleur C. S. Knappert, who conducted a survey of Kutai and visited the
Bentian, claimed that they regarded themselves as much more autonomous than the
Benuaq, and paid very little respect to the sultan, with only a few of their leaders
infrequently visiting Tenggarong (1905:626). Seventy-five years before that, in 1828, the
British traveler-adventurer John Dalton was told by locals in Muara Pahu (a large village
at the mouth of the Pahu River, at that time the last upriver outpost of the sultan), that the
road to Banjarmasin, leading through Bentian territory, was “very dangerous, ... the very
worst part of Diak [Dayak] country” (Dalton [1831a]:E4-E5). Similar views are echoed
in comments about the Bentian and neighboring Dayaks recorded fifty years later by the
Norwegian traveler Carl Bock, who in 1879 traveled through the area in the company of
the sultan and a group of Buginese soldiers. Spending the night at the mouth of the Anan
River, he remarked that “the Dyaks of the surrounding district are noted, even among the
Dyaks, for their ferocity” ([1881]:146). He also recounted a report that one of the sultan's
men had been “killed by natives” just prior to his arrival at the spot ([1881]:146), and he
described Dilang Puti, the present-day subdistrict capital, situated a day's travel
downriver from his campsite, as being at “the furthest extremity” of the sultan's
dominions ([1881]:143). 
Considering that the Bentian were then mostly living in small, dispersed and rather
loosely organized groups, and according to their own report practiced almost no offensive
warfare and very little headhunting, at least in comparison with the more populous and
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stratified Dayak groups of the upper Mahakam who were known to carry out devastating
raids within and beyond Kutai, such statements should probably read primarily as
indications of the limited extent of contact between downriver people and Bentians at the
time, and perhaps also of the fact that their area was located at the very margins of Kutai
territory, bordering enemy territory. However, such statements certainly also reflected
resistance on the Bentians’ part, although this was generally of a rather passive kind,
contrary to what is reported above. There was considerable reluctance among the
Bentians to move downstream and concentrate, and present-day Bentians also admit that
their ancestors long remained what they today, appropriating a downstream concept, call
“wild” (liar, I.). This condition was not only a result of their location, but also one of
choice. In fact, there were Dayaks (the ancestors of those to whom Weinstock refers as
the “Purei subgroup of Luangan”) even further upstream, in fact, at the other side of the
watershed and outside of Kutai, who nevertheless recognized the authority of the Sultan
of Kutai and “payed him a yearly tribute” (Schwaner 1853:118). Like some of the
Bentian's downriver neighbors, such Dayaks were referred to by Bentians as suaka
(subordinated, tributary). As elsewhere in Borneo at the time, an important distinction
was thus made between “tribute paying Dayaks,” and “free Dayaks” (Avé & King
1986:25), and the Bentian was — at least in southeast Borneo — among those who
remained in the latter category the longest. 
An important factor which might also have slowed Bentian integration into the Kutai
Sultanate is the relative proximity of the Bentian area to the Teweh River (see Map 2).
At least from the early nineteenth century onwards there were Bentians conducting trade
with Bekumpai Malays resident in the upper Teweh. The Dutch explorer Schwaner
(1853:120), who traveled through the Bentian area in 1847, probably overstated the point
somewhat when he described the Bentian as “born traders,” and his information (1853:
121) that they brought products procured from the Bekumpai down the Lawa River and
on to Muara Pahu on the Mahakam, “eight days away,” is not confirmed by Bentians
today. Nevertheless, his observations indicate that regular trade took place between
Bentians and Bekumpais (an additional factor which might have contributed to averse
downriver Kutai attitudes toward the Bentian), the latter supplying salt, tobacco, cloth
(colored and uncolored), dyes, kitchen utensils, Chinese jars, other ceramics, iron, lead,
rifles, and gunpowder in exchange for honey, beeswax (probably also beeswax candles),
mats (most likely rattan mats), and locally produced weapons (swords or jungle knives)
and clothes (Schwaner 1853:120). This list of products given by Schwaner was probably
not complete, at least not with regard to products provided by the Bentian, who remember
various sorts of resin and rattan as their most important trade goods. 
Despite the apparent fact that they never recognized themselves as part of the
Banjarmasin Sultanate, the proximity of the Teweh River meant that the Bentian were
subjected to much influence from that area. In fact, their peripheral position at the
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Mahakam-Barito watershed (which facilitated a relatively high degree of political
autonomy) exposed them to indirect influence from three coastal centers: the Kutai,
Banjar, and Pasir sultanates, the last-mentioned of which was located to the southeast,
wedged in between the Banjar and Kutai sultanates, and generally regarded as a region
of disorder throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. A couple of important
routes traversing the Bentian area and connecting these coastal centers with each other
brought the Bentian in contact with various people from various directions (among the
more notable, the Sultan of Kutai a few times traveled through). With regard to trade,
they not only exchanged products with the Bekumpai on the Teweh River, but also with
itinerant Kutai Malays and Buginese, who brought their goods upriver to the Bentian, as
well as with inland Pasir Dayaks or Islamized Pasirese, whom the Bentian visited in their
region. 
The Bentian’s peripheral location did thus not entail that they were isolated, although
their trade contacts and the important role of trade in their society should not lead us to
exaggerate the frequency or intensity of most Bentian individuals' contacts with other
peoples at that time. In the nineteenth century, contacts between Bentians, on the one
hand, and other Dayaks and Malays, on the other, consisted mainly of trade contacts or
formalized exchange visits carried out by large groups of men (roing). Fear of
headhunting or raids from other Dayaks, especially the Pari from the upper Mahakam,
who were an endemic problem for Bentians and Teweh River Luangans at this time,
effectively kept individual travel and the movement of women at a minimum, and in
many communities restricted marriage to within one's own community or the closest
neighboring communities. I shall return to discuss the implications of this important
condition of restricted mobility later, in Chapter 3. Before that I will first try to provide
an indirect understanding of Bentian history (on which there exists, as already remarked,
few direct references) through a regional history focused on three coastal regions of
southeast Borneo (which also are not very well known in a comparative perspective). I
will concentrate on the influence of these regions on the Bentian, whose position between
them is crucial for an understanding of the Bentians’ past and present predicament. In this
respect the Bentian may be said to share an essential feature with the peoples of the
Teweh River area, which used to be a region of considerable economic significance,
according to Schwaner precisely because of its intermediary location between these
coastal regions (1853:116). The Teweh River itself has also been an important source of
influence on the Bentian as it has been with regards to other Luangans, and it may, as we
have seen, be regarded as a center in its own right, a kind of inland center. However, not
all of its importance for the Bentian arises from the fact that it is regarded as the area
from where Luangan tradition originated. Part of it results from the fact that influence on
the Bentian from the Barito (and Pasir) direction mainly reached them by way of this
river. I will consider those aspects of Teweh influence mainly in connection with
      Principal sources for this subchapter and the next were: Black 1985, Boyce 1986, Dari Swapraja34
1979, Knappert 1905, Tromp 1888, 1889, Wortmann 1971a, 1971b.
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discussing the Barito region. Apart from describing the influence of the sultanates, I will
also account for the impact of the Dutch, which itself, at least in Kutai, was for a long
time mostly indirect, mediated by the sultanates or some segments of their populations.
In accounting for all these “external” influences I will go back to early historical times.
I will begin with the Kutai sultanate and describe this kingdom somewhat more
thoroughly than the others, as it is the oldest and the one which has had the greatest
influence on the Bentian, even if perhaps not on the Luangan as a whole.
The Sultanate of Kutai34
The Kutai kingdom is regarded as one of the oldest polities in Indonesia. Sanskrit
inscriptions in Pallawa script from about A.D. 400 acknowledge the generosity toward
Brahmins of King Mulawarman, whose father was the founder of the royal dynasty of a
kingdom known as Kutai Martapura, assumed to be located at Muara Kaman, some
distance upstream from Tenggarong on the Mahakam River (Wortmann 1971a). These
inscriptions put the origin of this kingdom further back than what is documented for any
other polity in the region, at the same time as they indicate very early Indic influence in
East Kalimantan, predating even that recorded for Java. The origin of the founders of
Kutai Martapura is unknown but it is told that it maintained relations with the famous
Hindu-Javanese kingdom of Majapahit, or Mataram, another contemporary Hindu-
Javanese polity (Boyce 1986:C3). Kutai Martapura remained Hindu until its fall in the
early sixteenth century when it became annexed by another Kutainese kingdom, Kutai
Kartanegara.
It is with the first king of Kutai Kartanegara, Aji Batara Dewa Agung Sakti (who
reputedly descended from heaven, an origin also shared by many Bentian and other
Luangan subgroup founders), that the “Salasila Kutai,” the genealogy of the Sultanate
of Kutai, begins. Kutai Kartanegara emerged as a trade center in the early fourteenth
century in the Mahakam delta. It is assumed that its founders were Hindu-Javanese and
thus that this kingdom was Hindu from the start. It has been suggested that it was
founded by refugees from the Singasari kingdom in Java whose fall concurred with the
rise of Majapahit, and that the name of the kingdom, “Kutai Kartanegara,”
commemorated the Singasari king, Kertanegara. Its first capital was Kutai Lama, located
downstream from present-day Samarinda. Kutai Kartanegara remained Hindu until some
time around the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth century when its population rapidly
converted to Islam introduced by religious teachers who previously had introduced Islam
      The population of the kingdom at Muara Pahu was likely Luangan of the Pahu subgroup.35
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to Sulawesi. It thus coexisted with Kutai Martapura for several centuries until the
expansionist reign of Sultan Pangeran Sinum Panji Mendapa (1605-1637), when a war
broke out, leading to Kutai Martapura's incorporation in Kutai Kartanegara. It was also
during this sultan's rule that the original Salasila Kutai was written, and regular contacts
with the Bugis of Sulawesi (with whom several subsequent sultans intermarried), were
initiated (Amin 1996; Boyce 1986).
It is unclear what or how much influence these early East Kalimantan Hindu
Kingdoms had on the Bentian’s ancestors. Various aspects of inland religious tradition
suggest the possibility of Hindu or Javanese influence, as may certain titles for leaders
and such traditions as use of head cloths (laung) (see Witkamp 1928:425). Stone figures
showing resemblance to Indic religious sculpture and likely dating back to pre-Islamic
times have also recently been found in caves of the Bentian area (Edmund Grundner,
personal communication, 2002), indicating the possibility of early cultural influence from
the coasts. It may be, however, that such possible Hindu influences were as much, if not
more, the result of later interaction with the Kutai sultanate, which despite its formal
Muslim status retained many Hindu elements in its royal rituals and court culture. The
Bentian's ancestors might not have had any direct contacts with these kingdoms, although
some other Dayak groups certainly did. According to well-known Kutai mythology, the
Tunjung established a marital alliance with Kutai Kartanegara when Puncen Karena, the
son of a Tunjung leader, married Dewa Putri, the sister of Maharaja Sultan, a Kartanegara
sultan who reigned around the mid-fifteenth century (later, a daughter of Puncen Karena's
great-grandchild married the Sultan Aji Di Langgar and together with him begot the
famous Sultan Pangeran Sinum Panji Mendapa, thus making possible the tracing of the
ancestry of the sultanate back to the Tunjung). Mythology also has it that the population
of two kingdoms at Kota Bangun and Muara Pahu,  reportedly annexed together with35
Kutai Martapura, were partly indigenous, mixed with Hindu-Javanese, which seems to
have been the case also with the kingdom of Pasir, which is of approximately the same
age as Kutai Kartanegara, and which was visited together with Kutai in 1635 by the
Dutchman Gerrit Thomassen Pool, the first European to visit the east coast. According
to Tunjung and Benuaq oral history, some of their ancestors also used to live on the lower
Mahakam before they later moved upriver, away from the Muslims. A similar situation
prevailed on the lower Barito, where Banjar Malay expansion occasioned the Ma'anyan
Dayaks to move upriver (Hudson 1967b:15), and supposedly also elsewhere in Borneo.
Kutai Kartanegara's interaction with inland peoples probably became more intense
in the seventeenth century after it had converted to Islam and seized the above-mentioned
kingdoms. This is also a time much celebrated by present-day Kutainese, inclined to
revive the past glory of the sultanate. In this period Sultan Pangeran Sinum Panji
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Mendapa is said to have established the legal code of the Sultanate, the Beradja Nanti
and Panji Selaten laws, which were written in Kutai Malay, the language spoken by the
Islamized Kutainese. The central concept of these Kutai books of law was adat, an
originally Arabic word, in Indonesia variously designating “law,” “customary law,”
“propriety” and “tradition,” which has long been used all over the country, among inland
and non-Muslim people as well as among coastal and Muslim groups, and which today
is of central importance for conceptions of self-identity among all Indonesian ethnic
groups, particularly among smaller minorities not adhering to one of the world religions.
The regulations in the law books recognized a wide range of different forms of adat,
including, most interestingly, the customary law (adat yang teradat) of inland peoples,
of which it was said that it was to be respected in their areas (Widjono 1991, referred to
in Fried 1995:36). The sultanate thus acknowledged the right — and simultaneously
indicated the obligation — of inland Dayak leaders to administrate their own adat within
their own local domains. Hence it established a model and system of governance which
gradually came to influence the inland population, among whom the concept of adat in
time gained central significance, both as a designation for customary law, and as one for
custom and religious tradition.
Another example of the influence of the Kutai Sultanate which probably reached the
inland peoples at about the same time as the concept of adat is the institution of
mantiship. Bentians say that “manti,” unlike the above-mentioned titles which were
granted to their leaders at a later stage, is an indigenous term, although it seems likely
that it was originally adopted as a result of outside influence. Cognates of the word (e.g.
mantri, menteri) are widespread in Indonesian societies, and the Kutai books of law
prescribed, along with the adat system, an administrative order according to which
menteri was a designation for office holders charged with the task of administering adat.
In addition, the same term was also used by high-ranking counsellors of the sultan, so it
seems reasonable to assume that the term and the institution gradually spread inland —
in a process assumingly involving both emulation and imposition — as the interaction
of inland peoples with the sultanate (and the authority of the latter) increased. Among the
Bentian the institution was somewhat transformed (and the term domesticated), and
“manti” became a generic designation for the usually self-appointed elders who acted as
the heads of extended families or housegroups. These manti performed tasks perceived
as concerned with the application of adat-law (i.e. adjudications in hearings and
litigations), but they did not yet possess any official or more widespread authority, and
their functions pertained as much or more to so-called domestic (i.e. family) affairs than
to community leadership. It is important to note, therefore, that the term manti is different
from the individual titles which were granted by the sultan to some (but not all) Bentian
manti from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, as these titles — recognized by Bentians
as exogenous — significantly transformed the manti institution and the societies
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concerned  by increasing the status of the former and the degree of hierarchy in the latter.
Similar developments occurred in the neighboring sultanates of Banjarmasin and Pasir,
where the adat institution was introduced at about the same time, and similar titles later
also became used by local leaders. 
Together with adat and mantiship, Bentians and other interior Borneans at this time
also obtained something more concrete from the coast, namely, the so-called “traditional
valuables” (ceramic jars and plates, gongs and other brass and iron items) which were,
in fact, a prerequisite for adat-law — which is largely what Fried (1995:95), influenced
by an indigenous account (Titus Pantir 1990), has called “a law of fines,” based on the
exchange of such objects — and thereby indirectly also for the manti institution. These
valuables had been obtained by some interior peoples for a very long time, but they
became more extensively available in this period as a result of an increasing trade
following in the footsteps of the inland expansion of the Islamized sultanates. Another
institution conceivably evolving at about the same time was what Bentians call roing,
formal exchange expeditions whereby interior communities traded and developed
relations with particular other interior communities. It is probable that residence in
longhouses (lou), which were led by a manti, also became more common among
Luangans at this time, as may have been the case with slavery too, since slaves, who are
said to have been owned by the manti, were principally obtained through roing, or as the
result of accumulated debt (making debtors who were unable to pay their debts into debt
slaves). 
One important factor which strongly contributed to increasing coastal-interior
interaction in Kutai (and Pasir) at this time was the presence of the Bugis. Especially
from the late seventeenth century, after a confederation between the kings of Kutai, Pasir
and Bone in Sulawesi in 1686, the Bugis, largely as a result of internal conflicts, started
to migrate into eastern Kalimantan in large numbers, and from that time on, they held an
important role in the trade and politics of the east coast for several centuries (Tromp
1887). Accomplished seafarers, controlling sea traffic in the southern part of the
Makassar straits, they controlled the export trade from Kutai and the rest of southeast
Borneo, their ships sailing to the ports of Makassar, Surabaya, Johore and Singapore
(Lindblad 1988:10). The Bugis also made up most of the armed forces in Kutai, and it
was on their advice that the capital was moved to Tenggarong in 1782, after already
having been moved upriver once, from Kutai Lama to Pemarangan, in 1732 (Boyce
1986:C7). The objective of these moves was to relocate the capital away from pirate
activity at the mouth of the Mahakam, carried out by pirates from the Sulu archipelago
in the southern Philippines, who in their turn controlled trade in the northern Makassar
strait and were the rivals of the Bugis. It was also the Bugis who in 1730 founded
Samarinda, the present-day provincial capital, and a large portion of the population on
the east coast is still Buginese. However, the Bugis lost their formerly dominant trading
      In 1812, the Sultan of Banjarmasin had actually ceded both his own sultanate and those of the36
east coast to the British. The British presence in Kalimantan at this time remained weak, however,
and limited mainly to some rather uncoordinated private business enterprises.
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position toward the end of the nineteenth century as a combined result of increasingly
effective Dutch control and increasing Chinese trading activity, which was favored by the
Dutch over that of the Buginese because of Dutch anti-Muslim sentiments which were
widespread in the colonial administration (Lindblad 1988:11).
A demand on inland peoples to produce forest products for the export market
gradually increased after the arrival of the Bugis. By the early nineteenth century a busy
trade between Kutai and Singapore had developed, with rattan, gutta-percha and beeswax
among the principal exports, and cotton, textiles and arms among the imports (Wortmann
1971a:6, cf. Dalton [1831b]). It is probable that it was an increased demand of rattan for
export which in this period prompted the sultan to request tribute from the Bentian and
other upriver peoples in Kutai. At this time, the Dutch presence in the area was still
virtually nonexistent (Irwin 1955:154). The treaty established by Gerrit Thomassen Pool
had been inconsequential and despite the fact that the Sultanate of Banjarmasin twice, in
1787 and 1817, ceded Pasir and Kutai, over which it had claimed supremacy, to the
Dutch, these acts were of little importance for the later sultanates. If anything, they seem
to have confirmed rather than undermined their authority by making it official (Black
1985:286). Even after 1844, when the Sultan of Kutai was forced to sign a treaty
recognizing Dutch sovereignty after an attack by the Dutch against Tenggarong, Kutai
still remained very independent in practical terms, even though the Dutch presence in
Kalimantan, because of fear of English claims to the area, now became somewhat more
pronounced, and an assistant resident was instituted in Samarinda a few years later,
becoming stationed in Banjarmasin.36
It is difficult to determine exactly how extensive or restricted the Kutai-Bentian
interaction used to be at this time, or how far back in time it ultimately goes, as there is
almost no historical documentation of these contacts. It seems likely, however, on the
basis of Bentian oral history, that it did not become very important before the early or
mid-nineteenth century, even if some amount of trade (in rattan, beeswax candles and
resins) had been conducted with Kutainese Malays and Buginese before that (as with
Bekumpais). The earliest historically determinable event indicating Kutai-Bentian contact
remembered by Bentians is a request for tribute in the form of rattan canes made to them
and other upriver Dayak peoples by Sultan Muhammad Muslihuddin, also known as the
Rose Water Sultan (Fried 1995:36). As Muslihuddin did not reign before 1780 (when he
left Sulawesi where he was born, his father having married a Buginese noble woman) it
seems reasonable to assume that this request was made in the late eighteenth or early
nineteenth century, certainly before 1816, when Muslihuddin died (Boyce 1986:C7;
Tromp 1888:4). According to Bentian information obtained by Stephanie Fried
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(1995:10), it was this request which prompted the commencement of Bentian large-scale
rattan cultivation, which gradually was to gain a central importance in their generally
subsistence-oriented swidden economy. However, it was probably not before the late
nineteenth century that rattan (of the sega and woyung species) became commonly
cultivated throughout the Bentian area, even if wild rattan (e.g. kehes) was collected and
sold before that. In Dilang Puti, the present-day subdistrict capital of Bentian Besar,
comprehensive rattan cultivation started in the first or second decade of the twentieth
century, when Raden Sokma, the district chief (kiai) in office at the time, ordered the
leader of the village, who held the title of regional head of customary law (kepala adat
besar), to see to it that rattan was cultivated on every swidden field.
The policy of the Kutai Sultanate toward the interior became significantly more active
under the reign of Sultan Aji Muhammad Sulaiman (1850-1899). Then the royal Erau
ritual in Tenggarong began to be arranged yearly and its scope widened as an increasing
number of remote upriver peoples were invited to participate. As well as distributing
titles to Dayak (and other) leaders recognizing his authority, the sultan on these occasions
also gave them small amounts of red and yellow rice which were stored by the leaders in
special yellow pouches indicating their status and used in village rituals, replicating the
festivities in the royal capital. In 1872, the sultan imposed a kind of headtax on his
subjects (Tromp 1889:300). Through special envoys sent upriver he gradually started to
mount pressure on dispersed and remote Dayak populations such as the Bentian, not yet
living in “proper villages,” to integrate and move downriver to more accessible locations.
At the same time, inland trade increased significantly. In the 1880s Buginese traders were
a common sight in many parts of interior Kutai. One example of influence on Dayak
culture originating from interaction with these traders is gambling (see Tromp 1889:299),
which since then has been an important and costly pastime among Kutainese Dayaks,
particularly, in the case of the Bentian, and the Benuaq and Tunjung even more so, during
secondary mortuary rituals. Yet another instance of a heightened presence of downriver
people in the Bentian area in the latter part of the nineteenth century were the troops of
the sultan who assisted the Dutch in the Banjarmasin war.
The Dutch in Kutai
Unlike the Sultanate of Banjarmasin which became a Dutch “direct rule territory” (direct
gebied) in 1860, and which lost most of its original dominions to the Dutch by the early
nineteenth century (e.g see Knapen 2001), the Kutai Sultanate retained, within the East
Indies administration, the status of a semi-independent landschap, and thereby also,
effective self-control in most administrative matters until the early twentieth century.
This meant that Bentians until then regarded Kutai and the Makaham River area as part
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of “the Sultanate,” while they considered the region at the other side of the watershed, the
area which today constitutes the province of Central Kalimantan, as belonging to the
Dutch. Even after 1909, when the other sultanates in Kalimantan were forced to accept
the “short declarations” (Korte Verklaringen), renouncing their semi-autonomous status
and transferring most of their remaining authority to the Dutch, Kutai was spared (Black
1985:288). In fact, Kutai remained a “special region” (swapraja) even after Indonesian
independence, until 1957, and the sultanate as an institution was not abolished until 1960
when Kutai became a kabupaten (regency) (Magenda 1991:45; Dari Swapraja 1979). 
Throughout the nineteenth century the Dutch had employed a deliberate non-
interference policy vis-à-vis Kutai (Black 1985:286-87). Even if the sultanate had to
accept Dutch sovereignty and it lost much of its economic control as the Dutch began to
control the export trade in the latter half of the century, the sultan still retained the right
to impose certain taxes and in addition, he received a considerable income from the
Dutch in compensation for surrendering the sovereignty of his kingdom. As a result of
this, the sultanate remained wealthy and it continued to wield administrative control in
its area. It was able to do so largely as a result of proving itself loyal to the Dutch and
providing them with manpower in the Banjarmasin war and its aftermath. Because of his
“skilful balancing act in his relations with the Dutch,” Sultan Aji Muhammad Sulaiman
was able not only to sustain prosperity and internal administrative control, but also gain
a more stable authority vis-à-vis Buginese and Banjarese influences at his court (Black
1985:288). 
From the very beginning of the 20th century, however, the Dutch began to impose
greater control in Kutai, both political and economic. This was the result of generally
more assertive Dutch policies in the “Outer Islands,” associated with their so-called
“ethical policy,” but also of their increasing economic interest in the natural resources of
the area: in 1888, the first Dutch coal mines in Kutai had been opened, and in the 1890s,
oil was discovered in Balikpapan and other locations along the coast. In 1900, the sultan
lost his right to impose taxes, including, most importantly, the Mahakam River tax and
the taxes on salt, opium, and gambling (Wortmann 1971b:52). This virtually ended the
already weakened economic dominance of the sultanate over its inhabitants, even if the
sultan continued to receive a considerable income from the Dutch  in the form of oil
royalties and in compensation for the district of Upper Mahakam, which became a direct
rule area in 1907. This income was large enough to secure the continuing prosperity of
the royal family who at this time was one of the richest in the archipelago; during the
early part of the reign of Sultan Parikesit (1910-1959), known for his extravagance in
spending his wealth (see e.g Krohn 1927:108-123), the sultanate loaned money to other
sultanates and even to the Dutch East Indies government in Jakarta (Magenda 1991:18).
Nevertheless, the changes imposed by the Dutch at this time were profound, and they also
affected the political authority of the sultanate. In 1902, the administration of Kutai was
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reorganized, although it remained staffed mainly with Kutai aristocrats. As elsewhere in
Kalimantan, a large portion of the administrative personnel of the Dutch in Kutai were
indigenous, which meant that the Bentian came to have very little direct contact with the
Dutch (Lindblad 1988:133). 
After 1900, the sultan continued to govern the Dayaks through what became known
as “adat leaders” or “heads of customary law” (pengurus, kepala adat), that is, local
leaders to whom he granted individual titles, although at this time “village heads”
(petinggi, later kepala desa) were increasingly commonly appointed, the status of whom,
among the Bentian, was long subordinate (and often still is, at least in some respects) to
that of the adat heads, in comparison with whom the village heads were to a higher
degree associated with the government than the people. In time, however, the adat heads
were replaced as the officially leading village authorities by the village heads, who were
entitled to receive 8 percent of the so-called “head tax” (uang kepala, M.) that was
gathered on Dutch initiative and imposed on every household head (Wortmann
1971b:54). It was in the three first decades of the twentieth century that most of the
present-day villages in the Bentian area were established (three had been established
before 1900), and Dutch influence, recognized as such, became more systematically
apparent. Apart from the head tax, this influence was above all manifested through
occasional visits by the Dutch controleurs (district officers) or their local assistants, the
indigenous kiai, based in Muara Pahu, who together with the village heads were
instrumental in establishing Bentian residence in villages.
Among the few things associated with the Dutch by Bentians today are the small rest
houses (pasanggrahan I, senkerahen) which were built in every village, mainly in order
to accommodate the occasional visiting government official. Other constructions were
the cement pillars which, with Bentian assistance, were raised on many of the
mountaintops in the area; the function of these objects (which were used for cartography,
enabling the measuring of distance) was the subject of much curiosity and became
something of a symbol of Dutch rule, destroyed after Indonesian independence. The
Dutch also ordered the Bentian to clear a few wide footpaths leading through their area
yearly. Unlike in some other areas, however, there were no larger Dutch development
projects requiring extensive local labor carried out among the Bentian (a channel built
to shorten the course of the Lawa River is the most notable exception). Taxation was
probably the most burdensome of the demands of the Dutch; however, most Bentians
were able to obtain the sums required relatively easily by selling rattan to traders, or else,
to evade payment altogether. 
The Dutch also put an end to headhunting and forbade slavery, both of which had
been practiced to some degree by most Dayaks, even if apparently only to a rather limited
extent among many Dayak groups in the southeast, including the Bentian. These
measures were partly imposed before the twentieth century by the sultanate, especially
      There may have been important connections between inland and coastal slavery. The inland37
population provided slaves for the coastal slave trade at least periodically and it appears that the
sultanates played an important role as intermediaries in this trade (see Dalton [1831a]:E4). It is also
likely that the institution of slavery in inland southeast Borneo largely developed in connection with
the coastal, Bugis-controlled slave trade networks; inland tributary relations with the sultanates, at
any rate, certainly contributed to the importance of inland slavery by creating conditions favoring the
development of intracommunity relations of debt and dependence.
      At first, it was not demanded that slaves were released immediately, but after a transitional38
period of up to eight years (see Black 1985:287).
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with respect to headhunting (Tromp 1889:293). In the Barito area this practice was
largely curtailed by the 1830s. In much of southern Borneo headhunting came to an
ultimate end with the famous pan-Dayak peace meeting that was arranged on Dutch
initiative in Tumbang Anoi on the upper Kahayan River in 1884. However, in many parts
of Kutai it continued into the early twentieth century. The Bentian were subjected to
headhunting attacks by upper Mahaham Dayaks until the late nineteenth century, and
some Bentians apparently did, albeit reportedly very infrequently, carry out small-scale
revenge or other raids themselves. The Dutch begun to employ a stricter policy with
regards to slavery in the late nineteenth century; the practice became officially outlawed
in Kutai in 1892 (Black 1985:287). Their efforts did not at first affect the system of
slavery among the inland Dayak population as much as they were directed against the
extensive slave trading which took place along the coast and which was largely in the
hands of Bugis and Sulu pirates (some of whom were connected to the coastal
sultanates).  With regards to Dayak slavery, a system of gradual abolishment was37
applied, and several decades passed before it was completely abandoned.  The Bentian38
are today highly reluctant to discuss this long neglected and much condemned practice,
but it is acknowledged that some wealthy manti owned small numbers of debt slaves
(ripen) or slaves purchased from other communities (batang ulun) until some point in the
early twentieth century.
The Dutch may generally be regarded as having had a somewhat paternalistic attitude
toward the Dayaks; protecting them from Muslim influence was an objective of high
priority. In attempting to fulfil this objective and realizing their “ethical policy,”
missionary work was an important measure. Perhaps as a result of their low population
and their relative remoteness, the Bentian were not subjected to missionary measures
before the 1930s. Then a Chinese preacher, Tuan Linn, representing an American
Protestant organization, in short time converted two Bentian villages (and two upper
Teweh villages) which have remained Christian after that. Later on, efforts, mostly by
Indonesian missionaries,  at proselytizing other Bentians have been implemented with
varying degrees of success; today half of the Bentian population is Christian, and most
active Christians live in the two villages converted in the 1930s. In a comparative
perspective, it may be noted, this means an exceptionally low degree of conversion; the
      Despite fame for their tiwah secondary mortuary ceremonies and for their success in39
establishing Hindu Kaharingan as an agama, the overwhelming majority of the Ngaju are Christians.
Among the Ma'anyan, only a very small percentage remain Kaharingan. Among the Ot Danum, the
number of Kaharingans is higher, possibly equaling or surpassing that of the Luangan.
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Bentian, like the Luangan as a whole (for whom a similar degree of conversion possibly
also applies) may in fact be one of the least Christianized of all the Dayaks, even as
compared with the other Barito groups.39
Even if the Dutch generally interfered rather little in Bentian lives, they were still
figures of authority and sometimes feared; like the Japanese who occupied Borneo during
the Second World War they are said to have used a stick to hit people who did not obey
their orders. In the Bentian case, however, it seems that most of the resentment against
the Dutch expressed today reflects post-independence propaganda (or influence from
their Teweh River neighbors) rather than their own colonial experience. The impact of
Dutch rule and the relationship of the Dutch to the Dayaks obviously varied a lot with
each region. In the former Sultanate of Banjarmasin and in the Teweh area, the influence
of the Dutch was both greater and established much earlier than in Kutai. 
Recurrent epidemics such as smallpox and cholera in Kutai and elsewhere in Borneo,
although perhaps not caused by the Dutch but certainly resulting from downstream
contacts in general, had a major impact upon the Bentians and Luangans.  According to
oral history, outbreaks of unidentified epidemics (repa) in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century severely decimated the population of many Bentian and other Luangan
communities. As a consequence, it is commonly remarked today, the present population
of these communities is much smaller than it would otherwise have been. The importance
of epidemics for notions of the past among these upriver peoples cannot be
underestimated, and like intergroup warfare and headhunting, epidemics have probably
contributed to the spirit of general mistrust which characterizes Bentian attitudes toward
downriver peoples, and possibly also, to some degree, to the persistence of their dispersed
settlement pattern. When Bentian and other Luangan communities were hit by a
epidemic, their members would typically attempt to avoid getting infected by staying out
on their swidden fields for as long as it lasted.
A History of the Barito Region 
Before the arrival of the Dutch, the Sultanate of Banjarmasin was the principal power in
the Barito region. Its predecessor, the so-called Negara kingdom, was probably founded
by Gujarati Indians in the early 14th century, although its population was mostly made
up of a mixture of local Dayaks and Malays from Sumatra who had moved into the area
sometime in the first millennium A.D. (Ras 1968:196). However, Negara had intensive
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contacts with Java from early on, which is evident by traces of influence in Banjarese
(which is a distinct Malay language), and it is believed that its court was modeled on that
of the kingdom of Majapahit, when a Majapahit prince succeeded the founder king (Ras
1968:62; Hudson 1967b:16). A couple of centuries later, in the mid-sixteenth century, as
a result of a conflict regarding succession, the capital of the kingdom was moved from
its location in the fertile Hulu Sungai plains downstream to Banjarmasin. Because the
winning party had requested military help from the Islamic kingdom of Demak (the most
powerful polity on Java after the fall of Majapahit in 1528), the new kingdom converted
to Islam and became a sultanate. The relocation of the main port of the kingdom from
Marabahan (the principal domicile of the Bekumpai, who at that time were still Dayaks)
to Banjarmasin, located closer to the sea (see Map 2), was also in response to the
demands of increasing trade with the Chinese and Portugese (Hudson 1967b:23). Among
the goods exported were various forest products and pepper initially supplied mainly by
Dayaks, and cultivated on their swiddens in the Hulu Sungai area until the seventeenth
century, when they were no longer able to meet the increasing export demands on this
crop, and inland-moving Banjarese, practicing sedentary pepper cultivation, forced them
to move upriver from the fertile areas where they had until then resided (Hudson
1967b:15). Forest products had probably been exported from southeast Borneo for a very
long time, and it has even been suggested that the name “Tanjung Pura” mentioned in
early Chinese sources from the seventh century A.D. was the name of the capital of the
early colony of the Sumatran Malays who later founded Negara (Ras 1968:188-91).
The Dutch established themselves earlier in the Banjarmasin area than on the east
coast. The Dutch East-India Company (VOC) was granted rights to export pepper as early
as 1638, although it was not before the mid-eighteenth century that they were able to
develop a relatively effective trade monopoly and establish residence in the area
(Lindblad 1988:8-9). In 1787 Sultan Nata of the Banjarmasin Sultanate ceded his
kingdom to the Dutch (along with Kutai and Pasir). However, Dutch control in the area
did not immediately take effect but, on the contrary, decreased while the Sultanate
temporarily regained most of its power, a development occasioned by, among other
things, the decline of the VOC (Lindblad 1988:8-9). As in Kutai, increasing British
interest in Kalimantan in the early nineteenth century gradually induced a more active
Dutch response. Through treaties in 1817 and 1826 the Dutch regained sovereignty over
the area. In 1840, the Dutch trading company Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij
(NHM) opened a branch in Banjarmasin (Lindblad 1988:11). In comparison to Kutai, the
Dutch generally employed a much more active policy in this region, which on account
of its fertile lands and comparatively high population density was regarded as especially
valuable. In 1859, Dutch interference in succession affairs through support for a
candidate not publicly endorsed led to the Banjarmasin war (1859-63). In 1860 the
sultanate became a direct rule area and it did not re-establish itself after the war; in 1886
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it was officially dissolved. Dutch control and influence continued to increase, although
it took some time before the Dutch established themselves in the upper Barito area, in the
district known as “Upper Dusun,” of which the Teweh River was also part.
With regards to the history of that part of the Barito region, the aftermath of the
Banjarmasin war was to prove as important as the war itself. The reason was that the
supporters of the candidate for sultan were sidetracked by the Dutch and withdrew to this
area. At first the Dutch largely left them alone, but in the 1880s escalating insurgency
activities demanded intervention. Despite their efforts, however, the Dutch did not
succeed in catching the leader and pretender to the throne, and so the area remained
unsafe through the rest of the century until 1905 when especially powerful military
operations were initiated (Lindblad 1988:122). During this volatile period, troops of the
Sultan of Kutai assisted the Dutch, while Banjar rebels, allied with Bekumpais and
Dayaks, attacked government posts or made raids into Kutai (Surapati, the Islamized
leader of the Siang Dayaks on the upper Barito was one of the principal opposition
figures). Dayaks from the upper Mahakam, allying with the Sultan of Kutai, were also
involved, attacking the inhabitants in the Dusun lands, whom they had formerly subjected
to headhunting raids.
As a result of the war and the subsequent dissolution of the Banjar Sultanate in 1886,
there was also a considerable influx of Banjarese to Kutai where, in time, they largely
came to replace the Kutainese and the Bugis in the trading sector, especially inland, as
well as make up a large proportion of the total population in the area (Magenda 1991:3).
Some rebels and other Banjarese also moved to the Teweh River where they, together
with Bekumpai traders who had been settling there since at least the early eighteenth
century, contributed to a diffusion of anti-Dutch sentiments and Islamic influence in the
area. The Dayaks on the Teweh River came to adopt a much more critical view of the
Dutch than those in Kutai, and some of them were actively involved in the Banjarmasin
war. Further south, among the Lawangan subgroup of Luangan, another type of colonial
resistance surfaced several times in the first three decades of the twentieth century. This
was a millenarian movement known as Nyuli (from the word suli, “to resurrect”), which
largely seems to have been motivated by discontent with increasing Dutch political
control, taxation requirements and road building projects (Mallinckrodt 1925:37-38). By
engaging in a special ritual incorporating Islamic elements, the movement's participants
expected to bring back the original mythological state of immortality and reunite with
their ancestors. Reverberations of the Nyuli movement, which attracted a lot of attention
from the Dutch at the time, also reached the Teweh and Montalat rivers and the Pasir
region (De Bruyn 1934:41).
In comparison with Kutai, the Dutch both met with greater resistance and exerted a
greater and more active influence in the Barito region. After the suppression of the Banjar
rebels they established a stronger presence in the Upper Dusun area, including on the
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Teweh River, which we will be most concerned with here. As a consequence, various
aspects of what could be referred to as modernization entered this region earlier than in
adjacent areas in Kutai. The Rheinische Mission began work in south Borneo in the
1830s (Avé & King 1986:24), and even if there seems to have been no missionary work
in the Teweh area before this century, and missionary efforts have had remarkably little
success on the upper Teweh where a majority of the Dayaks remain Kaharingan, other
aspects of Dutch influence thoroughly affected the Dayaks even in this relatively remote
corner of the Barito region. Various features of Dayak culture, including traditional
architecture (e.g. longhouses), styles of clothing and ornamentation (e.g. loincloth,
earplugs, and the custom of keeping long hair among the men), largely disappeared in the
early half of the twentieth century there, while it was only in the 1960s that these changes
mainly took place in upriver Bentian villages. A more efficient administrative order at
the subdistrict and village levels was also established much earlier in the Teweh area, a
fact which, among other things, reduced the length and format of larger rituals, which
were regarded as wasteful of material resources and time. However, despite these
changes, and even if the Dutch forced some inhabitants in the more remote parts of the
area to relocate and move closer to the main river (cf. Weinstock 1983a:126), the
population on the upper Teweh has remained comparatively reluctant to adopt permanent
village residence, and they have also preserved, in a somewhat unassertive way, a rich
stock of knowledge about cultural tradition, an indication of the fact that they live in the
area which is regarded as the ancestral homeland, and thus have a very concrete
connection to their mythological past. The Bentian also regard these neighbors as more
learned in these matters at the same time as their own more frequent and larger rituals
make themselves more knowledgeable about “tradition in practice.”
The Teweh Connection
The Bentian were not subjected to, or influenced directly by, the Banjarmasin Sultanate,
with the exception of the ancestors of some Bentian subgroups who originated in the
Benangin area in the middle reaches of the Teweh, and those Bentians who at various
times married into communities in the latter area. However, the Teweh River was one of
the most important dominions of the sultanate and it provided part of the Bentian
population with opportunities for trade which quite likely predates those afforded by the
Kutainese. The Bentian traded various forest products with Bekumpais on the upper
Teweh in the first half of the nineteenth century. The same is also true for their Luangan
Dayak neighbors on the Teweh, who in addition to the products traded by the Bentian
also supplied edible bird's nests for the Chinese market (there are no caves inhabited by
the species of swiftlet making these nests in the Bentian area). Some mountains on the
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middle and upper Teweh are rich sources of edible bird's nests, and the product has
presumably been exported from the area for a very long time (mainly via Banjarmasin,
but in part also via Pasir). The Teweh trade in bird's nests and other forest products —
most notably beeswax, most of which probably ended up for use in the batik industry on
Java — made the river one of the economically most important tributaries of the Barito,
or perhaps even, according to an eighteenth century observer, the most important one
(Hartman 1790). Schwaner described its inhabitants as featuring all the characteristics
required for trade (e.g. friendliness and cleverness), and in these respects distinguishing
themselves from the people of the Barito (1853:116). It seems that he intended his
description to apply both to the river’s Malay and Dayak populations. Early trade contacts
of the Teweh River Luangans may also explain some aspects of the lavish attribution of
prosperity and glory to the river's ancestral population in Luangan mythology.
However, at least since the early nineteenth century, most of the profits from the
Teweh River trade probably have gone into the hands of Bekumpai traders who for
several centuries up until this day have dominated the inland trade in the Barito River
system (cf. Schwaner 1853:73,77; Weddik 1851:20). This group, originating from Muara
Bahan (Marabahan) on the lower Barito, was also an important contributing factor to the
relative strength of the Banjarmasin Sultanate (together with its uniquely strong
agricultural base in the Hulu Sungai plains). The Bekumpais were originally Dayaks,
speaking a Ngaju-related language, who converted to Islam in 1688 (Schwaner 1853:74).
From about this time they started to move upriver and have continued to do so ever since,
colonizing parts of the river system further and further from Muara Bahan, at the same
time as their population has steadily increased. As was noticed by Schwaner (1853:74),
this population increase results in large part from their tendency to marry Dayaks as well
as from the fact that converted Dayaks in the region become Bekumpai. As Weinstock
(1983a:93-95) has noted, a majority of the present-day Bekumpais on the middle or upper
Barito and its tributaries are former Luangan (or other) Dayaks who have adopted
Bekumpai identity — and with it the Bekumpai language. Most of these, often very
recent, Bekumpais regard themselves as Malays (and, ironically, their language as a
Malay language), although there are, interestingly, also some who identify as Bekumpai
Dayaks. 
The key to the success of the Bekumpai may well have been this somewhat
ambiguous identity; they are a versatile people, easily adjusting to different milieus and
conditions, at home both in Dayak and Malay society. On the Teweh, where more than
a third of the population is Bekumpai today, most Bekumpais (both converted Luangans
and original) generally live much like Dayaks (make swiddens, hunt, etc.), with the result
that they are sometimes looked down upon by the Banjarese, who are known as the most
pious of the region's Muslims. The Bekumpai have nevertheless significantly influenced
the Dayaks on the river, who nowadays often refer to themselves using the Bekumpai
       “Dusun” is the name of the Luangan-related but distinct Dayaks who live along the banks of the40
middle reaches of the Barito, while “Tawoyan” (or “Taboyan”) is the autonym used by the Luangans
on the lower Teweh and Montalat rivers. The Bekumpai sometimes use the composite term Dusun-
Tawoyan as a shorthand label for both groups —  thereby following a locally popular pattern of
linguistic parallelism which will be discussed below. Some Teweh Luangans (especially those of the
village of Benangin), who formerly used only more restrictive local group denominations, have now
adopted this Bekumpai term even if they used to employ neither of its constitutents, and otherwise
take care to distinguish themselves from the Dusun. 
      According to information by the Austrian explorer Henri Albert Henrici, the total population of41
the Teweh was only about 1700 in 1833. Less than twenty years later, however, Schwaner reported
the population of the river basin to be around 3500 (1853:116). While there was only one village on
the upper Teweh (above the Datan rapids) reported by Henrici in 1833 (Henrici 1833), there were five
reported by Schwaner (1853:119). This change in population and village numbers was obviously not
only due to population increase, but rather, and to a much greater extent, to the increasing settlement
of Dayaks in villages who previously had lived dispersed in the surrounding forests. Similarly, the
increase of Bekumpais on the river in the same period does not so much reflect an increase of original
Bekumpais as one of Dayaks adopting Bekumpai identity. Comparing the information of Henrici
from 1833 (Henrici 1833) with that of Salomon Müller (1857) from 1836 we can note, for instance,
that the village of Djamoet which was Dayak at the former point of time had become Bekumpai at the
latter. A similar large-scale identity shift occurred in the early twentieth century when part of the
inhabitants of the village of Linonbesi became Bekumpai and founded a separate village.
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exonym “Dusun-Tawoyan.”   Perhaps their single most important accomplishment in40
this respect has been their gradual takeover of control over the trade of the Dayaks, who
throughout their history of coexistence with the Bekumpai frequently have found
themselves in debt to them (cf. Mallinckrodt 1927:582). Settlement in villages was
probably also established largely on the Bekumpai's initiative, and large numbers of
Teweh River Dayaks became Bekumpai in the 1830s, while others shifted ethnicity later,
sometimes one by one, sometimes whole families or villages at a time.  Those who have41
remained Dayak have picked up attributes of Muslim culture such as circumcision, which
is undergone by virtually all Teweh Dayak males today. On the whole, the Bentian's
Luangan neighbors on the Teweh appear much less distinctively Dayak than the Bentian;
the contrast between Dayak and Malay is also less marked here (as elsewhere in the
Barito region) than in Kutai, which Teweh Dayaks sometimes nostalgically refer to as a
haven of traditional Dayak culture. The common enemy — the Dutch, and before them,
the Pari — was probably an important factor bringing the Malays and Dayaks closer to
each other on the Teweh, at the same time as the Dutch also helped bring about this
situation more directly through their modernizing efforts.
As an influential example of the articulation of Dayak and Malay culture on the
Teweh River, Mangku Sari can be mentioned (see Tromp [1889:282] and Schulte
[1917:391, 394-95] for some published references to Mangku Sari). Mangku Sari was an
important Teweh River leader, famous for his “potency” or “magical power” (kekuasaan,
pengewasa), who is a frequent subject of Teweh river Luangan, Bekumpai and Bentian
stories today. Settlement in villages on the upper Teweh is said to have taken place under
Mangku Sari in the late nineteenth century. Mangku Sari is said to have lived in many
      Dutch nineteenth century literature on the Barito region abounds in references to the Pari42
Dayaks. These allegedly fierce headhunters were said to have lived in Kutai, on the upper Mahakam,
and to have made frequent incursions into the territory of what is now Central Kalimantan, traveling
on these occasions along small rivers in the Mahakam-Barito watershed which today bear their name
in commemoration of these events. Today there seems to be no Dayak group who use “Pari” as an
autonym. It is not unlikely that it was always used only as an exonym. To which upper Mahakam
Dayak groups the reports of Pari attacks referred is often unclear; however, the referent is sometimes
specified as either “Pari Bahau” or “Pari Mudeng” (Modang) by present-day Bentians and other East
and Central Kalimantan Luangans, who often remember the past raids of these peoples. King
(1979:12), who comments on von Kessel's (1850:167,185-86) usage of the word, points out that he
himself never came across it during his fieldwork (in West Kalimantan), but that the word pare
“appears in Upper Kapuas Punan and Kayan languages, and in Maloh ritual language, meaning quite
simply ‘rice’” (in the sense of paddy still in the field). It can be noted here that pare also means “rice”
in Luangan languages. Bernard Sellato (personal communication, 1996b) has proposed that the same
peoples also taught rice cultivation to several “Barito groups” (e.g. Ot Danum, Pin) and that it could
be on account of this that they (and the rivers on which they traveled) received their name.
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different locations on the Teweh as well as to have had numerous wives and innumerable
children. Like many other Bornean inland leaders, he was allegedly born a Dayak but
later converted to Islam. As an indication of his double identity — and, perhaps also, of
his general adaptability — is the fact that he is more affectionally known as “Kakah
Bayo” among the Dayaks, whereas Bekumpais and other Muslims prefer the name
“Mangku Sari.” Another indication of his versatile character is the seemingly contrary
statements that he fought the Dutch, but also gained his title and status from them.
Apparently his attitude toward the Dutch was different in different periods. After they,
at some point in the aftermath of the Banjarmasin war, shot an opposition leader in an
incident locally known as the Oleng Mea War, Mangku Sari become their ally.
Subsequently the Dayaks in the hills on the banks of the upper Teweh started to move
down to the main river to establish villages, and Mangku Sari, who is said to have led this
process on a Dutch directive, gained extensive authority, encompassing the whole length
of the river. At this time his magical power, which he is said to have gained by meditating
(betapah) on mountaintops and by associating with crocodiles (resulting in his acquiring
the Dayak appellation Kakah Bayo, lit., “Grandfather Crocodile”) helped him effect his
extraordinary leadership, as it had at an earlier stage helped him counter the attacks of the
dreaded Pari.
The Pari have to be mentioned in any historical overview of the Teweh River or the
Bentian area. Attacks from these upper Mahakam Dayaks  created a climate of fear in42
both areas in the first half of the nineteenth century, and on the lower Teweh the
inhabitants built highly elevated houses heavily fortressed by ironwood palisades
(benteng) for protection against these attacks. These architectural constructions were a
prominent feature in the region at the time, often noted by Western observers (e.g. Müller
1857:226; Schwaner 1896:cxc-cxci; Weddik 1851:22). Similar constructions of lighter
materials (excluding ironwood) were also sometimes built on the upper Teweh and
among the Bentian, where dispersed settlement in remote forest locations and frequent
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moves also served defensive purposes. The cessation of these attacks and other forms of
intergroup violence was a precondition for the settlement in villages and moves
downriver which the Dutch and the Kutai Sultanate begun to enforce in the late
eighteenth century and the second half of the nineteenth century, respectively (Knapen
2001:88-89).
The Pasir Region
There is one more region which we should briefly consider in order to get a more
complete picture of the Bentian's regional connections. This is Pasir, located between the
former Kutai and Banjar sultanates, an area which is today part of the province of East
Kalimantan. According to Pasirese mythology, the Pasir kingdom, located close to Tanah
Grogot (see Map 2), is said to have been established through the marriage of a Dayak
princess to the son of the king of the Hindu-Javanese kingdom of Giri, to which it is
believed that Pasir was tributary (Nüsselein 1905:566). Like Kutai Kartanegara, it was
presumably Hindu at first (with an inland Dayak population following local religious
beliefs) until Islam was introduced by an Arab preacher, probably at about the same time
as in Kutai (in the late 16th century). As in Kutai, the Bugis also much influenced the
political and economic situation in Pasir, when they started to migrate to the area after
the confederation between Bugis, Kutai and Pasir leaders in 1686. In the early 17th
century, the infamous pirate king Aru Paneki of the Bugis kingdom of Wajo, who
married a Pasirese princess, even tried to take over power in Pasir, but failed. He
nevertheless managed to make Pasir (and Kutai) tributary to Wajo, and it was from that
time on that the kings of Pasir bore the title of Sultan (Knappert 1905:590-91; Nüsselein
1905:566; Tromp 1888:18). At the beginning of this century, Pasir was a truly multi-
ethnic polity which consisted of a rather evenly balanced mix of Bawo Dayaks, Pasirese
(Luangan-related Pasir Dayaks who had converted to Islam), Bugis, Banjarese, and Bajau
fishermen (Nüsselein 1905:533). Before (and after) Pasir was drawn into the orbit of
Bugis influence, it was, like Kutai, periodically subjected to the overlordship of the
Banjarmasin Sultanate. The Dutch influence in Kalimantan, including the contracts
signed with the Pasirese Sultanate in the mid-nineteenth century (resulting in it becoming
a semi-autonomus landschap, recognizing Dutch supremacy), enabled Pasir, by freeing
it from Bugis, Banjarese, and Kutai control, to become more sovereign than it had
possibly ever been before (Magenda 1991:6).
It seems, however, that the Pasir rulers never succeeded in developing any great
measure of internal control in their kingdom, even less so than their counterparts in the
      As an indication of this we may see the remarkably loose social organization of the Pasir43
Dayaks, who probably were less subjected to integrative efforts than their counterparts in the Kutai
and Barito regions.
69
neighboring sultanates.  Through the nineteenth century the sultans replaced each other43
in quick succession (Nüsselein 1905:567). Factionalism was an acute problem, especially
in the late nineteenth century when the government was very weak and the Dutch
regarded the region as being in a state of anarchy. In 1896, the Dutch again became
involved in succession affairs when they replaced the then ruling sultan with a new one,
who unfortunately died within two years. As a result, Pangeran Mangkubumi (later
known as Sultan Ibrahim), a wealthy and influential Bugis trader related to the royal line,
came to power. However, as this man (who himself had been suspected of slave trading)
did little to bring order to Pasir, at the same time as he showed little respect for the
authority of the Dutch (whose presence was becoming stronger at this time), the Dutch
finally, in 1908, forced him to resign, and dissolved the Pasir Sultanate. The “disorder”
in the region did not immediately cease despite the Dutch takeover, however. The
aristocracy was dissatisfied with losing their position as well as with the size of the
pensions that they were given in compensation. This resulted in a revolt which lasted four
years, breaking out in 1913. This revolt was backed both by Muslims and Dayaks; the
latter, who were motivated to join the revolt by discontent with new Dutch tax policies
converted to Islam in large numbers at this time (Black 1985:285,289). 
In Pasir the institution of headhunting possibly had a comparatively small importance,
but, instead, slavery seems to have been very prevalent, probably as a result of the strong
Bugis influence and the absence of a powerful overreaching authority in the region.
Among the foremost characteristics of the Pasir region identified by Bentians are slaves
(batang ulun). Slaves were bought from (and possibly sold to) Pasir Dayaks of the
Kendilo and Telakei rivers, and some descendants of these slaves continue to live in the
Bentian and Teweh areas. Bentian formal exchange expeditions (roing) were particularly
frequently made to Pasir. Various objects and influences were acquired on these
expeditions or from Pasir Dayaks who married into some upper Teweh communities.
Among the most important of these are rattan seeds, water buffaloes, the belian bawo
ritual, and aspects of magical knowledge.
Bentians say that they brought the rattan seeds that they used when beginning to plant
rattan for cultivation from Bawo Dayaks in Pasir. This seems to have taken place mainly
at some time in the mid or late nineteenth century. Like the Bentian, and their Luangan
neighbors on the upper Teweh and the upper Bongan, the Bawo Dayaks of Pasir are
renowned for their high-quality rattan and they were so already a hundred years ago
(Nüsselein 1905:558). It is probable that the institution of rattan cultivation (which does
not seem to have been found in other parts of Borneo outside the southeast until recently)
spread from the Bawo Dayaks, although the primary reason for procuring rattan seeds
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from the Bawo which Bentians give is that Pasir is a center (pusat) or the origin place
(asar) of rattan (they were in possession of both the means, i.e. seeds, which can be
obtained from wild plants, and knowledge to plant rattan, and thus did not need to learn
rattan cultivation from the Bawo). In any event, it seems that all or most of the above-
mentioned groups (who have in common a rather dispersed settlement pattern) have been
cultivating rattan for trade for as long as one and half centuries, in time becoming
associated with the practice to the degree that it has become something of an ethnic
marker for them (Fried 1995:36; Knappert 1905:618,620,626-27; Weinstock
1983b:60,63).
Another thing besides rattan for which the Bentian enjoy a regional reputation is their
water buffaloes. Whereas water buffaloes are and have always been rather rare in Kutai
(cf. Bock [1881]:138) and the Teweh River area, they are numerous in many Bentian
villages. In some upriver communities there are several hundred animals, a condition
which, according to government officials, constitutes a safety hazard as well as a sign of
backwardness as long as they are allowed to roam free in and about the villages. Other
Dayaks, who like the Bentian slaughter water buffaloes only in connection with major
rituals in which they are used as sacrifices, often travel to the Bentian area to buy a water
buffalo. However, the distinctive Bentian practice of keeping large numbers of water
buffaloes is relatively recent. Like rattan seeds, water buffaloes were also brought from
Pasir (one or a few at a time), at approximately the same time period, or a few decades
earlier. Before that, there were no water buffaloes in the Bentian area, and only pigs and
chickens were sacrificed at the thanksgiving and mortuary rituals in which they seem to
play such an important role today. The reason that the water buffaloes were brought from
Pasir was probably mainly determined by questions of supply. However, a notion that
things — in some way or another — should be traced back from their center or origin
place was probably also involved in this (according to Luangan mythology, the water
buffalo originated in Pasir).
One thing for which the Pasir region is famous in south Borneo is magical or mystical
knowledge (ilmu, lemu) which especially its indigenous inhabitants (including the
Moslem Pasirese) are said to possess. The tradition of betapa, or isolated meditation for
the purpose of acquiring ilmu, is associated with Pasir, a connection probably not wholly
unrelated to the fact that Sultan Adam, who reigned there in the early nineteenth century,
is known to have meditated on the top of Gunung Melihat, Pasir's highest mountain
(Nüsselein 1905:538). Ilmu related to poisons and antidotes is another type of knowledge
that Bentians say was particularly developed in Pasir; today the Bentian themselves are
associated with these forms of knowledge. Like the Bawo Dayaks, to whom they have
at times been likened, the Bentian have for a long time been regarded as “primitive” by
downriver people. One reason for this reputation, besides their dispersed settlement
pattern, is related to their role as cultural brokers between their downriver Dayak
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neighbors in Kutai, on the one hand, and the Dayaks of Pasir and the Teweh River
Luangan, on the other. By passing on aspects of Kaharingan tradition from the latter to
the former, the Bentian have gained a reputation as ardent animists, well-skilled in
matters of spirit interaction. An important example in this connection is belian bawo, a
curing ritual which is characterized by a dramatic shamanic performance expressive of
the special spirit familiars employed in it. This ritual is today widespread in southern
Borneo, practiced both by various East and Central Kalimantan Luangans, and by the
Maanyan and the Siang (an Ot Danum subgroup) in the latter province, but it originates,
as its name suggests, with the Bawo Dayaks, and is thus itself a major form of Pasir ilmu
acquired by the Bentian.
The Bentian in the Postcolonial Period
The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia during the second world war (1942-45) brought
an end to Dutch colonial rule in Borneo, at least in so far as present-day Bentian
conceptions of their history are concerned (the period between 1945 and 1949, when
independence had already been declared but not yet recognized by the Dutch, is not
acknowledged as a separate period). As among many other Indonesians, the occupation
itself is remembered as a period of hardship and humiliation, although the Bentian were
somewhat less subjected to Japanese demands for foods and labor than some other
Indonesians as a result of the relative remoteness of their area. However, Japanese troops
did make claims on Bentian rice reserves and in some villages a small number of
Japanese soldiers were killed by Bentians (Fried 1995:42-43). Supplies of cloth and other
downstream items such as salt ran out during this time, and cotton had to be replaced by
barkcloth, while forest foods had to compensate for appropriated harvests. Some people
stayed away on their swiddens for most of the time of the Occupation. More than
anything else, perhaps, the experience of the period added up to an impression of
exogenous forces as unpredictable and opaque, an impression which events in the post-
independence period have continued to support. Today, the Japanese Occupation is
generally little and only reluctantly talked about; this reflects the fact that history and
violence are highly sensitive topics among the Bentian in their present situation.
Little regard is also presently given to the events surrounding independence (declared
on August 17, 1945) which in many villages was most concretely manifested in an order
commanding the inhabitants to fabricate a national flag to replace the former Dutch
banner and in some villages a goat, significantly not a traditional domestic animal, was
sacrificed by the foot of the flagpole. Effects of independence in the relatively far-off
Bentian area came gradually, even though today many of these subsequent changes —
and many preceding ones — are retrospectively associated with the event itself, as if they
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had all occurred then. So do, for instance, people associate the abandonment of various
forms of dress and traditions with independence, even though many of these aspects of
culture were relinquished mainly in the 1960s, around the time of the volatile transition
from Sukarno's Guided Democracy to Suharto's New Order regime. Similarly, people
associate independence with the end of intergroup warfare and the abolishment of slavery
and title-based leadership (which was often hereditary in practice), even if these changes
mainly took place before it, under the influence of the Dutch and the Kutai Sultanate. One
of the principal meanings which Bentians attribute to independence concerns
stratification; reiterating a revolutionary rhetoric of the early nationalism, they describe
independence as a new era in which everybody was to become equal, “sit equally low,
stand equally tall” (duduk sama rendah, berdiri sama tinggi, I.). But all manner of
twentieth century changes are typically identified with the event. As an old man
expressed it to me, independence meant that the old way of life (adet bayuh) was to be
abandoned, and new trends (aliran baru) had to be followed.
Many of the changes that have occurred since independence are the direct or indirect
result of influence from the state which in the postcolonial period has been present in the
Bentian area on a scale unprecedented in the colonial and precolonial periods. In fact, the
association of independence with change in general should perhaps be read as a subtle
comment by the Bentian on their experience of the postcolonial state. However, this is
not to say that the degree of national integration and modernization in the area has been
particularly high as compared to other parts of Indonesia. On the contrary, as a
consequence of its remoteness and low population numbers, the area has remained
comparatively undeveloped and marginal in these respects, and precisely its status as
such is, in fact, one of the factors which most profoundly marks the Bentian's
postcolonial predicament. As a result of this condition the Bentian have a regional
reputation as “unprogressive” (belum maju), “not yet ordered” (belum diatur) and
“backward” (terbelakang). In addition, other peoples' notions of the Bentian and their
own self-conceptions are also thoroughly informed by a nationally and regionally
prevalent view (reflecting early colonial stereotypes) according to which Dayaks are
primitive and savage. Eliminating attributes of Bentian culture perceived as backward or
primitive has in fact been a leading objective of government policies in the Bentian area
since independence. Accordingly, the presence of the postcolonial state has by Bentians
been perhaps most strongly felt as a general expectation of developing by leaving behind
the old ways and adopting new ones.
An understanding of the influence of the Indonesian state on the Bentian would be
difficult without reference to a few central concepts which have characterized
government politics in the postcolonial era. One of the most important of these is
undoubtedly Pancasila, literally “the five principles,” the Indonesian state ideology
which was established by Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, as a foundation for the
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country's constitution. Pancasila is probably the most influential and sanctified of all
Indonesian political concepts and one constantly hears it referred to on all levels of
political discourse and beyond. Public speeches in particular often contain at least some
reference to Pancasila even among remote Dayak populations such as the Bentian. Since
1973, school children and civil servants have been required to take courses in Pancasila
ideology (Langenberg 1986:21). 
Originally intended as the cornerstone of a pluralistic ideology accommodating the
diverse political currents (nationalist, religious, communist) dominant in the new
Indonesian nation, Pancasila has become above all an instrument of consensus and unity,
principally employed to promote interests of stability and integration, or what is
sometimes referred to as “Pancasila democracy” (Anderson 1990:114). For Bentians, the
word has come to signify the interests and language of the state and the associated taboo
on government critique which permeated the political climate of independent Indonesia
until the fall of President Suharto in 1998. It has also come to stand for the desirability
of unity and integration on a local level, both within communities, and with respect to
relations with other peoples. Under Pancasila, overt expressions of individualism and
ethnicity are equally divisive. Pancasila is associated, on the one hand, with a nationally
omnipresent public culture of consensual cooperation, epitomized in the two government-
endorsed concepts of musyawarah (“public consultation”) and gotong royong (“collective
work”/”mutual assistance”), which Bentians, like other Indonesians, commonly employ
as designations for various institutions in their society. On the other hand, Pancasila is
also closely connected with a government policy discouraging politicized expressions of
ethnic identity in a strict sense of the term, while promoting, in the spirit of the national
slogan Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (“Unity in Diversity”), objectified expressions of regional
variety in a restrictively cultural form (e.g. dance performances, traditional architecture)
(Acciaioli 1985). Among the Bentian, these aspects of Pancasila policy have had the
effect of discrediting their dispersed settlement pattern of swidden residence, as well as
strongly inhibiting public affirmation or discussion of anything which may be defined as
socially divisive. They have also contributed to a similar inhibition on the vocalization
of ethnic sentiments and made cultural difference a simultaneously important and highly
sensitive topic. As elsewhere in Indonesia, the application of the Pancasila concept has
also served to foster national consciousness and create the impression that the possession
of a national identity transcending more local loyalties is the mark of modern citizenship.
Consequently, being, or at least appearing, “Indonesian” has become a central concern
for most Bentians, and they are, in fact, more eager than any of their neighbors to deny
ethnic distinctiveness and social dissension, despite their appearance, in the eyes of
others, of being particularly “ethnic” and disintegrated. As in the case of other
Indonesians, one of the most significant aspects of belonging to the nation-state for many
      In contrast to Luangans in Central Kalimantan, many of whom have become Bekumpai, very44
few Bentians and a rather limited number of other East Kalimantan Luangans have converted to
Islam.
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Bentians (especially the young) is the crowd-attracting celebrations of Independence Day
and other major public events held in subdistrict capitals and transmigration camps.
In addition to being used to promote unity within communities and between ethnic
groups, Pancasila is invoked by government officials and other Indonesians to advocate
religious tolerance and the importance of religion. The first and most important principle
of Pancasila is “belief in the supreme God” (ketuhanan yang maha esa). Developed as
a compromise between secular and religious interests, this principle postulates religious
freedom at the same time as it states that everybody in Indonesia must have a religion
(Kipp and Rodgers 1987:16-17). As what officially counts as religion, or agama, is
limited to the four major world religions (Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism), this
freedom of religion has often been more restricting than liberating, especially in the case
of peoples who follow some of Indonesia's numerous indigenous religions, which do not
qualify as agama, but are classified as kepercayaan (“beliefs”). These people, including
a large portion of the Bentian, have in the postcolonial period been referred to as “people
who do not yet have a religion” (orang yang belum beragama), indicating that the proper
course of development implies adopting a religion and that those who have not (who are
often attributed the derogatory label of animis, or animists), are on a lower stage of
development than those who have. In the Bentian area, missionary work, conducted
mainly by Indonesians, has intensified in the postindependence period and non-Christian
Bentians have been subject to a good deal of pressure to convert to Christianity,
especially the younger generation and those individuals who have become government
employees (pegawai, I.) or received an education beyond primary school.  The pressure44
to convert to one of the world religions became especially strong from the mid-1960s
with the coming to power of Suharto's New Order regime and the associated communist
massacres; since then lack of affiliation with a world religion has been, in addition to a
sign of primitiveness, a potential indication of communism.
In order to be able to continue to practice the traditional religion without these stigma,
Ngaju Dayaks in the so-called “Dayak province” of Central Kalimantan — which was
established in 1957 out of the Muslim-dominated province of South Kalimantan as a
result of a Dayak rebellion (see Miles 1976:102-124) — have since independence been
campaigning for state acceptance of Kaharingan as agama (Schiller 1997:116-120). In
1980, Kaharingan received official recognition by the Indonesian Department of Religion
as a branch of Balinese Hinduism under the name of Hindu Kaharingan. Since then the
status of Kaharingan in Central Kalimantan has much improved and its followers,
including the Bentian's Luangan neighbors on the Teweh River, are now under
significantly less pressure to convert to a world religion than before.
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In East Kalimantan, however, the same situation does not prevail. In distinction to the
Central Kalimantan government where Dayaks often have held important posts, including
the position of governor, the Muslim-dominated East Kalimantan government has so far
been unwilling to recognize Kaharingan in practice. East Kalimantan Kaharingans still
suffer from a reputation as animists, and those who have acquired an identity card (KTP)
have had to report Christianity or Islam as their religion since the officials issuing them
have declined to fill in Kaharingan on the cards (in Indonesia, religious affiliation has to
be indicated on identity cards). In the village statistics which the village head is
responsible for providing to the camat, or subdistrict chief, Kaharingan followers have
likewise been classified as Christians (when, in some instances, the village head has
reported them as Kaharingans, the information has subsequently been revised at a higher
level). Consequently, the Kaharingans in East Kalimantan are officially non-existent,
even if unofficially close to half of the Luangan population in the province probably still
consider themselves as Kaharingan for purposes of self-identification (and many of those
who identify as Christian actively participate in Kaharingan rituals). In fact, Kaharingan
is probably more strongly adhered to in some parts of East Kalimantan than anywhere in
Central Kalimantan, at least if we understand by “Kaharingan” the “traditional religion,”
as opposed to Hindu Kaharingan. This is in large part due to the fact that the presence of
the Indonesian state, and before that, the Dutch government, has been stronger in Central
Kalimantan than in East Kalimantan. With a greater number of Dayaks in all levels of
provincial government, and a tradition of more effective local administration dating back
to the Dutch period (when much of Central Kalimantan, unlike East Kalimantan, was a
so-called “direct rule area”), the provincial government in Central Kalimantan has been
more intensely engaged in “developing” the Dayaks in their area (e.g. by demanding that
they obtain permits from the police before arranging larger rituals). In comparison, East
Kalimantan government officials (who are frequently outsiders, e.g. Javanese, Banjarese
or Buginese) have held an attitude of relative neglect and non-intervention in this regard,
especially with respect to the more remote parts of the province, such as Bentian Besar.
As a consequence, Kaharingan Bentians have maintained a much more active ritual life
— along with a reputation of being generally more traditional — than their Teweh River
Luangan neighbors on the other side of the provincial border, even though a higher
proportion of the latter identify (probably both officially and unofficially) as Kaharingans.
An important consequence of government politics concerning religion on the Bentian,
however, especially since the instigation of Suharto's New Order Regime, has been a
growing political and discursive importance of an almighty God. As everywhere in
Indonesia, monotheism has become a publicly recognized ideal among the Bentian. This
ideal has become especially important after the recognition of Kaharingan as a agama,
and the subsequent development of Ranying Hatallah Langit as the Hindu Kaharingan
Godhead in Central Kalimantan, where the Kaharingan religion has been significantly
      Unlike many other Dayaks, there are no strongly developed indigenous notions of an almighty45
God among the Bentian. An indication of this is that there is no consistently used indigenous term for
God; the most commonly used is Latallah or Allatallah which apparently derives from the Arabic
Allah. Although a creator God is referred to in myths (a fact which may  be the result of a relatively
recent revision), this creator God is not addressed in ritual (something which contrasts markedly with
the central ritual and other importance of a Creator among many northern Dayaks such as the Berawan,
who interestingly lack the “departmental deities,” that is, spirit agencies associated with special
responsibilities, which are so typical of the Bentian and, in Derek Freeman's 1960b:76 words,
“polytheistic” Dayaks such as the Iban (see Metcalf 1989:69-71).
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rationalized in response to government expectations regarding agama (see Schiller 1997).
Among Kaharingan Bentians, however, the practical importance of God as an “everyday
authority” has not yet become very important, and in their rituals, God plays virtually no
role.  For this reason, I will not be much concerned with the concept in Chapter 4, but
rather concentrate on the different kinds of spirits which represent the principal spiritual
authorities for Kaharingan Bentians.  45
Besides agama, another word closely associated with Pancasila political rhetoric is
adat, used as a designation for those aspects of minority culture which are allowed and
expected to be different. In Indonesia, every group is supposed to have an adat, that is,
a set of more or less distinctive customs and traditions, and often also a code of
customary law applying to intra-community affairs such as marriages and community
land rights. In order to regulate this customary law, most villages in interior Kalimantan
have a kepala adat or head of customary law, an office representing a heritage from the
earlier institution of title-based leadership. In government politics and present-day
Bentian discourse, adat is often contrasted to agama, and Kaharingan practices, since
they are not recognized as agama in East Kalimantan, are commonly classified as adat.
However, Bentian and other Dayak notions of adat in the sense of tradition — like those
prescribed in the law books of the Islamized sultanates from which they probably
originated — have “traditionally” been very broad, applying to the social world as well
as to the sphere of religion (for descriptions of such broad concepts of adat among other
Dayaks, see Metcalf 1982:4; Schiller 1997:77-79; Whittier 1973:135-37). It is only after
Indonesian independence that religion, as a result of a process of religious rationalization
brought about by Pancasila politics, gradually has become separated from tradition, and
the meaning of adat, in the sense of tradition, increasingly has become reduced to non-
secular tradition. Bentians nevertheless still use the word  “adat” (or its Bentian
counterpart, adet) in the wider sense to cover tradition in general, although the more
restricted application has now become dominant. As among other Indonesian groups
practicing similarly contested religious traditions (cf. Atkinson 1989; Steedly 1993),
questions about what is, or ought to be, adat and agama, respectively, also frequently
occupy them, even though a concern with objectifying or otherwise reconstructing adat
in the sense of tradition in response to government expectations, has not yet become very
important unlike among many other Indonesian populations (cf. Bowen 1991; Kipp &
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Rodgers 1987; Spyer 1996). The most common Bentian usage of the word adat may still
be what I believe to be the original usage, that is, adat in the sense of customary law.
In addition to a head of customary law, every Bentian village, in accordance with
general Indonesian practice, has a kepala desa, or village head. Together with a secretary
(sekretaris), and a number of subvillage heads (ketua RT), these officials, who are
generally popularly elected (although sometimes appointed by the subdistrict head) and
who receive small salaries (insufficient for subsistence) from the government, form the
formal leadership of the village.  Informally, as we shall see later, elders and extended
family heads, or those who have a lesser or higher degree of manti status, also play a
significant part in the regulation of social relations within the village. The position of
village head is officially the highest ranking office in the village, although in many
villages the head of customary law, who is usually a direct descendant of an earlier title-
bearing leader, has more authority in practice. One reason for this is that most influential
elders are either unqualified or unwilling to accept the post as village head as it involves
a lot of paperwork. Whereas it is the regulation of internal social affairs which forms the
jurisdiction of the head of customary law, the domain of the village headman (who, like
the head of customary law, is always a male) consists of the regulation of the externally
imposed, government-dictated order in the community. The village head is the principal
representative of the state in the village, in the sense that it is his task to oversee the
implementation of government regulations and provide data on the village for the
government. He is also responsible for the distribution of village subsidies (uang
pembantuan desa) — since the 1970s one of the most important aspects of state influence
on the Bentian — as well as for hosting important guests and communicating the requests
of villagers to subdistrict officials. He may thus be seen as something of an intermediary
between the state and his people. Because of these qualities of the position, Bentian
village heads have also long played a pivotal role in integrating the Bentian into the larger
society.
One of the most important implications of this integration into the larger society is
that Bentians have become obliged to register residence in particular villages. This
classification of residence, which began in the early twentieth century, but which has
become increasingly strict in the postcolonial era, imposes important restrictions on
mobility. Moving from one village to another today is far from a straightforward
business, and it cannot be done without due notification to village heads. Even visiting
other villages can sometimes prove difficult. Outside the Bentian area, staying in places
where one is not known often requires the possession of an identity card — which many
Bentians were still not able to acquire in the 1990s — as such documents may be
requested by the police and other authorities, including the military. Due to the military’s
“dual function” (dwifungsi, I.) of being responsible both for security and for various other
tasks in the public sector, the military is posted in every subdistrict, including Bentian
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Besar, as is the case also with the police. In addition to these agents of security, who are
mainly outsiders who spend most of their time in the subdistrict capitals where they are
posted, a small number of local men in every village belong to civil defense units called
HANSIP whose members regularly receive training in the subdistrict capitals. Movement
is especially difficult for a period of several months before and during national elections.
Indeed, registration for these intermittent events has itself been an important factor
motivating a stricter classification of residence. 
As a result of the country's hierarchic and centralized power structure, voting in
Indonesia — especially during the New Order era when only three parties were permitted
and government politics were overwhelmingly dominated by the state-backed Golongan
Karya (GOLKAR) party — has commonly been perceived as a state ceremony organized
to demonstrate national unity and government loyalty rather than an institution through
which the people can influence the politics of the state (e.g. Anderson 1990:114;
Pemberton 1994:5). Such perceptions are perhaps especially common among small and
marginal minorities such as the Bentian, among whom voting has generally been
perceived not so much as a right as an obligation, part of what is required of modern
citizens. Factors contributing to such notions in the Bentian case are suspicions of
electoral fraud on all levels, their assumptions that they have very small possibilities of
influencing, or gaining much from, government politics, at the same time as they are
being subjected to tight control in connection with elections.
The full significance of the fact that the Bentian are regarded as less developed and
modern than their neighbors cannot be grasped without considering the central
importance that the concepts of “development” (pembangunan) and “progress”
(kemajuan) have had in Indonesia. During Suharto's New Order regime (Orde Baru)
these concepts, especially the former, became what Michael van Langenberg (1986) has
coined “keywords” in Indonesian government politics (cf. Heryanto 1988). In the 1970s,
with the oil boom, and as timber extraction in the country took on speed, launching
programs of development became an increasingly common government activity also in
the more remote parts of the Indonesian archipelago. Developing “isolated” tribal
populations identified as particularly undeveloped then became a special issue for the
government (especially for the Department of Social Affairs, or DEPSOS) as these
groups, through their “negative” characteristics, appeared to negate the success of the
government in its development efforts. In order to achieve this end, a program for the
management of “isolated peoples” (suku terasing) was established, the principal targets
being hunters and gatherers and swidden cultivators, in other words, people who have in
common a lifestyle of being nomadic and dispersed. Mobility is, in fact, as Tsing
(1993:155) has noted, a defining characteristics of the suku terasing, and the same
feature, like dispersal, is a mark of a “lack of order,” which in its turn is the prototypical
attribute assigned to populations considered undeveloped. Standard measures applied in
      Swidden cultivating Dayak groups which have been classified as suku terasing in southeast46
Borneo include Bukits in South Kalimantan, and Bawo Luangans in Central Kalimantan and Pasir
(East Kalimantan).
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the isolated peoples' program have been relocation and agricultural guidance, including
the introduction of settled cash-crop cultivation and fertilizers. Since that which in
Indonesia has been understood as development and progress in the fields of culture and
social life is closely associated with notions of “order” or “regulation” (aturan), attempts
to “order” or “regulate” the daily activities of the target populations have constituted
common development strategies applied in the program.
Although the Bentian, unlike some other similarly remote and dispersed swidden
cultivators in southeast Borneo, have not gained official status as suku terasing, the
possibility of becoming so, like the stigma attached to their reputation of backwardness,
has formed an incentive for them, if not to conform unconditionally to all aspects of
change desired, then at least to try to make an appearance of being developed and
ordered.  An indication of this is that Bentians generally avoid discussion about, and try46
to conceal, those aspects of their culture and social life which for some reason are or have
been regarded as backward or disorderly, including customs and practices already
discontinued. In addition to swidden cultivation and swidden residence (which to
government officials represent major examples of unregulated and divisive practices,
respectively), particularly sensitive aspects in this regard include litigation (which implies
intracommunity division), the practice of keeping water buffaloes and pigs unfettered
(which, besides being indicative of a lack of order, is regarded by government officials
as dangerous and unhygienic, respectively), polyandrous unions (which suggest
promiscuity and violate national law), as well as the long-abolished practices of slavery,
intergroup warfare and headhunting (which, besides being classic savage insignia
confirming the stereotype of Dayaks as primitive, render the Bentian as violent, a
characteristic which makes them particularly uneasy). Another indication of a propensity
of Bentians to represent themselves as modern and developed is their eagerness to
reiterate state discourse and nationalist propaganda in public discussions, such as when
they claim, for example, that there is only one God, common to all people irrespective
of religion, or that all ethnic groups are basically similar.
It is not solely on the basis of their own initiative that Bentians try to divert attention
from such practices as are regarded as undeveloped or disordered, but also because of an
outright pressure from the government to make them abandon them to which they have
at times been subjected since independence. Examples of such pressure are the attempts,
channeled by subdistrict officials and some village heads, to make them stop building
longhouses and, instead, build small single-family houses, attempts which reflect notions
of administrative order according to which every kaka, a term denoting a household unit
ideally led by a senior male (kepala keluarga, I.), should dwell separately (masing-
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masing, I.), preferably in houses aligned in neat rows and provided with a number and
the name of the household head on a sign attached to their front wall. Bentians have also
been told by government officials that they should stay in the villages rather than out on
their swiddens, and that they should stop using certain forms of traditional dress and
adornment, such as the loincloth (long a major sign of primitiveness in the region and
which government officials declared as “inappropriate in the age of independence” in
connection with the first national elections). Rumors also have it that government
officials have been searching through some villages for individuals involved in
polyandrous unions.
Despite these government attempts (real or perceived) at transforming Bentian
culture, and its concomitant devaluation, Bentians do not generally consider development
merely or even mainly as negative. In fact, they welcome a great deal of change
understood as development, and many people even concede to the critique of their own
culture, at least in part. To the degree that Bentians are openly critical of development or
the government, they are mainly critical about the lack of development in their area.
Thus, Bentians have long been critical about the absence of roads in their area and they
are generally positive about the existence of the roads which were established in the
1980s and 90s, even if most of these are poorly managed and some of them are “owned”
by logging companies which have been reluctant to take Bentians as passengers on their
trucks. The same is true regarding Bentian attitudes toward education (schools were
established in a few villages already in the Dutch period, but the primary school network
was extended to include most villages during independence), even if many children, as
a result of swidden work or residence, sometimes neglect school. The Bentian also have
a basically approving attitude toward public health services, even if these, as already
noted, are exceptionally restricted in their area, and provided mainly in the form of
vitamin injections and antibiotics by a visiting nurse (for hospital services, Bentians have
to travel downstream to Tenggarong or Samarinda, minimally two days’ boat journey
away). Another aspect of development of which the Bentian have been basically
approving is the government's village subsidy program, which, to mention one of its most
notable effects, has enabled all Bentian villages to acquire generator-powered rice mills.
Even if the Bentian can be said to have a mainly positive attitude toward development
and integration into the larger society, this does not mean that they have welcomed all
aspects of integration and recent change in their area. One aspect about which many
Bentians are largely critical, and openly so, is logging company activities. In addition to
logging proper, these activities include the management of so-called “Industrial Forest
Plantations” (HTI), planted mainly with rubber and fast-growing trees grown for cellulose
production, as well as village development programs (proyek pembinahan desa), which
      It is common practice in Kalimantan that logging companies conduct development projects. It is47
understood that by doing so they recompense for the revenues that they obtain from their concessions.
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the companies have conducted on behalf of the government.  The main source of47
Bentian discontent with the logging companies, which nowadays are all Indonesian, is
the fact that the latter in many instances have failed to respect traditional community
landrights, and, as a consequence, destroyed vast areas of Bentian fallow fields and rattan
cultivation. Particularly instrumental in generating discontent was the clearcutting in
1993 of thousands of hectares of Bentian lands intended as a plantation for the inhabitants
of the transmigration camp which a couple of years later (delayed as a result of Bentian
opposition) was established in the midst of their territory (for details on these events, and
the ensuing developments, see Fried 1995:154-224).
Bentian resistance to logging company activities has been extraordinarily strong (in
general, similar violations of “traditional landrights,” although commonplace, met with
little resistance in New Order Indonesia), involving suits against the companies
concerned as well as numerous petitions directed to various government authorities on
all levels, including Jakarta. Thanks to the assistance of Indonesian and international
NGOs, and an increasingly open press, it has also made them famous throughout
Indonesia, especially since Loir Botor Dingit, the son and heir of the late “regional head
of customary law” (kepala adat besar), in 1997 received the International Goldman
Environmental Award. The exceptionally strong reaction of the Bentian to outsider
encroachment on their lands reflects the exceptional magnitude of their rattan cultivation,
which since the 1970s, as a result of rising world market prices, has enabled many
Bentians to obtain considerable cash incomes. However, some Bentians have still taken
up employment with the logging companies, and a couple of dozen Bentian families have
also taken up residence at the transmigraton site, thereby surrendering (by signing a
contract) their claims to land other than the three hectare rubber and vegetable plot
granted them, together with a small house, as part of the transmigration program. Despite
their strong critique of logging and transmigration, Bentian attitudes toward these
phenomena are not undivided, and many hold basically ambivalent views about them. A
fundamental ambivalence is even more characteristic of Bentian attitudes toward the
policies of the state, which they did, however, not criticize openly until recently.
The Bentian in their Local World: Subsistence and Settlement 
Place means everything to the Bentian. As I will argue in the following section, a very
concrete attachment to land and locality is fundamental to most aspects of Bentian
personal and social life. Social actions and interaction and people's understandings of
      Unfortunately, I did not conduct a survey on the use of rice seed varieties but Stephanie Fried48
(1995:118) reports a total of sixty-seven varieties planted (between three to fifteen by each family) in
a Bentian village “not known for preserving rice stocks.” This number may be compared with a total
of thirty-two among the Bukit, and fifty-seven among the Taboyan, as reported by Christensen and
Mertz (1993).
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themselves reflect their concrete positioning (and narrative re-positioning) in, and
distribution over, what are essentially social landscapes. Processes of spatial or
geographical positioning and movement go a long way in defining the dynamics of
Bentian society. Because of this intimate connection of land and people, Bentians
experience forests as social terrain, and for the same reason, both their more abstract and
their concrete notions of their relationship to the land center on practical association with
it.
Bentian Swidden Cultivation 
The Bentian live in a rainforest environment with heavy rainfall usually ranging between
2000 and 4000 mm per year. The months between June and September are usually the
driest, and rainfall is heaviest around the turn of the year between December and
February. However, rainfall is unpredictable, and in some years there may be a prolonged
dry season with little or no rain, whereas in others it may rain regularly throughout the
year. Much of the sparsely populated Bentian area was covered with primary rainforest
until recently, but logging operations since the early 1980s have dramatically reduced its
extent to well below a quarter of the total.
The Bentian, as already mentioned, are swidden cultivators which means that they
plant rice in plots of forests cleared by burning, usually located some distance away from
villages. Although hill rice (Oryza sativa) is the economically and culturally most
important crop — providing the highly valued food staple as well as a major symbol and
basic material element in rituals — a large number of other cultigens (e.g. cassava,
bananas, coconut palm, sugar palm, areca palm, eggplant, cucumbers, maize, to name
some of the most important) are also planted in the swiddens and around villages. A large
number of different varieties of rice with different properties are also used, and several
varieties are always planted in the same swidden.  The diversity of crops and rice48
varieties planted point to what Christensen and Mertz (1993) have described as a “risk
avoidance strategy” characterizing Bornean swidden systems. The unpredictable rainfall
together with the predation of wild animals make swidden cultivation quite a risky
business, and it is not uncommon for rice or other harvests to fail altogether. Severe
droughts have always occurred occasionally, but they were particularly common in the
1980s and 1990s, leading to region-wide rice deficiencies and reliance on purchased rice
      Again, I have no precise statistical data on this matter. Christensen and Mertz (1993) report49
incomplete lists of totals of 85 and 64 plants cultivated in a Taboyan and Bukit community,
respectively (excluding plants with purely medicinal or religious functions). Fried (1995:19) notes
that “Bentian gardens contain mixtures of over forty vegetables and medicinal herbs,” in addition to a
large number of fruit trees, other trees, and rattans, etc.
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and other swidden crops. The characteristic diversity of Dayak swidden systems may thus
be regarded as an adaptation to the unstable environment, and this function, together with
concrete experiences of hardship resulting from such unpredictability (and what we may
call a subsistence farmer identity), helps explains the resistance to giving up the lifestyle
which frequently characterizes Dayaks in the face of government development projects
advocating other subsistence models.
Apart from vegetables and fruit trees used for food, Bentians also grow various plants
for medicinal and ritual uses, and in their swiddens they also plant or encourage the
spontaneous propagation of many wild-growing trees, bamboos and rattans, which
provide, among other things, different kinds of construction materials. Perhaps some fifty
variously useful plants may be found in a single Bentian swidden.  Among the most49
important of these plants is rattan, especially the sega (I.) or soke species (Calamus
caesius), which is the one which has had the highest and most consistent market value,
and which is most extensively cultivated. Apart from this species, about five or six other
rattan species are also irregularly sold, and in addition to them some ten or more species
without market value are used locally. Rattan is by far the most important cash crop and
others such as coffee, rubber or peanuts are only cultivated by small numbers of Bentians,
usually in rather small quantities. In comparison, gaharu (I.) or aloe wood (Aquilaria sp.)
which is collected in primary forest and sold to traders, has a much greater importance
in the Bentian cash economy, and the same is also true for honey (collected from certain
species of large trees which attract colonies of wild bees, so-called “bee trees,” or tanyut),
which is periodically sold in large quantities. Historically, other forest products such as
resins have also been important as trade items. Swiddens are located in and immediately
surrounded by forests and Bentians, like other forest dwellers, utilize a wide range of
forest foods (e.g. fruits, mushrooms, palms, tubers) found in both primary and formerly
cultivated, regenerating forest. These forest foods together make up a significant portion
of all foods consumed, and proteins chiefly derive from fish and game (mainly wild boar,
deer, and mousedeer, but on occasion also various other animals) which most men
regularly search for, using, among other things, dogs and spears, bamboo spear spring
traps, snares, cast nets, angling rods, and tree-root fish poison (Derris sp.), which
stupefies the fish. Livestock (chickens, pigs, and water buffaloes) are also kept (both in
villages and swiddens, water buffaloes usually in the swiddens), although domestic
animals are only consumed in connection with rituals (which may, however, at times be
very frequent). Water buffaloes are important indices of wealth and hence of influence
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in the community, although their owners only rarely sell or manage to get good quantities
of cash for them, despite the high monetary value that they are recognized as having. The
number of these animals kept in some Bentian communities is probably higher than
anywhere else in the region and the Bentian are infamous for their water buffaloes which
wander freely about the villages (and often in them at night), inciting fear and derogatory
comments from outsiders.
The swidden cycle of the Bentian resembles that of other Southeast Asian swidden
cultivators. After a swidden site has been chosen, (an intricate process involving
negotiation with relatives and potential prior users, considerations of age, off-farm
activities, weather predictions, and, in some cases, omen readings), swidden work begins
with the slashing of undergrowth (nokap), a work task performed by small groups of men,
usually in May or June. A few weeks later, individual men fell larger trees (noweng), and
then in August or September, towards the end of the dry season, the same men and
perhaps their family members clear the fields by burning (nyuru). Then, with the onset
of the rains, usually around October, planting (ngasek) takes place. This is work done in
cooperation by men making holes in the ground with dibbling sticks and women
following behind and pitching rice seeds in the holes, often in large workgroups of up to
fifty people or more, especially if rice planting in the mementian fashion takes place.
Participation is according to a principle of balanced reciprocity (ideally, the number of
workers who are sent to households which have provided workers should be equal to how
many were originally provided), and the household which owns the rice field additionally
provides festive food, including meat, for the day to all participants. After planting
follows a period of occasional weeding (ngejikut) mainly performed by small groups of
women, which is closed with harvesting (ngoteu), also chiefly women's work, and a
harvest ritual (kerewaiyu, replaced by a Christian version, in converted families) in
February-March. At several points in the agricultural year, activities may be adjusted to
lunar cycles or the appearance of particular constellations of stars (Weinstock 1983a:172-
78), or to the advent of certain seasonally appearing birds (pempulun taun), although such
considerations seem to have lost some of their former importance, and may always have
been subordinate to weather considerations.
Swiddens are cleared in virgin forest only in a rather small minority of cases, usually
by young men or people with extensive family responsibilities. More frequently people
opt for young or old secondary forest, even if the yield is lower. Usually, but not always,
a field is cultivated a second year (the low level of nutrients in the soil does not allow for
more than two years of subsequent cultivation of the same spot), often at the same time
as a new field is opened up close by. A common pattern is to cultivate two or three
adjacent or closely located swidden sites in succession, which enables the cultivators to
use one swidden house for the whole period without having to move. It is also common
for old people to return to a site which they cultivated in their youth. Bentian swidden
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cultivation, then, is not of a particularly expansive type but rather functions according to
what we might call a rotational model. Several factors work together to ensure a long-
term attachment to the land: rattan and fruit trees plantations, the Bentian landrights
system, and, in the present situation, shrinking areas available for cultivation as a result
of logging concessions and transmigration.  
The Role of Rattan in the Bentian Economy
In Bentian swiddens, rice is planted interspersed with rattan and other crops. Rattan
seedlings are planted a little later than the rice, when the rice is already high enough to
provide shade for the seedlings (for a discussion of Bentian rattan cultivation techniques,
see Fried 1995:113-21). Rattan takes at least seven years to mature (a few years more if
grown from seeds instead of seedlings), so it is left to grow in the abandoned rice fields
which quickly regenerate into secondary forest along with various fruit trees and palms
planted or spared in the clearing process. The site is then not truly abandoned, as its
owners regularly return to tend it or harvest its yields. In the first few years following rice
cultivation, many vegetables and useful plants (e.g. herbs) continue to grow in the
swiddens. After some 7-10 years, various palms and fruit trees dominate. For at least as
long as unharvested rattan grows on the site, the planter retains a very active interest in
it. Rattan can be harvested in smaller or larger quantities and Bentians usually cut the
many stems which make up a rattan clump selectively and take care to leave the lower
parts of the stems uncut, as new shoots grow out from these. Cut rattan quickly
regenerates and may be recut once every few years after the initial harvest. As rattan does
not need to be harvested at any particular point of time, selling can be adjusted to
personal needs for cash (e.g. for rituals or for travel) or to market fluctuations, which
have long been, and especially lately, considerable. Allowing a longer period of
maturation and longer intervals between harvests only increases the yield (Weinstock
1983b:63). On the other hand, the owner may at any stage opt to turn the rattan garden
into a swidden should he need the plot for food production. Rattan is thus a highly
flexible cash crop, which as Weinstock (1983b:63) has recognized, has the additional
advantage of providing the cultivator with an incentive to maintain a fallow period long
enough to ensure the continuing productivity of the land for swidden cultivation (7-15
years), thus providing an ecologically sustainable model of alternating food crop/cash
crop production. Moreover, being a wild-growing, local plant, rattan does not upset the
ecological balance of the environment, and its cultivation counteracts the exhaustion of
wild rattan through over-collecting (ibid. 64). It was partly because of this fact that Loir
Botor Dingit was granted the Goldman Environmental Award, in recognition of the
ecologically sound character of the Bentian system of rattan cultivation as much as it was
      In a survey including 30 adult men in Dilang Putih, Mulya (1993:39) found that one man on50
average owned 11 hectares of rattan.
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intended as a reward for his attempts at defending Bentian lands against timber and
plantation company claims.
The principal importance of rattan for the Bentian, however, does not lie with its
ecological, but rather, with its economic significance, which has grown tremendously in
the last few decades. Since the 1970s, following increasing world market demand and
declining supplies elsewhere, Bornean rattan prices have multiplied many times, and
considerable sums of money have since then flowed into the Bentian economy, even if
difficulties of transportation have ensured that local prices have remained far below
coastal prices. We may be able to better appreciate the value of rattan if we consider that
one swidden (which is commonly about one hectare in size) frequently produces around
one and sometimes up to three tons of (dry weight) rattan canes, and that prices
approaching one thousand US dollars, at best, have been obtained per ton (a considerable
income by Indonesian standards). As Bentian families often do not have only one or two
rattan gardens, but plant rattan every time they make a swidden, and, in addition, often
inherit rattan gardens from parents and other relatives, this means that many individuals
are, or have been, in possession of considerable wealth.  In fact, many people have more50
rattan to sell than they are able to harvest themselves, and a system, referred to as bagi
dua (I., “divide in two”), has been established whereby cutters get half (or sometimes
even two-thirds) of the yield, and the farmer the rest. Young men without rattan gardens
of their own are particularly inclined to work as cutters and commonly travel around
among relatives and to other villages in search of such work. 
The high prices since the 1970s, together with their rapid and unpredictable
fluctuations, have sometimes occasioned what Tsing (1984:242-45) with reference to the
Meratus situation has called “rattan crazes,” short periods marked by high prices during
which the people in a particular area try to sell as much as they can, in the process
sometimes cutting down immature rattans and stems below the minimum length required
for regeneration, thus disrupting the continuity of the production system. In the 1980s
Luangans on the Teweh River reportedly also sold entire uncut rattan gardens, thus
relinquishing their rights to the plots altogether (Weinstock 1983b:65). Sometimes these
rattan crazes have also involved other than sega rattan (the most commonly cultivated
species), as in the dry season of 1998 when kesole, a thick, wild-growing rattan usually
lacking market value, suddenly “gained a price,” and some Bentian communities became
busy selling as much as they could of the species which, not having been harvested lately,
was found in good quantities in the surrounding forests. In the 1990s, however, prices
again became much lower after the introduction of an export ban on unprocessed and
semi-processed rattan in 1988 (Safran and Godoy 1993), and rattan crazes have since
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become more restrained. Periodically, prices have even been so low that Bentians have
opted not to sell rattan canes at all, in the meantime devoting more efforts to plaiting and
selling rattan baskets and mats (which generally have procured more stable, if
comparably much lower prices than the canes). As among many other Dayaks,
manufacture of rattan baskets and mats (made in black and white patterns of thin, partly
dyed strips) has long been the most common evening pastime among the Bentian, but the
practice has recently become notably professional among some Bentians, especially on
the Kias tributary of the upper Teweh, where they and their Luangan neighbors produce
and sell very large quantities of rather coarse rattan baskets which are sold in Barito
markets and exported to Bali via Banjarmasin. Other Bentians also make, and have done
so for a long time, and sell rattan baskets, but somewhat less regularly and in much
smaller quantities (although with an appreciably finer quality fetching higher prices).
Despite the periodically high income of rattan, it is only a limited number of Bentians
who can be said to have become rich on rattan (that is, that could afford to buy TVs and
build modern-style houses of expensive materials transported upriver at great cost), more
particularly those few individuals who buy up rattan from kin and neighbors and resell
it to traders, and these people live in most respects like ordinary Bentians, even if some
of them choose not to make swiddens some years and instead buy their rice from relatives
or shops. The income of most families often suffices for no more than school fees for
their children and the purchase of a restricted variety of consumer goods such as sugar,
kerosene, canned sardines, clothes, and transistor radios, which are sold in upriver areas
by local shopkeepers and itinerant traders at prices often two to three times higher than
coastal prices. Despite rattan, the material standard of living of the Bentian is quite low
even compared with other Dayaks in Kutai, a condition which reflects the relative
remoteness of their area and their relatively restricted involvement in wage labor.
However, because their major source of cash income is integrated with their food
production system, they have to a comparatively high degree retained a subsistence
oriented lifestyle typical of swidden cultivators, and hence also a comparatively high
degree of self-sufficiency and economic independence.
Bentian Notions of Land Ownership
All Bentians, and possibly all Luangans (Weinstock 1979), seem to follow a somewhat
loosely conceptualized system of landrights according to which the clearing of a plot of
primary forest establishes, in principle, permanent rights which are inherited bilaterally
(married couples, who usually are responsible for the clearing of land, share rights
equally). This pattern seems well-adjusted to the long-established Bentian practice of
rattan cultivation and I would not find it surprising if it was originally brought about by
      Tsing (1984:127-28) criticizes a tendency in the Borneo ethnography (Appell 1971; Weinstock51
1979) to assign only one system of land tenure to each ethnic group. Against such “ethnic
generalization” which tends to imply an understanding of variance in terms of deviation from basic
cultural norms, she advocates active attention to differences as significant expressions of adjustment
to historically variable local and regional conditions.
      The landright principles among these peoples may, however, recently have changed. Rousseau52
(personal communication, 2004) states that the situation had changed among the Baluy Kayan
already in 1988.
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rattan cultivation. As has been demonstrated by Anna Tsing, who has documented three
distinct types of landrights regulations among the Meratus Dayaks, landrights systems
can be highly flexible constructions and their variations often indicate different forms of
articulation within regional political economies rather than different sets of cultural “first
principles” (1984:127-152).  Indeed, on my part, and on the basis of my experience of51
Bentian conceptions, I would argue that we should perhaps not talk about landright
systems at all in this respect. In the Bentian situation, as in the central part of the Meratus
mountains studied by Tsing, jural principles far from hold any absolute authority, and
claims of land are ordinarily not — at least not in internal community affairs — couched
in jural language. Instead, “people's intimate familiarity with the plants and natural
features of the landscape as well as their knowledge of each other's current and past
activities form a framework for discussion of social affiliations in relation to landscape”
(Tsing 1984:129). 
Bentian land use organization is as much the result of negotiation sensitive to specific
needs and concrete past actions as it is the result of an application of any abstract
principle. Landrights conflicts between community members, moreover, are uncommon,
and normally forestalled by the manti or other elders who attempt to work out solutions
in the interest of the community. The notions of permanent ownership and bilateral
inheritance have more the status of “working principles” than absolute rules. They remain
important, however, not the least because the existence of rattan and fruit trees on the plot
ensures continuing interest in it, and because the owner's children for obvious reasons
(living with him or otherwise interacting with him) develop concrete relations to the land.
They also represent the norm and are vaguely recognized as an ideal. In this respect, the
Bentian situation is clearly different from that of such Borneo peoples as the Kayan
(Rousseau 1978), the Rungus Dusun (Appell 1976), or the eastern Meratus (Tsing
1984:133-38), among whom reportedly anybody from within the community, regardless
of kinship ties, can lay in principle equally strong claims to a piece of land.52
However, in common with these societies, the Bentian also, for at least the last few
centuries, recognize a principle of village territoriality (interestingly, this does not
necessarily seem to be the case with the central mountains Meratus, whose settlement
pattern is even more dispersed than that of the Bentian), and this principle may
theoretically interfere with the principle of bilateral inheritance (i.e. if the descendants
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of the founder have moved to another community), as it states that each community (or
village, in the present situation) possesses a particular, carefully delineated territory to
which community members hold primary rights (these rights are held collectively in the
case of previously uncultivated land). In practice, the rights of descendants are usually
respected even in their absence, and swidden site selection normally includes negotiation
with authoritative elders and/or the kepala adat (head of customary law), who attempt to
prevent potential conflicts. If the principle of village territoriality is applied, it may either
be the “traditional” boundaries, that is, which prevailed in the nineteenth or early
twentieth century prior to the government-sanctioned establishment of permanent
villages, or the present, official village boundaries that are invoked. Some of the
swiddens used by the members of a community are also frequently outside the village
territory, and for such lands there are no community, but only individual, claims. The
principle of village territoriality is most clearly influential in such cases when, as
apparently happened quite frequently in the past, a community buys up a territory from
some other community; then former individual claims to plots within that territory are
lost along with it.
To further complicate things, there is also a third principle regarding land ownership
influencing Bentian relations to land. This is a principle (stated in the Basic Agrarian Law
of 1960) according to which the national government, like the Dutch government before
it, owns all forested land which is not under cultivation or has a “yield” (hasil, I.). The
principle has become particularly important for the Bentian since the 1980s when logging
operations commenced in their area and concessions sometimes overlapping with land
to which Bentian communities and individuals held claims were granted to logging
companies by the state. As Bentians generally affirm government authority and are
anxious to appear “modern,” and thus, in their understanding, acquiescent citizens, they
generally accept the principle of ultimate government ownership of land, even if it has
enabled the appropriation of their lands by logging companies. In fact, Bentians often
refer to the principle when they want to point out that they hold  “rights” (hak, I.) to some
particular plot of land because of the existence of rattan or fruit trees on that plot planted
by their ancestors. This is also the line of argument that they have employed in conflicts
with the logging companies. The logging companies, in turn have employed the strategy
of dismissing the allegedly cultivated plants as wild-growing, an assertion sometimes
difficult to prove wrong, especially if logging already has taken place. As elsewhere in
Indonesia, the principle of government land ownership has led to a condition which
Weinstock (1983a:150-53) has referred to as “plant tenure,” that is, a situation in which
it is the plants rather than the land which is owned, and the latter only can be claimed
through the former. Thus, when Bentians today plant rattan on their swiddens, they do
so not only for the marketable produce which they expect to obtain, but also with an eye
to securing property rights to the land.
      Fruit trees form important points of physical orientation, as do some particularly big trees,53
which are named.
      It is, as Tsing (1993:168) has remarked for Meratus forests, “difficult to draw a line between the54
‘wild’ and the ‘domesticated’” in the Bentian environment. Some wild plants and trees are tended,
while some (accidentally or purposively) cultivated ones are left to do without care. Moreover, both
“the wild” and “the domesticated” —  if we refer here to primary and secondary forest, respectively
—  can be subject to varying degrees of familiarity, and most of the latter category is, anyway, in a
state of more or less advanced reversion into nature.
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Practical Association as the Basis of Bentian Relations to Land
Although importantly influenced by several sometimes contradictory principles, Bentian
landrights notions — and Bentian relations to their local milieu more generally — are
primarily based on practical associations with the land. Past experiences of one's own and
of one's ancestors recurrently and tacitly validate or motivate most types of actions
pertaining to land use as broadly defined (e.g. cultivation, hunting, decisions about land
distribution, settlement, travel). Much more than providing the principal guideline for the
manti in the resolution of intracommunity conflicts relating to land use (together with a
notion of precedence), such experiences, essentially concrete and personal in character,
inform Bentian notions of land on a “deep,” or ontological, level. What this bears witness
to is that land and landscapes for the Bentian are thoroughly social — “social landscapes”
in Tsing's words — invested with signs and traces of past and present human action. This
also applies to advanced secondary forest which to outsiders may appear as virgin forest,
but to Bentians is full of indications of its past condition in the form of rattan gardens and
fruit trees, some of which may be more than a hundred years old, and perhaps remnants
of old houses or graves. But even primary forest may bear traces of human activity in the
form, for instance, of harvested gaharu trees or bee trees (which are tended and cleared),
or possibly of wild boar spring traps, which can be fatally dangerous to people. Such
traces indicate, besides ownership, strictly speaking (most fruit trees, whether wild or
cultivated, are claimed by particular individuals who possess exclusive rights to sell their
yield, even though anybody is said to be free to eat the ripe fruit on the spot), varying
degrees of association of particular people with a place.  And such association, in its53
turn, adds up to varying degrees of familiarity with a location, which is what largely
determines a person's inclination to use, in whatever way relevant, the place in question.
Nature is never truly or entirely wild for Bentians but, rather, a social space where the
degree of personal association with a locality usually correlates negatively to that of some
other people.  54
Staying for much of the time on often rather isolated swiddens surrounded by forest,
Bentians generally have an extensive knowledge of their natural environment. Reflecting
the importance of swidden cultivation in this environment, the forest is divided into
“zones” corresponding to different stages of regeneration, the four principal ones being
      Each of these forest succession categories can be further divided into various subcategories. In55
addition, Bentians also distinguish between different sorts of forests on the basis of soil and
topographic conditions.
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boak (the regrowth of the first one to two years following swidden cultivation), kelewako
(young secondary forest without any larger trees), bateng (regenerating forest where there
is already some incidence of large trees), and alas (virgin forest or very old secondary
forest) — each of which are useful in different ways.  Knowledge of the environment55
is in fact to no small degree an effect of the swidden cultivation system which ensures
ongoing interest in former swidden sites as they continue to yield produce after they have
reverted to secondary forest, and which demands frequent moves to new swidden sites,
often located quite far apart from each other, and thus encourages a typically fairly
spread-out familiarity with a number of different, disconnected forest localities. Other
activities, such as the hunting and collecting of forest products, and the gathering of
vegetable materials required for the manufacture of ritual paraphernalia, also contribute
to the acquisition of such forest knowledge, and these activities help explain the fact that
men, who normally carry them out, possess by far more forest knowledge than women,
who tend to spend little time in the forest, and who are also frequently told not to do so
because of the dangers held to be involved. Conversely, the more or less extensive forest
knowledge and forest familarity of men add up to a kind of authority of men over women
and of some men over other men (cf. Atkinson 1989, M. Rosaldo 1980; Tsing 1993). 
However, despite the rather extensive general forest knowledge of Bentian men, and
their often extensive association with particular forest localities, their familiarity with the
forest is still significantly restricted, not the least since others' activities restrict their
movement in it. In fact, most of the forest which Bentians are likely to come into contact
with can be seen as divided into what Tsing in the Meratus setting has called “personal
familiar territories” (1984:277-79). Bentian men, like their Meratus counterparts, tend to
use and wander about mainly in certain specific forest localities and to avoid others. This
tendency can be seen as a consequence of the swidden cultivation system (which entails
extensive land use limiting the availability of land for any particular individual, especially
in the proximity of villages), including the notion of permanent and devolvable landrights
following the clearing of primary forest, although there are also other factors contributing
to it. A locality regularly frequented by some particular people is, even if not theirs
strictly or juridically speaking, still “theirs” practically speaking. Even if they do not
necessarily own it, other people are generally not supposed to hunt or collect gaharu
there (particularly not if it is located in the vicinity of the principal user's swidden), and
they would usually be more or less uncomfortable to do so, at least if they were not
closely related to the person in question or previously familiar with the locality. Examples
of Bentian uneasiness related to traversing other people's territories which I sometimes
witnessed and responded to with amazement during fieldwork occurred in situations
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when someone passed an unacquainted person's swidden: quickly rushing by at some
distance while making as little sound as possible, people would in such cases appear
markedly anxious to avoid contact or bring attention to themselves.
Uneasiness in other's or unfamiliar territories is characteristically composed of several
components. In addition to involving a sense of potentially violating other’s “rights” (the
quotation marks are to indicate that these rights tend to involve more or less implicit
prerogatives established by practical association rather than explicitly defined or
officially recognized jural rights), such sentiments typically include notions of danger of
some kind (in fact, it appears that a sense of uneasiness also more generally is connected
with a sense of danger among the Bentian). In so far as such danger has a recognized
referent, it is more commonly categorized as spirit rather than man or animal (the
distinction is not always clear though, as spirits often take human or animal form). As
among the Land Dayaks (Geddes 1957:7-18), the forest, and the primary forest in
particular, is generally considered to be a rather dangerous place associated with spirits,
and it is largely for this reason that women and children are discouraged from entering
it. However, spirits are conceived of as having “personal familiar territories” and it is
especially in certain types of forest locales that one is likely to encounter them (e.g. in
marshy or stony places, near strangler figs, or in the small confined areas of primary
forest often found around villages that form protected spirit domiciles where swidden
cultivation is prohibited). Since spirit encounters, outside of ritual, usually take the form
of spirit attacks, and as such attacks, the result and indication of which is illness (sorcery
being another common cause of illness), are assumed to be very common, we can
understand that fear of spirits, like of people, put important restrictions on movement in
the forest, especially if we also consider that violation of spirit territories forms one of
the most common recognized causes of spirit attacks, together with breach of social
norms. On the other hand, the danger associated with the forest also contributes to an
aura of authority ensuing from forest familiarity, and so works in the interest of some
community members who face it and are seen as having stronger souls than other people.
Forest knowledge and familiarity, both which result from practical association with
the forest, are sources of authority (and of prestige, and envy) both in their own right and
by being important means toward gaining authority. In the latter respect they contribute
significantly to hunting skills (not surprisingly, it is usually not young hunters who are
the most successful), and by providing better access to various, usually erratically
occurring forest products (e.g. gaharu, honey, fruits), and hence, potentially, to cash
income, which is important especially as a source of esteem in the eyes of women who
themselves have quite limited opportunities of obtaining cash. For the manti, who receive
much of their status from being responsible for the distribution of community lands,
forest familiarity is essential for knowing community history, which may, in a quite
concrete way, be seen as inscribed or embedded in the social landscape. For a young
     In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, residence for some Bentians became in fact tripartite56 
rather than dual: divided between farmhouses, extended family houses located somewhere in the forest,
and village lou. Tripartite residence also characterizes some families today, who own a farmhouse and a
small single-family village house, and in addition sometimes stay in a village lou. Although associated
with a very different ecological setting, a similar residential pattern evolved among the Semporna Bajau
Laut after they abandoned sea nomadism and began to construct permanent pile-house villages in the
second half of the twentieth century (Sather 1976, 1997:134-187). In place of an earlier pattern of dual
residence, characterized by family fishing groups at sea, and their periodic aggregation at boat moorage
sites, a more complex structure of intermediate residential groups emerged, consisting chiefly of village
housegroups (luma’) and housegroup clusters (ba’anan), both of them now primary units of a newly
emergent village social organization.
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family, having the knowledge and practical skills demanded to keep a swidden and
provide for themselves and their relatives is a prerequisite (although not yet a guarantee)
for obtaining adult status and a minimum degree of autonomy. Even for a belian, forest
knowledge is essential, in order, for example, to conduct the shamanic soul search
journeys which are a principal feature of belian rituals. Journeying, in a more worldly
sense, or walking about in one's familiar territories (both activities referred to by the same
term, malan) is also the prototypical form of practical association with the land, and the
basis for productive forest management and more instrumental forms of land use.
Understandably then, men frequently travel somewhere or walk about in the forest with
no very clear purpose, or multiple ones, (although some quite concrete objective is
always provided upon departure), and they tend to be eager to recount, in somewhat
standardized form, their experiences of such endeavors to other men upon returning or
when meeting after some time away from each other.
The Dual Pattern of Bentian Settlement
Having given some basic information on the Bentian subsistence pattern and their
relationship to the forest environment, I will now consider some other elemental aspects
of life in their local milieu, that is, their settlement pattern and way of habitation, which,
like subsistence activities, are central in transforming the natural environment into social
terrain.
The Bentian can be said to practice a dual type of residence, that is, they stay for part
of the time in villages and part of the time in farmhouses on their swidden fields. Until
the late nineteenth century they did not live in nucleated villages but alternated residence
between farmhouses and solitary extended family houses/small longhouses.  As notions56
of settlement associated with earlier forms of settlement continue to influence now
prevailing types, I will here describe both historical and present patterns. This entails a
discussion of modes of dwelling as well as group and community organization. I will pay
particular attention to Bentian houses because of their centrality in the Bentian system of
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social organization, but also in order to provide some insight into what might be called
the phenomenology of Bentian everyday life.
The most obvious implication of the dual settlement pattern of the Bentian is that one
cannot understand their lives only from the perspective of the village or, conversely, from
the swidden (which may be located anywhere between a few hundred meters up to ten
kilometers from the village). Most people divide their time more or less evenly between
the two residence categories (although there are also some people who stay mainly in one
of them), and life in the one place receives much of its meaning by way of contrast to life
in the other. The option — more restricted at certain periods of the year, and more for
some individuals than for others — of staying in either the village or on the swidden
enables, among other things, a significant degree of flexibility in how to structure one's
social network, as does the decision about where to make one's swidden. Part time
swidden-village residence also tends to make people's social relations more complex as
one often associates with different people in the village and on the swidden.
Bentian Swidden Houses and Clusters
Bentians usually make swiddens in clusters of adjacent fields (teming), consisting of
about two to five separate swiddens, although there also exists the option of making a
solitary swidden. The conjugal couple, or sometimes a widow/widower together with a
grown but unmarried child, is the standard swidden-making unit. Each such unit ideally
cultivates a separate swidden and frequently also builds a farmhouse of its own which is
usually placed somewhere in the midst of the swidden. However, swidden-making units
also quite often share farmhouses, particularly in the case of young married couples who
tend to stay together with one of the spouses' parents (occasionally also with other
relatives), and who at first usually have no separate field of their own, but assist their
older co-residents with theirs (which tends to be relatively large in such cases). 
There is normally only one hearth in a swidden house and its inhabitants usually
constitute one household, eating together, sharing rice and other resources. Bentian
swidden houses are generally quite small, between five to eight meters long and three to
five meters wide, sometimes with a small semi-detached kitchen at the back or side (see
Plate 1). The number of inhabitants is usually between three and ten although there may
in rare cases be up to twenty people residing in a swidden house. The overall impression,
even in houses with few residents, is that of a rather crowded space, not the least because
of the inhabitants’ rice stocks which are kept in large bark bins in the house. The walls
of the houses are typically lined with the belongings of the inhabitants, including rattan
mats and mattresses which are rolled out at night. The smoke from the hearth often lies
thick and blackens the inner roof of the single room which makes up the house. Under
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the floor of split bamboo slats hang small chicken cages, and pigs eating kitchen refuse
are kept in styes on the ground. Swidden houses are built on house posts about one to
three meters above the ground; in the past, when headhunting attacks were anticipated,
they could be several meters higher. The house posts are made of either ironwood (a
singularly durable wood which can be reused several times as the inhabitants move to
new swidden sites) or other, ordinary wood (trees that grow on the spot are often simply
chopped off at the appropriate height and left standing to serve the same purpose). Walls
are usually made of bark (near the Teweh area sometimes of bamboo or palm thatch) and
today also and increasingly of boards. The roof normally consists of wood shingles,
sometimes made of ironwood, but more usually of lighter wood. Ironwood was not used
as a house construction material (either for house posts or roofing) before the end of the
nineteenth century. This is true both for ordinary swidden houses, referred to as balei
ume, and the larger, longhouse-like structures known as lou which today are found mainly
in villages and, like practically all present-day village houses, have ironwood house posts
and roof shingles.
The houses in a cluster of adjacent swidden fields are usually placed at some distance
from each other, in order, among other things, to enable more efficient guarding against
marauding monkeys and wild boars. However, the family units making up a swidden
cluster frequently visit each other and they also share meat from game caught by their
members. Swidden cluster families are expected to help each other, by providing, for
instance, participants for rice field workgroups or rituals held by their neighbors. The
interdependence expected ensures that people, if possible, make swidden fields next to
someone whom they know well and like, preferably a kinsman. The constituent family
units of a swidden cluster are with few exceptions related by (bilateral) kinship ties. A
common pattern is to share cluster residence with one or several of one's siblings or
cousins and their families or one or several of one's spouse's siblings or cousins with
families. When one moves to a new location the other families of the same cluster often
follow although they may also choose not to do so. One does not usually have the same
swidden neighbors throughout one's lifetime, although some people with close
relationships stick to each other's company.
The Bentian Lou as a Building and a Social Category
As already mentioned, most people do not stay solely in their farmhouses, nor did they
do so in the past. In fact, because of the risk of headhunting attacks, exclusive farmhouse
residence was sometimes more rare in the past than it is now. Before the time of
settlement in nucleated villages, people periodically stayed in solitary lou, which like the
farmhouses, were located “in the forest,” (saang laang) frequently on hill tops, and next
     Small, impermanent swidden multi-family houses like the traditional Bentian lou are poorly57
described in the ethnographic literature on Borneo, as is the social organization of such houses.
However, swidden longhouses or multi-family houses are actually not unusual in Borneo but occur
among many longhouse-building Dayak groups such as the Maloh (King 1978b:203), Iban (Freeman
1970:161-70), Kayan (Rousseau 1978:80), and Kenyah (Whittier 1978:106-8), pointing to the
possibility that the organization in multi-family houses, intermediate to that in farmhouses or longhouse
apartments, on the one hand, and villages or communal longhouses, on the other, may have been more
widespread than suggested by previous studies, which have tended to focus on the two polar modes of
organization. The general importance of this “intermediate level” of social organization among the
Bentian, but also among some other Borneo peoples such as the Bajau Laut (Sather 1997:134-187) and,
perhaps, the Ma’anyan (Hudson 1978), demonstrates that “extended families” can indeed form social
units of central structural significance in Borneo (as such notably not being reducible simply to a phase
in the household’s developmental cycle) (cf. King 1978a:12-15).
     This is not to say that all longhouses in northern Borneo were internally compartmentalized into58 
family bilik; an exception being, for example, those of the Kelabit of the Sarawak/East Kalimantan
borderlands (see Bala 2002:44-45).
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to a swidden. However, they would stay there mainly under certain circumstances: at
times of ritual (e.g. curing rituals, weddings, mortuary ceremonies), during meetings
dealing with community affairs, or if they had a newborn baby or some severely sick
family member. For most of the time, the families who recognized themselves as
belonging to a particular lou would live dispersed and the latter would often be occupied
only by some elderly couple and perhaps a single family or an unmarried individual
looking after them and cultivating a rice field or garden close by. 
Like the swidden houses, such swidden lou (lou ume) were moved quite frequently
(perhaps once in a couple of decades on average), and they were rebuilt at least once a
decade which was a necessity because of the impermanent building materials used (see
Plate 2).  They were often rather flimsy structures — resembling large, rectangular57
swidden houses, built of the same materials — as were early village lou, whose
dilapidated condition inspired frequent complaints by Dutch and sultanate visitors
(Knappert 1905:627). Like swidden houses they usually consisted of only one large
undivided room, thus lacking the walled bilek or “compartments” typical of the
longhouses in Dayak areas further north (however, each family would occupy a particular
space in the house, and would unfold large cotton mosquito nets at night, providing some
degree of privacy).  They were also quite small in comparison with such longhouses,58
normally less than thirty meters long. However, some lou did have compartment walls
(albeit often only a few decimeters high, and not necessarily aligned in an inner row
along the back as typical for longhouses), and such partitioned lou were often somewhat
larger and more solid than the others. The fortressed lou built for protection against the
Pari, for instance, often conformed to this design, as did some early village lou which
were built under manti with extensive leadership ambitions aiming to concentrate large
numbers of followers under one roof. Generally, Bentian lou also appear to have been
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larger and more frequently partitioned in downstream Bentian areas closer to Benuaq
territory (and the central Borneo culture area), an indication of influence from these
neighbors, who more commonly built such longhouse-like lou. 
The number of inhabitants belonging to an average-sized swidden lou was quite
small, usually less than thirty people, consisting typically of a few elderly siblings and
their spouses if still alive, and perhaps some three to four of their children with their
families, the latter possibly including a few already married children with children of
their own. What we might term the core of a lou did, in fact, usually consist of a set of
siblings (sometimes including classificatory siblings), typically the oldest such set alive.
It was from these siblings that the other members of the lou traced their membership in
it whether through filiation, adoption, marriage, or combinations of such connections, and
it was the mutual solidarity (or discord) of these siblings which provided the source for
much of the cohesion (or instability) of the lou as a whole.
Every lou had a manti (or, in some cases, several) who in most cases was one of the
members of the core sibling set and thus born into the lou. The larger the number of
inhabitants, the more status did the lou, and particularly its manti, usually enjoy. And the
larger the number of its inhabitants, the more resources, both human and material, the
house had to arrange grand rituals (to which people from other lou were invited), further
adding to its status. However, the logic of the system was such that some of the members
of a lou were likely to marry out and hence likely to become associated with other lou
(the members of a sibling set, for instance, seldom all remained in their natal lou).
Whether they would do so or not was in large part determined by the persuasive powers
of its manti, as well as the number of inhabitants of the lou (a populous lou enabled
marriage with first and second cousins within the lou, a generally preferred practice).
Bentian marriage, according to customary law and continuing practice, is ambilocal —
initially uxorilocal and secondarily virilocal — which means that there always existed
some degree of tension between the two sets of parents of a couple, especially if they
were from different lou: where the couple were to end up staying most of their lives was
always more or less uncertain. For the same reason, and in part also because of the
Bentians' low fertility and high infant mortality rates (even today, about a third of all
couples are barren or produce only one child, and about as many of the children die
shortly after birth), the population balance of a lou (or a village) has always been
precarious, and the struggle for people, for manpower, followers, and allies, has always
been a central concern on all levels of Bentian group politics, as it generally seems to
have been in Southeast Asia (see Reid 1983:8, 1988).
The constituent families of a lou often made swiddens in clusters, as they continue
to do today. However, people also sometimes made and continue to make swiddens
together with outmarrying relatives resident in other lou. Bilateral kin networks (e.g.
kindreds, which include both cognatic and affinal kin) intersect in important ways with
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housegroup boundaries and we should not overemphasize the distinctness of this
essentially fluid and porous social category. In fact, for many people at any particular
time (and certainly over a longer period of time) it would be appropriate to speak about
multiple lou membership, or of contextual lou identity. How many people actually belong
to a particular lou, then, has to some degree always been a matter of definition and
viewpoint. Still, we should recognize the important fact that the members of a lou often
were and are referred to as erai aben or erai buhan (“one family”), indicating that they
form an internally related group, which indeed has always to a greater or lesser extent
been the case (although amalgamation of groups previously unrelated has at times
occurred). Furthermore, even though lou are markedly fluid in practice, they are typically
talked about as if they were quite solid and stable social entities, and there is normally
a core of members for whom lou identity is an unambiguous matter (often these core
members, typically members of core sibling sets, have descended directly from the
founders of the lou). We should also understand that there is, like in swidden houses,
usually only one hearth in a lou, and that the constituent families in some important
respects form one household while in the lou (e.g. by eating together and sharing food,
although not, for instance, by sharing rattan sales income), even if they form different
households on their swiddens. The manti of a lou also exerts a considerable degree of
authority over its families (over decisions about where and with whom to farm, for
instance), whose autonomy is thus significantly restricted.
One thing which has particular significance in bringing the families of a lou together
as a collectivity is the fact that the lou is seen as the proper place for rituals. Even if
single family households could hold and continue to hold curing rituals in farmhouses (or
single family village houses), it was still preferable to hold them in the lou, and the
performance of other rituals can even be said to have demanded the use of a lou. This is
so not only for the somewhat simple reason that farmhouses are not large enough to
accommodate the large number of participants attending the larger rituals (often up to
fifty people or more). Notions of lou as ritual houses also reflect notions of propriety
which ultimately express the important fact that lou are associated with the ancestors. A
concrete manifestation of this association is the longan, an ungainly wooden structure
consisting of some four to eight ironwood poles holding up a shelf on which certain
ancestral objects are stored (see Plate 10). A longan used to be part of most lou, and it
can be said to have formed the ritual center of the lou, or, in James Fox's (1993:1) words,
“the ritual attractor.” Interestingly, this structure, around which most ritual action
concerned with ancestors takes place (and in the proximity of which also skulls from
certain prominent ancestors are stored), used to be seen as the mark and defining
characteristic of a lou, and buntang “thanksgiving” rituals including water buffalo
sacrifice prescribed its use, and thus the use of the lou. 
      In this connection it may be relevant to report on a somewhat special meaning that the term lou59
has taken on in the village of Benangin on the Teweh River, where the word is said to be no longer
regularly used for houses, but instead mainly to refer to the village, as when people talk about “going
down to the lou” (dolui la lou) when they return to the village from their swiddens in the surrounding
hills. This usage points to the term's connotations of home and also to the traditionally strong
association between a lou and a particular place, expressed further by the fact that lou were usually
named after some particular location or feature of the landscape (e.g. a hill, a valley, a stream, a
waterfall, or a fruit tree or some other sort of tree occurring at the location where the house was
built).
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A lou is, in a sense, like the holy house of the Malagassy Zafimaniry, “a place where
one goes to obtain the blessing of ... the ancestors” (Bloch 1995:80), although we should
add that one goes to the lou for such purposes almost exclusively in the context of ritual.
The capacity of a lou for providing such blessings lies in the continuity between the
living and the dead which it is seen to embody most specifically in the longan (which
should be at least several generations old, and is typically claimed to be extremely old)
and the ancestor skulls and other ancestral objects stored nearby and above it, in the
rafters. Continuity is in fact itself a defining characteristic of the lou; as a man explained
to me, it is not enough for a house to be large for it to be a lou (in fact, many lou-sized
swidden houses were not given recognition as lou by informants), many people must have
been born and died in it before it becomes one. A similar factor sometimes mentioned as
a measure of sufficient continuity defining a lou was that it must have been in the same
location long enough for the coconut palm to begin to bloom (minimally six years). An
expression of the importance of continuity as a criterion for lou status is also the fact that
even ordinary-sized farmhouses could sometimes be loosely labeled as lou by informants,
providing that they had been long-lasting enough. However, the people likely to regard
such houses as lou were, significantly, those for whom they had served the social function
of lou, that is, functioned as a house where several family units gather as one — others
were likely to dismiss such buildings as “just farmhouses” (blai ume maha). This
indicates how the term “lou” often has some connotations of “home,” that is, indicating
a place of long-term residence and/or of origin, where one is more “at home” than
elsewhere.59
The constituent families of a “traditional” Bentian lou can be said to have formed a
minimal community. The integration of this community is heavily dependent on factors
which can be classified as religious. Not only did its members come together mainly
during rituals, but they also entered a soul house (blai juus) at the conclusion of buntang
rituals. A  material copy of the soul house was hoisted up into the rafters of the lou, and
an invisible counterpart of the soul house provided protection for the members’ souls at
a special location in the heavens. Continuity with the ancestors was provided by the
longan and the ancestral objects which were associated with particular spirits acted as
protectors of the lou. When a lou was moved, these objects were re-installed in the new
lou, and building materials were also commonly reused on such occasions, especially
      I am of a somewhat different opinion than Macdonald (1987) and Sellato (1987), for whom60
Lévi-Strauss' concept is of minimal relevance to unstratified Indonesian societies. Unlike them,
however, and like Waterson, I am not so much concerned with whether the society to which the term
is applied really fits Lévi-Strauss' concept, as with its heuristic value in using it as “a jumping-off
point, from which to examine indigenous concepts” (Waterson 1995:48). To me, the principal value
of the concept lies in the general attention it brings to houses —  both in the sense of physical
structures and conceptual models —  as vehicles of social organization, and to the articulation within
the house institution of a plurality of principles of social organization.
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after ironwood became employed for lou construction. Largely as a result of these factors,
the members of the lou community acquired a sense of unity and distinctness
transcending the solidarities provided by the kin relations of which it was composed. It
became a “house,” in the sense of a family, for which residential association as much as
descent or kinship provided the source (even if not the principal idiom) of notions of
relatedness.
Bentian Society as a House Society
It may be illuminating to liken Bentian society to a “house society” in Claude Lévi-
Strauss’ terms, if applying this concept somewhat loosely, as advocated by Waterson
(1995). In this understanding, the term basically refers to a society in which the house is
a central social institution and cultural concept. Such an understanding takes as its
starting point Lévi-Strauss’ definition in The Way of the Masks (1983:174) of the house
as “a corporate body made up of both material and immaterial wealth, which perpetuates
itself through the transmission of its name, its goods and its titles down a real or imagined
line, considered legitimate as long as this continuity can express itself in the language of
kinship or of affinity and, most often, of both,” but it is not so much concerned with Lévi-
Strauss’ later development of the term (1987a, 1991), according to which hierarchy and
inequality are inherent features of such house societies (as a logical, if not empirical
conclusion of the house's transmission of goods and immaterial property).  The focus60
here is on what Waterson (1995:49-50) refers to as the key features of Lévi-Strauss’
above definition: “the ideal of continuity,” “the passing down of some form of valued
property,” and “the strategic exploitation of the language of kinship and affinity.” 
In the present case, house society refers to a society where the house (the lou) is a
rather restricted or minimal unit as compared to some of those societies with which the
concept is more commonly associated (e.g. the Kwakiutl, feudal Europe, Japan), although
it should be remembered that Lévi-Strauss also applied his concept to many Indonesian
societies, and that he was expressly concerned with using it to make sense of the apparent
lack of order of cognatic societies. Admittedly, the continuity of the Bentian lou was also
quite limited (lou regularly branched off into “daughter lou,” usually after having been
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rebuilt a few times in the same locality), as were perhaps, in a comparative perspective,
the material and immaterial properties passed down and managed, principally by its manti
(i.e. the longan and ancestral objects, heirlooms such as Chinese jars and gongs, and
rights to land in locations cultivated by its members). However, some amount of valued
property clearly was passed down, and Bentian society is definitely a house society in the
sense that the house is a central organizing principle and dominant institution in the
society, as well as in the sense that relatedness based on residential association is
typically expressed in the idiom of kinship, even if it is in fact residential association
itself which is primary in establishing lou unity, or separating different lou communities
from each other. The house, in this case as in those explored by Lévi-Strauss, is a kin-
based category, although it is also clearly more than a kin category ( it is not simply a
descent category), and the concept of house may thus, in line with Lévi-Strauss’
intentions, be taken to serve as a complement to descent for an understanding of social
structure, in a manner analogous to how that of the household has been applied to
complement kin categories in analyses of Bornean longhouse communities since Derek
Freeman's pioneering works (1960a, 1970). In fact, the house concept may also, as I later
intend to demonstrate, fruitfully complement the term “household,” as its referent does
not seem to be as structurally all-important in Bentian society as it appears from studies
of other Borneo societies.
Change and Continuity in Bentian Residence and Settlement Patterns
In the nineteenth century, when Bentians began to settle in nucleated villages, lou also
began to be built in villages. In fact, at first, until the mid-twentieth century, it was only
lou rather than any single family houses that were built in the villages, often only one at
first, but usually supplemented before long by several others. Some of these lou were, as
already mentioned, particularly large, and some of them were referred to as lou solai,
large or grand lou (see Plate 3). Such lou were not only large, but they were intended  —
at least by the leading manti of the community, who were usually responsible for their
construction and resided in them — to be buildings where the entire village would gather,
and in which rituals for the entire village (i.e. nalin taun, an extended buntang ritual)
would be arranged. These lou in time and under the influence of the colonial and national
governments became known as lamin adat, “adat longhouses,” a term indicating that they
were houses where all major events pertaining to adat in the community (i.e. customary
law negotiations, larger rituals) were and are expected to be held. However, many
extended families continued to live in swidden lou until quite recently, while others built
lou of their own in the villages. Progressively throughout the twentieth century, smaller,
single family houses — known since the New Order regime as rumah pembangunan (I.,
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“development houses”) — have also been built in the villages (see Plate 4). During the
past ten years, these houses, which are now almost exclusively made of modern materials
(planks or plywood) and often painted and equipped with windows, have also begun to
be built along the newly constructed roads in the area, a pattern motivated by the
opportunities obtained for easier transport of rattan and other exported products.
Today there exist few swidden lou in the Bentian and surrounding Luangan areas.
There are also rather few traditionally designed lou left in the villages, in many Bentian
villages just one, in others three or four, and in a couple of villages none (among other
Luangan subgroups lou are even less common; on the Teweh River, for instance, there
are possibly no traditional village lou left). Most Bentians do, however, still reckon some
form of lou membership, although the lou to which they now belong often consist of
large, modern-styled village dwellings (built of the same materials as single family
development houses). These modern lou nevertheless serve the traditional function as
houses where the constituent families gather, and they are referred to with the same term
as their traditional counterparts. However, there are also some families who have no or
only a rather loose connection to some particular localized lou (although this does not
necessarily mean that their kin relations and obligations are any less extensive than those
of other community members). In fact, small numbers of weakly (or ambiguously) lou-
associated single families have probably always existed, even if their number now might
be higher than before.      
Bentian residences today are significantly different from their residences in the
nineteenth century, not the least because present-day lou, both modern and traditional,
interspersed with single-family houses, are spatially concentrated in villages, thus closer
to each other, which implies, among other things, less distance to outmarrying relatives
than when swidden lou were common, and a weakening of the former association of lou
with particular swidden areas, in which they used to be located, but from which they are
now at a distance. This development has meant that people have simultaneously become
both more individualized, living alone on swiddens, or in single family houses; and
collectivized, living together in villages, as “one large family,” as it is often expressed,
while “in between” the extended family — the lou category — has lost some of its former
importance. Nonetheless, there is still much continuity in residential arrangements and
social organization, especially if we look at the inside rather than the outside of houses.
The interior of the present-day Bentian lou, whether modern or traditional, is plain
and sparsely furnished. Most of it consists of an open space, where large rattan mats are
rolled out on the bamboo/rattan/plank floor during rituals or when guests are received.
In different parts of the houses along the walls are the sleeping mats and mosquito nets
of the inhabitants, and sometimes a four-poster iron bed. Elsewhere along the walls are
large ceramic jars, gongs, and piles of white plates — so-called traditional valuables,
used mainly as objects of exchange in the context of customary law and ritual — as well
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as other things belonging to the inhabitants (boxes containing clothes, drums, spears,
fishing nets, half-finished rattan baskets, and perhaps a few wicker chairs and a
cupboard). Here and there may hang plaited bamboo trays from the ceiling, on which
smoked meat skewers and other food of the inhabitants is kept away from the dogs. On
the house posts, which cut through the floor to support the roof, water buffalo horns are
usually attached, reminding the inhabitants and visitors of past rituals at which the
animals were sacrificed. In some part of the middle section of those lou which are known
as lou solai or lamin adat is the longan, surrounded by ancestral objects and various ritual
paraphernalia. Many present-day Bentian lou lack a longan; from the beginning of village
integration there has been a gradual decrease of longan so that there is now only one
longan in many Bentian villages, while outside the Bentian area among other Luangan
subgroups almost no longan remain. In the kitchen (beliku), which usually consists of a
separate building attached to the back of the lou, are mainly various kitchen utensils and
water containers, as well as the hearth, a wooden frame filled with sand and a few
cooking stones, above which firewood is dried on racks. The kitchen often has a separate
entrance from the entrance to the rest of the house (which is the one used by visitors),
typically located either at one end or in the middle of the lateral side of the lou.
Most buildings in present-day Bentian villages are built along the two sides of a
single village street that usually runs parallel to a nearby river which serves as the
community's bathing place (Bentian cosmology does not, as among some riverine Borneo
peoples, demand particular alignments of houses with reference to the river, or the sun).
Along this street and elsewhere in the village coconuts palms are a prominent feature.
Some distance from the houses is the grave yard(s), in or near which a few bone
sarcophagi on piles (temla, keriring) are usually found. In the graveyard and in some open
areas (lutar) surrounding the village browsed by water buffaloes, there are a number of
blontang, anthropomorphically carved ironwood poles raised during rituals at which
water buffaloes — which are tied to them on the occasion — are sacrificed. Domestic
pigs, chickens and dogs until recently ranged around unfettered in the villages, which
often, especially in the daytime, gave a somewhat abandoned appearance on account of
the majority of inhabitants being away on their swiddens, and many of the houses being
in a more or less neglected condition. At some central place in the village, usually in the
vicinity of the lamin adat, is the grove(s) of flower shrubs and bushes (baang bunge)
which supplies plants used in rituals. In most Bentian villages there is also, as elsewhere
in Indonesia, a usually white-painted school, often the largest building in the village. In
villages with a large Christian population there are also one or two churches, built of
wood in a style resembling traditional American Protestant churches. In the subdistrict
capital and some of the larger villages, a few special government buildings serve as
offices and lodgings for government officials and visitors. In most villages, one or two
      The term “benua” has a rather wide field of application. In addition to a territorial domain of a61
local group it can also be used to designate home or village. It would perhaps be most appropriate to
translate the term into English as village, although I have avoided this in order to maintain the
Bentian distinction between nucleated villages, which are referred to with the Indonesian term
“desa,” and traditional territorial domains, for which the Indonesian term is not applied. “Benua” is,
of course, a proto-Austronesian term indicating, in present-day Austronesian languages, a territorial
entity of highly variable character, and in some languages, a house (see Fox 1993:12). Traditionally,
the term was used by Bentians, for the territorial domain of the community as a whole, and also for
the more restricted locality with which a particular lou was associated.
      Although pre-dating Bentian integration in nucleated villages, village or community territoriality62
among the Bentian need not have been an originally indigenous concept. On the contrary, it is possible
that the concept, like that of nucleated villages, was introduced as the result of coastal influence, but
that it became adopted earlier than the latter, perhaps in the early nineteenth century, after the Kutai
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houses also offer retail sales of a restricted variety of market goods such as cigarettes,
kerosene, sugar, medicines, and batteries.
Predominantly Christian villages and houses sometimes differ only slightly from the
pattern which I have outlined here (principally with respect to certain objects and
arrangements associated with the traditional religion which have been abandoned).
Christian families differ more from Kaharingan families in that they often stay in the
villages. They are generally more concerned about being maju, “progressive” — residing
on swiddens, “in the forest,” is regarded as backward behavior by modern-minded
Indonesians — and services and other Christian ceremonies always are held in the
village. However, because of the bias of my field experience, this study chiefly involves
Kaharingan communities, so the above description can generally be taken to apply unless
otherwise stated.
Past and Present Conceptions of Community 
The village concept is, as already mentioned, not an indigenous or traditional Bentian
concept, or at least, that is how the Bentian themselves see it. The scope of integration
in nineteenth century Bentian communities was lower than it is today, and apparently also
lower than in most other Dayak societies at the time. As Weinstock (1983a:98) has
correctly pointed out, “the inhabitants of a low solai [a large lou] represented a single
family rather than an entire village as in the case of the longhouse dwelling peoples of
northern Borneo.” However, although the inhabitants of a lou, before the time of village
settlement, formed a kind of minimal community, they also belonged to a larger
community by this time. The members of lou in a particular area recognized themselves
as belonging to a territorial domain, a benua,  to which the members of other lou in the61
same area also belonged, and within which people from other areas were not allowed to
open up land for cultivation.  Together the inhabitants in this area, which was about the62
sultanate had moved to Tenggarong and begun to maintain more extensive relations with the inland.
These conjectures would be congruent with Tsing's observations (1984:127-152) on the lack of the
principle of village territoriality among the relatively isolated central mountain Meratus, and the
application, in some east side Meratus communities, of the same principle based on a notion of “the
local community as a small model of the coastal kingdom” (Tsing 1984:136). Similarly, George
Appell's (1992:3) remark, concerning the Rungus of Sabah, that “the jural personality of the village had
developed over time as land had become scarcer,” points in the same direction.
      When these “traditional” Bentian communities gathered it was typically not the whole63
community which would gather, but only the manti and perhaps some other elders in the capacity of
its representatives, or the kin of an extended family who arranged a buntang or gombok ritual.
However, all or most members of these communities apparently sometimes gathered temporarily in
some large lou in periods when attacks from the Pari were particularly frequent (for example, the
Terieq community, who for some time in the early nineteenth century had seven manti, normally
associated with separate lou, sometimes came together in a large partitioned lou for such reasons). It
also appears that community wide nalin taun rituals started to be arranged in some communities some
time before settlement in “proper” villages (desa) took place. Some of these rituals were occasions on
which the members of some other community were invited (nuak) and offered valuables, and, in
accepting the invitation, became committed to return it in equal or greater measure at some later
stage (i.e. through a new ritual and countergifts). 
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same size as present-day village territories and, like the latter, carefully delineated with
respect to particular rivers, streams and hills, etc., formed a named, predominantly
endogamous social unit which represented the highest level of indigenous political
organization, and the most inclusive social category recognized at the time (“ethnic
identities,” i.e. Luangan subgroup identities, gradually became more widely recognized
only as integration with the sultanates and the Dutch colonial government became more
instrumental towards the late nineteenth century). Before village integration, the whole
region comprising the Teweh River and the areas inhabited by the Bentian and the
Benuaq today was divided into such socio-territorial units. 
Although normally not residentially concentrated, these local groups or communities
(there is no specific indigenous term refering exclusively to the categories in question)
at times gathered, and in certain circumstances acted as corporate entities, such as with
respect to dealings with other entities of the same order with whom conflicts, settled
through payment and exchange of traditional valuables, are said to have been frequent.63
The typically uneasy relations between these groups, together with their corporate
character and dispersed residence, point to their similarity with another Southeast Asian
“hill tribe” social category of the same order, the Ilongot bertran (Rosaldo 1980). As in
the case of the bertran, the name of a Bentian local group could be used both as a
designation for a group and the territory with which it was associated, and the group
typically took its name from a particular locality, which in the Bentian case was often
borrowed from the name (and locality) of a particular lou which was seen as the “trunk”
or “base” (puun), while the other lou in the same area were regarded as its “branches”
      The use of the botanical idiom of trunk and branches follows a pattern widespread in Austronesian64
speaking societies (Fox 1993:17-20; Waterson 1990:124-29). A division in trunk and branch houses or
other residential units categorized through the same imagery seems also to be found among other
Dayaks than the Bentian (and other Luangans). For example, Sather (1993:75-78) describes in some
detail how the parallel concepts of “base” (pun, pemun) and “tip” (ujung, puchok) define relations of
ritual precedence between the bilik families that make up a Saribas Iban longhouse. Here, the family of
the pun rumah (“house source”), whose members are generally descended from the house founder and
occupy the center apartment, establish their ritual priority by erecting the first ritual house post (tiang
pemun) during longhouse construction. The resulting relationship between longhouse families and their
“source posts” appears in some ways closely analogous to that of Bentian lou groups and their longan.
Moreover, as Saribas families and longhouses hive off, or undergo fission, a distinction is preserved
between the original, or “old house” (rumah lama’) (or family, bilik lama’), and the “new” one(s)
created in the process (rumah baru, or bilik baru). Even though he does not report on the use of
botanical metaphors in this connection, Winzeler (1996:3) notes the creation of new villages among the
Bidayuh through a division in daughter villages “which in time have their own daughter villages,”
indicating a pattern structurally analogous to the Bentian distinction between trunk and branch houses.
The traditional settlement pattern of the Bidayuh was, incidentally, remarkably similar to that of the
Bentian in some other respects as well. First, migrations were not as extensive as among many other
Dayaks (e.g. the Iban and Kayan). Second, all types of houses were built of light materials and were
frequently far from navigable rivers, often on hilltops. Third, the line of movement among both groups
for the last 100 to 150 years has been in a downstream direction, that is, “from higher and more remote
locations toward lower and more accessible ones” (Winzeler 1996:3).
      The question whether lou should be classified as longhouses is a somewhat complex one,65
although perhaps more of scholarly than native concern. As we already know, the term has a variable
referent. Perhaps most basically, it refers to a relatively large house where a group of people,
preferably kin, gathers. The Bentian use it for all their larger houses, whether divided into internal
apartments or unpartitioned, modern or traditional, insofar as they serve this function. In terms of this
function, lou do of course resemble longhouses and it may be noted in this connection that the term lou
is contrasted with that of blai which is the term used for farmhouses and small village houses. However,
the scope of integration effected by a Bentian lou is undeniably quite restricted when compared to the
longhouses of central and northern Borneo, and in distinction to most of these longhouses, the
Bentian lou were usually unpartitioned. Nevertheless, I am still somewhat uneasy with the view of
some authors (Avé & King 1986:52; Waterson 1986:155-56), who contend that there never existed
any real longhouses among the Dayaks of southernmost Borneo (i.e. among the Ma'anyan, Luangan,
and Ngaju), and who want to make a distinction between the “great houses” used by these Dayaks to
house extended families, and the much larger “longhouses,” typically housing entire villages,
traditionally in use in other parts of the island. In the first place, very large and massive longhouses as
opposed to great houses did, at least until the nineteenth century, exist in some parts of southern Borneo
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(pakaak).  The lou in question was often (although not necessarily) the first lou64
established in the area over which the community as a whole made claims. It was
frequently used for gatherings during which community affairs were negotiated, and its
manti were likely to have a special status. It thus appears that some lou might have had
the status and function of lou solai (grand lou) already before the time of village
integration in that they functioned as houses which in some sense represented the
community as a whole — rather than only an extended family. As these lou also, like
those recognized as lou solai or lamin adat in the nucleated villages established later,
frequently were physically larger than other lou, it would appear justified to refer to them,
or at least to their village counterparts, in the standard Borneo terminology as
longhouses.  The existence of these lou also makes Bentian society more “house society65
(see Knapen 2001:85, 88; Miles 1964). The principal reason for my reluctance to accept this view is
that I conceive of a continuum between great houses and longhouses. Even though typical
“traditional” Bentian lou were unpartitioned, quite small, and housed only extended families (i.e. not
entire villages), the Bentian did sometimes build much larger and occasionally partitioned houses
which were intended to house whole communities. Perhaps more importantly, for the Bentian (and
other people familiar with Bentian lou) there exists no such distinction. They translate the word lou into
pan-regional vocabulary as lamin, a central Bornean term used throughout East Kalimantan for
longhouses. In addition, the term lou appears to be cognate with, on the one hand, the terms levu and
lebu used for longhouses by the Lahanan and the Melanau, respectively (see Alexander 1993:33;
Morris 1978:41), and on the other hand, “lewu,” used by the Ma'anyan for their extended family village
houses, which generally are much smaller than Bentian lou (although Hudson notes that lewu families
used to be larger prior to World War II) (Hudson & Hudson 1978:215,223,232). 
      However, it should not be assumed that the integration of a traditional Bentian community was66
always seamless, or that the subordination of all its lou to that of the “leading lou” necessarily was
unequivocal. There were families who were only loosely associated with a particular lou; there were
also lou which were marginal to the community to which they “officially” belonged, or ambiguously
associated with several communities.
      Some of these individuals are even believed to have been spirits originally, more precisely,67
representatives of the heavenly seniang who descended to earth and thus gave rise to these local groups
and descent categories. These seniang were typically descended in special “trays” (kelangkang,
langkar) suspended from chains, some of which were reputedly made of gold. The first sultan of Kutai
was allegedly also descended in such a container (see Adham 1981:130), as was a famous Tunjung
ancestor whose child married into the Kutai royal family (Tromp 1889:280). In Borneo, founders of Ot
Danum local groups (utus) also originate from heavenly beings descended in similar carriers (Pascal
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like” in Lévi-Strauss’ terms, as it points to the existence in their society of a degree of
inter-house hierarchy and of a notion of a house encompassing the whole society
(community).  As the houses which were thought to stand for the community as a whole66
in this way were also dwellings for a particular extended family, they can be said to have
served a double function. An example of a contemporary lou fulfilling this double
function is the lou solai of Temiang village, the house in which I resided for most of my
fieldwork and which forms the setting for some of the events which will be recounted in
the following chapters.
In the current situation, the community for the Bentian is largely synonymous with
the village. This does not mean, however, that the community divisions of the past have
lost all of their former importance. Like Ilongot bertran (Rosaldo 1980:226), the social
categories making up traditional Bentian communities could be either concentrated or
dispersed. If they became dispersed, that is, if their members married out or moved away
to other communities, they would eventually disappear. However, even if they dispersed
in this sense, they would retain some of their significance for at least some time, because
people would recognize descent from these socio-territorial categories, which thus may
be seen to have formed also some sort of descent categories, in addition to localized
social groups. Membership in these categories was often traced back from some
particular founding individuals, typically accredited with supernatural origins and
faculties.  Today, the importance of these categories as descent categories has possibly67
Couderc, personal communication, 2003). Similarly descended mythological founders are reported
also from elsewhere in Indonesia (see e.g. Beatty 1992:186).
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become even more important than before despite the fact that as a result of intermarriage
most of them are now dispersed over several villages (or make up only part of a village
together with another such category) and there remain only a few predominantly “pure”
villages, that is, villages which consist mainly of descendants from one category. What
has happened today is that the distribution of local groups in the nineteenth century
preceding village integration has become frozen. The divisions of that time now stand as
a model of the traditional order and people phrase claims of original rights to land in
terms of this order. 
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3. Kinship Authority: The Cement of Interpersonal
Attachments 
Introduction
The subject of this chapter is kinship authority, that is, the authority that people exercise
by invoking relatedness. More precisely, it is about the ideological obligations and
expectations associated with notions of relatedness as sources of authority in Bentian
social life, and about how authority deriving from these sources affects people’s
perceptions, dispositions, and actions. Kinship is a force of fundamental social
significance among the Bentian. However, what I subsume under the heading “kinship”
includes a rather broad range of phenomena. It encompasses, besides cognatic relations,
also affinal ones as well as relations based on residential proximity. To give a working
definition of the concept as it is used in this chapter, “kinship” encompasses all those
relations for which Bentians apply kinship terminology. Thus, it is not only the authority
of kin over kin, in a strict sense, which I will consider, but also, the authority that
cognatically and affinally unrelated villagers command over each other by virtue of
recognizing relatedness on the basis of proximate residence or friendship. In fact, what
I label “kinship authority” could perhaps be described as “local interpersonal authority.”
Rather than use this somewhat awkward term, however, I will talk about “kinship
authority.” Extending the semantic field of the term “kinship” in this way is motivated
by Bentian notions of relatedness: kinship provides the basic idiom in which local social
relations are conceived, and unrelated individuals are often referred to by kinship terms
or as kaben, “relatives,” and interacted with according to the same principles. Through
this semantic extension I attempt to establish a closer fit between the concept and local
conceptions of relatedness, and to avoid an approach proceeding from an analytical a
priori understanding of what kinship is. In opting for such an usage of the term I am
influenced, in particular, by Janet Carsten (1995a, 1997) and Robert McKinley (1983,
2001) but also, in some respects, by David Schneider (1984). Like Schneider I reject the
sharp distinction between “biological kinship,” on the one hand, and “social kinship,” on
the other, that he argues has conventionally been made in anthropology (1984:189).
However, unlike Schneider, and like Carsten and McKinley, I do not, in Carsten’s
(1997:290) words, “reject the validity of kinship as a cross-cultural category,” nor use of
the term “kinship” for such notions of relatedness which transcend the realm of kinship
when narrowly defined. Like them I find it appropriate, and consider it fruitful from a
comparative point of view, to use the term kinship to refer to the “the relatedness that
people act and feel” whether or not it is as centrally based on notions of procreation as
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it is in Western societies (Carsten 1997:290), in so far as it is, predominantly or partly,
couched in a genealogical idiom.
What I call “kinship authority” is also essentially local authority in some further
respects. It consists of such authority as is basically a function of local social
organization, that is, which arises from the ways in which local social relations and
interaction are organized. Moreover, it pertains predominantly to relations within and
between particular families, housegroups and communities, that is, to local relations, and
it is predominantly local in derivation (i.e. it does not to a significant degree reflect
influence from ideologies or models of social organization originating outside the local
society). In these respects it contrasts with what I call “political authority,” which derives
to a significant extent from relations with agencies outside the local society (i.e. from
relations with coastal peoples and past and present governments), as well as with what
I call “religious authority” — at least if what is understood by “the local society” here is
the presently living human one — which is derived from relations with so-called
supernatural agencies.
A story recounting the stay of a young man in the village where I did most of my
fieldwork will provide the principal case material as well as something of a general
context for my discussion of kinship authority in this chapter. Rather than attempt to
establish a systematic and comprehensive presentation of this subject, I have chosen to
introduce it gradually as aspects of it become invoked by this piece of empirical material.
A central theme in the story, and an important element in Bentian social life more
generally, is the tension between people's aspirations for individual autonomy and their
interpersonal or collective attachments. This tension is largely the result of contrary
attempts by Bentians at exerting authority, on the one hand, and evading it, on the other.
Its existence points to some seemingly paradoxical features of Bentian social life which,
despite their apparent incongruence, are characteristic of it. These features include the
facts that boundaries between Bentian social groups and categories usually are permeable,
and the groups and categories themselves seldom are mutually exclusive or residentially
concentrated, while at the same time — despite these indications of individual autonomy
and organizational fluidity — an ethos of moral community unity pervades attitudes
toward social relations, and even temporary congregations often exhibit corporate
qualities. Thus, even though individuals and households could be said to possess a rather
high degree of (structural) autonomy in Bentian society, people are nevertheless quite
strongly connected in practice, and frequently also constrained by their collective
attachments, especially by the intricate webs of their extensive kin relations. How can we
make sense of this? How can such simultaneous expressions of autonomy and
interdependence be explained? Or to phrase the question in a more well-known (and
perhaps somewhat outdated)  form: how can we account for social order or social
cohesion in such a “loosely structured social system” (Embree 1950)? This question
        Patrilines, assumably uncommon in typically bilateral Borneo, are also reported for the Lun68
Dayeh (Crain 1978:130-31) and the Selako (Schneider 1978:67). Among the Bentian, some women (i.e.
shamans) also occasionally trace matrilines. Generally, there seems to be a vague sense in which
unilineal connections are conceived of as more direct and powerful than bilineal ones, possibly as a
result of sultanate influence. The importance of these unilineal connections, however, seems to be
mainly restricted to spiritual powers. Unilineal connections are allegedly not superior to bilineal
connections with respect to inheritance or any legal matters, even though they may be invoked in such
contexts. Jerome Rousseau (personal communication, 2004) suggests that these genealogies may in fact
be bilateral same-sex pedigrees, but it appears to me, from the limited  information that I have on such
genealogies, that this is not the case among the Bentian. 
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represents a secondary line of inquiry which I hope to address through my analysis of
Bentian authority.
In addition to the tension arising from Bentian efforts at exerting and evading
authority, there is also another type of tension forming a central element in the story to
be presented. This is the tension arising from the continually ongoing negotiation of
social boundaries and otherness, which is present even within small communities
formally regarded as all kin. Even though Bentian kinship can be held to be basically
inclusive, and co-villagers frequently voice the idea that they are “one family” (erai
aben), processes of differentiation and exclusion also operate in Bentian society. An
illustration is the fact that notions about sorcery (egau) and poisoning (believed to be
effected by spiritually potent oils, ompan) often critically influence people's attitudes
toward each other. An alleged instance of sorcery which forms a significant ingredient
in the story serves to demonstrate this fact, and enables us to examine some of the ways
in which the negotiation of social boundaries are conducted within what in discourse is
usually emphatically portrayed as seamless wholes. In addition, this illustration of “the
reverse side” of Bentian notions of relatedness has the advantage of indicating the limits
of kinship authority, at the same time as it is precisely such assaults on the social fabric
which are particularly instrumental in activating claims of kinship in efforts to integrate
people.
A Few Notes on Bentian Kinship
Before I proceed to the story, I shall give a brief account of some basic features of
Bentian kinship (Appendix 1 gives a list of kinship terms). The Bentian have bilateral
inheritance and generally reckon kinship bilaterally, although some men keep patrilineal
genealogies, tracing them to powerful ancestors.  Marriage is mainly monogamous, but68
polygamy, both polygyny and polyandry, also occurs (as polyandry is not permitted by
Indonesian law, however, all polyandrous unions are unofficial and more or less secret
        Although polyandry is generally regarded as rare outside the Himalayan region, polyandrous69
unions are reported from several societies in Borneo (Lumholtz 1920:440; Rousseau 1990:227; Sellato
1994:156; Tsing 1993:130) as well as from peninsular Malaysia (Howell 1989:28). Interestingly, these
references are all either to hunters and gatherers or highly dispersed swidden cultivators, suggesting that
the institution, and polygamy in general in these societies, may reflect concerns with optimizing the
reproductive potential of the groups in question (Sellato 1994:156; Knapen 2001:126) and enabling
local endogamy. In addition, my own data suggest that ideological concerns with maintaining
previously established relations and having no one stay alone also motivate the institution. 
         The duration of the periods of uxori- and virilocal residence is largely the result of negotiation70
and practical considerations, although some ideal and standard lengths, varying between villages, were
also given (e.g. four years of uxorilocality followed by two years of virilocality). Virilocal residence is
not fully as often realized in practice as uxorilocal residence and has to be enacted through an official
visit by the man’s family. Both types of residence may be avoided through compensation. Immediately
after the wedding ceremony, before actual uxorilocal residence is established, the couple also stays first
some eight days with the bride’s parents, then some four days with the man’s parents (here again the
exact length of the different stays may vary in different areas and the order is sometimes reversed).
Usually, two weddings are also arranged, one by the groom’s family, one by the bride’s, and both
families present “traditional valuables” (ceramic jars, gongs, and plates) to the other, the value of the
groom’s family’s prestations normally being double to that of the bride’s (e.g. five dozen plates versus
two and a half). The principal purpose of all of these arrangements seems to be to ensure connection
and complementarity, especially a fair balance of expenses.
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affairs).  Divorce and remarriage, including sororate and levirate, is frequent, and people69
often remarry many times. Endogamy is preferred and it was more common in the past
when marriage usually was restricted to within one's community. First cousin marriage
is allowed and fairly common; second and third cousin marriage used to be the norm and
is still largely so. Postmarital residence, in theory and in most actual cases, is initially
uxorilocal and secondarily virilocal.  Due to the dual settlement pattern of alternating70
swidden-village residence and recurrent visits between relatives, household size and
composition vary and fluctuate considerably. In the villages, swidden households
typically merge into larger ones sharing an “extended family house” (lou). Reflecting the
vaguely defined character of Bentian kin entities, the Bentian term for a household or
family unit, aben, is used for all varieties of residentially concentrated kin groups, and
it may be extended to entire villages (or several adjacent ones) by villagers who want to
emphasize their closeness or the fact that most of them are related (through cognatic,
affinal, or adoptive links). Personal “kindreds,” including affines, and sometimes
unrelated neighbors, are crucially important as action groups and cut through the
boundaries of residentially concentrated kin and other groups. What emerges from a
consideration of these patterns is a picture of a fluid and variably composite social system
where residence and kinship combine to effect a highly flexible organization which
would seem to allow much room for choice and strategical manoeuver in interpersonal
alignments. However, kinship in this society represents a highly influential source of
authority which can effectively be used to counteract attempts at far-reaching autonomy
and bind dispersed community members together.
         Temiang, and Bermaung and Datai Munte (see below) are not the real names of the villages in71
question but pseudonyms. Udin is also a pseudonym. However, most other names mentioned in the
story or elsewhere in the thesis are not. 
      It can be mentioned here that Bermaung is not a Bentian village; most of its inhabitants belong     72
to the weakly objectified upper Teweh subgroup of the Luangan and refer to themselves as Dusun-
Tawoyan or just Luangan. They nevertheless point out that they and the Bentian are one and the same
people, differentiated only by name. For them, as for most Luangans, ethnic differences on this level are
insignificant or overridden by loyalties grounded in the sharing of a common language, a common
religious tradition, and a basically similar way of life. For the purposes of this paper, I will therefore
consider Udin a Bentian, and so was he, for most purposes, considered by the Bentians — as were other
non-Bentian Luangans living in Bentian villages during my fieldstay. A prominent feature of life in the
region is that people who move to other villages adjust to local customs and practices with what seems
like remarkable ease. Rather than insist on difference and emphasize their pasts, people are usually
strongly inclined to stress similarities. This is, of course, a common feature of many societies in
“plural” Southeast Asia, particularly in the so-called peripheries of the region (e.g. see Carsten 1997;
Gibson 1986; M. Rosaldo 1980). In such societies, suppression of differences in origin, often along
with suppression of differences in status, work to create a sense of local unity and enable local
cooperation. 
      What he had in mind was not wage labor but primarily an opportunity to help someone gather     73
rattan or gaharu wood, and then in return get part of the money when it was sold.
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The Story of Udin
Udin was a young man who married into Temiang,  the small Bentian village in which71
I resided for most of my fieldwork. Udin, at the time that I knew him, was a person who
may be described as cheerful, sociable and outgoing, all traits which were not always
particularly manifest among Bentians that I knew. He could also be characterized as
something of a dreamer with occasional ostentatious tendencies. He came to Temiang
from Bermaung, a village located on the Teweh River some two to three days’ walk from
Temiang, on the other side of the provincial border.  Out of about 90 people living in72
Temiang or on swiddens within its territory in 1996, 10 were born in Bermaung.
Temiangers have been intermarrying with people from a particular hamlet of Bermaung
for over a hundred years, although it is only more recently, especially during the past two
decades, that intermarriage has become more frequent.
Udin first came to Temiang in 1990, looking for temporary work to earn some cash
(elo usaha).  He was then in his early twenties. He stayed in Temiang with Nen Bai, his73
mother's second cousin (who had married into the village a couple of years earlier), and
her husband Ma Dengu, helping them to harvest rattan. During this stay he met a pretty
girl (Rosa) with whom he did not, however, establish a relation at the time. He was then
married to another girl in Bermaung, so he returned home after a few months, but got
divorced shortly after. In 1993, three years later, Udin met Rosa again, this time when she
came to Bermaung to visit relatives in the company of her mother's first cousin, Ma Bure,
and his wife Nen Simur, Nen Bai's sister, who had married into Temiang “following”
Nen Bai (Rosa, whose own parents frequently stayed away from Temiang in her father's
      Luangans, like other Dayaks, have both personal names, and teknonyms which they get when     74
they have children or grandchildren, or when they reach the age when they normally would do so.
Female teknonyms take the form of Nen X or Tak X (i.e. “mother of X,” or “grandmother of X”) while
male teknonyms, according to the same logic, read as Ma X or Kakah X. Not all apparent teknonyms
are true teknonyms, however. Luangan practice is unusual in that most people get their “teknonyms” not
from their children or grandchildren but, instead, from habits, attributes or particular events associated
with the namebearer (thus, for example, Ma Pija derived his “teknonym” from his penchant for dried
fish, pija). Some “teknomymic” names are created from a wordplay, or prosodic likeness, connecting
the teknonym to the personal name (thus Ma Lombang derived his “teknonym” from his personal name,
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village, had been adopted by, and living with, Ma Bure and Nen Simur since Udin's first
stay in Temiang). During this visit, Udin and Rosa started to see each other until “the old
folks” (dali tuha), that is, Rosa's attendants and Udin's mother (who is Nen Simur's
second cousin), saw that the two “had to become married” — it was not like he actually
had asked for her, Udin told me. At any rate, Udin could not have married Rosa while
still in Temiang because of his first marriage, and also because Rosa was then too young
to marry. A short time after the wedding, Udin and Rosa returned to Temiang with Ma
Bure and Nen Simur. The next two years Udin worked on a shared swidden site with Ma
Bure and Ma Bure's father Ma Lombang. During this period, Liman, Udin's and Rosa's
first child, was born.
At this time, and up to 1996 when I stayed most of the year in Temiang, Udin and
Rosa alternated residence between their farmhouse, where Rosa's grandmother Tak Rosa
also stayed, and the “village longhouse” (lou solai) owned by Tak Rosa's brother Ma
Bari, the (unofficial) village head. In 1995 Ma Bure and Nen Simur moved to a newly
opened transmigration site (called tran by locals) located some ten kilometers from the
village. Udin continued to work on the same swidden site, now in the company of his
friend Mudai, a young Benuaq Dayak who also had married into the village and
subsequently had become adopted by a villager (Ma Mar), whose swidden field was
adjacent to Udin's and now being farmed by Mudai. Like Mudai, Udin spent much of his
time hunting, and he seldom slept in the village, except during larger rituals. Since he was
one of the most successful hunters in the village he regularly came by the longhouse with
meat to give to its inhabitants and other of his relatives. Then he would usually sit down
recounting hunting stories for Ma Bari or Ma Bari's middle-aged sons Ma Kelamo and
Ma Isa. Occasionally, if he got large catches, he sold fish or deer to people at tran. He
also at times brought rice and vegetables to the village. When, for instance, in February
1996 an eight day buntang ritual was held for Tak Lodot (Tak Rosa's and Ma Bari's sister,
and Ma Lombang's second wife), Udin provided most of the rice consumed by guests and
participants. He had clearly become important for several villagers who depended on him
to a high degree for their subsistence or entertainment. Acknowledging his increasingly
adult status, Kakah Ramat, Ma Lombang's sister's husband and the most highly respected
belian of Temiang, introduced the teknonym Ma Denia (“Father of the World”) for Udin,
a name connoting his tendency of always being on the move.74
Mangong, because of the auditory semblance between Mangong and Lombang). Once teknonymic
designations have become established, most people are usually addressed by them rather than by their
personal name. However, personal names continue to be used for address of persons on a lower
generational level than the speaker, and sometimes also for people on the same generational level and
of the same approximate age as oneself (although not for affinal collaterals who must be addressed with
kinship terms). For people on a higher generational level, one is not allowed to speak personal names
but must use teknonyms or preferably kinship terms for address.
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List of Principal Characters in Udin’s Story
Udin: The 27 year old protagonist who married into Temiang from Bermaung.
Rosa: Udin’s wife.
Tak Rosa: Rosa’s maternal grandmother who lived with Udin and Rosa, alternating
residence between their farmhouse and her brother Ma Bari’s lou. 
Nen Bai: Udin’s mother’s second cousin from Bermaung. The woman who accommodated
Udin when he visited Temiang the first time.
Ma Dengu: Nen Bai’s husband. Acted as manti and provided plates for Udin at the
perkara in Datai Munte. Second cousin and close friend of Ma Bari.
Nen Simur: Nen Bai’s sister from Bermaung,. Married into Temiang “following” Nen
Bai. Adopted Udin’s wife Rosa together with her husband, and accommodated Udin and
Rosa the first few years of their marriage, before moving to the transmigration camp.
Ma Bure: Nen Simur wife. Cousin of Rosa’s mother.
Ma Pija: Rosa’s father. Originated from a Benuaq Dayak village where he and Rosa’s
mother spent much time.
Ma Pile: One of the manti who spoke and provided plates for Udin at the perkara in Datai
Munte. The first from Bermaung to marry into Temiang. Father of Ma Bubu who was
married to Tak Lodot’s granddaughter. 
Ma Lombang: The outspoken manti and warah who was caught between his conflicting
loyalities to Udin and Nen Pare’s family at the perkara in Datai Munte. Father of Rosa’s
adoptive father Ma Bure. Adoptive father of his dead brother Ma Resa’s children Nen Pare
and Nen Bujok. Took an active part in Udin’s and many other people’s lives in the village.
Tak Lodot: Ma Lombang’s wife.Grandmother of Nen Bubu in whose household she and
Ma Lombang periodically stayed
Nen Pare: The woman who Udin was accused of having made ill through sorcery. 
Ma Mar: Nen Pare’s first husband, originally from a Teweh river village. Adoptive father
of Mudai.
Ma Sarakang: Nen Pare’s second husband. Ma Lombang’s deceased sister’s son.
Nen Bujok: Nen Pare’s unafraid sister who spoke for Nen Pare at the perkara in Temiang.
Ma Putup: Nen Bujok’s husband who had married into Temiang from another Bentian
village. A belian known for his unusual spirit familiars
Mudai: The young Benuaq Dayak man who was Udin’s friend and swidden neighbor.
Ma Bari: The owner of the lou solai of Temiang. Unofficial kepala adat and the most
high-ranking manti of the village. Brother of Udin’s wife’s grandmother Tak Rosa and Ma
Lombang’s wife Tak Lodot . Acted as manti and provided plates for Udin at the perkara in
Datai Munte and led the negotiations (musyawarah) in Temiang during which it was
decided that Udin was to stay in the village.
Ma Isa: Ma Bari’s son. Shared a swidden with Udin toward the end of his stay in
Temiang.
Ma Kelamo: Ma Isa’s younger brother. Udin’s friend and the most successful hunter in
the village. Father of Ena who was married to Udin’s friend and third cousin Mohar.
Mohar: Nen Bai’s son, born in Bermaung prior to her marriage with Ma Dengu.
Kakah Ramat: The old and respected belian who gave Udin his teknonym and who
spoke, along with Ma Dengu and Ma Bari, during the negotiations in Temiang. Married to
Ma Lombang’s sister.
Ma Busek: The kepala adat of Datai Munte.
Nen Udin: Udin’s mother from Bermaung.
      As Nen Pare's marriage with her second husband Ma Sarakang had not been ceremonially     75
sanctified (as remarked above, polyandrous alliances are unofficial and sensitive affairs, where only one
of the spouses, usually the first, is recognized), it could be seen as an illicit and immoral relation
breaching adat (customary law) — and thus an offence for which fines could have to be paid — as well
as a potential source of personal misfortune, which explains why Udin wanted to draw attention to the
matter. 
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In late March the same year, returning from a trip downstream, I was surprised to find
a large number of people from Temiang gathered in the house of Ma Busek, the head of
customary law (kepala adat) of the neighboring village of Datai Munte (of which
Temiang officially is a subvillage), in the middle of a lawsuit case (perkara). Joining
them, I found out that the case concerned an attempt at seeking compensation for sorcery
by the family of Nen Pare (Ma Lombang's niece), who accused Udin of having wilfully
made Nen Pare sick. After a somewhat hazardous and unavailing trip to consult a doctor
in the regency capital of Tenggarong, Nen Pare and her two husbands had  “returned
upstream” (uli daye) with the information that Nen Pare suffered from a “possibly man-
made” uterine tumor, although she, being afraid to die away from home, had not
submitted to surgery, despite the doctor's insistence that an operation was necessary to
save her life. A little later they made their charges against Udin public. They said they
suspected him on the grounds of jealousy, a claim which Udin himself and most other
villagers found rather incredible, since Nen Pare was his elder by many years, as well as
disreputable because of her marital affairs.
The scene was one of emotional uneasiness and suspense, but also one of strained
formality. Attendants sat on white plastic chairs along the walls in the front room of the
modern-styled building where pictures of the president, the governor, Jesus, and
vaccination campaign posters decorated the light veneer walls. The head of customary
law sat at his desk in the middle of the room with piles of white plates laid out on the
floor in front of him. Outside on the veranda, women seated on benches peered in
through the windows. Tea brought in by Nen Pare's sister, Nen Bujok, was served, but
no one touched it, except Nen Bujok herself, the head of customary law, and the
anthropologists. 
Many of the people assembled in the house were markedly uncomfortable with the
situation, their eyes fixed on the floor or their faces hidden in their hands, looking as if
they were in mourning. More awkward than any other, perhaps, was Ma Lombang, who
had close relatives on both sides, but who was assigned to speak for Nen Pare. Most
people talking were older or middle-aged men with manti or near manti status, but Nen
Bujok forcefully defended her sister in her and her husbands' absence. Ma Bari and Ma
Pile (an older man cognatically related to Udin who had been the first in a series of
people from Bermaung to marry into Temiang) spoke for the accused, who tried to
counter the charges by pointing to Nen Pare's polyandrous marriage, indicating that it
could be the real cause of her disease.  Marital status, or its lack, was probably also the75
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reason for the absence of Nen Pare's second husband, Ma Sarakang, and the partial
absence of her first husband, Ma Mar (Udin's friend Mudai's adoptive father). Nen Pare
herself was at the time already too sick to walk.
After a night's break for sleep, the negotiations continued the following day, and
within a few hours the verdict was declared by the head of customary law. It was
established that Udin had to pay ten dozen white plates to Nen Pare, while he himself
would receive nothing. So that Udin would not feel hurt or unfairly treated, four older
men — Ma Bari, Ma Pile, Ma Lombang and Ma Dengu — offered to supply these plates
to Nen Pare for him. At the beginning of the negotiations the two parties had each paid
five dozen plates as deposits; two dozen of these were now given to the head of
customary law as compensation for leading and housing the negotiations, four were
distributed among those manti who had tried to resolve the conflict by speaking (the same
persons who provided Udin with the plates that he had to pay), and the remaining four
were returned to Udin and Nen Pare. In sum, this meant that Udin had to pay three dozen
plates (in expenses), while Nen Pare received seven dozen. No explicit reason for the
verdict was given, nor was it explicitly proven or stated that Udin had conducted sorcery
against Nen Pare. To guarantee consent to the verdict, the deliberation was closed in
customary fashion when the people involved and others present, led by a belian, held on
to a spear while scattering some rice, thereby addressing the seniang besarah, the
celestial guardians of customary law. The verdict was also written down on a document
signed by the two parties and their representatives (by thumb prints in the case of those
who were illiterate).
Despite this formal consent to the decision, many people from Temiang privately
expressed doubts about the notion that Udin somehow would have made Nen Pare sick
or even wanted her to get sick. Udin himself said that he believed that an event at a ritual
arranged by his family might have provoked the suspicions on her part: Nen Pare, who
had attended the ritual, had seen Udin come out of the kitchen eating something which
he had not offered to others to eat. She had become angry with him and one week later
she first became aware of her disease, which eventually was to take her life a few months
after the lawsuit.
Although most people did not consider Udin guilty, and many disagreed with the
outcome of the negotiations, they nevertheless did not seem particularly surprised about
it. Several persons said that they found the verdict understandable because it constituted
the solution most likely to enforce harmony in the village. If the decision had been
different, Nen Pare and her people would not have been satisfied, and this could have put
Udin and others in danger and also could have formed a source of dissension in the
village (even if no one suggested it, the spirit familiars and extraordinary shamanship of
Ma Putup, Nen Pare's sister Nen Bujok's husband and a stranger from an upriver village
with which Temiangers previously had had no relations, was probably a factor
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significantly contributing to these views). A week later, Udin announced that he would
not be staying in Temiang much longer, and that he intended to return to Bermaung with
his wife and child. Notwithstanding the outcome of the deliberations, he did not feel safe
anymore, especially not on his swidden (which was much frequented by Nen Pare's
husband Ma Mar, visiting the adjacent swidden of his adoptive son Mudai). Despite the
contributions of plates by the four benevolent men, he was also hurt and felt that he had
suffered injustice. He explained his plans to Ma Bari, who did not, however, support
them.
Ma Bari, and a range of other villagers as well, considered it important that Udin
should continue to stay in Temiang. Ma Bari's sister Tak Rosa, in particular, greatly
depended on Udin (and Rosa) because her only daughter and her daughter's husband
(Rosa's parents) only periodically stayed in the village and did not keep a swidden. To Ma
Bari himself, although he could largely rely on his sons Ma Kelamo and Ma Isa for rice
and meat, Udin had become a personal friend, as he also had with Ma Bari's second
cousin Ma Dengu, to whom his occasional meat contributions had a somewhat greater
significance. He was perhaps no longer that important in these ways to Ma Lombang
who, after his son Ma Bure and Nen Simur moved to tran, chiefly turned to his present
wife Tak Lodot's grandchild Nen Bubu and her husband Ma Bubu for meat and rice. He
and Tak Lodot now often stayed in Nen Bubu's and Ma Bubu's farmhouse, and Ma
Lombang also frequently visited tran where, in addition to his son, Nen Bubu's younger
brother Lodot worked. Like Ma Bari and Ma Dengu, however, Ma Lombang was openly
concerned with the low population of Temiang, and just as they were, he was still hoping
that one day the village could regain its autonomy and overcome its present status as a
sub-village of Datai Munte. This concern of the elders of the community probably also
affected their stance in the Udin case.
To resolve the problem, formal public negotiations, led by Ma Bari, were held in the
village longhouse. The negotiations began after nightfall and continued until midnight.
Udin explained that three years had now passed since his wedding: this was the length
of the customary period of initial matrilocal residence that had then been prescribed. He
now wanted to return to Bermaung where he was needed by his relatives, especially by
his mother (Udin's father was long dead). Ma Bari, Kakah Ramat and Ma Dengu each in
turn gave three lengthy speeches in which they discussed the circumstances which in their
views necessitated Udin's extended stay in the village. His contributions in hunting wild
boar and cultivating rice, banana and cassava were very much needed here, where there
were not many young, skillful hunters like himself, whereas in Bermaung, on the other
hand, there were plenty of people, and his mother could already count on the aid of
several of his siblings. During the course of the evening, no one really defended Udin
(and there might have been no one present who wanted him to leave). He himself said
very little. 
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The decision, announced by Ma Bari, was that Udin would be staying two more years
in Temiang, and that he was not allowed to visit Bermaung during this time. So that he
would not have to fear Nen Pare's people, it was arranged that he was to take his pig and
chickens and make next year's swidden with Ma Bari's son Ma Isa at a primary forest site
of Ma Dengu's, far away from his present swidden site. As a token of appreciation, one
dozen white plates were presented to him by the elders. As he himself afterwards
expressed it, there was nothing else that he could do, so he accepted the plates and the
terms that went with them. If he had to stay, however, he was going to ask Rosa's father,
Ma Pija, to buy him a motorcycle and a chainsaw from the money that Ma Pija expected
to receive as compensation for conceding lands in his home village to a mining company,
and then he was going to ask Ma Busek, the head of customary law of Datai Munte, to
have a logging company operating nearby build a road to Temiang.
The next day Udin came to see me, asking me to help him type a letter to his relatives
in Bermaung. He intended to send this letter with Ma Dengu, who would go to Bermaung
the following day with his wife's son Mohar, to ask Mohar's brothers to move to Temiang
to help Ma Dengu make a swidden next to Udin's. The letter is reproduced below (with
the consent of Udin). The first section was written in Indonesian, which is the language
that Bentians normally use when writing letters. In the second section Udin, encouraged
by me, switched to the local language. Here the tone becomes more straightforward and
personal at the same time as the sentences become more typical of spoken rather than
written language. His lavish use of proverbs in the third paragraph adds an expressive
quality to the text, at the same time as it helps maintain a formal aspect, as does his use
of parallelism, evident particularly in the first paragraph. The intent of the letter is
twofold: Udin expresses his disappointment at having to stay in Temiang, and asks his
relatives to visit him, since he cannot visit them.
Temiang, April 15, 1996
To my Honored Mother, my Younger and Older Siblings, and other Family 
Hereby I'm forwarding some brief news, that I had intended to come back to
Bermaung, but on Monday night I had a calling from some “adminstrators”
(pengurus, I.) or “leaders” (manti), first and foremost Ma Bari, second Kakah Ramat,
and third Ma Dengu. At this time we had a negotiation or arbitration in the “grand
longhouse” (lamin besar) or lou solai. The result of this arbitration was that I was
given one piece of jar [equivalent to one dozen plates] to keep me from coming back
to Bermaung for a period of two years. That night, beginning from seven o'clock
when the programme started, until over one o'clock, I responded to or resisted their
argument because I had already promised to get back to the place and the area which
I own in Bermaung. But because it was only I who had the intent and goal to come
back to Bermaung, because there was no one from Bermaung to pick up me and my
wife and child observing the custom of bringing a white plate, well since there was
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not that, I just had to lose, contesting their argument at that time, since I was all alone,
and they were many people. This accident is not, I feel, my fault, but instead the fault
of you in Bermaung, because you were not quick enough to perform the custom
mentioned. Now the way to proceed is already closed, there is no way out anymore.
If this letter of mine reaches you, I ask you to write me a letter as well. And in
addition to that, I ask you to come and see me over here. I want to meet, first Lende
[Udin's older brother], and second my ayu [sister's husband] Menari. In the first place,
if you are looking for work, there is work: rattan, and there is a price. And what
regards the rattan affair at Telisek, they have not paid me yet. So I'm asking you ayu
to visit soon. Don't wait until month five, first, if you want to collect gaharu, there
is the tree about which I once told you which to this day still hasn't been felled, and
second, to help me work over here, with swidden cultivation or with “business”
(usaha). 
Well, that's all for now, all of the news that I'm forwarding you, so that you'll
know. I can't visit yet, I'm kept here by them for two more years. To make swiddens,
raise houses, hunt with dogs, wander the forests. So that I would not run off from
them, for this year they gave me one piece of jar and prohibited me from visiting. It’s
like in the saying, the pig is fenced and the cock is caged. Because you were late, you
see, if you had come after me then, before I was prohibited by them, I would surely
have been able to make a visit. Now I simply don't know how to proceed, but what
about the possibility of you coming over here? First of all you, my honored mother,
my family and kin, friends and relatives, parent's older siblings, parent's younger
siblings, my younger siblings, my older siblings, my uncle Ma Sentikdan, my older
uncle Ma Luno, what are your plans? I'm kept here for two years by them, I had been
looking forward to come to Bermaung, but — there you have the account from the
beginning, the liana-like roots of the sugarpalm, the smoke which presages the flame,
the lightning which precedes the thunder. I can't escape, leave the house. The low
clouds pass by low, the high clouds pass over high. Well, even though I'm sending
this letter it is, as it says, with bleak saliva and a raw tongue because I have no
money, cash, bills, coins to accompany the letter. Sometime ago, well, then I had
some money, but because there was this problem, well, it’s finished. And at this time,
I can't do any business. Well, that's all of what I had to tell you in Bermaung, all for
now, thanks. Hope it's received.
Udin
After a short delay, Ma Dengu took Udin's letter to Bermaung. Several months passed
without Udin receiving news from his relatives. Meanwhile, he worked on his new rice
field, felling large trees and slashing undergrowth. Then, in early August, his mother and
his preadolescent brother and sister suddenly turned up, to visit him, they said, and to
help with the birth of his second child, which Rosa was expecting. They first settled in
his old farmhouse, but soon moved into the longhouse. Because of Rosa's pregnancy,
Udin too began to sleep most of the time in the longhouse now, hunting every other night
with Mohar, who also was staying there after the birth of his and Ena's first child in
August. In early October, Udin's and Rosa's second child was born. His mother, who with
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her sociable and unreserved ways had become popular with the other women in the
village, told me that she was going to stay in Temiang until the harvest (in February-
March), while his sister said that they were going to stay for good. 
Since it had been raining heavily through August and September, Udin had not been
able to clear his rice field through burning yet, and it began to look as if there was not
going to be a rice harvest for him that (farming) year. By mid October, most villagers had
in fact burned their fields, but Udin and Ma Isa, who unlike the others wanted to make
swiddens in primary forest (alas) which is more humid than other forest, still had not.
Then there was a three day streak of drier weather, which some people saw as their last
chance, but Ma Isa, referring to the approaching full moon, declared that it was already
too late. Ma Bari then decided that the two should make a common swidden together with
Ma Isa's older brother Ma Kelamo, whose own field was quite large, and could be
expanded through additional burning at the edges.
One night around this time Ma Bari gave a lengthy monologue addressed to Udin's
mother. He gave a detailed chronological account of the events of the past six months,
including Nen Pare's lawsuit against Udin and the subsequent negotiations in Temiang.
He pointed out how important Udin was in Temiang, and said that it was Udin's
“assignment” (urusan) to hunt wild boar and deer. After he had finished, Udin's mother
delivered a similar report of her situation in Bermaung, focusing on her difficulties as a
lone woman trying to raise several children, and her loss of some family valuables which
had been stolen. Some time later the two had an argument regarding a large catch of
catfish, which Udin had sold to tran, without first having distributed shares of it among
his relatives.
At the end of October, after an eight day curing ritual had been held for Udin's older
child Liman, at which both Udin’s family including his mother, and Ma Bari with his
wife Tak Ningin, were ritually bathed, Udin began working on his new swidden site. In
between he, like most other villagers, joined small workgroups, often including his
mother and siblings, planting rice on other people's swiddens. In November, before I went
on a trip to Central Kalimantan during which I also intended to visit Bermaung, Udin
revealed to me that he too was soon to make a brief visit to Bermaung. His mother had
decided to return home after all, and he was to follow her on the way. His visit would
probably coincide with mine so we decided that I would ask around for him while in
Bermaung. 
There was no news of Udin when I passed Bermaung. When I came back to Temiang
at the beginning of December, I learned that Udin, Rosa and their children, accompanied
by Rosa's parents, had left for Bermaung a few days earlier, and that they were going to
stay there for several years, at least. I was told that Udin's mother, who had returned to
Bermaung ahead of Udin with some other people, had asked Ma Bari to let Udin go
home, and Ma Bari told me that he had conceded, and that there would have been no use
      Formally, cognatic kin who become affinal kin initially cease to be recognized as cognatic kin,     76
even though they might still be regarded as such informally. This contrasts with the Bajau Laut, who
“attempt, as far as possible, to assimilate affines into appropriate categories of kin relationship” (Sather
1997:233). However, later, when affines have proven their worth, so to speak, they are, as already
noted, frequently assimilated in this way among the Bentian, too.
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in Udin staying anyway, as his swidden had failed. Udin had, however, already planted
rice on his most recent swidden before he left, so it was arranged that Rosa's parents
would care for that swidden when they returned to Temiang. In the meantime, it would
be tended by Tak Rosa, Rosa's grandmother who, having lived with Udin and Rosa for
the past four years, seemed more deeply affected by their departure than anyone else (in
fact, all other villagers seemed hardly affected at all). Later, news came to me that Udin
and his companions, including his one month old baby, had become lost in the forest, and
been held up by a flooded river for several days on their way to Bermaung. When I left
Temiang and my fieldwork ended in mid January, Rosa's parents had not yet returned to
Temiang. 
Following your Kin: The Continuing Significance of Kin Relations
There were many factors and circumstances at play influencing the course of events
related in the story of Udin, and chance, as always, certainly played a part in how things
turned out. Kinship will be at the center of my attention in the discussion that now
follows. There would be other ways to analyze the story, as there would be other ways
of telling it. Similarly, the particular way that the story's constitutive events are tied
together is largely the result of the fact that it is told from my perspective, that is, the
result of how these events appeared to me during and after my own stay in Temiang. 
But even though kinship can be said to have been pushed to the fore in the story,
kinship also frequently surfaces in Bentian real life experiences more generally. As a
result of a strong tendency for endogamy and the system of bilateral kinship reckoning,
most and sometimes all social relations that Bentians have are kin relations, that is,
relations with either cognatic or affinal kin, or people who are both.  Thus, as in many76
other places around Southeast Asia and the world, people largely live in what you could
call worlds of kin, that is, among people who are mostly their relatives. This is made all
the more compelling by the fact that kinship provides the basic idiom in which most
social relations are understood or at least talked about (even if they are not kin relations,
strictly speaking). Kinship is thus centrally salient, both as kin relations and in the form
of a flexibly applicable relationship terminology and ideology. This condition probably
prevailed to an even greater extent in the past, when the small sub-ethnic local groups
into which the Bentian then were divided usually had few marriage or other contacts with
      The diagram excludes people who have moved to other villages, as well as some people that I     77 
have not been able to illustrate because of considerations of space. I have not, for example, included all
the siblings or children of the people mentioned. People who died young and were childless have also
been excluded. The youngest living generation, which consisted of some fifteen children below the age
of ten, is also, with the exception of Udin’s children, excluded. For technical reasons, I have not been
able to illustrate all the marriages of the people in the diagram, although I have indicated a few
subsequent marriages for a few people who play prominent roles in the examples. Two people, Ma
Sarakang and Nen Bujok, I have even indicated twice, in different parts of this diagram, precisely in
order to indicate their marriages, which are relevant in different examples. Generally, I have not
indicated the internal relationship of inmarried Temiangers, and only a few adoptive relationships have
been indicated. The basic principle for inclusion in the diagram has been that only those who are
mentioned in the text, and their wives, children and parents should be indicated (and the latter are not
identified by name unless they are also mentioned). One more thing to observe is that the diagram
generally does not indicate internal relationships between non-original Temiangers. 
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each other or other groups. However, it still largely persists, even though, according to
my investigations, around twenty to thirty percent of the inhabitants of the present-day
Bentian villages originated from villages other than where they now reside.
In order to give some indication of the extent people in Bentian villages are related
and endogamous, I have included a kinship diagram (Fig. 1) of people resident in
Temiang who are mentioned in Udin’s story, or in some other examples which are
presented in later chapters. The diagram thus also serves to illustrate the links between
the dramatis personae in these examples (many of whom figure in several examples).
The diagram is notably not a diagram of all people in Temiang, even though it includes
two-thirds of the population who resided within the village’s territory in April-June
1996.  In addition, it includes the parents (all dead) of most indigenous Temiangers in77
the oldest generation alive at that time. These parents were all members of three sibling
sets (who were also internally related), a fact which demonstrates that most Temiangers
can trace a common ancestry from a very limited number of ancestors just a few
generations back in time. Most people in the oldest living generation notably also
belonged to two sibling sets, and all other original Temiangers in this generation,
including those not depicted, are also cognatically related, mostly within second cousin
range. In terms of the degree of interrelatedness that this entails, Temiang is probably
fairly typical of smaller Bentian villages (in large villages people are not quite as closely
related even though people within certain village clusters may well be so). The village
notably represents an amalgamation of seven housegroups most of which maintained
separate lou within its territory until some forty years ago (however, most present-day
Temiangers descend from just two of these houses, i.e. from those in which the three
sibling sets of the oldest generation were born). Temiang was established as a village at
the end of the nineteenth century when a few of its manti were given titles by the sultan
of Kutai and a lou solai bearing its name was built. Until the early period of Indonesian
independence, its members rarely married out and marriage within the house seems in
fact to have been preferred. The community was formerly somewhat larger than now, a
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majority of the members of most of its constituent housegroups having been lost to Datai
Munte over the years. Today, there is a shortage of marriage partners in Temiang which
probably largely explains the fact that many people in the younger generations have
married Bermaungers (or people from Datai Munte). Today, unlike in the past, many
people, especially men, have also traveled widely, and there are quite often visitors from
afar passing by.
Despite increasing regional interaction and intervillage marriage, kinship relations,
including cognatic ones, nevertheless continue to be prominent in most Temiangers’ as
in other Bentians' lives. In fact, even inmarried individuals usually have at least some
cognatic relations in the villages where they reside. This is the result of the fact that these
individuals tend to have originated from the same villages, and be related prior to arriving
at their new villages. If one looks at from where the non-original residents of the different
Bentian villages come, one generally finds that the majority come from a rather limited
number of other Bentian or Luangan villages. Most of them would say that they have
“followed their kin” (nyang kaben), that is, the fact that one or several of their relatives
have dwelled in another village has formed an incentive for them to go to that village.
Udin would not have gone to Temiang, a small, insignificant and rather isolated
village with a reputation for poisoning, had he not had some prior relations with relatives
there, which resulted in his getting the opportunity of making some money harvesting
rattan. The same is also true of his mother's second cousin Nen Simur (with whom Rosa
was living when Udin first came to Temiang) who married into Temiang as a result of
meeting her husband while visiting her sister Nen Bai (with whom Udin also stayed
during his first stay in Temiang). One could, in fact, regard all those ten people in
Temiang who originated from Bermaung — each of whom was related to everyone else
within a third cousin range — as together constituting one long chain where every link
is connected to some other one(s) at both sides, and where Ma Pile, the old man who
assisted Udin at the lawsuit negotiations, is at the starting end of the chain. Everyone
making up this imaginary chain was not, of course, necessarily dependent on the presence
of the immediately preceding link, in the sense that it was always that relative who caused
him or her to move. But most of them would not have been part of it at all without the
presence of at least some of the preceding links.
There are many more examples in Bentian society of kinship chains such as that of
the Bermaungers who had moved to Temiang. This chain itself is complexly intertwined
with two or three other ones, first, with one of some ten to twenty Bermaungers who had
moved to Datai Munte, the neighboring village, and second, with one of some ten
Temiangers who had moved to Bermaung, and another consisting of at least as many
people who had moved from Datai Munte to Bermaung. Another example, which it is
appropriate to mention here, was made up of a number of Benuaq Dayak men, including
Udin's friend Mudai (the young man whose swidden was adjacent to Udin's), Ma
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Sarakang’s dead father Ma Ruran, and Karim (see Fig. 1), who also one after another
moved to Temiang or its “mother” village Datai Munte, and who were also all internally
related and had originated from a few neighboring villages. The reasons why each of
these men and other people who were part of other similar kin chains initially came to
follow their kin are varied and not always clear. In some cases, they might have been
asked to come by their relatives (who might have needed some kind of help, or just
longed for company), whereas in other cases they have gone on their own initiative,
looking for a wife, perhaps, or as in Udin's case, looking for work to earn some cash (but
ending up with a wife). In some cases, they went because their elders had perceived an
opportunity to marry them to someone because of their previously established relations
with the affinal kin of that person. As this indicates, village exogamy does not always
entail kin group exogamy. When people marry out, they often marry relatives (with
whom they may be related either because of the relations established by their
predecessors in the new villages or because of the relations established by people
originating from these villages who have married into their villages). In so far as the
members of particular villages will continue marrying into a limited number of villages
— as they often have done for quite some time — this will of course mean that they will
have, in the generations to come, an even greater reserve of relatives to marry in these
villages. 
There are many reasons why particular Bentians may follow their kin, but what is
most important here is the fact that kinship often enables them to go to places where they
would not go if they did not have prior kin relations there. Quite frequently it does so
because it gives them courage and confidence to stay in unknown or unfamiliar places
among more or less unknown people. Despite increased intra- and interregional contact,
Bentians are, as already pointed out, generally quite suspicious and wary of strangers,
whom they often, in a rather general and unspecific way, feel might want to harm them
or at least cannot be counted on for various sorts of support — and this is probably a
major reason why endogamy is still preferred (at the same time as the persistence of
endogamy also contributes to these suspicions). But, as indicated by the few examples
of motives given above, kinship also enables intervillage movement for other, more
prosaic reasons. Lack of kin ties perhaps not so much inhibits people from going to
places where they would otherwise want to go, as it produces a lack of motivation for
them to go, both in the sense of a lack of a particular reason to do so (e.g. a source of cash
income), and in the sense of a lack of a more general desire to go: people, as I was often
told, want to be with their kin.
Kinship itself is, in fact, an important motive for people to travel. Individuals as well
as families not infrequently travel to other villages with the explicit and sole intent of
visiting their relatives. Visiting, both close range (koteu) and long range (ngonga), is an
important institution in Bentian society, and people sometimes visit their relatives “just
      I will not here describe the institution of visiting, which conforms rather closely to that     78
described by Rosaldo (1993) for the Ilongots, but it should be kept in mind that people very frequently
drop by each other's farmhouses and village houses. In village multi-family houses (lou), there is almost
daily someone dropping in, and for much of the time someone staying for an extended period.
         I here join Christine Helliwell (1995, 1996) in a critique of a tendency in the Borneo79
ethnography of treating the household as strongly autonomous, epitomized by Freeman’s (1958:22)
notion of the (Iban) household as a “sovereign country.” Sather (1993) has also challenged this notion
of Freeman's by way of an analysis of the Iban longhouse as a “ritually constituted structure,” which
integrates its constituent units, the longhouse compartments, in a hierarchic order of precedence.
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to hear the news,” or in order to keep up their relations with them (although there usually
is also some more concrete, often unexpressed purpose with such visits).  Not only does78
visiting make relatives important to each other (and some relatives more important than
others), but it works the other way around as well. Bentians are generally quite concerned
about the quality and quantity of their kin relations, and not breaking these ties is
imperative for most of them regarding at least most of their kin relations.
Inclusive Ideals: Bentian Notions of Kin Obligations
This ideal about maintaining good kin relations not only concerns cognatic kin, but
extends to affinal relations. People quickly become entangled in affinal relations after
marrying, as Udin did when he moved to Temiang after marrying Rosa. One is, in fact,
subjected to greater surveillance with respect to conforming to this ideal in the case of
affinal relations than one is in the case of cognatic relations. Behavior toward affines
(even if one knows them before marrying) is also expected to be somewhat more formal
than behavior toward cognates, and politeness and commitment is expected, particularly
from the newly-married toward their parents-in-law and other elders-in-law. Staying with
affines, one's obligations or interactions are normally not restricted to one's parents-in-
law. In Udin's case, this was especially clear as he and Rosa did not stay with Rosa's
parents while uxorilocally resident in Temiang (but, instead, with Rosa's grandmother
Tak Rosa while on their swidden, and with the latter's brother Ma Bari while in the
village). This had to do with the fact that Rosa's parents for several years had spent much
of their time in her father's village (Rosa did not want to follow them there), and that
Rosa therefore had been staying with other of her relatives (not an unusual arrangement).
Nevertheless, it is normally more common than not that one is much involved also with
other affinal kin than the spouse's parents. The household, whether it consists of a two-
generation family or a three-generation family, which is more common, cannot act
autonomously, but has to take into consideration the interests of both the larger
community and, more particularly, those of closer kin.  79
         The notion is expressed by the kinship term ayu meyari which literally means “sibling-in-law80
behaving like a sibling.” This term is frequently used for collateral affines with whom the speaker wants
to indicate a close personal relationship.
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Bentian kinship is ideally strongly inclusive. Important indications of this are the
practices of naming and treating classificatory siblings as true siblings, and the tendency
of equating the children of close same-sex siblings with one's own children (see
Appendix 1 on kinship terminology). Another significant manifestation of this
inclusiveness is the notion that “one's spouse's kin becomes one's own” (kaben sao/bane
jadi kaben nyawa).  For address, one is expected to use the same terminological80
designations as the spouse for her or his kin, except for the spouse's siblings (and
classificatory siblings) who are referred to by special terms (ayu, ongan). Officially, no
moral distinction is made between cognatic and affinal kin. Both should be treated with
respect if they are in an older generation than ego, or as equals if they are on the same
generational level as oneself. Most important, both cognatic and affinal kin should be
treated well. Also in respect to people's behavior in practice, no moral distinction is
usually made between the two categories. If one looks at ego-centered kin groups, for
example, such as ritual congregations or ricefield workgroups, these almost always
include affinal kin. Similarly, important dyadic relations are also frequently maintained
with affinal kin. There thus seems to be little justification for the use of an exclusively
cognatic kindred concept as advocated by Freeman (1961). In so far as cognatic kin are
favored over affinal kin at all, this seems to have more to do with “practical association”
and “familiarity,” the result of having lived together and learned to know each other, than
with any idea about common substance or the like. 
Turning affinal relatives into kin does often not happen overnight, however, but is
rather something appropriately described as a process, which sometimes takes
considerable time. Many marriages (including Udin's first) end in divorce, especially
during the first few years. People unaccustomed to each other are often painfully shy and
uncomfortable in each other's company. Young couples are strongly subordinated to the
parents of the spouse with whom they live (Udin was something of an exception in this
respect), who not infrequently take more responsibility over their grandchildren than the
parents themselves (when the grandchildren get ill, for instance). Inmarried individuals,
in so far as they do not know their affines from before, often feel highly vulnerable in
their new milieu, and are themselves often regarded with suspicion.
The authority of the older generations over younger kin is also manifested in that
parents (or other older kin) usually select or suggest spouses for their children, although
marriages initiated by the spouses themselves are increasingly frequent (especially in the
case of village exogamy). Udin's marriage to Rosa can perhaps be seen as belonging to
the latter category. He fell in love with Rosa during his first stay in Temiang, and when
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she visited Bermaung with her relatives two years later they started to see each other until
it became clear to their relatives that they “formed a couple,” and that consequently, as
it was expressed by the people involved, there was nothing to do except for the two to get
married (illicit relations are considered dishonorable and unlawful in respect to both adat
and national law). However, as in most intervillage marriages in the region, there was a
kin link in the older generation, that is, between Udin's mother and Rosa's adoptive
mother Nen Simur, which thus made Rosa, if adoptive connections are counted, Udin’s
first cousin. These connecting relatives were also the ones who decided that Udin and
Rosa should get married, even if it was the latter who chose each other. 
When people marry among the Bentian and thus (in some cases) acquire new kin, this
is not a purely formal matter. Kinship is not only a theoretical conception of relatedness,
theoretically linking practically discrete and independent households to each other, or a
set of abstract principles applied freely or ignored at will. On the contrary, kinship is a
primarily practical concern regularly compelling, constraining or enabling (with kin
assistance) people to do various things or not to do others. Kinship, in the form of
particular cognatic or affinal kin relations, is an experientially central preoccupation in
Bentian everyday life, which frequently presses itself upon people, even when they try
to resist it (e.g. when elders come to get young people who stay away from their kin on
isolated swiddens). The authority of kinship obligations is thus largely an effect of the
salience of kinship relations in practice; the practical difficulty of avoiding one’s relations
contributes significantly to the force of such obligations.
In a strictly legal sense, on the other hand, kinship is not very important. As elsewhere
in Borneo, there are no explicit or implicit juridically effective rules defining rights or
obligations toward particular categories of kin or even toward kin in general (cf.
King:1991:18). There is never a guarantee that one will receive support from any
particular relative in any particular case, and one is not very likely to obtain much
compensation if one sues someone for neglecting his or her obligations (although one
can, in principle, always try). The most that is reasonable for one to do in most cases is
simply to answer back, so to speak, by abstaining from performing one's own obligations
toward the person who has done so toward oneself. 
Nevertheless, even though there are no jural guarantees for obtaining support from
relatives, and no specific regulations pertaining to particular relations, there are some
highly authoritative general norms stating that you should help and share food and
material resources with your relatives and not break your ties with them. Thus,
recognizing a kinship tie with someone involves a recognition of some obligations toward
that person. Despite the general character of these norms, and the lack of effective
measures of enforcing them, they still influence people significantly. The ideals of
helping and sharing with one's kin and of maintaining one’s kin relations are repeatedly
expressed both in informal everyday discussions and in such semi-formal contexts as
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customary law negotiations, speeches given at rituals and weddings, and the elders'
regular evening monologues (during which, among other things, various family concerns
are brought up, and work tasks of the next day scheduled). Living in Bentian society, one
is constantly reminded of these ideals, and people take them seriously. Most Bentians
regularly go to considerable effort to help their relatives (like Udin did, working on other
people’s swiddens for extended periods), and frequently also make substantial material
contributions to them (as, for example, Kakah Ramat did, when he contributed a water
buffalo to be sacrificed at the buntang ritual arranged for Tak Lodot, his wife's brother's
wife). Consciously failing to conform to the norms would make most of them more or
less uncomfortable, not the least because of fear of supernatural retribution, lest they had
some good excuse to do so, like illness, or unfulfilled obligations on the relatives' part.
At the least, no one would readily admit to transgression or be indifferent toward
accusations of it. In this respect, kinship clearly represents an influential authority in
Bentian society which frequently shapes the way people interact with other people,
sometimes as a result of other-authorization, sometimes because of self-authorization.
At the same time, it is undeniably true, in the Bentian case as in Borneo in general,
that we are in a “nebulous realm of expectations and moral obligation, in which there is
considerable choice in co-operating with kinsmen and others, and in affiliation to social
groupings” (King 1991:18, orig. italics). As a result of the system of bilateral kinship
reckoning, people cannot even keep up the links to all their cognatic relatives even if they
wanted to — and given the possibility of extending kinship terminology to non-affines
and non-cognates, there is a potentially almost infinite number of relatives. As there are
no regulations specifying whom you should support or turn to and when, this indeed
leaves some room for individual decision about in which relationships to invest. This
does not imply, however, that kinship has little influence over people's lives. With respect
to norms, the lack of precision and sanctions does not have to mean the lack of authority.
The ideals of helping kin and maintaining kin ties are very real concerns for most
Bentians, and they have a tremendous impact on their social life. They do so because they
are internalized. People want to appear to themselves and to others as conforming to the
ideals, that is, to appear as “good people.” As it is hard to do so by only investing in those
relations that one for some reason would like to invest in, freedom of choice in kin
cooperation is, in fact, largely illusory or theoretical. In practical life one has to take into
consideration recurrent requests for help or material contributions from a wide range of
relatives, and one cannot dismiss them all and still maintain good kin relations (at least
one cannot then expect others to respond to one's own requests). Just like visiting,
“asking someone for something” (sake) or “ordering someone to do something” (siu) are
central social institutions in Bentian society, and frequently the purpose of visiting.
People make requests of each other almost on a daily basis. Even though one can avoid
responding to many requests by simply letting time pass and doing nothing (especially
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if the request is unreasonable, which it is not very rare for requests to be), it is never easy
to resist a request, as requests usually are presented face-to-face in a rather formalized
and very explicit way. At least one cannot do so straight away — such behavior would
be considered very impolite — and not without reference to some sort of “obstacle” (aur)
or other legitimate excuse. 
The prominence of kin relations, and kin requests, together with the ideals of kin
obligations discussed above thus makes it very difficult to interact with kin solely
according to one's own preferences. This is not, however, to suggest that people have no
choice at all or that they help their kin only because of a sense of obligation. Udin, for
instance, did not carry out various services toward his affinal kin in Temiang just because
he felt he had to. He took a certain pride in being an exceptionally good hunter, and
usually did not seem reluctant at all when distributing game that he had caught (even
though he tried to get away with selling some at times, especially toward the end of his
stay). Likewise, he did not complain when he, at different periods, helped Ma Lombang,
Ma Dengu, Ma Bari and Ma Pile (the four manti who provided the plates that he was
ordered to pay at the lawsuit case) by hard work on their swiddens, or when providing
most of the rice eaten at the buntang ritual held for Ma Lombang's wife Tak Lodot, or by
feeding Rosa's grandmother Tak Rosa for several years. These were all tasks that he, like
most other locals, largely took for granted, and often even performed with a certain
degree of enjoyment, or at least contentment. This was also the case when he told hunting
stories to Ma Bari, although I could not at first help getting the feeling that he was being
ingratiating. Later I realized that his overt enthusiasm was real, and that he also liked Ma
Bari and apparently found some pleasure in having this otherwise serious man relax while
listening to him. More generally, Udin probably found it rewarding to perform a whole
range of different obligations toward his affines (and cognatic kin) because in
accomplishing them, and often doing so in a commendable way, he validated his
increasingly adult status, and his moral standing, in his own eyes as well as in others'. In
comparison with other young men in the village, Udin appeared quite successful,
experienced and even autonomous, largely as a result of fulfilling his kin obligations.
This points to the fact that becoming a mature social person in Bentian society has
much to do with learning how to adopt proper kin role behavior, as well as acquiring the
requisite material resources needed to do so. For this reason it is, among the Bentian, as
among the Ilongots (cf. M. Rosaldo 1980: 68, 182), especially adults who “know of
kinship,” and I was told that children or young people (tia) need the guidance of their
seniors for the reason that they “do not know how to act as brothers-in-law, do not know
how to act as sisters-in-law” (beau tau mayu, beau tau mongan), an expression which
was commonly used to metonymically designate failure to live up to expected kinship
          The translation of this statement is inexact. The word ayu (of which mayu is a verbal form) is81
used by male speakers for all their brothers- and sisters-in-law (including their siblings’ spouses and
spouse’s siblings), and by female speakers for their brothers-in-law, while ongan (which is the root
form of mongan) is only used by female speakers for their sisters-in-law (see Appendix 1). The fact that
kinship terms in this example are used as verbs is interesting and can perhaps be taken as an  indication
of the relatively great importance among the Bentian of kinship as an ideology, as opposed to a system
of referential designation.
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behavior.  In these societies, kinship apparently represents, as McKinley has argued81
more generally, a “philosophy ... about what completes a person socially, psychologically,
and morally, and how that completeness comes about through a responsible sense of
attachment and obligation to others” (2001:143). As this indicates, the appeal and force
of kinship as an authority derive in part from the fact that being a relative (by acting as
one) represents an integral aspect of personal and social identity. Acting as a good
relative may be rewarding in that it can be consonant with one’s vision of whom wants
to be. In Udin’s case, in particular, this factor seems to have been an important one, and
one which generally had favorable effects on his standing and relationships in Temiang.
Udin's adaptation to his new kin in Temiang did in fact seem to be a comparatively
successful case at first; he relatively quickly established close and harmonious relations
with a number of affinal relatives in the village. This process was somewhat hastened by
his prior (cognatic) kin relations in Temiang, but the most important factor was without
doubt his success in fulfilling his kin obligations. Everything did seem to go really well
for him until he suddenly, after having stayed three years in the village, was sued for
sorcery by Nen Pare's family. This event, which came as a shock to him and others,
immediately made him very discontented about staying in Temiang, even though until
then, he mainly had enjoyed himself and his social role in the local community. 
Food and Reciprocity: The Material Basis of Bentian Kin Relations
Why then, did Udin become suspected of sorcery in the first place? Why was he found
guilty? In order to explore these questions and gain some understanding of what
subsequently happened, it is necessary to investigate a few issues which are of critical
importance for Bentian kinship. These issues profoundly inform notions of relatedness,
at the same time as they help create division, and give shape to notions of otherness.
The focus on Udin has suggested some reasons why Bentians and other Luangans are
concerned with maintaining good relations with their relatives. There are some other
factors as well, some of which might be important generally, if perhaps not in Udin's
case. One of the most obvious of these is that people (in varying degrees) rely on their
relatives for their basic needs. Unlike Udin, many people are far from autonomous or
self-sufficient in terms of subsistence. In fact, some people need kin support even to
           These meat skewers are, although no one would say that much, treated as if they were owned82
by individuals rather than by families. They are stored in bamboo trays (ansak) hanging from the rafters
of the house (away from dogs), and are an important source of envy for those who are not fortunate
enough to receive such skewers from successful hunters so often.
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survive. Food is a most vital concern, and often a very sensitive matter in the Bentian
area. It is only occasionally that anyone has plenty, and during years with bad harvests
some individuals and families might become critically dependent on others (in the past,
this sometimes led to some people becoming debt slaves, batak ripen). Private skewers
of barbecued/smoked meat (seluyan), which a large part of all individual meat shares
become, are objects of considerable concern in everyday life.  Hunger, or its anticipation,82
influences many people's affairs with their kin. Less dramatically, people need kin for
other elementary purposes than food, as well. Kin relations provide such essential
resources as manpower for various work tasks such as house building or rice planting,
participants at curing rituals (important for the patient, as well as for the shaman),
followers for the manti, supporters at customary law arbitrations, land for cultivation
(granted by previous cultivators or their relatives), and not the least, company (on visits
to other villages, hunting trips, or during lonely days in isolated farmhouses). 
For anyone trying to make a living in Bentian society, it is clear that good relations
with relatives and extensive kin networks are good to have. People need kin relations just
as much as, if not more than, they are constrained by them. They need kin relations for
the various social resources that such relations can be expected to provide. Why exactly
it is that kin relations can be expected to provide such resources in the first place is a
question for which there is no simple answer — perhaps one comes as close as one can
get in suggesting that it is because experience has shown it to be so. Let me here suggest
that it probably has much to do with the observation that the concerns relevant for
providing or expending such kin resources are rooted in practicality. However, this
should not be interpreted to mean that Bentians, for most of the time, consciously and
calculatingly act on the basis of some more or less simple sort of self-interest. On the
contrary, the values of kin-tie maintenance and sharing are sincerely affirmed, and a
certain degree of altruism is typically practiced in kin relations. But kinship relations are,
nevertheless, much informed by reciprocity, even though often by a reciprocity of a rather
generalized kind, although sometimes also in terms of a more balanced reciprocity, as in
the case of labor exchange, beru, carried out in connection with collective swidden work.
Reciprocity, like kin tie maintenance, is a Bentian ideal which puts certain limitations on
the authority of kinship, but which also gives kinship part of its meaning.
Bentians think of kinship relations as relations of mutual obligation. Not only should
kin help each other, but those who help each other are seen as kin. To simplify just a
little: those continuously interacting according to principles of general reciprocity either
are, or become, kin. As is famous for Bornean and other Southeast Asian societies, if one
          The plates, which are usually white or almost white, and typically referred to as “white plates”83
(lumah bura), are most importantly distributed as “rewards” (upah) for various forms of ritual (and
sometimes other) work or paid as fines in lawsuits, but also presented as items of exchange at weddings
and in other transactions within the adat sphere. In the past, other objects such as gongs, spears, and
ceramic jars were also frequently used (especially when larger sums were paid) but today cheap,
factory-made plates increasingly substitute for these. As a consequence you often see tall piles of plates
tied together with rattan lining the walls in some houses, particularly in those inhabited by a manti,
belian (shaman) or warah (death shaman). The value of plates is largely symbolic, although their
purchase value which in 1996 amounted to about 10.000 rupiah for a dozen (about 4.5 USD at the time)
is not locally negligible (for instance, Udin could not have afforded the 10 dozen plates which he was
ordered to pay to Nen Pare). A particular example of plate exchange, mentioned in the story, is when
parents bring a married child home after concluded postmarital service by presenting a single white
plate to the child's parents-in-law. Single plates are also presented at other occasions as expressions of,
among other things, gratitude or a clean heart.
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stays long enough — and becomes involved in complementary exchange relations — one
usually becomes adopted. Similarly, inmarried collaterals in time usually become
regarded as peyari, “siblings,” by their affinal peers, whereas sons- or daughters-in-law
(benantu), frequently become referred to as children, anak, if, as an informant put it to
me, “they become close enough.”
Kinship among the Bentian does not work automatically and it is not something
given. The fact that one is related to someone is not alone enough to make that person
important to oneself. It is those relatives with whom one has much to do (or rather, that
have much to do with oneself) that become important. Those who move away tend to
become distant not only physically, but also emotionally — if not occasionally visited.
Those who never give anything in return tend to become avoided — if possible. Those
who are one's neighbors are difficult to ignore and tend to become important, whether one
likes them or not. Interaction, together with reciprocity and proximity, thus emerge as
crucial factors shaping “true” relatedness. Kinship that matters is largely constructed or
achieved: it has to be enacted to become important. 
Considerations of reciprocity are centrally significant in Bentian social life, and
reciprocity largely concerns material resources. In everyday practical life, food is a crucial
mediator of social relationships (e.g. Schieffelin 1976), and it should not be surprising
that fear of strangers is mainly expressed as fear of being poisoned, or that commensality
and the sharing of food are critical indicators of boundaries of commonality within local
communities. Considerations of reciprocity also concern services, and participation in
religious rituals (which are very frequently arranged in Kaharingan communities, such
as Temiang) or in ricefield workgroups are examples of prestations provided according
to a logic approaching balanced reciprocity. Failed reciprocity and envy are recognized
as major sources of dissension (they are, for instance, standard topics of wedding
speeches), and the pervasive system of presenting and distributing plates on a number of
different social occasions should be understood against this background.  This allocation83
of plates, which in local conceptions epitomizes the practice of adat (customary law) is
          The word ulun interestingly has several different referents. In the first place, it means “person”84
in a general and neutral sense. But it is also used more specifically to denote strangers or non-kin and,
finally, as in other Bornean languages, it is used in the particular sense of “slave.”
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a custom aimed at symbolically (and materially) regulating socially disruptive sentiments,
and thus providing favorable conditions for coexistence and cooperation. At the same
time, however, by addressing and publicly enacting such concerns, and by spotlighting
the payment of rewards and compensation, the system also stimulates considerations of
reciprocity — by promoting consciousness and calculation of services and endowments
provided — and thereby helps to regenerate socially disruptive sentiments (e.g. envy,
anger). 
Even though people in Temiang frequently voiced the idea that they were erai aben
or “one family,” there were several lines of division discernable in the small, but only
very occasionally gathered, community. There were clear tendencies with regards to who
interacted with whom, and which families and individuals that helped or asked for help
from which others. So even though Udin generally appeared quite successfully integrated
in Temiang, this does not mean that he (or anyone else) was integrated with all the people
in the village. Udin did not bring meat to all of his affinal relatives, and he did not help
all of them with work on their rice fields. He maintained rather close and corporate
dyadic relations with quite a few people in Temiang, and with many others he regularly
associated at rituals. But there were also some people who rarely attended the same
rituals as he did, with whom he had almost no interaction. He had particularly few
contacts with the people of the two houses located furthest downstream in the village, the
one of which was inhabited by Nen Pare's family (and the other by Kakah Unsir and some
of his children and grandchildren: see Fig. 1). To these people, with whom he neither had
any cognatic or close affinal relations, he largely remained a “stranger” or “other person”
(ulun),  and to them his success as a hunter and in befriending other villagers was not84
so much a reason for gratification as an occasional source of annoyance or envy.
Exactly why Udin came to be accused of having caused Nen Pare's illness was,
however, a secret possibly known only by Nen Pare herself and her sister Nen Bujok. It
was not revealed, although it appears that something that the doctor who diagnosed the
tumor said (or a misunderstanding of what he said), was of decisive importance for the
development of the hypothesis, in that it made Nen Pare's family believe that the illness
was manmade. For an outsider, the dead-end situation in which they found themselves
when Nen Pare refused the operation after the doctor had pronounced that her illness
would be fatal unless she underwent surgery, can also appear as a factor which in itself
was capable of stimulating the growth of such suspicions in that it made Nen Pare and
her family desperately embittered.
If, however, there was any specific individual in Temiang who was particularly likely
of being accused of sorcery by Nen Pare, it was probably Udin. In the first place, most
      Beliefs resembling those described here are quite widespread, at least in Borneo. In addition to     85
among Luangans I also encountered them among Malays and Ngaju Dayaks (cf. Schiller 1997:80), and
Bernstein (1997:67-70) reports similar notions among the Taman of West Kalimantan, while Tsing
(1993:189) does so for the Meratus. Bernstein suggests a somewhat different interpretation of the
rationale for the beliefs surrounding the Taman term kempunan, which resembles but covers a wider
range of misconduct than the Luangan word tapen used here. He sees failure to carry out an action in
accordance with a preconceived wish as the basic factor leading to vulnerability of spirit attack. In
contrast, I here propose an essentially social explanation. I consider failure to partake of interpersonal
exchange (that is, failure to carry out the Maussian obligations of giving, receiving and reciprocating)
to be the underlying cause making such behavior objectionable and dangerous. A similar interpretation
is made by Tsing who gives “isolating oneself from others or from one’s environment” as what leads to
the equivalent condition among the Meratus (1993:189).
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other villagers were Nen Pare's relatives or people well-known by her, and so much less
likely of becoming the object of any such suspicions on her part. Udin, on the other hand,
was an unrelated person from another village whom she hardly knew, and who had done
quite a lot of traveling, which is an opportunity for acquiring such “knowledge” (lemu or
ilmu) as is a prerequisite for conducting sorcery. On top of this, Udin might have
provoked Nen Pare by his sometimes conspicuous behavior, and he certainly did so when
he walked around eating meat at his family's ritual without offering any to the people
present. Regardless, whether Udin was correct in believing that it was this incident that
made Nen Pare suspect him of sorcery — and he might very well have been at least partly
right, as it most certainly contributed to her disapproving attitude toward him — his own
assumption that it was so testifies to the fact that there was something wrong with his
conduct that might have motivated such an interpretation by her. His behavior was, in
fact, highly inappropriate in that it violated some very basic notions of Bentian social
etiquette, as well as exposed Nen Pare to danger. Not inviting others to join in while one
is eating or, conversely, not accepting such an invitation and failing to symbolically
partake of the food by picking up a few grains of rice (sintep), are forms of misconduct
referred to by the term tapen, which according to Bentian beliefs makes both offender
and offended vulnerable to spirit attacks.   85
Community Integration and Formalization
Coexistence and cooperation are not always easy in small communities with dense and
tangled kin relations entailing sometimes burdensome obligations and difficult balancing
with limited resources. Udin might not always have been the most tactful and gracious
of all persons in his interaction with other people in Temiang, but becoming accused of
sorcery was still something which he had not expected, all the more so as he had little
esoteric interest or knowledge of any sort. Much worse for him, however, than the
accusation itself, based on the claim that he had been jealous of Nen Pare (which he
dismissed as ridiculous), was the verdict of the lawsuit case, and the fact that the manti
137
who defended him did not put up a very hard defense. It was of some, but not much,
consolation to him that these manti provided him with the plates that he was ordered to
pay (it implied acknowledgment of the help that he had given them). He was insulted and
disappointed that the community of which he had become a part had allowed such an
outcome, and he began to feel that he was not really among his own, and to miss his
family in Bermaung. He also started to fear staying in Temiang, or at least expressed this
as a reason to return home. Another reason to do so, to which he until then had given
little attention, was the fact that the three years of initial uxorilocal residence prescribed
at his wedding had now elapsed.
Even though most people considered Udin innocent of the charges, however, no one
except Udin himself seemed much upset about the outcome of the case. It seems
reasonable to assume that people's theory that the unexpressed motivation for the verdict
had been to ensure harmony in the village, or at least counteract division and conflict,
was correct. People feared Nen Pare and her sister Nen Bujok, who were hot-tempered
women, and believed that a decision clearing Udin of charges could have induced them
to hurt others, taking into consideration that they already were in great despair because
of Nen Pare’s illness. This fear was probably also the main reason why no one present
at the lawsuit drank the tea that Nen Bujok served, although a concern for demonstrating
neutrality could also have played a part. In addition, relations between the two
downstream houses and the rest of the houses of Temiang were already strained, so such
a decision could have threatened the already fragile unity of the community. 
On the other hand, no one except Nen Pare's family was probably fully comfortable
with the decision, as people did not consider it fair that Udin was judged guilty, even
though they accepted the verdict for the sake of its consequences. Ma Lombang's
awkwardness at the lawsuit, for instance, was deeply felt. He was torn by his
simultaneous obligations toward Udin, on the one hand, who had helped him much
during his first two years in Temiang (and to whom he gave one dozen plates as part of
those that Udin was sentenced to pay), and, on the other hand, toward his “children” Nen
Pare and Nen Bujok, whom he had adopted when their father (his brother) had died, and
for whom he was assigned to speak. For some other people, if perhaps not for Ma
Lombang, as he was a quite experienced and bold manti, the formality of the occasion
probably also contributed to a more general sense of discomfort.
It is clear, in my view, that the verdict can be seen as an expression of some widely
shared Bentian notions assigning priority to the community (and other collectivities) over
the individual. Justice for Udin was subordinated to the well-being of the community, as
it was once again and even more clearly a couple of weeks later when negotiations were
held in Ma Bari's longhouse in Temiang, following Udin's announcement that he planned
to return home. This time Udin had no one speaking for him or really supporting him, so
he lost his case, even though he had “tradition” (adat) on his side, so to speak, in that it
      Material considerations were also invoked by Udin's mother when describing her own life     86
situation in Bermaung in response to Ma Bari's monologic account of Udin's situation in Temiang. The
significance of such considerations — as well as of principles of sharing and reciprocity — were made
evident again, when she and Ma Bari some time later had an argument regarding a catch of catfish
which Udin sold without distributing shares to his relatives.
138
had been determined at his wedding that he was to return home after three years. The fact
that he, in his own words, “was all alone, and they were many people” was of crucial
importance for the outcome of these negotiations, and his acknowledgment of this
indicates that his cognatic kin in Temiang (some of whom were present at the
negotiations) no longer considered themselves as fellow Bermaungers as much as
Temiangers, primarily engaged in their present life situations and affinal relationships.
It also shows, of course, the importance of kin support on such occasions. Because he had
no relatives representing him at the negotiations, it was possible for Udin's affinal kin in
Temiang to virtually unchallenged invoke their kin ties with him as examples of morally
sanctioned kin obligations which he was to fulfill. Without the presence of his closest
cognatic relatives from Bermaung, his suggestion that his kin obligations toward them
provided a reason for him to return home could not be confirmed, which put him in a
situation in which he could only speak for himself as an individual, and hence lacked
legitimate grounds to counter the claims of his kin obligations by his affinal relatives who
represented a collectivity.
In addition to being able to control the definition of his kin obligations, Ma Bari and
the other manti speaking could also invoke the rather incontestable fact that Udin was
badly needed in Temiang because of his material contributions to the community, an
argument weighing heavily in local thinking, which Udin could not have opposed in
itself, even if he had tried.  He did, however, not do so, and in fact, he hardly defended86
himself at all, contrary to what one could be led to believe by his statement in the letter
that he “resisted their argument.” With the exception of the manti, who gave their long
speeches while the others were silent, no one said very much, and would probably have
not dared to, or at least been uncomfortable doing so, as it is usually mostly the manti
who speak during such “negotiations,” which essentially are conceived of as occasions
when the elders speak and present solutions in the interest of the community, with the
authority of the ancestors and tradition. 
The manti obtain a significant portion of their power from the fact that they are, or
at least are supposed to be, speaking in the interest of the community, for the common
good. The development of local leadership has historically gone hand-in-hand with an
increasing regional and local integration capitalized on by the manti as well as largely
effected by the manti. Integration is in itself seen as an ideal both in local views and
according to government politics, which for over a century have been concerned with
altering the dispersed settlement pattern of the Bentian and other Luangans. Significantly,
      The importance of kinship for mantiship is, of course, an additional factor demonstrating the87
importance of kinship in Bentian society. It will be explored more thoroughly in connection with my
discussion of mantiship in Chapter 5.
      It is unclear to me if Udin by writing the letter not only hoped for his relatives to visit him but     88
also considered it possible that they might come to take him home.
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the manti commonly use “external” authority to achieve their ends. An example of this
was when Ma Bari, using the Indonesian word urusan, explained to Udin's mother that
it was Udin's “assignment” to hunt wild boar and deer, thereby conjuring principles of
responsibility associated with the Indonesian state administration. Apart from
expectations that they represent the community, and from their use of the language of the
state, the manti also receive an important part of their authority from their regularly
trained skills in speaking the “language of the ancestors” (basa tuha one) or what is also
sometimes called “roundabout language” (basa mengkelotes). It was partly by attempting
to employ such a language (which is rich in parallelisms, proverbs and metaphors) that
Udin in his letter tried to authorize his requests to his Bermaung kin to come and visit
him. Another source of manti power, finally, which can hardly be overestimated, is the
kin relations of the manti within and outside of their communities. Kin relations
determine the scope of effective influence of a manti, and wide networks of kin are a
prerequisite for any greater degree of manti authority (today, however, it is theoretically
possible for a manti to exert village-wide authority even if he would lack such a kin
network, that is, if he holds office as village head or head of customary law).  87
Customary law (adat) is itself the perhaps most sanctified of all Bentian notions, and
submitting a conflict or problem to adjudication or formal negotiation implies imbuing
the resolution with the sanctity of that institution. As is clear from his letter, Udin
considered the manti's decision as more or less incontestable or even irrevocable (“the
way to proceed is already closed, there is no way out anymore”), and afterwards he made
no attempt at contesting the decision, except perhaps by writing his letter.  As the88
negotiations in Ma Bari's longhouse indicate, it can be difficult to resist the authority of
the elders during such formal negotiations. As Maurice Bloch (1974, 1975) has argued,
with reference to Malagasy oratory, authority on such occasions largely derives from
formalization which effectively reduces what can be said and so helps preserve tradition
and the preexisting order. Bloch primarily refers to formalized language comparable to
what I here have called ancestral language, but I want to continue his line of reasoning
and suggest that formalization more generally serves similar purposes among the Bentian,
as well as constitutes a key strategy of authorization employed not only by the elders in
the name of the community, but also sometimes by other parties and individuals, and for
other purposes. 
Examples of the use of formalization for authorizing purposes in Udin's story are the
speeches of the elders, the distribution of plates after the lawsuit in Datai Munte, and the
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presentation of one dozen plates to Udin as a token of appreciation after the negotiations
in Temiang. These are prototypical instances of formalization employed to serve the
interests of the community (Temiang) and subordinate the individual (Udin) to these
interests. Other examples include the formalized closing of the lawsuit in Datai Munte
(when rice was scattered and the seniang besarah addressed), and the ritual bathing of
Udin, Rosa and Udin’s mother together with Ma Bari and his wife at the ritual for Udin's
child Liman a few months later (a ritual arranged, significantly, on the initiative of Ma
Bari). All of these instances of formalization can most fundamentally be seen as aimed
at enforcing harmonious relations between the parties involved, as well as eliminating
threats of spiritual and human danger seen as ensuing from disharmonious relationships.
A somewhat different example, finally, is Udin's letter which in itself constituted a
formalized request to his relatives to visit him. The letter can also be regarded to have
contained several distinct formalizing strategies such as his use of “ancestral language”
and his use of kinship terms (e.g. mother's brother, sister's husband) in addressing his
relatives. The invocation of kinship can, in fact, be seen to represent a formalizing
strategy in itself, in that reference to kinship terminology or obligations entails, when
successful, the framing, in Goffman’s (1974) terms, of a situation, relation or action as
regulated by a distinct, authoritative code (kinship ideology) which has the effect of
reducing the range of appropriate behavior in the context and making action accountable
in terms of this code as well as compelling the participants to devote greater attention to
the situation than they would to an unframed situation. The force of kinship authority can
thus be observed to derive in part from how the invocation of kinship is intrinsically
linked up with formalization. Similarly, invocation of adat (customary law, or prescribed
tradition more generally) derives some of its authority precisely from the formalization
that such invocation involves. 
Notwithstanding its importance as what might be called an authorizing device,
however, formalization should not be seen simply as an attempt at authorization
transparently oriented towards a goal, but also as an expression of a general and
fundamental Bentian concern with what we could call good form which to an important
extent represents a value for its own sake. And the paradigmatic way of doing things
properly is acting in accordance with adat in an expressly articulate and contained,
formalized way. An example of acting according to such good form, to which Udin refers
in his letter, is when parents (or some other kin representative) present a white plate upon
bringing their children home after concluded postmarital residence with their parents-in-
law. This, as the plate itself signifies, is adat, the right way of acting in such situations
(it is also seen as right that the parents in the capacity of elders take responsibility over
such moves). Other ways of enacting such shifts in postmarital residence are wrong or
at least less appropriate. Thus, if Udin had returned after the lawsuit in Datai Munte it
would have been bad form. He did not really have tradition on his side, as he also
      Sending letters to relatives has, however, become something of an institution in the area.     89
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indirectly acknowledged in his letter, when he blamed his relatives for having to stay in
Temiang. For tradition to have become valid in this case, they should have brought him
home.
There is still another reason why such an abrupt departure by Udin would have been
bad form. Apart from it having been unauthorized, it is obvious that he would have left
with “bad feelings” (aseng daat, lit. “a bad gallbladder”) which would have implied that
the case was not really resolved or that there was something wrong with its conclusion.
Not submitting such an unauthorized and unsettling decision to formal resolution would
have been experienced as less than satisfactory, not only because of the disadvantageous
consequences that it would have had for some particular individuals in Temiang (and for
the reputation of the village as a whole), but also because of some important notions of
propriety regarding conflict settlement, with which Ma Bari, in particular, was much
concerned. That the resolution of the formal negotiations then held also turned out as
favorable for the community of Temiang is another thing, even if that was by no means
an accident either.
Unpredictability, Situational Adaptability, and Individual Autonomy
When Udin, in his letter, asked his relatives to come to Temiang and visit him, he was
appealing to the sense of obligation that people who recognize themselves as kin have
toward each other. More precisely, he was hoping that some particular (specifically
mentioned) relatives' sense of obligation toward him would make them overcome
whatever practical reasons they might have not to make the trip. Addressing them and
some of his other relatives by kinship terms, he was spelling out their relationships with
him, thereby both reminding them of the connections and making his request formal and
thus more difficult to ignore. Udin did not possess any particular type of authority (such
as manti status) upon which he could draw, and neglecting his request would not have
had any repercussions for his relatives. Indeed, he could have done nothing if no one had
showed up. All he could do (which he also strategically did) was appeal to his relatives'
sentiments, as well as their own interests (by mentioning opportunities of gathering rattan
and gaharu, for instance). In the end, it was probably a combination of sentiment and
interest that caused his mother to come, several months after he had sent her his letter
(she both felt sorry for and needed him).
Udin was never sure that anyone from Bermaung was going to visit him, and it is
possible that he would never have written a letter if the anthropologist's typewriter had
not provided him with an incentive to do so.  Letters and other requests to relatives are89
      The common occurrence of men getting a new or second wife while away for long periods in     90
other villages may perhaps be better understood against this background.
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far from always answered. Ma Dengu, for instance, who took his letter to Bermaung, had
to return home without his wife's son Mohar's brothers, who could not be persuaded to
follow him to Temiang and make next year's swidden there. It is also quite likely that
channels of other people traveling between Temiang and Bermaung were much more
instrumental than the letter in causing Udin's mother to come to Temiang. What I am
trying to argue here is that a fundamental uncertainty often characterizes such
interpersonal business between relatives among Bentians and other Luangans, especially
if they live in different places. This is something which does not only have to do with
such things as the difficulty of traveling, however, although difficulties of traveling can
be considerable, as Udin's return to Bermaung shows. There also seems to be something
about the orientations and expectations of the people — and the nature of Bentian social
organization — which on a deeper level makes for such uncertainty. 
People in the region often appear intensely preoccupied with their lives in the present,
and with those kin relations in which they are engaged at the moment, frequently, it may
seem, at unnecessary expense of other relations not currently activated. People also seem
to become deeply attached to places and persons with which they become familiar
(despite some degree of initial suspicion, if these are places and persons new to them)
like Udin did, when he moved to Temiang. But then, on the other hand, people also
sometimes break away from the lives and relations in which they previously have been
intensely engaged, and in such cases often do so with very short notice, and in a rather
total way. 
Ties which are not active often do not seem to concern people very much, and of
course, people are sometimes so much engaged with those ties that are active, that they
have little time left for others. Indeed, forgetting kinship, as an unintentional or more or
less intentional action, plays some part in most Bentians' kinship experiences, as it also
seems to do among people in many other Southeast Asian societies (e.g. see Carsten
1995b; Dumont 1992). Caught between the cross-cutting and frequently conflicting
demands of their various cognatic and affinal relatives, it is as if people had made a virtue
out of necessity, and developed a remarkable capacity for “situational adaptability,” for
making the best of what they have at hand, while keeping an emotional distance from
what is past or absent so that it does not interfere more than necessary.  Under such90
circumstances it is never easy to “intervene” by making appeals to someone with whom
one does not presently have active relations, especially if one does not present one's
requests face to face (this helps to explain, among other things, the custom of having
someone fetch, nontong, persons that one wants to invite to rituals). Spatial and temporal
distance thus lessen the strength of kinship obligations, even if the institution of visiting
      An example from the story of Udin is Ma Dengu's above-mentioned journey to Bermaung which     91
was delayed several days because of an unfavorable omen. Inauspicious dreams and inauspicious
natural signs (typically referred to in tandem as upi daat, baya sala, lit. “bad dreams, wrong omens”)
are frequent subjects of Bentian conversations. They also occasionally necessitate ritual healing of the
affected person (this is true especially for dreams) who is believed to be vulnerable because of the
dream/omen. Bentians are not only hindered by dreams and omens, however, they are also often
assisted by them. Bad dreams and omens are most frequently referred to retrospectively, as
explanations for misfortune, while auspicious dreams and natural signs, in their turn, often enable
people to gain a sense of ancestral and magical power or positive confirmation of what they have set
out to do. 
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often serves to counteract this tendency. Kinship obligations clearly exert their greatest
power “here and now.” 
There are many factors which make for unpredictability as to how notions of
relatedness will play out in interpersonal relations among the Bentian. As already pointed
out, there are no rules specifying particular kin obligations, and no prescribed sanctions
applicable if someone fails to perform such obligations. In principle, people can decline
whatever requests that are made of them, even if they frequently choose not to. However,
people do sometimes reject requests, even in such cases when it would not be particularly
difficult to fulfil them. But, when they will choose to do so, or otherwise end up doing
so, is very difficult to predict. This is so not least because such decisions usually are not
made in public or openly discussed beforehand. Bentians are frequently very secretive
about whatever they are planning to do, and they are particularly silent about all matters
which in some respect can be regarded as divisive or as implying resistance to reciprocity.
Moreover, like people everywhere, Bentians do not always plan things, and accident or
chance frequently determines what will happen. This has partly to do with the pervasive
tendency (well-known for other Borneo peoples as well, see e.g. Hopes 1997b; Sather
1980) of letting dreams and natural signs determine the course of events, or of purposely
seeking divination (e.g. in such matters as initiating a journey or choosing a new swidden
site).  Even more importantly, however, Bentians often deliberately avoid making91
decisions in order to “wait and see,” that is, so as to let the course of events determine
what will happen. Rather than actively attempting to solve problems or force events in
some particular direction, they are much inclined to let time work out or settle things. In
fact, so common does this strategy seem to be, that I find it appropriate here to talk about
situational adaptability also in this respect, as a gloss for a readiness to adjust to the
demands of the situation, and for a remarkable patience and flexibility in dealing with
changing or uncertain circumstances. However, this ability is much more evident on
some occasions than on others. One occasion when it was particularly manifest was the
last few months of Udin's stay in Temiang.
The arrival of Udin's mother (and sister and brother) in Temiang was something of
a turning point in Udin's stay in the village. Udin quickly became much less dissatisfied
with staying in Temiang, and seemed to be enjoying himself much as usual again. This
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also had a lot to do with the approaching birth of his and Rosa's second child, which in
its turn was a factor significantly contributing to the prolonged stay of his mother. Udin
probably felt more at peace with his mother and siblings around even if he, like everyone
else, had no real idea about how long they were going to stay. At the same time, the
incessant rain which had continued since their arrival had given him hope that he would
be able to at least visit Bermaung after all — in case he would not be able to make a
swidden that year. In late October, when most other villagers already had burned their
fields, I started to suspect passive resistance, but the fact that Udin worked on his field
together with and under the direction of Ma Bari's son Ma Isa makes this hypothesis
disputable.  
Another factor which might have contributed to making Udin more at ease at this
time was that his mother in principle, that is, according to tradition, had the right to ask
for him to return, even though it was not clear that Ma Bari would necessarily have
conceded to such a request. Doing so would have contested the decision of the
negotiations in Temiang, and to some extent challenged Ma Bari's authority, as well as
somewhat discredited his attempts at arranging for Udin's continued stay in Temiang. In
other words, it would have been bad form for his mother to ask for him, and she might
not have done so if certain things had not happened. 
Despite all that he had been through, and despite that he was forced to stay in
Temiang, Udin never stopped liking Ma Bari. Nor did he show any signs of discontent
when Ma Bari, after it became clear that it was too late for Udin and Ma Isa to burn their
swidden site, arranged that the two would get together with Ma Isa's brother on his
swidden (a typical manti arrangement). Similarly, Udin did not mean to upset Ma Bari
when he ventured to sell some meat a few times during this period without first having
distributed shares of it. However, he did do so, and this led to an argument between his
mother and Ma Bari which made her much less content with staying in Temiang. I was
not present to witness the resolution of the case which led her and Udin, with his wife
and children, to return to Bermaung. The event was not much talked about, and it seems
that Ma Bari and others were as confident as they could be in leaving the affair behind
them in that manner. The departure of Udin and Rosa was something of a non-event,
which hardly seemed to affect anyone, at least not openly. The only partial exception was
Rosa's grandmother Tak Rosa, who appeared quite saddened, and admitted to missing
them, but she did not discuss it much with other villagers.
Udin's situation in Temiang had probably become untenable after his attempt at
making a swidden with Ma Isa failed. Ma Bari's solution of having the two join his son
Ma Kelamo on his swidden had never been a very good idea: it would have been a waste
of resources having four strong men (Ma Kelamo's son-in-law Mohar was also to join
them) work on a field which could be tended by two. Ma Bari did not really want to keep
Udin in Temiang against his will if the arrangement could not be seen as sound, or if it
          One indication of this, perhaps, is that there is little constraint in asking for things (sake) from92
relatives, people do this routinely and with no apparent shame.
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could not be shown that significant gain would come from it (if nothing else, his
reputation as a just and knowledgeable manti could have suffered from it). Although no
one in Temiang found Udin's return to Bermaung totally unexpected, it had not been
much talked about or foreseen with any certainty by anyone, so most people were still
more or less unprepared when Udin and his family finally left Temiang.
Comparing the resolution of the events surrounding Udin's attempt at leaving
Temiang after the lawsuit in Datai Munte, and his actual departure about half a year later,
it can be noticed that the affairs were handled in very different, almost contrary ways. In
the one case, there was intense negotiation and much formalization involving a large part
of the community and several manti, whereas in the other, only a few people were
engaged, no negotiations were conducted, and no attempts made at formalization. Despite
the dissimilarity between the two cases, however, both represent very common ways to
solve such problems, and we would get the wrong picture of Bentian society by
considering just one of them. 
The manti and other elders often manage to resolve various interpersonal problems
and conflicts. In so doing they typically use formalizing strategies such as public
negotiations, distribution of plates, speeches, and rituals, drawing on the ideals of
integration and kin tie maintenance as they exert their authority. The authority of the
manti is not, however, unlimited. Although open conflict is generally avoided (strong
emotional expressions are rare in public), and the word of the elders is almost never
openly contested, people still quite frequently manage to evade such authority and have
things their own way. When this happens, it usually, and significantly, happens more or
less unnoticed — off the record.
Like integration, autonomy is also an ideal among Bentians, even though, unlike
integration, it is not publicly recognized and celebrated as such. The same is true also for
the related ideal of economic self-sufficiency which, even though not representing an
acknowledged value or something that it would be appropriate, if realized, to brag about
in public, is an almost universal desire as well as something that indirectly provides some
people with an incentive to look down on others in private (in comparison with some
other Dayak groups, however, it appears that the relative importance of this ideal is small
among the Bentian, and there is, for example, nothing resembling a “ranking system”
based on degrees of self-sufficiency; see Helliwell 1995:364-69;  cf. Tsing 1993:63-64).92
As an expression of the ideal of autonomy, many Bentians stay most of the time on their
swidden field, often with the usually unexpressed intention of getting beyond the
authority, influence, or demands of some other people. This was also the case with Udin,
whose preference for staying on his swidden rather than in the village was motivated, in
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part, by the possibility of thus keeping the requests from his varying Temiang relatives
down to a reasonable level. Even though he liked Ma Bari, he did in fact exhibit a greater
reluctance in submitting to authority than most other young men in the village. Unlike
them he did not, for instance, want to go to work for the logging companies, for the
expressed reason that he disliked being ordered and pushed around. Even though he
might have been more independent in this respect than most people in Bentian society,
most Bentians seemed to enjoy the practical autonomy associated with the relatively
solitary and easy-going life that they led on their swiddens (and frequently seemed to
become somewhat more easy-going themselves than they would be in the village). A
great proportion of the Bentian continued to spend most of their time on their swiddens,
despite the strong government pressure to stay permanently in village dwellings.
As stated above, situations in which individual autonomy is conspicuously
manifested, or interpersonal affairs resolved in contradistinction to kinship obligations,
community interests, or the authority of the elders, frequently take the form of non-
events. Rather than demonstrably take place, such non-events just happen; they eventuate,
so to speak, or transpire. Alternatively, they may also take another form: they may occur
as a result of deliberate effort but then secretively or furtively, as in the case of  the
practice of some people of eating newly caught game in the middle of the night in order
to be able to avoid distributing it. People did not always live up to the ideals of kinship
ideology and communal solidarity. The point is, however, that when they did not, they
almost always kept a low profile. Similar characteristics as marked such situations when
social connections were repudiated also marked such proceedings which diverged from
good form, such as the hasty arrangement of Udin and Rosa's marriage after they already
had started to see each other. Indeed, the frequency with which interpersonal affairs were
dealt with in this manner during my fieldwork gave me the impression that they
represented an ordinary way of managing such concerns, rather than some sort of an
exception.
The fact that the adjustment and readjustment of interpersonal relationships among
the Bentian at times involves extensive negotiation and formalization, whereas at other
times things just seem to happen more or less invisibly and unintendedly, reflects the
simultaneous salience of kinship authority and aspirations for individual autonomy and
self-sufficiency in Bentian society. Resolving affairs of conflicting allegiances in the
latter way enables outcomes which do not contest established authority and ideals of
kinship and community solidarity, at the same time as they allow for the exercise of some
amount of individual autonomy and potentially divisive interests. If collective interests
are pursued, on the other hand, similar precautions need not be taken, and a variety of
public and formal strategies can be employed to achieve the ends, which probably would
be realized much less fully without such efforts, taking into consideration the
inclusiveness of Bentian notions of relatedness, the dispersed Bentian settlement pattern,
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and the lack of prescribed rules and specified sanctions defining particular kin obligations
and their violation.
The way that things were handled when Udin left Temiang had the effect of leaving
Ma Bari's authority unchallenged. It facilitated a convenient resolution of a more or less
untenable situation. Furthermore, at that point in time so much time had already elapsed
since Udin was (innocently, as it seems) determined guilty of sorcery that it was no
longer plausible that he would harbor much resentment over the case — and for that sake
be likely to discredit the community of Temiang. Most importantly, as things had turned
out, when his swidden failed he was no longer as useful for the community as he had
been, so it was much less easy for Ma Bari to resist Udin's mother when she finally asked
for Udin to return. However, that Udin did not run away in the first place, or more
persistently protest the outcome of the lawsuit in Datai Munte and the negotiations in
Temiang, testifies both to the general authority of the elders and the widely shared ideals
of integration, cooperation, and “good form” in Bentian society, as well as to a more
particular concern with the maintenance of good kin relations on the part of Udin, and
perhaps also to his own personal sense of good form. 
One and half years after he had left Temiang, in August 1998, when I made a brief
visit to Bermaung, Udin was about to make a trip to Temiang in order to bring a sack of
rice seeds (bini pare) for sowing to Ma Bari and other of his affinal relatives in the
village which they, like most people in the area, were lacking, as a result of the
exceptional drought the preceding year (almost no one in the area got any rice harvest at
all that year). Evidently, he was doing this wholly or mostly on his own initiative, perhaps
as a gesture of good will, and without the knowledge of the people in Temiang. Whether
he ultimately was doing it out of concern for his kin, or because of self-interest, I did not
ask; that is perhaps irrelevant or at least inconsequential here, and he might not have
known himself, any more than people usually knows such things in such situations. What
matters here is that his kin relations mattered to him, and that his sense of obligation
toward his affinal kin influenced his actions even when he was in a position where he
could have ignored his obligations without any immediate consequences. Another
indication of the influence of his affinal kin relations, which at the same time points to
the limitations of their influence, was that Rosa's parents had visited him and Rosa a few
months earlier in order to ask them to return to Temiang, a request that Udin's mother had
turned down. Even though this attempt failed, it is quite likely that it induced Udin to
bring the rice seeds to Temiang (after the request was turned down it became a
motivation for him to make a compensating gesture of good will in order to maintain his
reputation as a good relative among his Temiang kin). Moreover, regardless of whether
it was instrumental in this respect, it points to the centrality, practical presence, and
pressing force of such enactments of kin relationships in Bentian society.
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The Character of Kinship Authority 
So far I have analyzed some empirical data selected to illuminate how notions of
relatedness can be a source of authority and  influence people's actions among the
Bentian. Among other things, I have used these data to point to the continuing salience
of kinship in Bentian society and the importance of kin relations for intervillage
movement. I have also addressed the inclusiveness of Bentian notions of relatedness and
the relevance of reciprocity and material factors for such notions. Moreover, I have
briefly discussed some ways in which kin connections can be used to exert authority and
indicated the importance of formalization in this process. Finally, I have addressed the
general unpredictability and situational adaptability which also frequently characterize
Bentian kin relations, especially under such circumstances as those surrounding Udin's
departure from Temiang. Throughout the discussion of these issues, an underlying
concern has been with the relative autonomy and authority ensuing from the mediation
of social relations by notions of relatedness. However, there are no absolute authorities
or closure to events, even as there is much constraint and possibility of containment. 
I shall proceed by discussing more explicitly what I have referred to as kinship
authority, which forms, as I see it, a major form of authority in Bentian social life.
Kinship authority, even if defined fairly narrowly, is a complex category, consisting of
various special types of kin authority pertaining to specific kin relations. It includes
parental authority and the mutual but gender-specific authority of spouses over each
other. It also encompasses the authority of older siblings (tuke) over younger siblings
(ani), elders over their younger kin, and that of parents-in-law (tupu) over their children-
in-law (benantu). I will here comment on some of these kin authorities, although I will
not extensively review them as they have been discussed by other anthropologists for
other bilateral Southeast Asian societies and they generally seem to conform to their
reported equivalencies there (cf. Carsten 1997; Peletz 1988; Sather 1997). My interest is
not so much with the specifics of particular types of kin relations as with kinship
authority in a more general sense, as common to all kin relations. Therefore, I will
concentrate on some basic features characterizing these kin authorities, including what
might be called the dispersal of fostering responsibilities, the respect pertaining to
intergenerational relations, and the equality expected to inform collateral relations. As
among Malays, the two latter, in particular, can be observed to represent basic principles
of Bentian kinship (cf. McKinley 1983:355-56).
Parental authority can be described as mild, even if children, especially when they get
a little older, are expected to obey, and normally show uncompromising obedience
toward, their parents. Both parents have an affectionate and rather lenient relationship
with their children and the father is no more a distinct authority than the mother.
Moreover, parental authority is by no means exclusive: authority over children is not
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solely the responsibility or privilege of parents. Grandparents often take a very active part
in the upbringing of their grandchildren, especially the mother's parents with whom the
conjugal couple is more likely to spend more time, the ideal of alternating ambilocality
notwithstanding. Sometimes they assume an even more important role than the parents,
for example, when children get ill. Such influence of grandparents may be expected
especially when the parents are young. However, other older relatives, such as aunts or
uncles, may also play an important role. The mother's sister and her husband are also
important in this respect, and they are particularly likely to adopt the child. When
children are small their older siblings or sometimes their older classificatory siblings
(cousins) also take an important role in their upbringing. The relation between older and
younger siblings resembles to a degree the relation between other older and younger kin,
although the relationship is less hierarchical. Like the other above-mentioned authorities
it is, in a sense, an instance of elder authority. Elder authority, or the kin authority which
prevails upon the relation between older and younger kin, forms a backbone in Bentian
society and I will discuss it again in Chapter 4 where I will consider another of its
manifestations, namely, that which pertains to ancestors over their descendants. Respect
for seniority, but also the responsibility of elders for younger kin, is repeatedly
proclaimed. Older kin are said “to own” or “be the base of” (puun) their younger kin. Old
or middle aged men who are regarded as kin or housegroup leaders (manti aben) exert
considerable authority over their followers, often in precisely this capacity. Yet another
form of elder authority is that exerted by parents-in-law and other senior in-laws over
their children-in-law are expected to show particular respect toward the former (whom
they address with the same kinship terms as their cognatic relatives, i.e. as “mother,”
“father,” “parental sibling,” “grandmother,” etc.). Young people until about the age of
thirty are generally addressed by elders (tuha) as “children” or “immature persons” (tia),
even if they may have several children of their own.
Collaterals, in distinction to relatives in ascending or descending generations, are
(with the partial exception of the weak hierarchical relation between older and younger
siblings) ideally perceived as equals. Thus, in theory at least, the authority between
collaterals is reciprocal or balanced, which does not mean that it is not expected to be
considerable: extensive mutual solidarity and obligations are the ideal. In practice it is not
always balanced, but this reflects factors other than recognized kinship ideology. Thus,
as a result of several factors — e.g. forest familiarity, access to wage labor, shamanship
(which today has become predominantly male), national ideology (which postulates that
men should be household heads and assume a more prominent public role than women)
— husbands often have slightly more authority over their wives than the wives have over
them. But this authority is not a function of their kinship position per se, and women are
not expected to defer to their husbands any more than to men in general (an indication
          In the past, women apparently had more prominent public roles than today. Female shamanship93
and mantiship were both relatively common.
           Since the 1970s, many authors have postulated a central structural significance for siblingship 94
as a complement to descent and other principles of social organization (e.g. Kelly 1977; Marshall 1983;
McKinley 1983; Peletz 1988). The importance of siblingship in Bentian society, especially with respect
to housegroups, but also in general, supports these findings, which have often been employed to dismiss
the apparent lack of order (from a descent perspective) in cognatic societies.
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of this is the role of Nen Pare's sister Nen Bujok at the lawsuit against Udin).  In addition93
to an ideal of equality, collateral relations are also informed by an ideal of companionship
entailing a greater concern for balanced reciprocity than that which applies to other kin
relations, and an associated sense of these relations as in some respect conditional.
Collaterals, including both cognatic and affinal ones, ideally should be like siblings.
Like the Malay word saudara (see McKinley 1983:336), the Bentian term peyari stands
in a more restricted sense for “sibling,” but can also be used to indicate any collateral
relative (whether related with ego cognatically, affinally, or as friend). As already
observed there is a practical foundation for such a terminological extension: siblings-in-
law (including both spouse’s siblings and sibling’s spouses) provide cooperation as often
as cognatic collaterals. In fact, the relations between affinal collaterals (including, not the
least significantly in this connection, that between “coparents-in-law,” sanget) are
informed by the ideals of equality and reciprocity to an even higher degree than those
between cognatic collaterals. This is indicated by the principle of ambilocality and
various symmetrical or complementary wedding arrangements designed to balance the
expenses and statuses of the bride's and the groom's families. However, collateral (and
other) affinal relations should also have a certain formal quality (even in the case of close
endogamy), as indicated by the obligatory use of special kinship terms and the prohibition
against using personal names and, perhaps, by a special joking relationship between
siblings-in-law. 
The idiom of siblingship thus provides an idiom for affinal as well as for other
collateral relations, particularly in its aspects of symbolizing unity and a basic
similarity.  Most particularly, however, it is same-sex siblings (who are conceived of as94
particularly close and whose children consequently are not permitted to marry without
ritual compensation), who are invested with this representative value, even though these
relations may sometimes be especially prone to dissension and conflict. Siblingship,
however, is not just an empty signifier. Sibling relations epitomize their symbolic
meaning. The terminological and metaphorical extension for cousins, as for non-cognatic
collaterals, is motivated by the fact that it forms — partly as a result of childhood
familiarity, and partly as a result of residential patterns favoring sibling co-residence in
adulthood (i.e. lou residence) — a primary basis of kin support in Bentian society. Sibling
         That this is so should perhaps go without saying, in so far as the discussion regards values,95
strictly speaking. Values are, by definition, so general that their contextual application is unclear. As
Talcott Parsons expresses it “[v]alues are modes of normative orientation of action in a social system,
which define the main direction of action without reference to specific goals or more detailed situations
or structures” (1958:198).
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relations also tend to have a relative stability in the general flux of multi-stranded kin
relations, thus further warranting the use of siblingship as a general idiom for relatedness.
What, then, can be said to characterize kinship authority in a general sense, that is,
in terms of the general expectations and obligations that most Bentians have in respect
to most categories of kin? What is common to all the above-mentioned kin authorities,
and of what can kinship authority be said to consist in its capacity as a source of
authorization (including both self-authorization and other-authorization)? In a very basic
sense, kinship authority can be said to consist of values, or more precisely, a set of very
basic values which constantly are invoked — and expressed as imperatives — in various
speech situations. These values include, most importantly, the notions that relatives
(kaben) should be treated well, that ties with relatives should not be broken, that having
a kin tie with someone (whether cognatic, affinal or classificatory) implies a moral
obligation to help that person, and that food and other material resources should be
shared (meru) with relatives (and neighbors). Another basic, closely related value which
does not specifically concern relatives but which often is highly important in relations
with them is the idea that prestations, whether services or gifts, should be reciprocated
(males), and debts repaid. Still another fundamental value of which kinship authority is
made up is represented by the notion that relatives, in principle, should stay in one place
(nono be erai tono), or at least, regularly concentrate (berinuk). These values are
elementary in the sense that they are regularly invoked and known by all, and no one, to
my knowledge, would deny their importance. Adding to their significance is a perceived
risk of so-called supernatural retribution attaching to their defiance.
But kinship among the Bentian should not be understood as being only or most
essentially about values or principles. As I have discussed, rules and precepts are not
particularly important in Bentian kin interaction (the values discussed above I would,
following Kelly [1977:1] call principles rather than rules, as they do not, in distinction
to the latter, “incorporate a restrictive designation of the context in which a given
structural principle is applicable”). But the same holds true also for values in the sense
that people's behavior cannot always be understood as a conscious application of them
or, at least, apprehended with reference to them alone.  The lack of detailed rules95
regarding behavior with relatives, and the very generality of those values which inform
Bentian kin interaction, presuppose the existence of additional motives or other forms of
determinants in most practical situations. In fact, in so far as Bentian kin interaction may
be said to be guided by ideational categories, it is primarily by much less explicit
What I am referring to here conforms rather closely to what cognitive anthropologists and             96 
psychologists have referred to as “schemas.” Schemas can be described, following Mandler (1984:55-
56, quoted in D’Andrade 1995:122) as “abstract [schematic] representations of environmental
regularities” which are “built up in the course of interaction with the environment,” and activated by
concrete events, mostly in an automatic manner which involves no “awareness on the part of perceiver-
comprehender.” Schemas not only reflect but also serve to organize experience: “we comprehend
events in terms of the schemas that they activate.” Schemas notably operate in a very different way
from rules and represent a kind of knowledge quite different from rule-based knowledge. They seem to
function according to what in the cognitive sciences has become known as a “connectionist network”
model (see D’Andrade 1995:138-149). According to this model,“thinking consists primarily of pattern
recognition; learning “what goes with what” by association” (D’Andrade 1995:140).
          The pervasive use of kinship terms for address among the Bentian, which sets them off to some97
extent from their Dayak neighbors, may also be used as an example.
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conceptual schemes applied to specific types of contextual environments and
appropriated by the actor through concrete instances of regularly performed social action
(cf. D’Andrade 1995: 122-149).96
It is, in a sense, activities rather than ideas, which form the framework of Bentian
kinship authority. Values do not constitute rules as much as ideals, and only occasionally
provide motives, while at other times they are deliberately ignored or simply not
consciously invoked. Whether they are invoked has much to do with if the actor
performing an action to which they are potentially applicable has any concrete interest
in invoking them, or whether someone else affected by that action has. On the other hand,
the social constellation and type of context in which the actor finds himself decisively
affect his behavior. Similarly, the past experiences of the individual actor in the same
type of situations and the same concrete social constellations also significantly influence
his behavior. The reason that kinship functions as an authority for most actors is, I
contend, largely a result of their experiences of concrete social activities, which is what
has most critically molded their understanding of kinship. Examples of concrete social
activities instrumental in this regard are those activities when some actor deliberately and
explicitly invokes kinship values for some concrete purpose (as a strategic device when
asking someone for something, for example), but also those events when these ideals are
voiced for their own sake (e.g. the elders' evening monologues) or otherwise abstractly
expressed.  They also include events where kinship values are indirectly expressed by97
way of example, as in the case of incessant meal invitations, as well as other activities in
which no explicit reference to kinship values is made, but the behavior of the people
involved conforms to these values (as tacitly apprehended by the actor but seldom
perceived consciously, and then typically in retrospect). It is all these activities which —
especially in a society where explication is neither the rule nor an ideal — put their
deepest mark on the actor. In other words, the experiences imprinted by the actor's
trajectories in social space form, I suggest, the most fundamental factor determining
           An alternative theoretical framework which could be used to make sense of how action is98
practically constituted without depriving the subject of agency to the extent this occurs in Bourdieu’s
theory, is the schema theory of cognitive anthropologists (see D’Andrade 1995: 147-49). Both the
habitus and the schema concept consist of “implicit recognition procedures, not rules,” although they
seem to differ in respect to the extent to which they presuppose that people are determined by these
procedures. 
      This tendency is reported also by Michael Jackson, whose phenomenological approach to     99
anthropology has influenced my approach to authority. Jackson (1996:35) discusses the failure of the
peasant informants of the Russian psychologist A. R. Luria to respond adequately to syllogisms
presented for the purpose of testing cognitive development and their refusal “to discuss any topics that
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Bentians’ interaction with their relatives. Bentian kinship authority is practically
constituted.
Following Bourdieu, I want to stress the general unimportance of rules, which, as he
(1977:73) argues, one would have to “postulate in an infinite number” in order to succeed
in explaining practice. Also in line with Bourdieu, who believes that “dispositions ... and
situations combine synchronically to constitute a determinate conjuncture” (1977:83), I
want to stress the importance of past and present social contexts and constellations as
determinants of social action. However, unlike Bourdieu, and following de Certeau
(1984), I contend that social action is always a kind of bricolage entailing a greater or
lesser degree of creativity on the part of the actor, involving an active process of “making
do” with the limited resources and restrictions inherent in situations or internalized by the
actor. Despite his deceptively subject-sympathetic concept of “habitus” — which he also
refers to as “generative schemes” (e.g. Bourdieu 1977:95), and as the “generative
principle of regulated improvisations” (1977:78) — which appears to locate the motor
of social action “within” the social actor, Bourdieu nevertheless regards, as Jane Fajans
(1997:283) has critically argued, structure as external to the habitus, and social action as
ultimately determined by “objective conditions” above or beyond practice (cf. Bourdieu
1977:72, 77). Contrary to these notions (which are also those of conventional social
theory), Fajans argues that we should not regard structure as external to social action, but
instead view social activities as “the primary units of social and cultural structure” and
thus treat “the locus of structure” as immanent in those activities (1997:264; cf. also
Giddens 1984:37). Such a view seems especially appropriate for an understanding of
Bentian kinship behavior, which, as I see it, is essentially produced by practice (i.e. by
regularly performed social action), and typically associated with a higher degree of
reflexive mediation and control than what Bourdieu's theory allows.  An indication of98
the general importance of practical experience in determining agency among the Bentian
that repeatedly struck me during fieldwork was what I have come to think of as “the
authority of experience, ” that is, a common tendency of informants to dismiss theoretical
knowledge as not true knowledge or a valid grounds for action or belief, and to advance
personal observation as the only reliable source of knowledge.  Statements of the type99
went beyond personal experience.” Jackson interprets these responses as expressions of an attitude
assigning priority to “practical accomplishment” over “cognitive understanding.” In his view, they
reflect not a “lack of abstract cognitive skills” but a “positive preference for other skills more
compatible with immediate social concerns” (1996:35, orig. italics).
          Interestingly, kaben seems to be a cognate with the Iban term kaban, the term used by Freeman100
to designate the kindred. This is worth noting as Freeman argues for the use of an exclusively cognatic
kindred concept (excluding affines) in the Iban context. However, just like the Bentian kaben, the Iban
kaban also “[i]n its widest connotation ... refers not only to all of an individual’s cognatic and affinal
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“how would I know, I wasn’t present” or “I can’t tell, I did not see it” were exasperatingly
common, and reflected, I propose, a recalcitrant everyday empiricism congruent with the
importance of the notions of  “practical association” that I argued are central in
determining Bentian relations to land (see Chapter 2). 
Practical Kinship
One of the most indicative expressions of how Bentian kinship authority is practically
constituted is the significance for relational closeness of what could be referred to as
“practical” as opposed to “genealogical” relatedness. Being close (dini) is as much a
function of practical association as it is of genealogical or affinal connection. Theoretical
connection is insufficient in itself to make people close (due to their sheer number, not
all relatives can become close). It has to be complemented by practical association.
Practical association, on the other hand, can make people close regardless of any a priori
existent tie: non-relatives can be and frequently are regarded as equally close as relatives
— and in such cases referred to by kinship terms. In a sense, because of this feature of
Bentian notions of relatedness, Bentian kinship can, I suggest, be regarded as practical.
In turn, this feature reflects, and itself contributes to, a certain conceptual and practical
flexibility which perhaps most appropriately could be described as a “pragmatic attitude
toward kinship.” This “attitude” (strictly speaking, I do not refer to attitudes but to
dispositions) provides another sense in which Bentian kinship can be regarded as
practical. Together these two aspects of practical kinship, and some others such as the
lack of formal and specific regulations pertaining to particular kin relations, and the lack
of discreteness and permanency of kin groups and categories, provide additional support
for the interactional basis of kinship authority which I have been outlining, and thus they
deserve closer examination.
Kinship for Bentians is not restricted to kinship in the sense of cognatic kinship.
Bentians use the idiom of kinship or “the genealogical idiom” not only for genealogical
kin. Terms of address and reference are “extended” to include affines as well as friends
and neighbors, as is peyari, the Bentian term for sibling, collateral relative, and friend,
and kaben, the most general Bentian term for “relative.”  This extendability also100
kin but also to his (or her) friends and acquaintances” (Freeman 1960a:70).
      The Bentian term aben, glossed by Weinstock (1983:103) as “household,” is variously used to101
designate households, extended families, the inhabitants of a longhouse or those of a local community.
The use of other Bentian kin group terms such as buhan and leluhen, also follows the same pattern.
Indeed there seems to be no specific or primary meanings attached to these virtually interchangeable
terms to distinguish them from each other, nor could I elicit any other, more specific terms for such
phenomena as kindreds, housegroups, and descent categories for which all these terms may be used (a
minor difference between aben and the two latter terms is that the latter are not, in distinction to the
former, used to signify very small kin units such as swidden households or conjugal couples with
children). This first struck me, as I had, on the basis of data on other Dayaks such as those by Hudson
on the Ma'anyan (e.g. Hudson & Hudson 1978), expected to come up with at least some number of
relatively discrete and distinctively named social units. Now I am inclined to believe that a similarly
wide range of referents for terms signifying social categories as those reported for the above-mentioned
might be very prevalent in Southeast Asian societies, and that indications of a greater degree of
designative or referenial discreteness may sometimes reflect a scholarly concern for order and
coherence more than any conditions prevailing in the societies under consideration. In the case of the
term aben, I propose that its generality may also be taken as an indication of the limited autonomy of
the household in Bentian society.
155
characterizes Bentian kin group designations, such as the term aben, which is used to
refer to a range of several more or less inclusive social categories.  However, there are101
more than considerations of practicality informing this usage, as is evidently the case with
the similarly extendable (or contractible) Langkawi Malay term kampung, which,
according to Janet Carsten (1997:161-62) variously refers to a village, a subvillage, a
compound or “land cleared for the purpose of house building.” Carsten (1997:162)
suggests that this term “expresses through its generality an unwillingness to differentiate
people from each other, and ... thereby stresses the unity of the community.” It seems to
me that similar considerations also lie behind the polysemy of the Bentian term aben, as
well as behind that of kaben and other, similarly extendable kinship terms and kin group
designations used by the Bentian or other peoples in Southeast Asia (cf. e.g. Schrauvers
1999:313). 
A general reluctance to make explicit distinctions between categories of people is, at
any rate, strongly characteristic of the Bentian as of various other egalitarian societies in
the so-called peripheries of the region (see e.g. Carsten 1997; Gibson 1986; Tsing 1993).
I propose that this reluctance also motivates “the extension of kinship” more generally
among Bentians, and that both the former and the latter phenomena, as well as the general
egalitarian ethos which pervades much of Bentian social life (and collateral relations in
particular) reflect a concern for social harmony and the authority of collectivities over the
individual, a concern which in its turn is motivated by the conditions set by a relative
scarcity (or at least, erratic accessibility) of material and social resources in their world,
and the potential of dissension and fission ensuing from these conditions. The principles
of sharing and reciprocity also reflect the same concerns as do other kinship values (e.g.
those advocating kin concentration, which work to counteract the effects of subsistence-
motivated residential dispersion). In fact, Bentian kinship, as an ideational phenomenon,
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may perhaps most importantly be said to provide a moral code, a code which is
predominantly used to maintain and establish bonds and compelling obligations between
people. It conforms in this respect to McKinley's (1983:360) understanding of kinship as
“a conceptual model ... which clarifies and gives definite shape to [a] framework of
trust.” Its force as such a moral code arises to a significant extent from certain socio-
material conditions in the society where it is employed, and it is due to the persistence
of these conditions that its force is greater, and invocations of kinship terminology and
obligations are more common, among Bentians than among their more modernized,
residentially concentrated and wage-labor engaged Luangan neighbors, of who I often
heard commend the Bentian for the respect with which they treated their relatives, while
lamenting the erosion of kin values and a spread of individualistic tendencies in their own
societies. In connection here it can be suggested that another factor explaining some of
the force of Bentian kinship authority may be the same that Carsten (1997) and Gibson
(1987) have proposed to explain the egalitarianism of the Langkawi Malays and the Buid
of Mindoro, that is, the position of these societies within the larger regions of which they
form part. Kinship values are for Bentians in the contemporary world an important aspect
of their self-identity and tradition (adat), something which sets them off, in a
predominantly positively valued respect, from their downriver neighbors among whom
these values are seen to be held in less regard.
The central significance of Bentian kinship as a moral code directs our attention to
the possibility that the primary importance of the genealogical idiom may not be literal,
but rather, metaphoric (McKinley 1983:359-61, 2001). In other words, usage of the
genealogical idiom may not as much reflect concern with blood or some other substance,
or with one’s blood relations as opposed to other people, as a concern with establishing
bonds and obligations, a possibility which would explain the lack of inhibition among
some peoples such as the Bentian to extend relationship terminology expressed in this
idiom beyond genealogical relatives to whomever it is vital and practically expedient to
maintain such relations with. Rather than a referential system, kinship may in fact most
primarily represent, as McKinley (2001) has argued in a recent article, “a philosophy,”
more precisely, a “social philosophy” which “founds obligations” (2001:144). It seems
to me that this is correct at least in the case of the Bentian, and that a concern with
establishing lasting relations and compelling obligations is what primarily motivates the
rather pervasive — and flexible — use of the genealogical idiom in their case. This is not
to say that the genealogical form in which relationship terminology is expressed is
insignificant or arbitrary. As McKinley observes, the genealogical idiom is “good to
think” because it is made available by nature and provides a coherent and widely
adaptable model for classifying people and their relations, a model which has the
advantage of naturalizing the demands which are expressed in this idiom by making the
relations which it is used to designate appear given and incontestable. (2001:159-160).
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The “concrete natural symbolism” of the genealogical idiom thus “convey[s] the idea of
there being some social locus of unquestioned obligation” (McKinley 2001:143). This
is another factor which contributes to explain the force of kinship authority.
The flexibility and practical character of Bentain kinship, then, is not an indication
of its unimportance. As has become evident in this chapter, kinship ideology is an
important authority affecting social life among the Bentian, and to demonstrate this —
in contrast to scholars (e.g. King 1978a:10-12, Rousseau 1978:87-89) who have argued
for a relative unimportance of kinship in Borneo societies — has also been an objective
in this chapter. However, it is mainly kinship “here and now” that is important, while
inactive ties, unless relevant to concerns in the present, are normally less influential.
Strong obligations attach mainly to “activated” relations. This fact — like the
concomitant fact that “forgetting ties” and “discovering ties” are important Bentian
kinship experiences — can itself be seen, I suggest, as an expression of the pragmatic
attitude toward kinship. Another aspect of the same attitude is a creativity in managing
or manipulating multiple ties which commonly characterize people's longterm kin
interactions, and which forms a valuable resource which people may employ to get
through difficult situations. An example of a person involved in such multiple tie
management (a practice which itself offers an illustration of “social bricolage” or
“tactics” in de Certeau's sense) is the manti Ma Lombang, Rosa's adoptive father Ma
Bure's father, whom Udin helped with swidden work during his first two years in
Temiang. Besides Udin and his own son Ma Bure, Ma Lombang at different periods
employed the services of several other men in the village — including Nen Pare's and
Nen Bujok's husbands Ma Mar and Ma Putup, and his wife's granddaughter Nen Bubu's
husband Ma Bubu — with whom he was affinally related through their wives. By shifting
affiliations in this way he was able to artfully use these ties to his own advantage, at the
same as he minimized the weight of his burden on each of these relations.
A crucial consequence of the inclusiveness of notions of relatedness — and the strong
interdiction on exclusive social thinking in any form — is that some individuals (manti
and elders in particular) can use them to their advantage, or, less selfishly (although this
often amounts to the same thing), to the advantage of the community or other groups (e.g.
housegroups), in ways that significantly restrict the autonomy of some people. Lack of
clear boundaries between kin categories is, in fact, largely a consequence of this
authoritative use of notions of relatedness which frequently limits the autonomy of
individuals as well as households. As a consequence, the household is not, despite its
corporate properties, including status as judicial subject in curing rituals, a “sovereign
country” (Freeman 1958:22) any more than extended families or housegroups ever were.
There are frequently strong pulls from outside all these categories, from other kinspersons
within the community or in other communities, including both ordinary people with no
special status, who usually present personal requests for help or contributions, and
      Examples of adoption or adoption-like arrangements involving people in Udin’s story (the     102
distinction between fosterage and adoption is not always entirely clear among the Bentian) are the
following (see Fig. 1): Rosa was adopted by her mother's first cousin Ma Bure and his wife Nen Simur.
Ma Lombang adopted his brother’s children Nen Pare and Nen Bujok, and his sister’s child Ma
Sarakang  (when they had already grown up and their parents died). Before her marriage to him, Ma
Lombang’s wife Tak Lodot had also adopted her son’s wife Nen Keladi when her son died (because
they were close, and wanted to maintain their relation) making Ma Lombang, by extension, the adoptive
father also of Nen Keladi. Ma Mar adopted Mudai, the Benuaq Dayak man who was Udin's swidden
neighbor, and who became his friend, even though there was no genealogical connection (purus)
between them, just as there was none between Mudai and Ma Mar. Before adopting Mudai, however,
Ma Mar, with Nen Pare, had already adopted Ma Mar’s second cousin’s child Seneng who later, after
Ma Mar’s adoption of Mudai, became Mudai’s wife (this, it appears, is not an unsual arrangement:
before marrying Nen Pare, Ma Mar himself had married his father’s brother’s adoptive daughter Nen
Mar, and by marrying Rosa, Udin married the adoptive child of his mother’s second cousin by whom he
might himself have been adopted if he had stayed in her household, instead of in her sister’s, before
marrying Rosa). Ma Buno, a person whom we will hear more about in Chapter 5, adopted Buno, a child
distantly related to his wife, as a result of a request that the child’s father made of him following
instructions that he had received in a dream. Relatively wealthy people (and the manti) are especially
likely adopters (cf. Schrauvers 1999). For example, Kakah Ramat’s son Ma Lutar, who had made some
money trading rattan, adopted several relatives’ children, as did Nen Bola, Ma Lombang’s sister, who
was a shopkeeper in neighboring Datai Munte.
      A particular, semi-institutionalized form of lending out children occurs between the child's     103
parents and their parents, particularly the mother's parents (an example here is the children of Ma Bari’s
and Tak Ningin’s daughter Nen Tali who stayed most of my fieldwork in Ma Bari’s lou, while their
mother lived with her husband in neighboring Datai Munte). When the mother’s parents  no longer have
any small children of their own (or any grandchildren) in their household, their children often surrender
one (or several) of their children to them for a period  “so that they have company” (adi naan tuyang).
Another relation commonly involving child transfer is that between a woman and her sister, which is
conceived of as particularly close (as an indication of the closeness of the relation, the terms of address
used by children for their parents' same-sex siblings are, regardless of whether adoption or fosterage by
them takes place or not, “mother,” ine and “father,” uma: see Appendix 1). As in other societies (e.g.
see Carsten 1997; Trawick 1990), the sharing of children is essential to kin integration and social
organization.
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individuals with a special status, that is, the manti, who in large part receive their status
from precisely these kin relations, and who typically present not only personal requests,
but also requests made in the name of groups or communities. These demands are
successful largely as a result of the authority of kinship as a moral code, whose
importance is made more important by the inclusiveness of Bentian notions of
relatedness.
The inclusiveness of Bentian notions of relatedness among the Bentian, which helps
to create a very large pool of social resources, and thus facilitates increased flexibility in
the use of such resources, is perhaps most obviously demonstrated by the prevalence of
adoption or adoption-like arrangements, of which there were several examples in Udin's
story.  Partly, the prevalence of adoption is a result of high infant mortality and low102
fertility (the latter frequently provides a motive for people to lend out their children to
childless relatives), but far from all adopters are childless,  and as some of these and103
other examples show, adoption is frequently employed for other reasons — for example,
        With respect to polygyny, there is also another, special motive motivating this practice, which104 
is, or rather used to be (official polygynous marriages have recently declined, reflecting the demise of
the institution of title-based leadership), particularly common among men of high status (i.e. manti of
some kind) who through these marriages demonstrated their ability to provide (materially and sexually)
for more than one wife.
         Several polygamous marriages that I recorded had been made with “co-spouses” (meruoi) who105
were siblings or cousins with each other, particularly in the case of polygynous unions involving male
manti (in such cases practical considerations relating to marriage payments and the fact that the
closeness of the spouses was assumed to counteract tension between them probably represented
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because it can signal a transformation of relations between non-kin into kin relations, or
because it can serve to establish closer relations (or maintain close relations) between
parents and adoptive parents, or because it can serve to relieve parents with many
children — and so itself forms an example of practical kinship. 
The institutions of polygamy and sororate/levirate marriage can also be seen as
examples of the flexibility characterizing practical kinship, at the same time as they
reflect a concern about maintaining those kin ties that one already has, and thus again
point to the authority of kinship ideology, and the relative importance of kin relations
established or reinforced through interaction. Unwillingness to break pre-existing ties
was presented to me as a motive for both practices, and it also seems to have been a
principal factor at work in those cases on which I have information. Bentians say that it
is not good for people to be alone. As among the Teduray (Tiruray) of Mindanao, there
exists a strong cultural imperative that no one should be left out or, as the Teduray
express it, that “everyone needs to be in a [cooking] pot” (i.e. part of a household, and,
preferably, of a sexual union) (Schlegel 1998:114-15, 125-26). Therefore, if someone's
spouse dies (or leaves them, which frequently happens), one should remarry, and most
people would try to do so, unless already quite old, or at least move in with some relative,
if one already does not live with one. However, the Bentian are, as they themselves often
complain, few people (putik unuk): there is, in their sparsely populated region, not always
a marriage partner available (in fact, finding a spouse of any kind — and not just an
appropriate one — is for many people a very pressing problem). As an extension of this
logic, people, and their kin (who typically arrange their marriages) are frequently willing
to accept quite flexible arrangements in order to avoid being left without a partner. In
other words, rather than become, or have someone else, left out, they may resort to or
accept polygamy. Another very important motive for the institution of polygamy is
barrenness, which, as already mentioned, is very common.  Thus someone may, in order104
to resolve this problem, take a new partner, but keep the old one. Barrenness seems, in
fact, to be a factor in a majority of Bentian polygamous marriages (whether polyandrous
or polygynous). Not breaking pre-existing ties is also, as just said, a motive for sororate
and levirate, as well as for other monogamous remarriages (which, like polygamous
marriages, are frequently with spouses related to the first spouse).  In addition to105
important factors). Not all polygamous unions were with related co-spouses, however. Another
common pattern was for men who stayed for prolonged periods in different villages to marry unrelated
women from these villages.
     It seems pertinent here to make reference to Storrie (2003:416) who says with reference to the     106
Hoti of Venezuela that “the world of kin ... is composed of all non-strangers, in other words, anyone
who has always been part of one’s life-world is a relative.” Even though Bentian notions of relatedness
are not entirely similar to the remarkably non-genealogical notions of this people (whom Storrie
2003:407 describe as lacking “any notion of genealogical relatedness between persons”) the logic of
thinking referred to in this quotation illuminates Bentian notions as well. 
      It seems that there might be some differences in Ngaju and Bentian notions about cognates and     107
affines which at least partly explain the differences in interpretation here. For instance, Schiller
(1997:107) states that among the Ngaju the bones of one's spouse may not be included in the same bone
repository as oneself if the spouse was not also cognatically related, whereas among the Bentian
cognatically unrelated spouses and other cognatically unrelated kin can be included along with cognates
in bone repositories. Indicative of this difference between the two groups, blood also seems to have a
greater cultural importance as a symbol of relatedness among the Ngaju.
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enabling maintenance of the old relations with the spouse’s kin, such marriages are also
advantageous, people remarked to me, because they mean that one does not have to
become subjected to the potential troubles and dangers, and, perhaps most importantly,
the division of property, which the initiation of new relations may involve (cf. Schlegel
1970:79-81) . 
The institutions of polygamy and sororate/levirate thus reflect the importance of what
I call practical kinship and, more particularly, the principle that one wants to hold on to
and continue building on prior relations because these are relations which one already
knows and in which one has invested a lot, emotionally and materially. Fear of strangers
is probably also an important underlying factor in these cases, although it seems to me
that such fear is essentially about fear of people that one does not know rather than about
fear of non-kin.  I consider Anne Schiller's (1997:94-108) interpretation of similar fears106
among the Ngaju as ultimately deriving from a lack of genealogical knowledge, making
non-kin potential hantuen (malevolent spirit in human guise), as somewhat misleading
if applied to the Bentian situation.  In the first place, Bentians are generally not cautious107
in their dealings with non-kin because they suspect them of being spirits (although they
occasionally do, but then they also sometimes suspect kin and domestic animals of being
spirits). Rather, they are suspicious of whether they can be trusted in a more general
sense; whether they can, for instance, be expected to provide some services in return for
others, or whether they for some reason (usually unspecified) are likely to hurt or mistreat
them. Second, Bentians are not so much fearful of non-kin as of people with whom they
have had no or little experience. Again, it is not kinship in a strictly genealogical or some
other theoretical sense which is decisive here, but rather relatedness in a more practical
sense, as based on familiarity (people are not afraid of non-kin whom they know well).
Kinship in a more formal sense does sometimes matter, it is true, in the sense that a
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discovery of a genealogical link between two unacquainted persons probably would make
them more well-disposed toward each other, or at least increase their interest in each
other (a couple of encounters of such discoveries that I had support this hypothesis). Land
use rights and heirlooms are also primarily inherited bilaterally (through both blood and
adoptive links). Because of the indisputable practical value that kin relations have,
genealogical kinship interests Bentians in some contexts (one indication of this is the
above-mentioned patrilines that some men keep). But genealogical connection is not the
reason that people trust kin. Bentians generally expect kinspersons to be well-disposed
toward them because they assume the sense of obligation to be reciprocal, and because
they have practically experienced kin relations as providing support and security. Kin are
trusted and kinship values are compelling because of what kin and kinship have meant
for them in practice.
A quotation from Michelle Rosaldo in condensed form sums up much of the
importance of what could be referred to as “the practical element” which seems to be at
the heart of both Ilongot and Bentian notions of relatedness: “Because Ilongots
experience kinship as the basis of cooperative support — and frequent contact is
considered a prerequisite of true kinship — no man wants to live further than necessary
from his relations” (1980:186). There are exceptions in that some people sometimes want
to keep a distance from others so as to preserve a degree of autonomy, but on the whole,
most people try to maintain most of their kin relations, and do so precisely because they
want or have to, and consider it to be the natural order of things. In so far as we are
concerned about its effects, kinship should perhaps not be viewed primarily as an
ideational category, but rather as consisting of social relations which press themselves
upon people in interaction, not just because of how these relations are conceived, but
also, and as much, because of how they are bound up with materially embedded everyday
practices, because of how people in a very concrete sense, through requests and needs,
are entangled in the webs of their kin relations.
Kinship by Default? — Some Concluding Remarks on the Importance of Kinship
Authority among the Bentian 
Appell (1976:151), particularly in connection to Borneo, has noted that “in small-scale
societies ... social isolates [i.e. groups] may contain only kin by default.” Somewhat
similarly, King (1978a:10) has stated that “bilaterality is a defining characteristics of
Bornean societies by default.” What these two scholars have in mind is the fact that it is
not always kinship, at least not kinship strictly speaking, which in Borneo societies
determines group recruitment or other aspects of interpersonal relations (e.g. rights and
obligations), even though, on the face of it, it may appear so. The reason for this illusion
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is simply that most people in many Bornean communities are related — or at least,
consider themselves to be so. But instead of kinship it is in reality often other factors,
such as rank or residence, or a combination of kinship and other factors, which are
instrumental in regulating such phenomena (see King 1978a, for a discussion of this
condition with special reference to rank, Sather 1976, for one with special reference to
residence). Consequently, in this view, kinship in Borneo is not particularly important as
an “organizing principle,” even though it is admittedly important as an “idiom,” and a
general preference for endogamy is recognized (these two factors, endogamy and
kinship's use as an idiom, are of course what enabled the alleged misperception of kinship
in the first place).
These observations do, in some respects, support the understanding of Bentian
kinship that I have developed here. In the first place, cognatic kinship, as opposed to
other forms of relatedness, is not particularly important. Housegroups and ego-centered
action groups include affines and other persons with whom one is not related strictly
speaking. Second, kinship alone, whether in the sense of cognatic or affinal relatedness,
cannot explain patterns of group membership and interpersonal loyalties. Bentians do not,
for example, trust kin because they are relatives, but rather because the people that they
know and are extensively involved with are their relatives (whereas those that they do not
know and are only marginally involved with tend to be non-relatives or at least
considered as such: note Nen Pare's family's targeting of Udin as the one who had made
her sick). In other words, it is frequently not kinship, in the conventional anthropological
sense, which is instrumental in shaping interpersonal relationships among the Bentian —
even though they typically understand such relationships in the idiom of kinship — but
rather something like familiarity (and familiarity often comes down to residence which
is indeed frequently more important than kinship: how are we otherwise to understand
the behavior of Udin's cognatic relatives during his hearing in Temiang?). Are we to
conclude, then, that kinship is unimportant among the Bentian?
No, such a conclusion would of course not be fully acceptable. Bentians, it is true, use
kinship, no matter how we define it, very flexibly: sometimes it is emphatically invoked,
while at other times, when the relation in question is not currently of pragmatic use, it is
almost ignored. However, as soon as relatedness has been invoked it is usually very
difficult to ignore. As a result of the facts that the ideal of relatedness and the obligations
associated with it are so widely affirmed in principle and so vitally useful for successful
co-existence and individual well-being, there is both strong social pressure and good
utilitarian reasons to respond affirmatively to claims made in the name of relatedness —
and such claims are made often. The fact that kinship is nebulous in the sense of kinship
terminology and obligations are extendable to genealogical non-kin does not subtract
from its importance in this respect but rather adds to it as it increases the frequency of
such claims. Thus kinship — especially if defined broadly as relations for which kinship
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terminology is applied — is important as a criterion for action among the Bentian,
particularly in such situations as when one is confronted with claims that are made in the
name of kinship. What I have called the practical character of Bentian kinship is thus a
factor contributing to — rather than reducing — the importance of kinship in Bentian
society.
Relatedness itself, however, is often not the actual cause or catalyst inducing attempts
at invoking (as opposed to fulfilling) kinship obligations. Frequently pragmatic interest,
rather than relatedness, is effective in this respect. The fact that non-kin, if desirable, can
be made kin relatively easily is perhaps an indication of this: in Bentian society, claims
are made on relatives not so much because they are kin; rather relatedness is invoked (or
people are made kin) because one wants or needs to make claims on them (for some
practical purposes). However, kinship ideology is also sometimes causally effective in
this respect as when people visit or give food to a relative for the sake of maintaining
good relations. Bentian kin interaction is thus sometimes goal-rational, sometimes value-
rational, and frequently both. To the extent that it is primarily value-rational it is largely
the direct result of the (causative) influence of kinship ideology. However, even when it
is goal-rational, kinship often represents an authority which serves as a means to realize
objectives by way of influencing the reactions of other people affected by it. As a result
of how notions of relatedness are perceived and invoked in Bentian society people are
significantly constrained by their kin relations, and often (although this applies to some
people more than others) in a position to constrain others. 
The restricted importance of cognatic kinship as an organizing principle should not,
then, be taken to imply that Bentian kinship is generally unimportant: even though it does
not clearly define obligations in particular contexts, kinship ideology is centrally
important in Bentian society in that its use frequently results in obligations (and thus
generates resources). Similarly, the fact that notions of relatedness are so inclusive should
not, any more than what I have called the “pragmatic attitude toward kinship,” be
interpreted as a sign that Bentian kinship lacks content, that is, that it signifies nothing
in particular (or potentially everything). Rather, we can speak with Fortes (1969) of its
content as consisting of “the axiom of prescriptive altruism” or perhaps even borrow
Schneider's (1968) characterization of American kinship as “a code for conduct enjoining
diffuse, enduring solidarity” (Schneider 1984:53). Bentian kinship forms a moral code
which receives a remarkable force from how it is articulated with and expressed by
regularly performed social action. The meaning of kinship among the Bentian is its
function as an authority, and it is in this capacity that it plays a central role in Bentian
social life.
There is thus something quite misleading about the notion of kinship by default, in
so far as it suggests that kinship ideology does not exert a positive influence, that is,
affect through its presence instances of action and courses of events. That kinship
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terminology is so frequently invoked, and that people want to interact with and marry
those people whom they consider their kin, is not inconsequential, but demonstrates, on
the contrary, as Douglas Miles has claimed for the Ngaju, that kinship “serves as a
catalyst in social relationships” (1970:305). If also considering the fact that relatedness,
as indigenous vocabulary suggests, can be based on several criteria (consanguinity,
affinity, residence, friendship) rather than just on biological/genealogical kinship, then
kinship, as an ideology and in the form of the concrete instances of social relations
identified as kin relations, makes an even greater difference. What matters in respect to
kinship terminologies is, as McKinley argues, “not how the apparently genealogical
meanings get extended out but rather how effectively the model as a whole draws people
in” and in that respect Bentian kinship functions admirably well (1983:360, orig. italics).
As illustrated by the story of Udin, notions of relatedness and obligations toward relatives
constitute sources of authority which can effectively be used to restrict the autonomy of
some, and increase the social resources of other, members of Bentian society, thereby
challenging notions of far-reaching individual or household autonomy postulated
somewhat one-sidedly by academic Borneo observers. Bentian kinship represents a
highly influential authority which is at one and the same time a vitally important personal
resource (sometimes critical for survival) as well as a vehicle by which integration in
Bentian society is largely achieved (although the end result of integration in this society
is not equivalent to a neatly ordered series of discrete social units consisting of members
recruited solely on the basis of kinship, narrowly defined). However, no authorities are
absolute and this is, as borne out by this chapter, no less true regarding kinship authority,
the force as well as limitations of which, in the final instance, are based on its practical
constitution. But Bentians do not rely just on kinship in order to fulfil personal needs or
achieve integration, other means and ideologies are employed as well, and it is to some
of these that I will now turn as the next chapter begins. 
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4. Religious Authority: The Imperative and Impact of
Ritualization 
Introduction
One of my most persistent impressions from staying among the Bentian is that of a
couple of belians sitting at the base of the longan, chanting quietly, their voices tired and
hoarse, to the minimal accompaniment of the hollow but dull sound of their drums, which
they slap at infrequent intervals, a single, loosely synchronized blow producing a
monotonous rhythm marking the progress of a buntang ritual. Around them, at some
distance, there are other voices: children playing, men and women talking, people coming
in or going out of the longhouse — “everyday life” unfolding. No one pays the belians
much attention, and at times, typically around noon before the midday heat becomes most
oppressive, they may be alone in the house for several hours, while other people are away
on their swiddens or out performing other chores.
The occasion of this impression is a common and significant occurrence in Bentian
society. I spent quite some time observing it, as it makes up much of the first few days
of buntangs, which were held frequently during my fieldwork. Even though the specific
part of the ritual which the related impression concerns is unspectacular and commands
little attention from ritual participants, the activity in question is regarded as essential to
the ritual. I use it here to illustrate something essential about how religious authority, the
subject of this chapter, is acquired by Bentians. Also, I will analyze this subject largely
by way of the buntang. This ritual — a multiprogram and multipurpose event often
lasting around a week or longer —  will form the principal case material of this chapter.
Religious authority, which I define as “authority pertaining to or deriving from
relations with so-called supernatural agencies,” is a complex category, at least as complex
as kinship authority and, of course, to no less a degree an analytical construction. It
consists of various sources of authority, such as different kinds of supernatural agencies
— spirits, ancestors, souls — as well as the notions, objects, and practices (i.e. rituals)
associated with these agencies (God is not an agency which I will be concerned with in
this chapter, however, because of the unimportance of God in Kaharingan ritual). Then
there are also some authority positions associated with religious authority, that is, those
of “life ritual shaman” (belian) and “death-ritual shaman” (warah). I will provide an
overview of most of these agencies, notions, objects, practices and positions, although
I will do so largely indirectly — through an analysis of their role in ritual, and in the
buntang ritual, in particular. I have chosen to approach religious authority by way of an
analysis of ritual because it is mainly through rituals that its various aspects become
relevant to Bentians (as well as known by them in the first place). Doing so also attunes
      Bell (1992:7) understands ritualization as “a strategic way [orig. emphasis] of acting which108
differentiates itself from other practices.” Like her I also see ritualization as a special form of action,
but I primarily use it with respect to such spatio-temporally circumscribed actions associated with
formalized social gatherings led by a religious specialist (belian or warah), intended to redress or
reconstitute human relations with so-called supernatural agencies in order to achieve some practical
end such as curing an illness or celebrating a social relationship. This means that I principally use the
word for such actions (including verbal action) which are associated with what might be called
“religious rituals.” I am not, in this chapter, so much interested in isolated instances of ritualized
actions which occur outside religious ritual, even though much of what I will have to say applies to
such actions as well. It should perhaps be noted here that some minor religious rituals, that is, rituals
which address supernatural agencies, may indeed be conducted by laymen without an human
audience; like other instances of ritualized action occurring outside religious rituals conducted by
religious experts before a human audience, such ritual will not concern me here, however. In
investigating ritualization through what I here define as religious ritual, I am particularly interested in
how such rituals, as strategic actions, work authoritatively, and in what, more generally, their appeal
lies.
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well with my general approach which is to investigate authority in the context of the
social practices which establish it.
Religious life for Bentians (I am here and throughout the chapter mainly talking about
Kaharingan Bentians) is largely synonymous with ritual. This is the result of several
factors. First, religious rituals are arranged exceptionally frequently. During my fieldwork
I had the opportunity of participating in rituals almost every second night. A family
typically arranges several rituals every year, including curing, harvest, and buntang
rituals. Second, ritual actions generally seem to concern Bentians much more than
religious beliefs, while outside of rituals, people generally appear to be rather secular and
unspeculative. Since the Bentian engage in rituals so frequently, most of their persistent
problems relating to the actions or wishes of spiritual agencies (and many of those
pertaining to human actions and desires) are also eventually subjected to ritual treatment,
in rituals which are often remarkably complex. “Ritual treatment,” or what I henceforth,
influenced by Bell (1992), will call “ritualization,” is also a principal strategy of
authorization in such cases when Bentians deliberately employ religious authority.  For108
this reason, which provides another motive for me to approach religious authority through
ritual, I will pay special attention to the phenomenon of ritualization, particularly such
ritualization which is carried out through the buntang. In doing so, I am interested, not
only in what, and how, ritual authorizes, but also, and even more importantly, in
illuminating those properties of the ritualization process which make it authoritative.
Hereby, it is my intention to work toward an answer, in the Bentian context, to a
fundamental question asked by Bell (1992:115): “How is it that ritual activities are seen
or judged to be the appropriate thing to do?” 
There are other Bentian rituals, some of which could perhaps merit equal
consideration with the buntang: various curing rituals (belian luangan, belian bawo,
belian sentiu, belian bawe), harvest rituals (kerewaiyu), birth rituals (ngulas bidan),
weddings (pelulung), and secondary mortuary rituals (gombok). Curing rituals, for
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instance, are much more common than buntangs. What makes the buntang especially
interesting to me is the wealth of spiritual agencies which it attracts, as well as the
relatively large number of people which it tends to draw together. In addition, the
buntang encompasses activities which also occur in these other rituals (e.g. curing),
which means that a discussion of the buntang will reveal a lot about other Bentian rituals,
as well.
Concentration — of spirits, people, and souls — may in fact be advanced as the basic
goal of buntangs and, to a lesser degree, of rituals in general. It is partly in order to
illustrate this point that I have opened this chapter with an image of the belians chanting
by the longan. This curious object, which was long something of a mystery to me (and
to some degree, still is) is the focal point of the buntang ritual. It marks the place where
a large part of the ritual activities occur, the center around which much of the ritual
paraphernalia is arranged. It also constitutes a place where spirits congregate during
rituals and from which certain kinds of spirit and ancestral authority emanate. Consisting
of a cone-shaped wooden structure of some four to eight poles connected at the base and
leaning outwards as they reach higher, the longan, similar in this respect to bamboos
whose stems grow out from one clump, also symbolizes (e.g. in ritual chants)
concentration and a common source. So although the belian, during the activity described
above, may be in the background with regards to the attention of the ritual participants,
he is, in another respect, at the very center of what takes place. This, in turn, illustrates
another fundamental aspect of Bentian religious life: Bentians are generally quite content
to let the belians (in ritual texts nicknamed lalang, “envoys”) handle their dealings with
religious authorities. Indicative of this, the most basic ingredient of Bentian rituals is the
chants of the officiating belians. A majority of the ritual activities are made up solely of
these chants, part of which are unaccompanied, and part of which are accompanied by
music played on drums and gongs. In the buntang there is an unusually large number of
activities which require participation by others than the belians, but these activities also
involve chanting, which is perceived by Bentians as their essential part, as that which
makes them effectual.
The Buntang: A General Description
I will begin this analysis of religious authority through ritual by providing a general
description of the buntang, which has not been ethnographically documented previously.
In particular, I will discuss the basic purposes and social context of the ritual, so as to
give the reader some notion about the motives for ritualization among the Bentian. Later
I will present a concrete example of the ritual, and then proceed by analyzing ritualization
through this example. 
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Buntangs, called bekeleu among the Benuaq and the Tunjung, are said to have been in
existence for as long as can be remembered. Early references include Grabowsky
(1888:583-84) who witnessed a buntang held after a mortuary ritual among the Lawangan
of present-day Central Kalimantan (Ayuh river), and Knappert (1905:619) who
encountered buntangs among Bawo Luangans in present-day East Kalimantan (Bongan
river) and South Kalimantan (Tabalong river). The buntang was probably practiced by
all Luangans (today it is reportedly rare outside the central Luangan area), and in its
general form (as well as in many details) it resembles some rituals performed by other
peoples elsewhere in Borneo and beyond, for example, the balaku untung of the Ngaju,
the gawai of the Iban (Masing 1997), the ma'bua' of the Toraja (Volkman 1985), the
salia of the Wana (Atkinson 1989), and the pangnae of the Mapparundo (George 1996).
Like these rituals, the buntang is, to use an expression employed by Atkinson to describe
the salia, a “liturgy-centered” ritual (Atkinson 1989:14). As such, it is characterized by
a relatively fixed, prescribed structure, or in Atkinson's words, an “orderly set of ritual
procedures which coordinate the actions of practitioners and congregants.” As is the case
with the other rituals mentioned, thanksgiving and supplication addressed to spirits for
the benefit of a collectivity of some kind is also a dominant feature of the buntang. Other
prominent characteristics are the comparatively grand, numerous and expensive animal
sacrifices which it involves (dedicated to the spirits, but eaten by the participants) and the
relatively large number of participants which it tends to attract (largely because of the
animal sacrifices, which are quite important in a society where meat and other protein
sources may often be absent from people's diet for long periods). 
Being a multipurpose and multiprogram ritual, however, it is somewhat difficult to
state briefly what the buntang generally is about. Despite a high degree of structural
consistency, buntangs are remarkably varied, both in the sense of accommodating a wide
range of rather diverse activities, and with respect to the diversity of the basic purposes
for which they are arranged. In addition, buntangs vary in terms of length and
elaborateness. Perhaps the most basic criterion that Bentians use to distinguish between
buntangs is the number of days that it ideally takes to perform them. Four, six and eight
days are the standard formats. Eight-day buntangs involve the sacrifice of a water buffalo,
in addition to some number of pigs and chickens, while in four and six-day buntangs,
only pigs and chickens are sacrificed. 
To give the reader a rough idea about the structure and contents of the buntang, I have
included a table (Table 1) which lists the activities of a six-day buntang, a common
format of many buntangs which I witnessed, including one which later will serve as my
principal example of the ritual. Four-day buntangs are structurally identical to six-day
buntangs; eight-day buntangs, which require a water buffalo sacrifice, include some
additional features, although they have otherwise the same basic structure. 
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Table 1. The Program of a Six-Day Buntang
Day One
Nempuli liau (Sending Away
the Liau)
Nyili nyolo (Sending Away
Bad Spirits and Bad Luck)
Pedolui mulung (Descending
of the Spirit Familiars)
Pejiak pejiau (Blessing the
Ritual)
Marah mansa la longan
(Reporting News by the
Longan)
Marah mansa la dongo
(Reporting News by the
Patient)
Marah mansa la boa jaweng
(Reporting News by the Door)
Bekawat (Curing)
Nyerah upah  (P resenting
R e w a rd s  to  the  S p i r i t
Familiars)
Pekuli mulung (Returning the
Spirit Familiars)
Day Two
Peruko Luing (Awakening
Luing)
Nempuun teraran (Reciting
Tempuun Teraran)
M u l a i  n e m p u u n  u r e i
(Beginning Tempuun Urei)
Bekawat (Curing) 
Nyerah upah  (Presenting
R e w a rd s  to  the  S p i r i t
Familiars)
Pekuli mulung (Returning the
Spirit Familiars)
Day Three (Olo Nyerewe, The
Day of Hanging up the Ibus
Stripes) 
Peruko Luing (Awakening
Luing)
N y o lu n g  n e m p u u n  u re i
(Finishing Tempuun Urei)
Nyili nyolo (Sending Away
Bad Spirits and Bad Luck) 
Nyorong nyokoi (Feeding the
Ancestor Skulls) 
Uge utek  (Fetching the
Headhunt Skull)
Makan utek layau (Feeding the
Headhunt Skull) 
Pesengket (Receiving the
Celestial Naiyu Spirits at the
Headhunt Skull) 
Nyenkoi ampun pengoreng
(Fetching Luing Ayang from
Her Abode)
Pedolui Luing (Descending
Luing Ayang)
Betangai (Dedicating the
Animal Sacrifices) 
Muat tueh  (Erecting the
Fortune Tree) 
Nyerewe (Hanging Up the Ibus
stripes) 
Jue ngopou (Naming the Ritual
Decorations)
Marah mansa la longan
(Reporting News by the
Longan)
M arah mansa la dongo
(Reporting News by the
Patient)
Marah mansa la boa jaweng
(Reporting News by the
Patient)
Bekawat (Curing) 
Berejuus (Soul Retrieval) 
Nyerah upah  (P resenting
R e w a rd s  to  the  S p i r i t
Familiars) 
Pekuli mulung (Returning the
Spirit Familiars)
Day Four (Olo leno, The Day
in Between)
Nangko Luing (Waking and
Dressing up Luing)
Nempuun buut piak (Reciting
the Tempuun of Pigs and
Chickens)
Bekawat (Curing) 
Berejuus (Soul Retrieval) 
Nyerah upah  (Presenting
R e w a rd s  to  the  S p i r i t
Familiars) 
Pekuli mulung (Returning the
Spirit Familiars)
Day Five (Kenoyeng, The Day
Before the Big Day)
Nangko Luing (Waking and
Dressing Luing)
Nginton ngunau (Requesting
the Bad to Leave) 
Niti nenteng (Informing about
the Approaching Climax of the
Ritual)
Pedolui mulung penengkejah
(Descending the Frightening
Spirit Familiars)
Nengkejah (Frightening the
Spirits) 
Pedolui mulung selebemeng
(Descending the Prohibiting
Spirit Familiars)
N y e l e  b e m e n g  ( I s su in g
Prohibitions to the Spirits) 
Ninek torung (Planting the
Samat Trees) 
Marah mansa la longan
(Reporting News by the
Longan)
Marah mansa la  dongo
(Reporting News by the
Patient)
Marah mansa la boa jaweng
(Reporting News by the
Patient)
Bekawat (Curing) 
Berejuus (Soul Retrieval) 
Nyerah upah  (P resenting
R e w a rd s  to  the  S p i r i t
Familiars) 
Pekuli mulung (Returning the
Spirit Familiars)
Day Six (Olo kolak, The Final
Day)
Nangko Luing (Dressing Luing
Ayang)
Ngeramu (Distributing Betel
Nuts to the Spirits) 
Nyili nyolo (Sending Away
Bad Luck) 
Nyorong nyokoi (Feeding the
Ancestor Skulls) 
P e d o l u i  b a w e n  p a y a k
( D e s c e n d i n g  th e  S p i r i t
Familiars Responsible for
Distributing the Offerings)
N g e j u a  n g e b l a a n g
(Distributing the Offerings) 
Ngaper buut piak (Blessing the
Sacrificial Animals)
Betangai (Dedicating the
Sacrificial Animals)
Nempuk pali (Ascending the
Pali spirits) 
Rak tang  (Finishing the
Dedication of the Sacrificial
Animals) 
Pekate  (Slaughtering the
Sacrificial Animals)
Ngulas pusaka (Anointing the
Ancestral Objects with Blood)
Makan utek layau (Feeding the
Headhunt Skull) 
M a k a n  a n in g  (O ffe r ing
Cooked Food to the Clean
Ones) 
The Concluding Morning (Pita
penyolung)
Bekawat (Curing) 
Ngobet sepatung (Discarding
the Ritual Paraphernalia Used
for Curing)
Mengket blai juus (Entering
the Soul House) 
Nempuk blai juus sampan
benawa (Ascending the Soul
House and the Soul Search
Ship)
Nyentuar mulung (Taking
F a re w e ll  o f  the  Sp ir i t
Familiars)
Pedolui Kerongo (Descending
Kerongo)
N g e j a l a  ( N e t - C a t c h i n g
Whatever Bad that Remains) 
Nitik ketong (Playing the Jews
Harp to Ascend Kerongo)
Meru (Distributing Rewards to
the Participants)
Rak tang (Music Marking the
End of the Ritual)
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Informants reported buntangs had a smaller format but were more frequent in the
past. It is perhaps impossible to say how often they used to be arranged, but most
extended families or housegroups were probably likely, if resources allowed, to arrange
at least one a year, as was the case, during 1996, in the village which constituted my
fieldwork base. Outside the central Luangan area, buntangs seem to be generally rare
today.
For brevity’s sake, I will not provide a comprehensive description of the activities
listed in Table 1, although I will comment on many of them as I proceed. From the point
of view of the officiating belians (there are usually three or four belians performing a
buntang, with one recognized as their leader), the program should ideally proceed
uninterrupted from start to end, except for brief meal breaks and a few hours sleep in the
middle of the night. With the exception of the first day, when the program starts in the
evening, and the concluding morning, the program every day begins at the break of dawn
by the belians waking up Luing — the female spirit of rice who is their leading spirit
helper — and continues until about midnight or later. The mornings and afternoons of the
few first days mainly consist of the slow recitation of tempuun, origin stories recounting
the origins of the sacrificial animals and different paraphernalia used in the ritual. This
is the recitation that the belians sitting by the longan depicted at the beginning of the
chapter were performing. Like many other activities in the buntang (such as the waking
up of Luing every morning), the recitation of tempuun forms a “preparatory activity;” it
does not by itself bring about any of the perceived goals of the ritual, even though it is
regarded as essential to its performance.
The recitation of tempuun typically attracts little attention from participants, and the
belians may sometimes be the only people present while it proceeds. In this respect, it
contrasts with the activities performed after sunset — which on the first few nights
mainly consist of curing — when the sponsoring family and their relatives tend to be
assembled, and guests often continuously drop in. As the ritual proceeds, the program
gets more varied and intense in both the day and the night while the number of
participants and their involvement in the ritual activities increases. At the same time, the
focus of the ritual activities shifts from curing to thanksgiving and supplication. The final
evening, when most of the animal sacrifices are made, and cloth banners are hung up
outside the ritual house to inform the spirits and people that this is occurring, the ritual
culminates and the number of participants increases to its maximum — to usually
between thirty and a hundred people. 
For most of the duration of the ritual, participants typically spend their time chatting
in small groups, not infrequently while plaiting rattan baskets or mats or playing cards.
Ideally, the atmosphere is festive, but relaxed. Occasionally, some participants take part
in collective ritual activities or in playing the music performed as part of these activities.
Others, particularly the sponsors and their relatives, are from time to time involved in
      When I talk about “rewards” to spirits here I do so in the sense of  “wages” or “ fees.” The term109
which I thus translate (upah) essentially refers to payment for services rendered and it is notably not
used in the sense of  “offering” for which another term is employed (semah).
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constructing the numerous ritual paraphernalia (ruye) to be used in the buntang or in
fetching the plants needed for their construction from the forest. At least twice a day,
good food (including meat) is served freely to all participants. In the late evenings, those
still present often doze off but typically wake up at the point when the program ends and
the special delicacies used in offerings to spirits (okan penyewaka) are served to the
human participants.
Thanksgiving, Curing, Supplication, Congregation, and Consecration
Joseph Weinstock, whose dissertation Kaharingan and the Luangan Dayaks (1983a) is
the most extensive work on Luangan religion and society in English, classified buntangs
as “thanksgiving rituals” (1983a:44-46), a designation which is supported by the
important fact that a majority of buntangs are held in fulfilment of a vow (niat) made to
the spirits on the occasion of a preceding curing ritual in hopes of thus inducing them to
alleviate the patient's suffering and help him or her recover. The Bentian themselves also
commonly describe the objective of buntangs as being to present “rewards” (upah) to the
spirits, primarily the belians' spirit helpers (mulung) and several categories of protecting
spirits (pengiring) who continuously guard over people and various general conditions
in nature or society. In addition a large portion of the activities carried out during
buntangs are obviously thanksgiving in character, that is, they serve essentially to
distribute some form of rewards or express gratitude to the spirits.109
While justified in some respects, however, a categorization of the buntang as a
thanksgiving ritual may be misleading. Even though thanksgiving in some form is always
present in buntangs, the ritual is never only an act of thanksgiving, and other objectives
are frequently of more primary importance for holding it. As already indicated, curing is
a standard feature of buntangs which, when arranged in fulfilment of a vow made to
spirits during preceding curing rituals, tend to be held even when the patient has not yet
recovered. In such cases, the curing activities of the buntang become centrally important,
but they will be included in the ritual also if the patient has recovered, in which case they
are regarded as preventative rather than restorative. Buntangs are, in fact, perceived as
a particularly powerful means of curing, superior to ordinary curing rituals, and they are
sometimes enacted primarily for this purpose, for example, when ordinary curing rituals
have failed (in which case the buntang forms advance payment as much as an expression
of gratitude) or when a curing ritual is considered hopelessly insufficient even from the
start. The curing conducted during buntangs is basically similar to that carried out during
      As there is no indigenous term corresponding to the word “curing ritual,” and as the rituals to110
which I refer by that term (i.e. belian luangan, belian bawo, belian sentiu, belian bawe) are not
exclusively arranged in order to cure illness (i.e. somatic disorders) but also, for instance, to treat the
dangerous states following from bad dreams (upi daat) or house fire (blai soya), it is perhaps
inaccurate, strictly speaking, to label them curing rituals, although I have chosen to do so here in
order to more easily distinguish them from other rituals. Bentians often refer to these rituals as just
“belian” for short, and they can be called “ordinary belian” (belian pee) in distinction to buntangs
(which may be called belian buntang) and other rituals. As this indicates, the term belian can also be
used as a generic term for “life-rituals” as opposed to “death-rituals” (i.e. mortuary ceremonies).
Finally, the word belian is the most commonly used word for (life-ritual) shamans (who more strictly,
but less commonly, are called pemelian), and it is mainly in that sense that I will use the word in this
text.
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curing rituals: it takes the same general form and its central aim is to retrieve the patient's
soul (juus), which spirits are believed to have abducted, and hence to restore the patient's
health.
Like ordinary curing rituals, or what should perhaps more properly be called ordinary
belian,  buntangs are also sometimes arranged to remedy conditions other than illness110
in the strict sense of the term. Buntangs can be held, for instance, after the death of a
relative if the hot (layeng) state of listlessness (utas) which is associated with sorrow still
persists among the survivors after the secondary mortuary ritual has been held. In the
nineteenth century, if the deceased was an especially influential person, buntangs of this
kind, which are called buntang moas utas (“buntangs expelling listlessness”), sometimes
provided an occasion for slave sacrifice or headhunting, and some of the heads then taken
have been kept and are “fed” as part of the program of buntangs today (Day Three in
Table 1). To mention another example, a buntang is also considered to be the appropriate
ritual to arrange in order to rectify marriages which are considered too close or otherwise
illicit (sumbang), or when such marital or other sexual relations, or breach of other
elementary norms of social conduct, are believed to have caused extensive collective
misfortune or upset conditions in nature (i.e. caused drought, excessive rains or a solar
eclipse). In such cases, the buntang arranged frequently takes the form of a nalin taun,
an extended version of the buntang usually lasting at least sixteen days which forms the
grandest and most expensive of all Bentian rituals, and which, unlike other buntangs, is
sponsored by an entire community instead of by a single family. This ritual, whose name
means “to heal the year” (the agricultural year), encompasses some additional activities
not part of ordinary buntangs, most importantly the sung recitation of the origin story of
the world and mankind. Like ordinary buntangs, the nalin taun can also be held for
purposes of thanksgiving, for example, as a token of gratitude for a good harvest or if
drought has been averted as a result of a vow made to the spirits.
      Most Bentian rituals aim in at least some respects to thank as well as cure. In the first instance,111
all rituals, including curing rituals only a few hours long, involve some distribution of rewards
(nyerah upah) to those spirits who have contributed to their enactment (minimally, a bowl of
uncooked rice is dedicated to the belian 's spirit familiars). More particularly, secondary mortuary
rituals are conceived of as rituals through which the souls of the dead are “cured” (nalin), and certain
dangers for the living thus eliminated —  at the same time as they are essentially thanksgiving in
character: acts of reciprocation dedicated to the dead by living descendants repaying what the dead
did for them. At weddings the shaman cures the bridal couple —  for the future so to speak, so that
they “should not fight, not separate, not contribute unequally to their respective families.” Curing per
se may perhaps be regarded as absent from harvest rituals —  which are perceived primarily as
thanksgiving rituals dedicated to all those agencies who have enabled the harvest to occur (including,
most importantly, the spirit of rice, Luing) —  although activities aimed at supplication constitute, as
they do in the buntang, a central element in the ritual. Such activities are also part of the birth rituals
(held four or eight days after the birth of a child) which are enacted primarily in order to thank the
midwife and her spiritual helpers (especially the earth spirits, Tonoi). 
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Both thanksgiving and various forms of curing are basic purposes for arranging a
buntang, as they are in fact also for other Bentian rituals.  In addition, supplication111
represents a third such purpose. An emphasis on thanksgiving and supplication is
characteristic of the buntang, as also indicated by the fact that holding a buntang may be
referred to by the phrase beresinta beredua, meaning something like “demonstrating
devotion and making prayers.” Thanksgiving activities are almost always combined with
some form of appeal, and the buntang also includes a whole series of activities whose
primary objective is supplication. Such activities, many of which require collective
participation (but are always led by the belian), are typically not so much concerned with
a particular problem of immediate concern (e.g. the patient's illness, the weather), as with
the general well-being of the sponsoring family as a whole and, somewhat secondarily,
of other participants. Some of these activities take the form of seeking to eliminate bad
conditions (e.g. Nengkejah, the burning of nateng resins emitting sparks as part of an
effort to frighten evil-minded spirits) while others (e.g. Ninek torung, the sowing of
invisible plant counterparts of the participants with rattling bamboo dibbling sticks) form
attempts to obtain various positive conditions, such as a long life, good luck, or plenty
of food. What is explicitly requested in the chants accompanying these activities is
typically couched in general and conventionalized terms rather than in terms of particular
favors.
A most important feature of buntangs is the fact that, whereas the great majority of
Bentian rituals are sponsored by a nuclear family, that is, a conjugal pair, the buntang is
characteristically sponsored by a somewhat larger family entity, minimally an extended
family and typically what I have called a housegroup. The housegroup collectively owns
a wooden miniature ship (sampan benawa), used by the belians for soul-search travel
particularly on buntangs, as well as a “soul house” (blai juus), into which the members
of the sponsoring family symbolically enter, by simultaneously placing one of their feet
on its ladder, at the conclusion of the ritual. Sponsorship by the housegroup reflects the
      The longan is, as I have argued above, a symbol of the housegroup and the place of storage of112
the ancestor skulls and other objects associated with the housegroup’s ancestral representatives, a fact
making the expression nerek longan especially appropriate as a designation for a family ritual. 
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greater expenditures of buntangs as compared with other rituals, but also shows the fact
that the buntang is essentially perceived as a kind of family ritual, another expression of
which is the fact that it is (together with the nalin taun) the only ritual in which the
longan is used; holding a buntang may, in fact, be referred to metonymically as nerek
longan, “to erect the longan.”  Together with mortuary rituals, the buntang also forms112
the principal occasion for kin congregation in Kaharingan communities, and achieving
kin unity is commonly an explicit or implicit motive to arrange a buntang. A generally
plentiful participation is also an acknowledged goal of the ritual, serving to establish
good relations between the sponsors and other families, and enhance the status of the
sponsors.
Unity is sought not only between the members of the sponsoring family, and between
them and their kin and neighbors, but also with their dead relatives and the ancestors in
general. In fact, buntangs are concerned so much with various categories of ancestors that
an ancestral orientation can be seen as an important characteristic of the ritual. In the first
place, buntangs include several thanksgiving and supplicatory activities addressed to the
ancestors. An example is Ngulas pusaka, the anointment of sacrificial blood on the
ancestor skulls and the other ancestral objects, with the double intention (expressed in the
accompanying chants) of conveying gratitude toward them as well as receiving their
blessings. In the second place, buntangs are also concerned with what we could call the
negative aspects of the ancestors. For example, buntangs begin by sending away the body
souls (liau) of the ancestors, who are believed to be capable of otherwise sabotaging the
ritual work. And in connection with the curing activities conducted during buntangs, a
search for the souls of the patient and other participants is always carried out by the
belians at the abodes of the body and head souls of dead relatives, who, like other spirits,
are believed to sometimes lure away the souls of the living from their bodies (dreams
about dead relatives are often interpreted to mean precisely this).
In addition to these reasons to hold buntangs that pertain to spirits, ancestral or other,
there are special reasons pertaining to the living. I will call these “social motives,” which
are only rarely mentioned in the chants of the rituals. Typically, a buntang has at least
some social motives, along with several spirit-related ones. Some of these social motives,
such as kin congregation, are always relevant, whereas others, which may be regarded as
being of special types, specifically pertain to a particular social situation. All the social
motives, including kin congregation, relate to some sort of consecration, either of
relations between people, or between people and nonhuman entities, or of statuses. 
As an example of a more special social motive, a buntang may be held to consecrate
a new house (especially if the house in question is considered to be a lou, an extended
      Possibly because of this indirect association with harvests, Weinstock describes the buntang as113
a “thanksgiving ritual ... traditionally held only after an exceptionally abundant harvest” (1983a:45).
While it may have been the case that expressing thanks for harvests at some point in time had been
the principal purpose to hold buntangs in some Luangan areas where Weinstock did fieldwork, the
motives and objectives of the ritual have usually been more complex among Luangans, as they
certainly have among the Bentian.
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family house, rather than just an ordinary house, blai, in which case a smaller “curing”
ritual would usually be sufficient). Similarly, a buntang can be arranged when a family
leaves one community for another, to signal the value of their relationship to relatives and
co-villagers left behind. Buntangs can also be held to inaugurate the installation of a new
village head or the opening up of a previously uncultivated tract of land for cultivation,
or to bless marital unions, as an extension of the wedding ceremony. In addition, there
is a special form of buntang called buntang nuak, which specifically addresses social
concerns. During this ritual, the sponsoring family, or sponsoring community (the
buntang in this case is often a nalin taun), invites and offers gifts to another family or
community, which is expected to counter (bales) the invitation and the gifts on some later
occasion. 
The fact that buntangs are most often arranged during the first few months following
the harvest when there is plenty of rice to serve to participants, and little work on the
swiddens to keep them busy, shows that social considerations are never entirely absent
from buntangs. In years when there has been an especially bountiful harvest, more
buntangs are held than in other years, and a family who has some motive to arrange one
will then be under greater pressure to do so than at other times.  There are also special113
expectations placed on the families of distinguished manti, and on families who own
many water buffaloes, to arrange a buntang at least occasionally, regardless of whether
they might have any motives to do so (however, the frequency of curing rituals and the
fluidity of social constellations in Bentian society ensures that there is practically always
some reason for a family to arrange one). In the past, and to some degree still today,
buntangs played an important role in promoting local leadership, as indicated by the fact
that the nalin taun ritual evolved in the mid-nineteenth century in connection with the
development of community-wide leadership. 
As we have seen, a double concern with the social and the so-called supernatural
world (which in Bentian conceptions are not separated) is an intrinsic feature of the
buntang. The ritual takes place in, and also affects various conditions in, both of these
realms. What the buntang basically comes down to is maintaining good relations: good
relations with agencies in both of these realms — spirits, ancestors, relatives and
neighbors. By arranging a buntang, one in effect gives something — e.g. food, respect,
rewards or forgiveness — to every one of them. But at the same time, one also asks for
something — health, harvests, help, or honor — which one hopes to achieve by invoking
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the religious authorities (the spirits and the belians), and which provides a major
incentive for giving the buntang in the first place.
Ma Mar's Buntang
Since I am investigating religious authority through the ritualization process, I will
introduce a concrete example of the ritual. Using material from this example (e.g. belian's
chants), I will then analyze some of the central implications of ritualization, and in that
connection discuss the various aspects of religious authority relevant to the process. The
example to be presented consists of a six day buntang held in late December, 1996, in the
village of Temiang. It focuses on Ma Mar, the patient (dongo) at the ritual, a man in his
mid or late forties at the time of my fieldwork, who was the first of the two husbands of
Nen Pare, the woman whom Udin was accused of making ill by sorcery (see Fig. 1 for
an illustration of some of the kinship relations of the people discussed in this example).
The ritual in question, which I will henceforth refer to as “Ma Mar's buntang,” was
allegedly arranged primarily to deal with what could from a Western viewpoint be
characterized as a rather mild illness: a flu (semek). However, the illness was also
associated with listlessness (utas), including an unwillingness to work. This indicated that
the weakness experienced by Ma Mar was an expression of soul loss or loss of soul
strength, more particularly, one which could be related to the death of Nen Pare six
months earlier; Ma Mar had mourned her loss for several months, his head shaved
(tolong) in accordance with the customary practice of expressing sorrow and for that
length of time making a notably cheerless appearance. (Nen Pare had died of an uterine
tumour which had kept her in bed, and Ma Mar stayed by her side for over a year before
her death.) 
Now, however, Ma Mar had moved in with a new woman, Nen Pore, his dead brother
Ma Lemake's former wife, and because of this affair, suspicions of jealousy (kewoyu) on
the part of Nen Pare constituted another potential cause of soul loss. An additional factor
indicating soul loss was the fact that Ma Mar had recently fallen while wandering in the
forest (as many other Southeast Asians, Bentians believe that soul loss may result from
falls or fright; it is thought that the soul can leave the body as a result of the shock).
Finally, various spirits associated with particular forest areas that Ma Mar routinely
traversed (mainly in the vicinity of the swidden of his adoptive son Mudai whom he had
periodically been helping out, having been prevented by Nen Pare's illness from making
a swidden of his own that year) were also suspected of having stolen (dako) his soul. 
Apart from an attempt to retrieve Ma Mar's soul, some quite different  motives for
arranging the buntang were also suggested. It was said that it was arranged because a
marriage ceremony for Ma Mar and Nen Pore had not yet been held. The ritual thus
       Before Ma Mar moved in, Kakah Unsir's “longhouse” (lou) was inhabited by Kakah Unsir114
himself and his second wife Tak Unsir, Nen Pore, Nen Pore’s newly-wed daughter Tiar and her
husband Kadir, and from time to time also by Nen Pore's brothers Ma Unsir and Ma Kerudot (the
latter then accompanied by wife and small children), as well as by Ma Unsir's son Unsir (with wife
and children), all of whom usually stayed in their respective swidden houses. Before his death, Ma
Delidi, another brother of Nen Pore, had also been living there. Ma Mar's somewhat smaller village
house, now empty, had before the death of Nen Pare been the home of himself, Nen Pare and Ma
Sarakang (Ma Mar's “co-husband”), as well as of Nen Pare's sister Nen Bujok and her husband Ma
Putup (who now moved into a small, single-family house adjacent to Kahah Unsir’s lou). Earlier, Ma
Mar's older brother Ma Lemake, who died two years before Nen Pare, had also lived in Ma Mar’s
house. Considering, as villagers sometimes did at the time of my fieldwork, the individuals
associated with the two houses as forming an entity apart from the rest of the village, the following
marriages can be used to exemplify their internal connectedness. Nen Pore had as already mentioned
been married to Ma Mar's brother Ma Lemake prior to his death. Nen Pare had also once been
married to Ma Lemake (i.e. before he married Nen Pore) while Nen Pore in her first marriage had
been married to Ma Mar's co-husband Ma Sarakang with whom she had begot her daughter Tiar (thus
Nen Pare and Nen Pore had three times, in different order, and at different times, been married to the
same three husbands: Ma Lemake, Ma Mar and Ma Sarakang). Nen Bujok, Nen Pare’s sister, had in
her turn before her present marriage with Ma Putup been married first to Nen Pore's younger brother
Ma Delidi, and then, after his death, to Nen Pore’s older brother, Ma Unsir, whom she had divorced.
See Fig. 1 for an illustration of some of these marriages.
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aimed to consecrate their as yet illicit relationship, as well as bless Ma Mar's integration
into his new family. Ma Mar had moved into Nen Pore’s house, whose head was Nen
Pore's elderly father Kakah Unsir.  Kakah Unsir’s poor eyesight, body aches and general
feebleness were also treated during the curing portions of this buntang. In fact, the ritual
was jointly sponsored by Ma Mar and the old members of Kakah Unsir's house. Apart
from reflecting concerns about Ma Mar's relation to his new family, it also reflected
concerns regarding the relationship of the latter as a whole in relation to the rest of the
village. It intended to demonstrate, for the sponsors as well as for the rest of the village,
the unity of the inhabitants of its two downrivermost houses (Ma Mar's and Kakah
Unsir's), who already were connected by numerous close intermarriages, and who had
become somewhat detached from the rest of the village.  Despite being quite a small114
buntang, attracting a little over forty people in all (38 on the concluding evening), the
ritual may also be said to have made a statement regarding the social viability of the
sponsors which was particularly motivated by the fact that some time had passed since
these people last had arranged a buntang, while all the other housegroups in the village
had held one within the last year. Finally, even though not providing the decisive impetus
to hold the ritual, arranging it was motivated because it created an opportunity to display
the belian skills and authority of three individuals associated with the housegroup: Nen
Pare's sister Nen Bujok's husband Ma Putup (the eccentric belian who gave the wedding
speech of the three authorities), Nen Pore's younger brother Ma Kerudot, and Ma Mar's
former co-husband Ma Sarakang. 
Ma Mar's buntang, then, had many different issues on its agenda. For Ma Mar and his
new family, holding a ritual obviously meant much more than an attempt at curing Ma
      Rice, the economically and culturally most important plant of the Bentian, is actually not115
regarded as having a juus, but instead, to be animated by Luing, the spirit of rice. Other plants are also
sometimes said to be animated by luing (e.g. in the chants of harvest rituals), although not by Luing
of rice but by luing of their own kind.
      What I here refer to as soul closely resembles what other scholars studying other Southeast116
Asian peoples also have glossed as soul. However, Robert Harrison's (1979:61) use of the possibly
somewhat more neutral term “spirit” for what appears to be the same entity among the Ranau Dusun
of Sabah would be no less appropriate in the Bentian case. This is to say that I use the word “soul” in
a very unspecific way, for a supernatural agency associated with the body of living persons, while I
reserve the word “spirit” for other supernatural agencies (the only exception being the ancestors,
regarding whom I use both words, as in “ancestral spirits” and “souls of the dead”). This usage
coincides with Endicott's (1970) who regard souls as bound and spirits as unbound spirit agencies.
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Mar's flu, and the ritual did clearly not represent — even though thanksgiving was part
of its program — a straightforward attempt to fulfill any vows made during preceding
curing rituals. Various social concerns, of Ma Mar as well as of the (as yet unofficial)
affinal members of his new family, were relevant, just as the propriation of ancestral
spirits and a diverse assortment of other spirits was. As with buntangs in general,
maintaining or recreating good relations with various agencies formed the perhaps most
general objective of the ritual.
Soul Loss and Retrieval
By a closer look at some selected aspects of Ma Mar's buntang, I will try to illuminate
the workings of the different components of Bentian religious authority and suggest some
reasons why ritualization is authoritative. I will first consider the issue of soul loss and
soul retrieval which is a matter whose importance in Bentian culture and society can
hardly be overestimated (curing rituals being held almost every night in Kaharingan
communities). As the plurality of theories for the soul loss of Ma Mar indicates, soul loss,
and consequently soul retrieval, are typically very complex affairs. The association of
soul loss with illness and other unfavorable states points to the urgency which the issue
commonly has in everyday life. 
In order to facilitate a deeper understanding of soul loss and retrieval, an introductory
discussion of Bentian notions of the soul, as well as of ancestral souls, is necessary.
Bentians believe that all living people have a juus which is what I have here glossed as
“soul” (animals, and occasionally plants,  are also said to have a juus, although Bentians115
are not very clear or articulate about this; inanimate things, on the other hand, do not have
a juus and are not seen as sentient, even though some objects, e.g. old ceramic jars, are
sometimes associated with spirits).  The juus is, under normal conditions, lodged116
somewhere in the body. However, it may leave the body during illness as a result of being
intentionally stolen by spirits (or mistaken by them for one of their game animals) or, as
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hypothesized in Ma Mar's case, as a reaction to fright or shock. The juus is also believed
to temporarily leave the body during dreams, which are said to represent its nightly
wanderings. 
Bentians have no clear conception of what the juus looks like. Like its Wana
equivalent (Atkinson 1989:108), it may be said to stand in a metaphoric relationship to
its owner, yet it stands also in a metonymic relation to him as a potentially detachable
part of his body. Even though it represents him, it is usually not, in contrast to the Wana
or the Iban (see Sather 2001:51-58), regarded as a small replica of him (even though the
use of the soul house, entered by the soul at the conclusion of the buntang, could seem
to indicate the contrary). As among other Southeast Asians (e.g. see Errington 1989:53;
Forth 1992; Rousseau 1998:110), the belian summons the juus by an articulation
resembling the sound that locals make to summon their chickens. The belian frequently
also pretends to grasp the juus, holding an invisible object between his thumb and
forefinger, and sometimes, at the conclusion of the soul search, a small, round object is
provided to represent it. After catching it, before returning it to the patient's body through
an entrance on the top of the head (kerepuru, located slightly to the back of the fontanel),
the belian usually puts the juus for temporary storage in a small tin — today most often
a plastic tiger balm jar, formerly a brass betel container — which is filled with “soul oil”
(olau juus), coconut oil containing eight carefully selected grains of rice (eight being an
auspicious number, and rice symbolizing, among other things, humanity).
The juus is what we might term the life-force of people. When people die their juus
also ceases to exist and, conversely, if the juus would permanently leave the body, death
would result. Non-permanent or partial soul loss, on the other hand, is associated with
illness (roten). More precisely, illness is said to be the result of — or described as a state
of — either soul weakness or (temporary) soul loss. Illnesses do, of course, have
additional attributes, for instance, the various bodily symptoms associated with them. In
belians' chants, the illness is commonly described as a pole (ori), and it may also be
conceived of as sharp or pointed objects capable of entering the body. Becoming ill does
in fact imply an intrusion into the body of something foreign to it, as indicated by the
standard curing practice of nyelolo, whereby the belian uses a banana leaf whisk
(serumet) to wipe the body clean of illness. 
Whatever other attributes that illnesses have, however, the dominant imagery in
which they, as well as various other afflictions, are conceptualized by Bentians is that of
soul loss, or alternatively soul weakness, particularly in rituals. Holding a curing or
buntang ritual therefore amounts to a translation and deduction of some particular
problem or (as the case frequently may be) problems into that imagery. As an indication
of the pervasiveness of the imagery of souls, soul weakness (lome juus) is often seen as
a cause of — or at least a precondition of — soul loss. A weak soul (which is more
characteristic of children as opposed to adults, women as opposed to men, ordinary
      I do not, it may be noted, go quite as far as Lévi-Strauss here. I do not claim that the juus is an117
“empty signifier,” a “symbol in its pure state,” “itself devoid of meaning and thus susceptible of
receiving any meaning at all,” as he claimed the quite similar Polynesian concepts of hau and mana
are (Lévi-Strauss 1987b:55,63-64). Even though I recognize that the conditions of the juus may
signify moral states, etc. —  just as hau may serve to designate “profit” among the Maori (Sahlins
1972:160-61) —  I do not deny the existence of indigenous notions of a more thing-like, less abstract
signified (i.e. a “soul”). However, the concept is, to an important extent, used to describe certain
moral, psychological and social states of persons, just as naiyu, a Bentian word designating a
particular category of spirits, is used to describe “potency,” or a potent quality of certain things or
persons (and some Bentian “spirit familiars” do not seem to refer to any concrete spirit beings at all
but rather to qualities that it is desirable for the belian to have). Keesing (1984) has argued that
scholarly understandings of mana in Oceanic languages as representing “an invisible spiritual substance
or medium” are generally mistaken and at odds with indigenous usage in which the word and its
cognates usually represent a stative verb, or, in those cases when it represents a noun , “an abstract
verbal noun denoting the state or quality of mana-ness” (1984:138). However, he notes that, in some
places, mana also became used as a substantive and a “metaphysics of mana” developed. Interestingly,
he argues that the verbal and abstract usages of the term were historically anterior even in these cases,
and that “the substantive” notion developed only under particular circumstances, more precisely in
connection with the emergence of political hierarchy and a class of theologians (1984:152). The same
preconditions may, it seems to me, have been instrumental also in southern Borneo in the development
of a more elaborate and rationalized cosmology among the Ngaju as compared to the other Barito group
Dayaks.
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people as opposed to the belians and the manti) is more prone to capture by spirits or loss
through fright than a strong one. For this reason, people with weak souls should avoid
certain experiences which people with stronger souls can endure better (e.g. watching
people or animals die, wandering in the forest where spirits are abundant, contacting
powerful spirits). However, soul weakness is not an inherent quality but rather the result
of certain experiences. Soul hardness (tokeng juus) can be achieved by gradual exposure
to those conditions which are dangerous for the soul, or by ritual procedures involving
the use of iron or by receiving ritual payment, or such extra-ritual means as secluded
meditation (betapa). 
Nevertheless, having a strong soul is clearly advantageous and it entails having
authority as well. Soul strength is commensurate with having authority. Someone
believed to have a weak soul would not command much respect or be listened to in
important matters. People who command respect, on the other hand, are said to have
strong souls. Thus the condition of one's soul clearly reflects more than health. In fact,
it may indicate social standing, psychological integrity and moral dignity, too. The
discourse on juus among the Bentian is therefore very much a discourse on subjectivity
— and sociality. Losing soul is not only about losing some unreal and intangible body
aspect, but also a metaphorically charged event communicating something about the
person affected, and about his or her social relationships.117
The dead, in contrast to the living, do not have a juus. However, dying does not mean
that one ceases to exist altogether. On the contrary, death means that a head soul
(kelelungan), associated with the deceased's skull, and a body soul (liau), associated with
the deceased's bones, come into being (Weinstock [1987:79-80], describes this process
      Contrasting Weinstock's thesis, there are some indications that the juus becomes the kelelungan118
while the liau is the replacement of something else, more precisely, some ill-defined “bodily vital
principle.” These indications include the facts that the kelelungan, unlike the liau, may be addressed
as juus kelelungan, that the juus is returned to the body through the head, and that it is the head or
skull which is said to become the kelelungan, while the body or bones are said to become the liau.
      Peter Metcalf (1982), following Hertz 1969[1907], postulates a metaphoric relationship119
between the condition of the soul and the condition of the body. When the body decomposes, the soul
is miserable and malevolent, but when this process finally ends and the bones are dry the soul is
freed, may enter the land of the dead, and becomes a beneficent spirit. (He also notes that among the
Berawan and the Ngaju, and perhaps more generally, spirits of the upperworld represent or originate
as such beneficent ancestral spirits, a statement which holds true for a limited number of Bentian
upperworld spirits as well.) The Bentian material — which is particularly interesting because of the
twin existence of an earthly, coarse and basically malevolent ancestral spirit, and a heavenly, refined
and predominantly (although not exclusively) good one —  does not fit this neat scheme very well
even though it displays a basic resemblance to it. As among the Berawan, newly dead ancestors tend
to be malevolent whereas long dead ones tend to be beneficent (and often deified). However, the state
of the body is not directly instrumental with respect to the malevolency or goodness/pureness of
Bentian ancestors which is determined much more (although far from guaranteed) by the arrangement
of the obligatory secondary mortuary ritual (which may occur long before actual decomposition of
the body, and which does only rarely involve exhumation) or other acts by the living demonstrating
respect for the ancestors. Furthermore, the liau remain basically coarse and malevolent with the
passing of time while the kelelungan may only occasionally turn malevolent.
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as the bifurcation of the juus into liau and kelelungan).  Liau and kelelungan should118
properly reside in their respective abodes on Mount Lumut (a mountain in the
mythologically important upper Teweh area a few days walk from the Bentian area) and
Tenangkai (a location in the heavens) although they may sometimes linger around the
graveyard or their former homes, particularly if a secondary mortuary ritual (gombok) has
not yet been held for them. In the secondary mortuary ritual, or gombok, the death ritual
shamans (warah) escort both the deceased’s liau and kelelungan, assisted by the liau and
kelelungan of the deceased’s previously dead relatives, to their proper afterworldly
abodes. However, even after the gombok has been held, liau and kelelungan may
sometimes visit their living relatives in order to ask for food or other services, and then,
so as to express their desires and have their demands met, abduct their relatives' juus.
Both liau and kelelungan have this malevolent aspect, even though kelelungan is referred
to as good or clean in distinction to liau, for the principal reason that kelelungan, unlike
liau, can become a protecting spirit.  This occurs in instances when and if (only a119
selected few undergo this procedure) the skull of the deceased, during an especially
elaborate mortuary ritual (gombok mpe selimat) involving exhumation of the bones, is
“brought into the house” to be stored by the longan as an “ancestor skull” (utek tuha
longan, lit. “elder's skull of the longan”).
In contrast to the juus whose physical appearance to Bentians is obscure, liau and
kelelungan are described as resembling people. They are said to live in their abodes on
Mount Lumut and Tenangkai much like ordinary, living people, inhabiting villages and
houses whose this worldly representations are the sarcophagi (temla, keriring) erected for
182
them on gomboks, and rearing the same animals which were sacrificed in their honor
during these rituals (water buffaloes, pigs, chickens). Like spirits, however, whom they
resemble in many aspects, they are regarded as gaib (invisible, mystical). This means that
one cannot really be sure what they look like and, perhaps more significantly, where they
are at any given moment, or what they are up to. Like spirits, they should be treated a
little as if continually present; care has to be taken so that they receive respect and do not
get hurt. A principal reason for soul capture by ancestral or other spirits is, in fact,
misbehavior on the part of the person attacked.
Even if one has done nothing wrong, however, ancestral spirits may still want to
capture one's soul, simply, as Bentians say, “because they long for company.” As among
other Dayaks practicing secondary burial, jealousy over the fact that their relatives remain
alive while they are dead makes the recently dead dangerous (cf. Metcalf 1982:103-104).
In Ma Mar's case, the death of his wife Nen Pare at a young age provided a special reason
for him to expect envy from the dead, particularly as the “heat” (layeng) felt by him
following her death had persisted after the arrangement of the secondary mortuary ritual
for her, and he had now become ill in connection with moving in with Nen Pore.
However, it was not only Nen Pare who was addressed in the capacity of having captured
Ma Mar's soul at “his” buntang, his and her other relatives were also simultanously
mentioned (although significantly, Nen Pare was mentioned first). According to the
leading belian, Ma Putup, the names of these dead relatives were suggested to him by
different members of Kakah Unsir's family. There may have been particular reasons why
some of them were included (e.g. the inclusion of Ma Mar's first late wife Nen Mar was
probably motivated by similar motives that motivated the inclusion of Nen Pare), but
rather than specific motives providing the reason for the inclusion of each of them, some
were probably picked primarily in order to represent an appropriate sampling of the liau
as a totality (which are always visited on buntangs in the search for souls, regardless of
whatever additional reasons buntangs are held).  
Searching for Souls from the Liau
In order to illustrate my discussion about soul loss and soul retrieval, I shall present a
belian's chant from Ma Mar's buntang. This chant was given on the evening of the ritual's
fourth day by its leading belian, Ma Putup and it describes his attempt to retrieve Ma
Mar's soul from the liau (the “body soul of the dead”). A more or less identical chant,
with the same structure and identical wording, but inapplicable because of the different
addressee, formed part of Ma Putup's previously conducted attempt at returning souls
from the kelelungan (the “head  soul of the dead”) while the chants which he produced
when he tried to retrieve souls from various non-ancestral spirits on the two following
      Interestingly, belians may actually conduct the attempt at soul retrieval from the liau a little120
closer to Mount Lumut (in a dark forest grove called Kerenem) in case a water buffalo is sacrificed
(i.e. not, as on Ma Mar's buntang, only pigs and chickens). The logic here is that a greater sacrifice
reduces the danger associated with the liau (which is essentially the danger of death).
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evenings were also basically similar. Hence, the chant gives a fairly good general picture
of the chants used by belians to retrieve souls from spirits.
Because it describes, in poetic form, what is believed to take place invisibly (or rather,
what is desired to take place), the chant, like others of its kind, quite neatly delineates the
procedure whereby souls are retrieved from spirits. Although wordings always vary with
the officiating belian (and may even vary with the same belian on different occasions),
the structure of this procedure is fairly invariant, consisting basically of three phases
which are readily separable in the text presented here. Bentians refer to these phases as
“paying respect” (besemah), “purchasing the soul” (sentous), and “searching for the soul”
(berejuus). The last stage includes “snatching the soul” (nakep juus) which is sometimes
talked about as if it were a phase of its own. In a way, even though these phases are
always carried out in the mentioned sequence and appear to work according to a
cumulative logic, with the previous stage enabling the next, they are really only loosely
connected (why would it otherwise be necessary to search for the soul after one had
already bought it?), and each stage is best seen as an alternative strategy employed to
achieve the goal at hand. “Paying respect,” which basically comes down to a
demonstrably submissive presentation of offerings, and “purchasing the soul” correspond
to principal forms of interaction (tribute and trade) which the Bentian have had with
outsiders, and are for that reason seen as appropriate procedures with which to approach
spirits as well. 
Before the belians can carry out this three-fold soul retrieval attempt, however, they
first have to establish contact with the spirits, and in order to do so they, or their juus (or
sometimes, only their spirit familiars) have to travel (invisibly) to the places where the
spirits reside. In the case of the particular soul search recounted here, the place visited
was Pengular, a location by the Mea river beneath Mount Lumut where liau stops to rest
and chew betel while on its guided journey to the mountain at the conclusion of the
secondary mortuary ritual (hence the reference in the chant to “the stone stained with
betel,” a stone at Pengular on which liau is believed to sit while resting). Since it is only
the warah (death shamans) who may ascend Mount Lumut, because of the danger
involved in such close association with death, the belians' attempt at soul retrieval from
the liau has to take place at Pengular.120
The chant begins by invoking the liau (lines 2-4), referring to their characteristics of
showing themselves in dreams or daydreams (lines 1-2) or by mediation of certain birds
(lines 3-4). It then raises the question (lines 5-14) of why the patient suffers from his
affliction, and describes his condition in conventionalized, metaphorical terms (e.g. “as
      That hunger represents the unspecified reason why the liau would want to capture the soul is121
yet another expression of the importance of food as a social mediator among the Bentian. It can also
be seen to indicate the importance of the omission to fulfill one's ritual obligations (which very much
come down to giving food) as a motive for soul theft by spirits.
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if marked by soot, as if rearing a dying chicken”). Lines 15-26 continue by suggesting an
explanation to the previous question: the liau are hungry — hunger here metonymically
stands for any (unspecified) want that they might have — and express this by making the
patient ill.  Lines 27-30 then explain that this is the reason that food (and drink) is121
offered to the liau while lines 31-33 indicate the sincere and complete manner in which
the offerings are delivered (“the whole person, the entire body is holding out wine,
presenting beverages...”). Lines 34-36 in their turn describe, perhaps somewhat
confusingly, the location where the offerings are to be received as being Mount Lumut,
even though the belians' invisible aspect travels only as far as Pengular (and their visible
aspect conducts the ritual in Kakah Unsir's house in Temiang), while lines 39-41 entreat
the liau, here likened to hungry fish and crabs, to receive them. Describing the liau in this
imagery has the effect of concretely evoking the reception of the offerings and suggesting
the desired manner (quick, resolute) of this reception. The same is true regarding the
abbreviated count to ten in line 37 (“one-two-three-four-nine-ten”) which belians told me
represents or hastens the process whereby the offerings reach their recipients. The
semantically meaningless exclamation “o-lo-lo-loo” in line 38 signals the end of phase
one, “paying respect,” and the start of phase two, “purchasing the soul,” as does the same
sound with respect to transitions between other phases later. 
Lines 42-84 describe the so-called purchase of the soul and particularly the
presentation, in a spirit house specifically made for the liau (Bentians make special spirit
houses, usually about the size of a shoe box, for most kinds of spirits), of two named
bamboo figurines (one male, one female), given in exchange for Ma Mar's soul and those
of his relatives. The lines also suggest various work tasks which these figurines,
according to gender, can perform for the benefit of the liau at their abode. Along with
these named figurines, the liau also receive a few rice paste figurines (another kind of
exchange object representing the patient and his relatives: line 49) as well as a live chick
representing a human slave to be sacrificed by the liau at their buntangs (line 50;
resembling the living, the liau supposedly hold buntangs of their own in their realm).
Lines 79-80 describe the patient and his relatives in botanical metaphors as trees.
Lines 85-97 describe some of the belian's spirit familiars and the process whereby
they search for souls. Rather than concrete, particular spirit familiars, the spirit familiars
named here represent properties which the spirit familiars should have (e.g. nimbleness,
good sight) in order to discover or snatch souls (why it is appropriate that one of them is
blind could not be elucidated by Ma Putup, who helped me with the transcription and
interpretation of the chant). In accordance with the same logic, “the dead belians” (most
      In curing rituals and buntangs, the belians have female ritual assistants (penyempatung) who122
help them prepare and physically move around offerings while the ritual is in progress. In some
chants they also sing along with the belian and at certain points they recite news to the spirits (see
Table 1). Apart from the penyempatung, certain persons, typically males, are assigned to serve as
pengeruye, collectors and constructors of the ritual paraphernalia (ruye) which is made anew (from
forest materials) for every ritual.
      This line, like the two previous ones, metaphorically describes the condition of being ill.123
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spirit familiars belong in this category) are here likened to birds. Lines 98-100 refer to
Pengular, mentioning, in addition to the stone stained with betel, other characteristics of
the place such as pebbles in the water and wild rambutans, siwo, which grow on the
banks. Lines 105-108 describe the spirit familiars in zoological terms, as macaques and
hawks this time, and their efforts to catch the souls as involving fighting, which
macaques and hawks eagerly do/have special capacities for. Lines 110-115 describe what
the spirit familiars should look for, that is, the souls, here likened to pearls and other
small round objects, while the count in line 116 prefigures how they snatch them. 
Lines 118-171 continue the description of the snatching of souls, including, as said,
those of Ma Mar's relatives (mentioned by name) and those of the belians and their ritual
assistants  (who because of their effort to catch the souls are themselves subjected to122
danger), as well as those of other villagers, and even those of “us people inhabiting the
earth.” Lines 138-39 refer to the previously mentioned “soul tin” in which the returned
souls are temporarily stored. Lines 144-50 identify by name the particular liau from
whom the soul is snatched. Lines 153-56 liken the souls to fruits and plants (which
should not be allowed to become dispersed or omitted when collected), while lines 170-
71, finally, liken them to wild boar and deer, which should follow the tracks of their likes,
that is, return home.
Berejuus la Liau be Pengular (Retrieving Souls from the Liau at Pengular)
1   liau who may be seen in dreams at night
2   liau who can be glimpsed at noon
3   you liau of the tatit bird wailing 
4   you liau of the juru bird burring
5   how does it come?
6   that the person of Ma Mar
7   is having dreams at night
8   is seeing things in the day
9   as if marked with soot
10  as if bound up by rattan
11  that he's rearing a dying chicken123
      This doubly metaphorical line again refers to the patient's condition of being ill as well as to the124
dying chicken in the previous line.
      Resembling living people, the liau are believed to have protecting spirits who are here125
addressed instead of the liau directly, on whose behalf they are assumed to act.
      This expression (“first and foremost”) might seem somewhat inappropriate here. It is clearly126
understandable, though: Ma Putup addresses the liau first and foremost in contrast to their protecting
spirits addressed in the previous couple of lines. As a translation of the original expression (tempue
punsu ure), the phrase “first and foremost” is, we may note, very poor. It entirely misses the local and
metaphorical character of the original which consists of a word pair of which tempue, “boat's front,”
forms the first part, and punsu ure, “young termite nest,” the second.
      Mount Lumut and Peyuyan are twin peaks seen as one mountain at a distance. The primary127
purpose of line 36 is to create an expression parallel to the previous line.
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12  a tame pigeon with slack wings124
13  thrust by the pole of sickness
14  stung by piercing maladies
15  we're afraid you evil spirits protecting liau  125
16  you satans watching over them
17  are notifying us of empty stomachs
18  are complaining over tired sinews
19  we're afraid you evil spirits protecting liau
20  you satans watching over them
21  [but] first and foremost  126
22  you liau of the dead
23  you who can be seen in dreams
24  you who can be glimpsed at noon
25  we're afraid that you're asking for food
26  afraid that you're asking for edibles
27  that is the reason
28  we're bringing you 
29  offerings this evening
30  for you to receive
31  the whole person, the entire body
32  is holding out wine, presenting beverages
33  handing over drinks, offering food
34  even though this presentation is enacted here
35  it takes place on the top of Mount Lumut
36  in the village of Mount Peyuyan  127
37  one-two-three-four-nine-ten-receive!
38  o-lo-lo-loo
39  receive offerings
40  clench hungry crabs
41  bite fish of deep forests
42  you liau of the dead
43  there is one thing more
44  we're offering you a house of kelewono wood
      “Tewok” is another name for kelewono, the tree that provides the material for the spirit house128
constructed for the liau.
      Rinsum and Runsom are the bamboo figurines given in exchange.129
      The chick/slave.130
      E.g. the beautiful noblewoman Rinsum.131
      Leaves used as wrapping for rice portions.132
      A standard epithet for the liau.133
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45  a repository of the tewok tree  128
46  containing the beautiful noblewoman Rinsum
47  and mister Lalung Runsom129
48  containing food offerings
49  as well as rice paste figurines
50  here is a servant for a festive ritual   130
51  first among our precious gifts
52  foremost among the offerings given in exchange
53  there is a substitute for the women131
54  exchanged for the maidens
55  she will pound white rice
56  go and get boloi leaves132
57  scoop the large river prawns
58  screen wayuk and walur fish
59  work on the wide ricefields
60  enter the tall swidden houses
61  among you liau of the dead
62  that effigy over there 
63  that's a substitute for the men
64  above all for Ma Mar
65  it is mister Lalung Runsom
66  just for you jawa liau133
67  to make wide ricefields
68  raise tall swidden houses
69  chop dry logs
70  split firewood
71  hunt with spears and many dogs
72  blowpipe-hunt in desolate forest
73  net fish in the deep pools
74  trap wild boar for you
75  on the top of Mount Lumut
76  in the village of Mount Peyuyan
77  there you have the beautiful noblewoman Rimpu
78  and mister Lalung Runsom
79  to substitute for the pimping plants alive
       An epithet for Pengular.134
      Ma Putup here, in a somewhat humorous tone, refers to his spirit familiars as grandchildren,135
thereby speaking as from a position of a superordinate to subordinate, indicating that their role in the
ritual is to serve him.
      To be precise, the fruits, i.e. wild mangos, referred to here are not unripe but fruits whose136
growth has ceased altogether at about thumbnail size.
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80  in exchange for the siwo trees still strong
81  to substitute for the children and the old
82  in exchange for the women and the men
83  one-two-three-four-nine-ten-receive!
84  o-lo-lo-loo
85  stand up Dusun with the nimble hands
86  Buno the observer, Entau the discerner
87  Keling with two heads, Rewaja with two bodies
88  the blind noblewoman Ape
89  search, look in all directions
90  search, look up and down
91  together with you, the order of dead belians
92  even if the bodies are dead
93  the spirit familiars are still alive
94  swarms of myna birds fluttering around
95  flocks of crows soaring all over
96  going upstream, going downstream
97  ascending the mountains, descending to the rivers
98  go as far as the pebbles at Pengular 
99  head toward the stone stained with betel
100 go all the way to Siwo plain134
101 get the precious souls of the living plants alive
102 the life forces of the siwo trees still strong
103 above all those of Ma Mar
104 one-two-three-four
105 what is it, grandchildren?135
106 fight you macaques, fight
107 as long as your bellies do not burst
108 kick you hawks, kick
109 as long as your claws do not break off
110 don't go for clods of earth
111 don't collect the black of wood
112 be sure to look for beads
113 be sure to pick up pearls
114 like the knotholes in wild sugarcane
115 like undeveloped golden asam fruits  136
116 one-two-three-four-nine-ten-grasp!
117 o-lo-lo-loo
118 calling out for the precious souls
      The meaning of the concept of ruo, which I have here alternately translated as “spirit essence”137
or “life force,” appears to be very vague and should perhaps best be understood as a synonym of juus.
No one that I talked to was in fact able to describe a referent distinct from the soul. Most commonly
the concept is used in belian chants in connection with soul searches in the expression juus jatus, ruo
walo (“a hundred souls, eight spirit essences”). In this expression, I was told, ruo merely serves to
replicate juus in order to enable a so-called parallelistic construction. In addition, I was also told,
there do not literally exist eight ruo any more than there are a hundred juus; these numbers are chosen
solely because they rhyme with ruo and juus, respectively (and perhaps also because the numbers
eight and one hundred represent completeness). An understanding of ruo as “spirit essence” and as
closely synonymous with juus is further substantiated by the fact that the only context in which I
encountered ruo on its own (without juus) was as a designation for what I understood to be the
“spiritual essence” of primary forest groves.
      The line refers to the soul tin. It is nicknamed the “Javanese receptacle” because it is of non-138
local manufacture (everything foreign may be referred to as Javanese for short) but also so as to make
it attractive in the eyes of the souls which are beckoned to enter it.
      Another epithet for the liau.139
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119 reaching out for the eight life forces 
120 the precious souls of Ma Mar [the patient]
121 the spirit essences of Rihei  [Nen Pore, his new partner]137
122 Kakah Unsir, Itak Unsir [her parents]
123 the precious souls of Ma Unsir [her older brother]
124 the spirit essences of Kadir, Tiar [her daughter and son-in-law]
125 the precious souls of Ma Kerudot [her younger brother]
126 Nen Biru, the child Niko, the child Jeria [his wife, child, and Unsir’s wife]
127 bamboo shoots, three to four pieces [unspecified child participants]
128 finish calling, stop catching, all are collected
129 the precious souls of Ma Lombang, Ma Bari, Ma Kelamo [see Fig. 1]
130 Nen Leget, the child Ena
131 the spirit essences of Ma Geli [Nen Leget’s sister from Datai Munte]
132 Nen Tekalis, Nen Adir [Nen Bujok]
133 don't leave behind a single torung palm
134 a kajang palm in lonely, dark-earth forest
135 the whole family of Temiang village
136 the souls of the children as well as the old
137 the spirits of the women and the men
138 gather in the bowl of the tin
139 in the cavity of the Javanese receptacle138
140 from the top of Mount Lumut
141 from the village of Mount Peyuyan
142 from the jawa liau
143 from the minsu maliu139
144 from Nen Pare [Ma Mar's second late wife]
145 from Nen Mar [Ma Mar's first late wife]
146 from Ma Kale, Nen Kale, [Ma Mar's father's brother with wife]
147 Ma Keris, Nen Keris [Ma Mar's father and mother]
      The envoys are the belians.140
      The belian 's bear tooth whistle, which he uses to summon spirits and souls.141
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148 from Kakah Pulang, Itak Pulang [grandparents of Ma Mar's second late wife]
149 from Ma Resa, Nen Resa [parents of Ma Mar's second late wife]
150 from Ma Delidi [Ma Mar's present partner Nen Pore's dead brother]
151 finish calling and reaching out for
152 the precious souls, the spirit essences
153 don't leave behind a single torung palm
154 a kajang palm in lonely, dark-earth forest
155 don't let the keramu fruit disperse when collected
156 the temeyano fruit become scattered around
157 collect the souls of us envoys140
158 the spirits of the ritual assistants
159 the souls of the cherished children
160 the souls of the beloved wives
161 the many souls of us humankind
162 the numerous people inhabiting the earth
163 gather at the hole at the top of the head
164 tinkle the instrument of the precious soul141
167 the whistle calling spirit essences
168 so that it summons over the high mountains
169 calls out over the extensive valleys
170 so that the wild boars follow their routes
171 the deer gather in their tracks
Reciprocity and Respect as Authoritative Values
The chant illustrates several aspects of religious authority and how ritualization works
authoritatively. One of the most prominent aspects of the chant is the elaborate
description of the work tasks to be performed by the gendered bamboo figurines given
to the liau in exchange for Ma Mar's and the other participants’ souls (e.g. “pound white
rice,” “net-fish in the deep pools”). One may sense here a general moral conveyed by the
chant, an affirmation of work as a valued activity. It is no coincidence that work (awing)
and food (okan) are the two principal forms of prestations offered to the liau in the soul
retrieval attempt: they are principal categories designating prestations in everyday social
interaction as well. Food and work (including, not the least significantly, ritual work) are
what kin should share. Poetic elaborations aside, the principal issue at stake in offering
work prestations to the liau relates to the fact that one owes them something. The persons
explicitly mentioned as representatives of the liau on these occasions are mainly, as in
this case, persons with whom the patient or sponsors were close or at least personally
      In this context it may be significant to note that the buntang in its basic outline parallels the142
balian balaku untung ritual of the Ngaju which is an integrated part of their secondary mortuary ritual
(the tiwah). Rather than the opposite, however, the buntang 's dissociation with the gombok may, I
suggest, be taken as an indication of a more continuing concern with the dead among the Bentian as
compared with the Ngaju, typified also by the practice of keeping ancestor skulls, which was
interpreted by Mallinckrodt (1974[1925]) as an expression of the greater ancestral orientation (and
primitiveness) of the Luangan as compared with the Ma'anyan and the Ngaju.
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acquainted, and typically people on generational levels above oneself, who before dying
did more for oneself than one had time to do for them. As elders, they are additionally
regarded as one's “trunk” or “foundation” (puun), which means that one is indebted to
them in a most fundamental way by, in a sense, owing one's life to them. Offering work
prestations to the liau (or the kelelungan) thus signals the elementary obligation of paying
back (males) one's ancestors, in terms with which the latter are familiar (e.g. swidden
cultivation), and which index their human condition. Moreover, in so far as it is company
that the dead want, “substitutes for the self” (which is the literal meaning of the generic
terms gantin unuk or ganti diri used by Bentians for figurines such as the ones used here)
is the best thing one can give, next to oneself. 
In addition to envy and longing, a motive no less important for ancestral spirits to
“ask for food” by capturing their descendants’ souls is to communicate the latter's
omission to reciprocate or respect them. The principal course of action whereby one can
repay or honor the ancestors (and other spirits) is ritual. Holding a secondary mortuary
ritual is essential in this regard: as much as it is performed in order to guide the liau and
kelelungan to the afterworld, the gombok represents a gesture of gratitude and veneration
toward the dead by their loved ones. But buntangs also, albeit perhaps less obviously,
serve the same purpose. Whatever the specific motives for their arrangement, they are,
I was told, about “paying back the debt to the ancestors” (bales utang dayang kepanei).142
To hold a buntang is also to honor the ancestors, their ways and heritage (of which the
buntang itself forms an important part), and the ancestral objects (pusaka) associated
with them (which are anointed with blood during the ritual). In addition, holding a
buntang is also about rewarding the ancestors more concretely in their capacity as
protecting spirits (pengiring), and in this respect the animal sacrifices constitute payment
explicitly dedicated to them (and the other pengiring).
In the case of Ma Mar's buntang, repaying the liau and kelelungan was particularly
motivated because the gombok held for Nen Pare shortly after her death was very brief,
lasting only three days and not involving a water buffalo sacrifice, an additional reason
to expect discontent from her and her dead relatives. Wavering plans existed to remedy
this condition by holding a new and larger gombok for her (and some other people) after
the harvest the next year, and the buntang may in this respect have formed something of
a compensatory measure, or at least an act of appeasement aimed at amelioration of her
sentiments for the time being.
      Pali could be loosely translated as “taboo” or “restriction.” The term is used for an extensive143
number of permanent or temporary, individual or collective, restrictions (e.g. on eating certain foods,
entering people's houses or swiddens on particular occasions, etc.) the breach of which may result in
soul loss (or other afflictions) caused by the heavenly pali spirits (or sometimes other spirits). As part
of the program of the buntang, the pali of the participants, meaning both their committed wrongs and
the spirits so designated (who are said to “descend” upon breach of pali restrictions) are “ascended”
to the accompaniment of the belians cracking heated bamboo canes (semotu).
      Bunsung designates spirit-induced misfortune provoked by lack of respect for elders or people144
on higher generational levels.
      Sumbang designates illicit sexual or marital relations (e.g. incest, too close marriages,145
intergenerational marriages) liable to be punished by misfortune ultimately generated by the seniang.
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Reciprocity and respect were identified as the principal values on which kinship as a
moral code is centered. These principles figure prominently also in interaction with
spirits, ancestral and other. Apart from making people keep rituals to honor or feed the
spirits as well as obviously being what “paying respect” and “purchasing the soul” as
substrategies of the soul retrieval attempt are about, concerns pertaining to these
principles are also what is believed to induce the spirits to capture souls in the first place.
I am not only referring to the fact that ancestral and other spirits alike are said to ask for
food and thus, in effect, request rituals. Asked why spirits would want to steal the soul,
Bentians most typically claim that it is because the person affected has succumbed to
tapen, “failure to involve in social exchange.” In the previous chapter, Udin's failure to
share the meat which he publicly consumed was an example of an alleged instance of
tapen. Besides failure to share or partake of food, failure to contribute work or participate
in rituals are other common instances of tapen. 
Tapen essentially seems to concern the transgression of elementary social norms, and
more precisely, the breach of the injunction on reciprocity understood here broadly as
encompassing all three of the components defined by Mauss (i.e. giving, receiving and
reciprocating) (Mauss 1990:39-41). This fact receives a more general significance if we
consider that the Bentian also recognize a range of other named types of transgressions
(e.g. pali,  bunsung,  sumbang ), which like tapen a) may cause soul theft or other143 144 145
forms of misfortune induced by spirits and b) are essentially “social,” that is, sanction
interpersonal respect or reciprocity. Spirit attack is thus frequently a question of a moral#
order — indeed I was often told that without transgression, one's soul will not be stolen.
If we would ask what it is that spirit authority among the Bentian does, that is, what its
existence entails, an important answer would be — besides making people arrange rituals
— that it imposes reciprocity and respect as social values.
Talking with Bentians, however, it was revealed that most spirits do not actually steal
souls in order to punish, particularly not those referred to as blis, “malevolent spirits,”
      The designation blis (which is derived from the Malay and originally Arabic word iblis) is146
mainly applied to various forest and “downriver” (sawa) spirits, especially in their capacity of
stealing souls. Other spirits (e.g. the spirits of the dead and some protecting spirits) may also steal
souls, but they would not normally be included in this category.
      The God-like and heavenly seniang, who are guardians over the fundamental conditions of147
nature and society (including, essentially, incest) are regarded almost as incarnations of morality.
Actually they do not, in opposition to other spirits, capture souls, but instead inflict misfortune
directly, so to speak, and for a purpose. The likewise heavenly pali spirits who “descend” (dolui)
whenever someone has breached any of the pali taboos, capture souls but apparently also act out of
moral concern when they do so. Ancestors generally, and the kelelungan in particular, are generally
regarded as concerned about their descendants’ morality, although when the latter or the liau capture
souls, they seem to do so in order to ask for services rather than because of their moral concern.  
       The fact that the soul's condition may be affected by socially improper or commendable action148
should not be taken to mean that it indicates its “owners” moral stature in any straightforward way,
any more than experienced misfortune or success do. Tapen may, as we should note, punish all
people involved, not just the offender (as in a case when someone fails to accept food, which
endangers not only the receiver who fails to accept the food, but also the person offering it, and vice
versa). Ideas regarding supernatural sanctions of social norms do not systematically add up to a
system of individual reward and retribution. What is of primary concern is the demonstration of
proper reciprocal relations rather than the accomplishment of individual justice; the outlook is socio-
centric and performative rather than ego-centric and instrumental. The message is transmoral: social
exchange is good for all whereas its lack is detrimental for all. For some other examples, we may
note that the distribution of plates as rewards to the belians and other participants after a ritual is
extended to those who themselves present the plates (e.g. the sponsors), and that people in these
contexts sometimes receive payment which is immediately returned afterwards.
      Here it is interesting to note that the word sumange in Nias (a cognate of the Malay word149
semangat which is usually translated as “soul”) simply means “tribute” or “token of respect,” indeed, is
“a material payment devoid of inherent spiritual quality” (see Beatty 1992:250).
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who are the ones most frequently suspected of soul theft.  In fact, spirits are generally146
not considered particularly virtuous or concerned about people's morality (although there
are some exceptions).  It is rather that succumbing to immoral action through the above-147
mentioned transgressions has the effect of weakening one's soul, and that the weakened
soul makes one susceptible to soul loss by the agency of spirits.  In correspondence with148
this line of reasoning, it is said that spirits do not need any particular reason to steal souls;
they simply have a desire to do so and will do so upon opportunity, that is, if they
encounter weak souls (strong souls, by implication, can resist or discourage such attempts
— at least somewhat more successfully).
Social interaction and the soul's condition are intimately connected as is evidenced
by the fact that the soul can be strengthened by receiving payment or gifts (of money,
cloth bundles, plates) in ritual.  It is almost as if involvement in social exchange has the149
capacity of strengthening the soul on its own accord. The plentiful participation and
social concentration sought by rituals are regarded to contribute to the well-being of the
patients cured. By analogy, valuables received through trade and or connecting the owner
to ancestors or powerful outsiders are often endowed with the capacity to enhance the
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strength of the owner’s soul (which is one reason why wealthy persons tend to have
stronger souls). It is no coincidence that Mauss' most famous work (1990[1923-24])
begins with references to the Maorian hau and the Samoan mana as spiritual forces
attached to the gift. Social exchange cannot be considered apart from the “spiritual”
dimension and vice versa.
Mauss's statement regarding the Maori, that “the bond of law ... is a bond of souls”
is thus highly pertinent to the Bentian (Mauss 1966:161, quoted in Sahlins 1972:153,
Sahlins’ translation). Religious authority, in the form of spirit authority, reproduces
essential social values, in the best Durkheimian tradition. Conversely, reciprocity is the
essence of religious authority; the demands on people which spirits make are
authoritative because of the validity of reciprocity and related values. Fear of the
consequences, of course, provides a critical incentive for responding to these demands,
but Bentians also respond to them because they consider it right and proper to do so. This
is quite natural in the case of the ancestors, who “came before” and to whom Bentians
say they owe everything (and it is perhaps particularly understandable with regards to
recently deceased relatives, to many of whom one personally owes much). However, the
same applies as if by extension also to other spirits, many of whom originated as
particular ancestors, and all of whom ultimately trace back their origin as children of the
first man and woman (which makes them, as Bentian conceive of it, “the siblings of
man”). Explaining their obligations to spirits, people may refer to the origin myth of
mankind (tempuun senaring), or more particularly, to a passage in it where the one child
(Punen) from whom mankind descends makes a promise to his runaway siblings who
have turned into spirits to provide them with food whenever rituals are held.
Even though it seemed plausible that Ma Mar's listlessness had something to do with
Nen Pare (either in the capacity as liau or kelelungan), a lot of other spirits were also
treated as suspects of having abducted his soul. Some of these spirits were beings who
more or less as a standard measure are addressed in cases of psychic distress: keraatan
and tentuwaja, two categories of forest spirits who are said to cause bad dreams and
“madness,” respectively. For these and a range of other forest spirits (most of whom were
not particularly associated with any of the “symptoms” that Ma Mar exhibited) a special
“temple” (balei nansang) was prepared outside Kakah Unsir's house, a decorated
platform upon which Ma Putup sat while conducting the soul search to them. During this
soul search, particular attention was paid to spirits associated with localities that Ma Mar
had recently visited or which were generally known as favorite habitations of spirits (e.g.
a small lake hosting a species of large fish said to be owned by spirits). Also outside, at
the ladder of Kakah Unsir's house, other special paraphernalia were constructed, and here
a fair number of earth or underground spirits (Benturan tana, etc.) indicated as suspects
by Ma Mar's recent fall were addressed. Yet other spirits, all of whom received species-
specific spirit houses (containing rice paste figurines given in exchange for Ma Mar's
      These observations contrast to some degree with those of Michael Hopes who describes150
Benuaq and Tunjung curing rituals as if being essentially a quest of identifying the right spirit, about
which he indicates that conclusive evidence may be obtained through symptoms, dreams and
techniques of divination (1997b:42,63-72). No Bentian belians or other Bentians whom I talked with
ever claimed to know with certainty exactly which spirit was involved in particular cases, and despite
indications of the identity of culprits obtained in the ways described by Hopes, several suspects
always remained, and soul retrieval attempts and offerings were invariably addressed to a number of
different spirit categories (often a remarkably large number), which in themselves consisted of many
individual spirits.
      Tambiah (1985a, 1985b) talks about rituals as performative acts in several respects, but most151
basically in the sense of illocutionary acts (cf. 1985a:78-80, 1985b:134-35). As such, rituals do
something “simply by virtue of being enacted (under the appropriate conditions),” in the manner, for
instance, of greetings, or wedding ceremonies (1985b:135). This performative aspect of rituals “is to
be distinguished from their locutionary (referential, information-carrying) and perlocutionary
(consequences for the participants) features” (1985a:79). The validity of rituals as performative acts
is independent from their (locutionary) truth value and their (perlocutionary) effectiveness in a causal
respect. By proposing that Bentian soul retrieval attempts should be regarded as performative, I want
to emphasize what they do (“simply by virtue of being enacted”), and point to the relative importance
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soul), were addressed inside Kakah Unsir's house, including the naiyu and timang
protecting sprits of the house (who were perhaps not yet accustomed to Ma Mar's
presence in the house), the pali spirits charged with sanctioning transgressions of pali
prohibitions, and of course the liau and kelelungan.
Performative Authority
The fact that attempts to retrieve Ma Mar's soul, in accordance with normal procedure,
were made from a great variety of spirits testifies to the general importance among the
Bentian of maintaining good — which is to say reciprocal and respectful — relations
with spirits. The plurality of addressees in the soul retrieval attempt further reflects that
the Bentian, like the Weyewa of Sumba as described by Kuipers, “are usually less
interested in finding a single agent who caused the calamity [or soul loss] than in
exploring the ruptured relationships among the specific actors who participated in the
event” (Kuipers 1990:42, orig. italics). A multitude of spirits are honored, offered
sacrifices, and souls are bought back, and retrieved, from this multitude. This complex
process is not enacted simply because of an uncertainty about which particular spirit has
made the patient ill, or because of the associated belief that there is something in that
particular spirit's possession (i.e. the soul), whose return to the patient would cause, as
if by the laws of mechanics or organic chemistry, health to return to the patient (already
the fact that there is an illness to be removed, in addition to a soul to be returned, makes
the matter more complicated than that).  Rather, the whole enterprise should be150
interpreted as what Tambiah (1985b), following Austin (1962), has called a
“performative” or “illocutionary” act.  What is postulated primarily is not a realistic151
of this aspect of the practice in contrast to the literal statements about reality that it makes (e.g. in
terms of cosmology), and the indirect anticipated effects which it may or may not bring about (cure
illness, affect social relations).
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one-to-one correspondence between enacted ritual action and what is assumed to take
place. Instead, a number of conceivable scenarios are displayed and an ideal order of
relationship with the various imaginable “culprits” restored. As a belian told me, it is
important to retrieve the soul from a variety of “directions” (tuduh) even though one
would “know” who has taken it (which one can never really do); such action is beneficent
in itself by working to maintain good relations with the spirits. Thus I may concur here
with Valeri's (1985:67) view that sacrifices (including the figurines given by Bentians in
exchange for the soul) primarily represent the relationship between the giver and the
receiver.
The chant and other songs in the ritual concerned with the same issue notably makes
no mention of whether or not Ma Mar's and the other participants' souls were returned
from the liau; it merely describes the spirit familiar-assisted attempts to do so. Only Ma
Putup's and his co-belian Ma Kerudot's accompanying performance of first grasping for
something in the air and then putting that something in the soul tin, and finally returning
it to the participants' heads, could be taken to indicate that the operation was successful.
But, as Ma Putup told me, these are things that one cannot be sure of; when and if this
happens one cannot tell. A more or less identical procedure was conducted with respect
to a large number of other spirits (and it had in fact already once been conducted in
ralation to the liau at Saung Pingen, a location slightly downstream from Pengular).
Precisely when, then, during these repeated attempts, Ma Mar's soul was caught — or if
it was caught at all — remained unclear. In fact, there probably existed no real
expectations that it should have been caught at any particular moment (and in this
respect, the situation was undoubtedly even more unclear with regards to the other
participants' souls, which may not even have been lost in the first place). Clearly, the
activity should not be taken too literally. Only Ma Mar's recovery — which as regards his
flu was complete even before the ritual was over, but gradual and indefinite as regards
his listlessness — could have been taken as an indication that his soul had been restored
to his body, should he or anyone else have wanted one. However, he probably did not
reflect much on this (significantly, I did not ask him) as he eventually got better.
Generally, such matters are not of direct or continuing concern for Bentians, but invoked
mainly ex post facto when things go wrong.
What this indicates is that the referential aspect of ritual practices is of secondary
importance. What actually takes place in the invisible world is frequently quite unclear
for Bentians, including belians, and a literal reading of ritual practices is therefore often
unwarranted and besides the point, so to speak (an example here is Ma Putup's claim that
some of the spirit familiars invoked — “Dusun with the nimble hands, Buno the
      Informants often claimed ignorance regarding the qualities of the soul and ancestral souls, as152
they did also with respect to characteristics of spirits. Typically they said that “only the belians
know” (ede belian ye tau) but even the belians were often unknowing. Manifest beliefs, in their turn,
were frequently inconsistent. To give an example, people generally believed that the liau and
kelelungan linger around the deceased's former home or grave until the gombok has been held for
them in order to help them find their way to their afterworldly abodes. At the same time, however,
liau and kelelungan were commonly said to go these places immediately upon death, and at rituals the
warah assisted by their spirit familiars first fetched them from there for the ritual before escorting
them back. Somewhat similarly, the juus is supposed to be attached to the body (or possibly
temporarily detached) but it also enters the soul house at the conclusion of buntangs where it is said
to stay between rituals, protected by the belian at a location in heaven. As yet another example, it is
unclear, and perhaps essentially ambiguous, whether or not those kelelungan who are said to be
“brought to the house (along with the ancestor skulls that represent them) to become protecting
spirits” continue to stay at Tenangkai in heaven like other kelelungan, and whether it is they, or the
naiyu spirits that they sometimes are said to become, who are addressed through the skulls during
buntangs.
      As an indication of the importance of the illocutionary as opposed to the perlocutionary aspect153
of rituals, we may perhaps read the fact that when Bentians complain about rituals it is less about
whether they succeed or not than whether or not they correspond to proper, conventional form (i.e. in
terms of whether or not they are valid in an illocutionary sense) (cf. Tambiah 1985a:81-83). Failures
may always be due to insurmountable adversity, but, irrespective of whether post-ritual developments
are “successful” or not, rituals may or may not be valid, and on that ground criticizable (and
therefore, if they fail, they may be plausibly regarded to have done so for this reason).
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observer,” etc. — do not really exist but rather illustrate desirable properties of spirit
familiars). A certain degree of scepticism in religious matters, reflecting perhaps the often
expressed Bentian idea that you cannot know what you have not seen or experienced
personally, is also quite common (cf. Rousseau, 1998:114-118, for reports of similar
scepticism or what he calls “agnosticism” among the Kayan). Regarding spirits and
offerings made to them in rituals, Udin, the protagonist of the last chapter, told me: “they
cannot be seen, [so] it is not certain that they exist, but there exists the belief from the
past, [so] you just have to give [them]” (beau ditan, beau tentu naan, tapi naan
kepercayaan ke bayuh, paksa ngokoi). More important than scepticism, however, which
tends to be suspended and rarely involves contestation of ritual practices, there is
commonly a basic uncertainty about what to believe, as reflected by the remarkably
unrationalized, frequently inconsistent character of many Bentian beliefs, with the beliefs
about souls and ancestral souls being a case in point here . Vagueness, uncertainty or152
even contestation of the meaning of ritual practices, however, is normally inconsequential
to their performance; rather, their performative aspect is most essential. 
Obviously, the authority of ritualization is not so much derived from the truth value
of the referential claims that it involves (or even its desired perlocutionary effects) as
from what it does “by virtue of being enacted” (Tambiah 1985b:135).  This leads us to153
a very important fact, namely, that the appropriation of religious authority among the
Bentian is, as Rousseau claims it to be among the Kayan, “tacit” rather than “didactic”
(Rousseau 1998:118). Like kinship authority, its force derives mainly from the impact
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of regularly performed social action — ritual practice — which especially by way of
tactile and sensory impressions as opposed to cognitive influence works to instil
particular moods, persuasions and dispositions among its performers. Rather than the
intellectual internalization of dogma, it is personally lived tradition sedimented as “the
natural attitude” of daily life (cf. Schutz 1970:72-73) which makes ritualization among
the Bentian in Bell's (1992:115) words “the appropriate thing to do.”
Anonymization, Entextualization, and Indirectness
If it is the performative aspect which counts, what, then, is it that ritualization in the case
of buntangs and more particularly through the institution of the soul search does? I will
address this question at some length as I believe that it can give some clues as to why
ritualization is authoritative. A very direct and condensed answer would be that it
provides a way of acting upon varied socio-existential concerns of particular people by
translating these concerns into problems of soul loss and obligations to unseen agencies.
The most obvious implication of this is that the concerns in question become
addressed through what could be called “soul and spirit discourse,” a fact which is
already evident in Ma Putup's chant. To perceive its full significance, it should be noted
that not only is this “metaphorical” dimension added to the “real” dimension of what
“really” is at stake, but the latter dimension tends to become displaced to the point that
very little direct or explicit attention is given to it in the ritual, a fact which struck me as
I got to know the contents of the various chants of the buntang. What this means is that
the patient and the participants, albeit mentioned by name, become in a way
depersonalized; their attributes and the particularity of the events which occasioned the
ritual are largely invisible in the chants and take almost no expression in the actions
performed as part of the ritual program. For instance, the description of the illness in Ma
Putup's chant (“as if marked by soot, as if bound up by rattan”) is plainly metaphorical
and reveals, as is typical, nothing about the specific condition of Ma Mar's “illness.”
Likewise no explanation as to why the liau would want to steal the soul is proposed, apart
from hunger (the metaphor par excellence in Bentian society) which actually detracts
from the more specific motives that the liau may have had to capture Ma Mar's soul (as
does the mention of a number of other ancestors along with Nen Pare).
The ritual, then, in some ways treats the event as if it were just one instance among
many. However, here lies much of its appeal, and without this aspect it would, in a sense,
be much less of a ritual. Other positive features of the ritual also serve to produce the
same effect, from which much of the authority of ritualization is in fact derived. The
anonymization of the event means that the ritual foregrounds structure, that is, its own
internal order (of prescribed procedures pertaining to supernatural agencies) which
Photographs
Plate 1. Swidden house (blai ume)
Plate 2. Forest lou
Platte 3. The lou solai of Sambung village
Plate 4. Lou solai surrounded by “development houses” (rumah pembangunan, I.)
Plate 5. Man and water buffalo on a swidden
Plate 6. Expressing discomfort at a perkara
Plate 7. Making an accusation at a perkara
Plate 8. Holding on to a spear and scattering rice at the conclusion of a perkara
Plate 9. Wedding. The bridal couple in a state
Plate 10. A belian dances while holding chickens by the longan, devoting them to the
protecting spirits of the house
Plate 11. Belian sentiu. The belian holds the suspended sarong rope (penyelenteng)
down which spirits descend
Plate 12. Belians blessing a new bridge on the interprovincial road watched by
schoolchildren
Plate 13. Ngebidan for an eight-day old child
Plate 14. A belian presenting offerings to spirits which have possessed a man
Plate 15. Elderly belian leadsinging while two apprentices “follow in” (nuing)
Plate 16. Entering the soul house (blai juus) at the conclusion of a buntang ritual
Plate 17. Collective bathing at an outdoor shrine during buntang
Plate 18. Plate and meat distribution after a ritual
Plate 19. Mementian
Plate 20. Three “sisters” showing finished and unfinished rattan baskets
Plate 21. Blontang sacrificial pole
Plate 22. Displaying heirlooms
Plate 23. Man and grandchild
Plate 24. Manti giving a speech
      The term entextualization refers to a complex process whereby a speech event or a piece of154
discourse is rendered structured (in the sense of text-like), and hence becomes extractable from the
context of utterance and, typically, associated with another context or with something transcendent of
the context (e.g. tradition, or a particular form of speech). It encompasses, in the terms of Bauman and
Briggs (1990), both “decontextualization” and “recontextualization.” In my usage of the term, the
emphasis is on the aspect whereby a speech event, or another phenomenon (such as non-linguistic ritual
action) becomes associated with something transcendent of the context.
199
remains more or less the same from event to event. It thus functions to invoke tradition
and portray the event as something which this authoritative institution can be used to act
upon. Here, it is appropriate to talk about “entextualization,” a concept which has gained
popularity in anthropological studies of language (e.g. Bauman and Briggs 1990; Keane
1997; Kuipers 1990).  If understood in a loose sense, as the transformation of something154
into an instance of something more general, this concept may be used not only for aspects
of language use, but also for non-linguistic aspects of ritualization. In fact, by involving
the subordination of event to structure through the transfiguration of the more or less
unique socio-existential concerns and conditions of the patient and the sponsors into a
standardized interpretation in the shared and encompassing cultural code of ritual,
ritualization, in a very basic respect, is entextualization.
Another thing which anonymization does is permit rituals to address issues indirectly.
Trading in accusations and sensitive assumptions (of soul theft, of soul loss induced by
misbehavior) and the delicate matter of intra- and inter-family relations, this indirectness
is a critical resource for buntangs. Among the Bentian, socially disruptive or otherwise
sensitive issues are not comfortably addressed and preferably avoided, especially in
public. This disinclination for socially confrontative action goes hand in hand with a
tendency to indirectness which forms a conspicuous aspect of Bentian culture expressed,
among other things, in the use of metaphor and indirect reference to persons, the use of
envoys in ritual and other formal contexts, and in various types of what might be called
“implicitly allusive action” (such as deliberately missing someone's rituals in response
to offense). Thanks to the anonymity which it allows, ritualization also forms an avenue
for indirect and implicit action, as it did, in several instances, in the case of Ma Mar's
buntang. 
Although ostensibly being about curing Ma Mar's flu by retrieving his soul and
requesting well-being for him and his new family, Ma Mar's buntang also served to
address several other concerns, some of which it would have been inappropriate to
address openly. One very obvious concern which in important ways related to Nen Pare
was the fact that Ma Mar now had moved in with Nen Pore without a marriage ceremony
having been performed. A wedding was not arranged at this stage probably because it was
felt that it would have been too soon after Nen Pare's death, especially when considering
Ma Mar's listlessness (which indicated Nen Pare's discontent). In a way, the couple was
also, because of the marital history of their relatives involving their own close association
      In public, Bentians generally give very little expression of love or sexual affection (one never155
witnesses kisses, for instance). In this case the couple did not even address each other as spouses or
act as such by publicly performing different daily chores together, with the notable exception of
entering the soul house at the conclusion of the ritual together.
      The prohibition against marriage of one's parallel cousins (bawen tumar, soong tumar) pertains156
to cousins up until about third range. It is said that close cousins cannot be married if there has not
occurred a “change of face” (ganti wai), that is, that the sex of the siblings in the connecting
generation is different (and preferably also that of the connecting parents of the prospected couple).
The only explanation for the prohibition that I could elicit is that parallel cousins are closer (and,
implicitly, too close) than cross cousins, in its turn a result of the generally closer relation between
same sex siblings (and cousins). One could imagine such closeness to reflect notions of some sort of
substance transmitted specifically or predominantly along lines of same-sex descendants (cf. Peletz
1988) although I obtained no such information from informants.
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with each other as relatives and “house-mates,” already so close as to be practically
married, which made a marriage somewhat dispensable from a practical point of view as
well as somewhat inappropriate (by reinforcing an already rather extreme kin group
endogamy regarded as backward by modernization-minded outsiders and even, on
occasion, by other villagers). The couple also maintained an exceptionally low relational
profile in public at the same time as they privately appeared affectionate.  Whatever the155
reason(s) not to marry — it was not a question of resources, as the buntang demanded no
less than a wedding would have — their present status was clearly improper, as adat
(customary law) proscribes non-marital relations. This condition motivated a buntang,
and did so much more than the assumed loss of Ma Mar's soul per se, for which an
ordinary curing ritual, which had not previously been held in this case, would have
sufficed. Because of the nature of their relation it was decided to address the godly
seniang spirits who oversee adat and sexual relations — and who may only be addressed
during buntangs (or nalin taun). Attempting to appease these, and by extension, other
spirits, in this matter thus formed an important objective of Ma Mar's buntang. 
This leads us to another important thing that buntangs do (in addition to
entextualizing, translating concerns into soul and spirit discourse, and allowing indirect
consideration of sensitive issues), namely, redress reality retrospectively (or occasionally,
prospectively). The fact is that people sometimes live together without a “proper”
ceremony having been conducted (e.g. in polygamous unions) and, conversely, that they
marry when it is improper for them to do so (e.g. in the case of parallel cousin marriage,
which is proscribed).  In such cases, ritualization in the form of a buntang (or nalin156
taun) is necessary and, significantly, often also sufficient to authorize the unions (parallel
cousin marriage, sanctified in this way, is almost as common as cross cousin marriage,
at least in one village where I made systematic comparisons). What this means is that
buntangs, through the appropriate offerings, words and actions can recompense for and
thereby validate or authorize conditions which in principle are unacceptable. Through
rituals, Bentians say, “what's bad is made good, what's wrong is made right” (ye daat
      A literal translation of this expression would be that “what's bad is told good, what's wrong is157
told right.” The essence of the expression, however, is in that by “telling something good or right”
one simultaneously transforms it. The emphasis on telling (i.e. on verbal activity) may also be taken
to indicate the centrality of chants in ritual action.
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dulek buen, ye sala dulek kunen).  Ritualization, which as this shows, not only serves157
to sanction adat and so-called social values but also offers a possibility to solve problems
in contravention of such values, is regarded by Bentians to hold a supreme capacity to
legitimize various states and affairs in the eyes of people as well as spirits. Post-ritual
developments (e.g. persisting illness or misfortune), may sometimes challenge this
legitimacy, it is true, but such potential indications of spirit disapproval are also open to
new and other interpretations unrelated to earlier events and rituals, which means that
they do not automatically entail contestation.
According to Michael Jackson (1998:24), “Objectively, stories and ritual scenarios
seldom tell the truth about what actually happened. They tell a truth that enables people
to live in the here and now with what happened to [orig. emphasis] them in the past. In
this sense, the scenarios are expedient lies; they prioritize the existential urge to remaster
experience rather than the epistemological need to preserve an exact record of it.” This
quotation can be taken to recapitulate some of the observations made here both as regards
the importance of the performative as opposed to the referential aspect of rituals, and
with respect to ritualization's redressing capacity. In addition, it points to the important
fact that rituals, including buntangs, have a special ability to establish what we might call
“existential control,” typically in response to an experienced loss of agency (represented
among the Bentian as soul loss). Control in this respect should not be understood
primarily in a very strong sense of, say, a capacity for prediction or domination (even
though such control may at times be an objective of buntangs), but rather in the sense of
maintaining or regaining agency by validating, redefining, or at least making sense of a
particular condition or state of affairs. Instead of existential control, it would be possible
here to talk about performative, or illocutionary control (as opposed to instrumental, or
perlocutionary, control denoting control in the above-mentioned stronger respect).
Control as I use the concept here, obviously influenced by Jackson's (1998:17-22)
treatment of it, may not involve the power to actually achieve what one wants; more
likely, it merely entails something akin to what we refer when we speak of “getting
control over a situation,” that is, obtaining an understanding of what goes on which
allows one to “do what there is to do,” or at least “do something.” It is a basic capacity
which people struck by misfortune need to gain, and what it bears persuasive witness to
is that ritualization, at the same time as it serves to salute tradition and superimpose
structure on events, also works the other way around by doing something for the event
and the practical interests of the participants.
      This is true to a much lesser extent among most Luangan subgroups whose languages differ158
much more from the language of the central Luangan area than does the Bentian language.
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The Authority of Ritual Language
Apart from the issues discussed so far, Ma Putup's chant can also be taken to illustrate
some quite different issues, perhaps the most obvious being ritual language. I will discuss
ritual language here as its authority critically contributes to make ritualization
authoritative as well as forms the basis of belian authority. Moreover, many of the
properties which make ritual language authoritative also characterize other aspects of
rituals, which means that an investigation of ritual language can say a lot about what
makes ritualization in general authoritative. 
What I call ritual language is referred to by Bentians as either basa belian (belian
language) or basa luangan (because is is associated with the Luangan ritual tradition
originating in the central Luangan area). This language is similar enough to everyday
language to be broadly intelligible to all Bentians.  However, it contains a large number158
of words which are not used in everyday speech, a good deal of which are unintelligible
to many or most people. Some of these words are archaic, others loan words from other
languages, and some are words which are exclusively used in ritual language (cf. Metcalf
1989, who identifies the same categories of words in Berawan ritual language). Many of
the latter words are said to have no meaning of their own, and are used only as
“extensions” (penyeleloi) of other words. In addition, ritual language is characterized by
the extensive use of a number of stylistic devices which are only sparsely used in
everyday language. There is thus a significant difference between ritual and everyday
language, even as there is also a continuum between them.
Bentians characterize ritual language as “roundabout” or “indirect” (mengkelotes,
beau kentes), designations which they may also apply to “the language of customary law”
(basa adet, basa perkara), which shares many of the distinguishing features of ritual
language, as well as to “the language of the ancestors” (basa tuha one), which allegedly
also did so. Indirectness or elaborateness in language, as well as in behavior, is generally
considered “refined” (halus, I.), and is thus a positive quality distinguishing ritual
language from everyday speech. Another such quality of ritual language is its association
with ancestral tradition — which is one of the most sacrosanct concepts of the Bentian
— of which it forms a major example. In being conceived as different than everyday
language, ritual language is thus also constructed as the more authoritative. Hence, ritual
language can be described like Bell has described the ritualization process in general,
namely, as “a way of acting which establishes a privileged contrast, differentiating itself
as more important or powerful” (1992:90). 
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Of the stylistic devices employed in ritual language, two of the most important, which
are also major factors accounting for its indirectness and elborateness, are metaphor and
parallelism. The pervasive use of these devices in Ma Putup's chant is conspicuous. Of
metaphor, evident examples are the depiction of the soul as pearls, animals, etc., the
description of the liau as “fish of deep forests” or the spirit familiars as “swarms of myna
birds,” and the rendering of the condition of being ill in terms of markings by soot, etc.
“Afraid that you're asking for food,” of course, also qualifies as an example, even though
this line may simultaneously be read literally. Yet another example is the notion of “tall
swidden houses” (see lines 60 and 68) which is my gloss for the word tompong, a word
designating a kind of former swidden house which for defensive purposes was built on
very high piles (15 feet and more). What is referred to in this connection, however, is an
ordinary swidden house; here, as usual today, the word tompong is used with blai, the
standard Bentian word for house, to form the expression blai tompong which means
simply “house,” particularly in the sense of “a house of one's own.”
What the use of metaphor demonstrates is that poetic elaborations, far from being
beside the point, are essential to the task at hand. A principal effect of metaphorical
expression is that it makes ritual language indirect and elaborate and thus refined, which
is particularly appropriate considering the purpose of such language of making appeals
to the spirits (cruder language could imply disrespect or at least be less compelling).
These qualities do, of course, also appeal to the human audience which provides an
additional reason for the belians to use such language so as to guarantee their own
popularity and prestige as practitioners of their trade. Moreover, metaphor, like such
devices as rhyme and alliteration, which, albeit infrequent in my translation, are abundant
in Ma Putup's original (e.g. see lines 15 and 16 or 46 and 47), amounts to a general
poetification in a conventional code which identifies the text as part of tradition. Thus the
performance receives the authorizing stamp of tradition as it becomes validated as a
faithful representation of it. Another property of ritual language which obviously
contributes to the same effect is the use of archaisms, but the use of loan words and other
special words not employed in everyday speech is also relevant here. The use of all these
special words testifies to the fact that authoritative words tend to be distanced or
transcendent, associated with something more or other than the everyday here and now.
The most important object of association in this respect is the more or less ancient
ancestral past, but the foreign, an archetype of which is Java, is also important, which
explains the essentially flattering reference to the liau as “jawa liau” (lines 66, 142) or
the nicknaming of the soul tin as the “Javanese receptacle” (line 139). The use of Kutai
Malay associated with the former Kutai sultanate as the language of belian sentiu curing
rituals convincingly attests to the same fact. The ancestral past is one of the most
thoroughly objectified sources of authority in both everyday speech and ritual contexts.
      This situation apparently contrasts with that described by Fox (1975) for the Rotinese, for159
whom the couplets of ritual language express important (binary) semantic relations encoding a
cultural ontology.
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The use of special words in belian's chants is to an important extent the result of the
other principal stylistic device, parallelism. This concept, discussed generally by Fox
(1974, 1975, 1988), and in the Bornean context by Peter Metcalf (1989), refers to the
practice of pairing words or lines into couplets or dyadic sets, a process which may take
place on several linguistic levels (semantic, syntactic, phonological, prosodical). Again,
the translation has resulted in a considerable reduction of the use of this device in the
text, but many examples remain as almost every second line more or less closely repeats
or complements the previous one (cf. lines 13 and 14, “thrust by the pole of sickness /
stung by piercing maladies,” or 1 and 2, “liau who may be seen in dreams at night / liau
who can be glimpsed at noon,” or 11 and 12, “that he's rearing a dying chicken / a tame
pigeon with slack wings”). Typically, the second line in such contexts adds little by way
of content, and in any case primarily serves to replicate the previous line. The same is
also true for many of those individual words which Bentians say are used as “extensions”
(penyeleloi) of other words, that is, as the second word of a word pair (which may follow
the first word either immediately, or in the next line). As examples of such word pairs
from Ma Putup's chant we may again mention  “blai tompong” and “jawa liau”
expressions, as well as “minsu maliu,” another epithet for the liau, used “solely to extend
jawa liau” with which it also assonates. 
Bentian parallelism is clearly less canonical than the more extensively studied eastern
Indonesian variants, and in terms of combinations of lines and words it is much less
restricted or prescribed (cf. Metcalf, 1989:30, for similar findings among the Berawan).
However, like them it is a pervasively applied poetic device whose use tends to involve
the application of an elevated, or at least authoritative, code. As in the case of metaphor,
what counts in parallelism is not the meaning, that is, the literal statements made by
parallelistic constructions which, as said, often add little by way of meaning anyway, but
their use, that is, the pragmatic, interactional outcomes of their application (Keane
1997:109-111).  One such outcome, to which I have already made reference, is159
entextualization. Kuipers has identified parallelism as a “textualizing device,” that is, as
something “which functions ... to detach discourse from the immediate constraints of
utterance and attach it to a shared, coherent, and authoritative tradition” (1990:71).
Predominantly conventional, memorized pieces of oral tradition, Bentian parallelisms
have a relatively fixed and objectified character which eases their attribution to the
authoritative cultural order which they purport to represent. Like reported speech, which
is the general form in which the belians tend to present such and other formulaic aspects
of their chants, parallelisms thereby also deemphasize the particularity of the immediate
occasion and the agency of the performer. As Keane, describing the Anangkalese of
      This model of history, which might be described as something of an inversion of the Western160
myth of progress, is of course, not uncontested. The Western myth of progress, heralded by the New
Order regime as a national project (and, before that, by other governments), has deeply influenced the
Bentian resulting in them now having an essentially ambivalent attitude to their ancestral past, many
aspects of which they are ashamed and refuse to acknowledge.
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Sumba, has remarked with respect to reported speech, it “like other decontextualizing
features of ritual speech [e.g. parallelism], seems to insist that what's happening is not a
direct expression of the individual interests or agencies of the speakers” (1997:117). As
Keane also has observed, such aspects of ritual language may reflect an attitude of
deference (1997:116), an attitude which also (at least ideally) characterizes the belians'
use of ritual language — and other Bentians' use of other kinds of poetic language. Such
language represents the language of the ancestors, to which Bentians attribute special
powers: “in the days of the ancestors” (jaman tuha one) they say, somewhat in the
manner of how Christians talk about the word of God in Genesis, “what was expressed
could come into being” (ye dulek tau jadi). As among the Anangkalese or the Wana,
where ancestral language is endowed with the same capacity (cf. Keane 1997:99;
Atkinson 1989:53,314), these notions are associated with a conception of the ancestral
past as an unsurpassable glorious age, and a concomitant view of subsequent history as
in a cultural decline, reminiscent of that ascribed by Geertz (1980) to the nineteenth
century Balinese negara.  The very authority of that elevated ancestral past, in160
combination with the fact that the gist of the values with which it is associated are
collectivism and concord, make the proper manner of appropriating ancestral authority
(e.g. by using ancestral language) deferent and self-depreciating.
Another important outcome of the use of parallelism — and of other devices of
poetification as well — is that it formalizes relations (with spirits as well as people) and
contexts (e.g. rituals, but also any other context when it is used) and thereby makes
contestation difficult. We already discussed formalization in the previous chapter as an
important interactional device employed to serve community interests or community
values (e.g. generosity toward kin) or individual interests if expressed as kin interests (as
in Udin's letter to his relatives). As Bloch (1974, 1975) argues, much of its force is
derived from its ability to enable a kind of communication which inhibits opposition, at
least within the code and conditions which it itself establishes. Ritual is an obvious
example of formalization, as is ritual language which forms Bloch's example. What holds
true for the formal requests made in the name of kinship discussed in the previous
chapter, holds true even more with respect to these institutions: there is no arguing
against what the belian, acting as the voice of the ancestors, says, at least not for the time
that he holds the floor.
      As Judith Irvine (1979) has demonstrated, the concept of formality covers several distinct161
notions which frequently are conflated. She discusses four principal such notions, all of which are
relevant to at least some of the examples of formalization that I have discussed (lawsuits, Udin's
letter, kin requests, elders' monologues, ritual settings, ritual language). With respect to the social
situations that I have described, formality in the sense of an “emergence of a central situational
focus” (a “dominant engagement” involving all or most participants) and the “invoking of positional
identities” (marked by respectfulness and relatively strict role behavior) are particularly relevant,
although formality in Irvine's two other senses of “increased code structuring” and “code
consistency” also apply to some degree. On the other hand, when I talk about formalization in the
sense of “increasing adherence to form” (as a property of ritual media), it is especially these two
latter aspects of formality that contribute to this aspect of formalization.
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Formalization not only serves as an authorizing device inhibiting contestation, but
also, in the sense of increasing adherence to prescribed form, works to make ritual
language and other forms of ritual action authoritative.  By being structured and thus161
conceived as following a locally variable cultural script, formalized ritual action
functions to define a right way of saying and doing things. And by setting such a
standard, it simultaneously contributes to create the preconditions for its own
authoritativeness, as the process of definition has the effect of imposing restrictions on
what is right action, right words, or right material prestations, which makes them scarce
and valuable resources. Thus, parallelism, like other linguistic or extra-linguistic devices
amounting to formalization, in a sense makes ritualization something of a self-generating
source of authority, a machinery producing its own fuel.
As should be obvious by now, many of the properties of ritual language also
characterize other ritual media involved in the ritualization process, and it has been my
intention to say something about ritualization in general through looking at ritual
language. Formalization, for instance, is affected also by such factors as the sequencing
and spatial organization of the different activities of the ritual (see Table 1), the
prescribed form of the ritual actions pertaining to them (e.g. the tossing of chicken
feathers and pig bristles by the participants over their heads as signs to the protecting
spirits of the approaching animal sacrifices during Betangai, Dedicating the Sacrificial
Animals), and by the relatively fixed material setup of the ritual, including the numerous
paraphernalia, such as spirit houses, decorations, and different types of offerings and
sacrifices made. Similarly, metaphor is often a feature of non-linguistic symbolic ritual
action, such as when the belians on the concluding morning of the ritual during Ngejala
use the intestines of a pig as a fishnet to catch any remaining bad influences represented
by a few betel nuts floating in a hand basin filled with water.
At least two other properties of linguistic and other ritual media, often discussed as
general characteristics of ritual (e.g. Tambiah 1985b; Bell 1992) warrant some brief
discussion here, namely, redundancy and condensation. Bentian ritual language is
excessively redundant, typically stating whatever is on its agenda numerous times in
several different ways. The same also goes for ritual action, particularly in buntangs;
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many of the activities listed in Table 1 serve essentially similar purposes as some other
ones, and are best regarded as variations on a single theme. For example, Nginton
ngunau, Nengkejah, and Nyele bemeng performed on Day Five all aspire,
notwithstanding their slightly different approaches — appeal, intimidation, prohibition
— to eliminate bad influences in whatever form they might come. Like other devices of
poetification characterizing buntangs, such redundancy is not unessential, or simply an
expression of the difficulty of communication with the unseen, but an important factor
contributing to make the ritual “roundabout” (mengkelotes), and hence authoritatively
different from everyday speech or action. In addition, redundancy, another aspect of
which is the simultaneous use of multiple media to express the same point (e.g. chants,
music, material prestations, bodily gestures), brings about the other property to be
discussed here, that is, condensation. Condensation, by which I mean the process of
merging or assimilation of several different sensory or cognitive impressions into a single
unitary totality, in its turn generates what we might call a heightened experience of the
ritual, or in Tambiah's (1985b:165) words, a “total fused experience.” This should not be
taken to mean that some sort of radical change of consciousness ordinarily takes place
in buntangs, even though the exhaustive, on average week-long event involving
comparatively intense socialization, a perceived pervasive spirit presence, and little sleep,
evidently is quite conducive to the occurrence of spontaneous spirit possession (occurring
outside the ritual program). Rather, condensation in buntangs (which is facilitated also
by the multifaceted redundancy of ritual language) serves most effectively to foster a
sensory appropriation of what it contributes to make the most basic values, ways of
acting, and ways of being associated with the ritual. Working as by way of synergy,
condensation promotes an internalization of what the buntang stands for as ontology.
Finally, it should be noted that words have a privileged cultural status among the
Bentian as well as more generally throughout southeast Borneo, a factor which
contributes to make ritual language, as opposed to other ritual media, authoritative.
Centuries of Muslim influence in this region (Kutai, Banjar, Bekumpai, Pasir, Bugis)
have made spells and “reading” (basa, M. baca) the archetypes of magical activity,
especially of magic which is not incorporated in rituals (which is in fact somewhat less
prevalent among the Bentian than among many of their downriver neighbors, despite
common allegations to the contrary by the latter; cf. Tsing 1993). At the same time as it
has promoted formualic and esoteric forms of “knowledge” (ilmu), this influence, and the
ideals of the Koran and recitation in Arabic associated with it, has contributed to the
widespread general authority of the word in the region. Among the Bentian, the central
role of chants in belian rituals, and the idea that they constitute their most instrumental
parts, may well owe something to this influence, as may the elevated authority of the
ancestral word already discussed. However, there probably also exists an originally
indigenous basis for the Bentian belief in the denotative power of the word. Notions of
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this sort, commonly expressed by Bentians, as that knowing someone's (a spirit's or
human's) true or complete name involves having some power over him, or that the
mentioning of something (e.g. a spirit or death) may invoke it, are common everywhere.
Like curses (sumpah), often suggested as sources of misfortune by Bentians, such notions
probably predate Muslim influence, even though some more esoteric forms of verbal
magic do not. As among the Ilongot, who appear not to have been subjected to a similar
influence to a similar extent, the authority of the word is to an important degree derived
from an association of language (and elaborate language in particular) with the controlled
and controlling agency of “seniors” (manti in particular among the Bentian) and the
social order which they uphold, especially through formal oratory but also through
informal “reconciliatory” speech (cf. M. Rosaldo 1980). Whatever the derivation of the
privileged cultural status of words among the Bentian, it points to the fact that ritual
language is authoritative also because of some quite different factors than its much-used
poetic devices.
Belian Authority
A particular form of religious authority already mentioned several times is the authority
of the belians. I shall now discuss belian authority, whose display was also a concern in
Ma Mar's buntang, especially in regard to that of its leading belian, Ma Putup, who laid
claims to exceptional talents. Being a liturgy-centered ritual, the buntang does not allow
for very much in the way of dramatic performance or idiosyncratic improvisation, except
during the somewhat insulated curing sessions incorporated in the ritual, which may be
conducted in any style, traditional or novel, and which may be developed into small
rituals in their own right. However, leading a buntang and performing all the activities
associated with it testifies to the possession of considerable knowledge (not the least, of
chants), and is something of a mark of mature belianship. Ma Putup, in his early sixties
at the time, was, beyond anyone's doubt, widely learned, knowing, except for buntangs,
all major curing styles (belian luangan, sentiu and bawo), in addition to being a warah,
or death shaman, a somewhat rare combination. However, as an outsider, having moved
to Temiang less than a year ago upon marrying Nen Bujok, he had so far only been
invited to perform a few rituals in his new village, and he had not yet had the opportunity
to lead a buntang. Despite his obvious skills, the villagers preferred, as Bentians
primarily do, to turn to their own belians (i.e. their own kin). Apart from his outsider
status, a special reason for villagers not to employ him so much as he might have
deserved, was probably a principal aspect of his belian reputation which made him
feared, that is, his distinctive “downriver” spirit familiars and his intermittent use of their
incomprehensible spirit language (allegedly Arabic) during performances. The fact that
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he was unusually self-assertive, loud, and sturdy also contributed to his frightening
appearance, and at least the first two of these qualities made him not conform very well
to the somewhat conservative picture of belianship that the villagers had.
For Kakah Unsir's family, however, holding a buntang provided an opportunity to
advance the belianship of the potentially most distinguished belian affiliated with the
house, as it also did with respect to two other, somewhat less distinguished ones, Nen
Pore's brother, Ma Kerudot, and Ma Mar's co-husband, Ma Sarakang (see Fig. 1). In a
situation where fifteen of about fifty adults in the village had at least some experience of
performing as belians, there was, despite the fact that belian rituals were held in the
village or its surrounding swiddens almost every week (and often several in a week), an
overabundance of belians, which meant that many of those who were less distinguished,
or had peripheral kin network positions, were inactive for much of the time (for instance,
Ma Sarakang had only twice performed in the last couple of years, in both cases in rituals
arranged for his wife, Nen Pare). Competition is a factor significantly moderating the
individual belian's authority, which may only be persuasively demonstrated through
performance, preferably frequent performance, which in itself testifies to his authority.
As for the Wana shaman, the authority of a belian is largely a function of the spirit
familiars (mulung) that he is able to summon, without whom no belian ritual may be
conducted in the first place (cf. Atkinson 1989:100). Claims on connections to such
familiars — who predominantly consist of dead ancestors, particularly dead belians, but
who encompass practically all kinds of spirits including “malevolent ones,” blis — is best
demonstrated through ritual performance, although spontaneous possession by spirits
(which mainly occurs during rituals) may also be an indication of such connections (if
not yet of one's capacity to command them). An instance of spirit possession took place
during Ma Mar's buntang when Nen Pore's older brother Ma Unsir became crazed and
started talking in the voices of his personal protecting spirits (pengiring) who complained
that the ritual paraphernalia constructed for the ritual was incomplete, and did not become
placated until Ma Putup “paid respect” to them (besemah) by holding some offerings
above Ma Unsir's head as token presentations. All people are said to have protecting
spirits of their own — as do analogously houses and communities — who are not,
however, regarded as spirit familiars, unless used by a belian in ritual (for a belian, the
two categories may, of course, overlap). Even though not a belian himself, through his
possession, Ma Unsir in consequence laid claims to some powerful spirit connections of
his own (somewhat like Ma Putup did by becoming possessed by his spirit familiars in
rituals) which would be useful should he consider taking up occupation as a belian.
Although spirit familiars are a prerequisite for most kinds of belian activity and are
thus much more than guides for travels in the spirit world, the authority of belians derives
to an important degree also from other factors. This is especially the case in buntangs
where all belians use pretty much the same spirit familiars, particular representatives of
      Women may perform any belian style except belian bawo which is considered too strong162
(gaga), that is, too physically exhaustive, in addition to involving use of exceptionally dangerous
spirit familiars. Women belians are said to have been more common in the past, and there used to be
a now extinct form called belian bawe, “women's belian,” which only women could perform (which
is not to be mixed up with a present style with the same name imported from the Tunjung, which
among the Bentian at least may be performed by either men or women). Today, most women belians
(which make up a small minority, well below ten percent) only perform belian sentiu or related styles
(dewa-dewa, kenyong).
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which are “descended” (from their heavenly abodes) to perform many of the particular
activities of which the ritual consists (see Table 1). Some spirit familiars are used by all
belians in practically all rituals (such as Luing, the spirit of rice who is used to summon
all other spirit familiars employed), and as a general rule, belians employ most available
and conceivable spirit helpers rather than rely on just a few distinctive ones.
Although there are no principal limitations on who may become a belian (women, for
instance, are not excluded),  there is some clarity about who has become one. Normally,162
belians study belianship through apprenticeship to an experienced belian for an extended
period of time, usually for about a couple of years, and conclude with formal initiation
rites (tumbang). During this time the novice belian above all memorizes the chants sung
in rituals (by singing along, nuing, in actual performances), but also learns various
techniques associated with curing, including some semi-secret ones. In the concluding
initiation rite certain mystical belian faculties are installed in the novice such as a
shamanic voice, vision and senses which enable him to summon, see and catch spirits or
illnesses. These faculties are represented by small objects such as grains of rice, mirror
fragments, and fish hooks which are allegedly inserted into the novice's breast, forehead,
and finger tips, respectively. The belians' ability to perform their tasks, and their
authority, is considered to derive in large part from the capacities that they acquire in the
initiation rite and through the preceding training, especially from the knowledge of
chants. Much more than a question of ability to demonstrate spirit connections in
performance, then, belianship requires a willingness to submit to long training, which is
regarded as a principal reason for the diminishing popularity of buntangs and belian
luangan (which are the most wordy of the belian rituals) among young and “busy”
(sibuk) belians today.
People may, it is true, in rare cases become regarded as belians without going through
the formal procedure, but instead, by receiving direct spirit guidance through dreams or
during a prolonged illness associated with mental imbalance, but even then some
informal study of the chants under a competent belian is necessary, and one's status as
a belian may suffer from the lack of formal competence. Kakah Ramat, an over eighty
years of age, but still active, belian who was regarded as the most competent belian in
the village, made a distinction between belians who “have spirit familiars” (naan
mulung), meaning especially those who make a great display of their spirit connections,
211
and those who, like himself, “know belian chants” (tau bukun belian), that is, who rely
primarily on the efficacy of words in rituals. A special reason for the authority of belians
is their knowledge of chants, which despite considerable variation between belians, are
said to have been passed down unchanged from early ancestors and thus to represent the
ancestors’ words. Together with the manti and the warah, the belians are regarded as the
custodians of ancestral tradition and therefore generally, although not always, thought to
express the will of the ancestors, which means that criticizing them should be avoided
as it may amount to a criticism of the ancestors.
Despite simultaneously mastering chants and commanding plentiful spirit support —
and indeed a lot of respect as a result — Ma Putup still did not enjoy very much
community support for his belianship in his new village. There were several reasons for
this, one of which relates to the ancestral connection of belians, which Ma Putup did not
very persuasively demonstrate through his non-deferential manners (during Ma Mar's
buntang he caused some annoyance by somewhat over-enthusiastically ordering people
around and complaining about the ritual paraphernalia) and his obviously non-local spirit
familiars (which played a lesser role in the buntang, however). Also, coming from
another village he performed a few aspects of rituals in ways slightly but nevertheless
conspicuously different from local custom. In Ma Mar's buntang, he brought food
offerings to the seniang in heaven rather than inviting them to come down and receive
them, and upon returning from the soul search to Mount Lumut he made a detour to bathe
Ma Mar's and the other participants’ souls with potent water from a well on top of
another mountain, Mount Purei, a custom only associated with mortuary ceremonies in
his new village. These were aspects of his performance which some of his present fellow
villagers privately complained about, experiencing them as non-consonant with their
personally lived ancestral tradition and therefore as potentially offensive to their
ancestors.
Yet another aspect of Ma Putup's outsider status which helps to explain the villagers'
relative disinclination to turn to him — and indirectly the general inclination of Bentians
to turn to their own belians — was the fact that the majority of the villagers as yet owed
him nothing. An important source of the individual belian's authority is what he has
previously done for particular people and families in terms of belian services (cf.
Atkinson 1989:270-74). Having saved their lives when they were ill, provided good lives
and good relations for them by performing their buntangs, conducted their marriages and
their birth rituals, and having, whether the rituals that they performed were successful or
not, invested extensive effort in their well-being in return for rewards which are regarded
as only nominal (e.g. a couple of dozen white plates and a few kilos of meat for a
buntang), most people stand in a kind of informal debt relation to a smaller or greater
number of belians who in return can expect some degree of respect and often also some
small services or gifts (such as pieces of meat from hunters), as well as invitations to
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perform future rituals. It would be impolite not to invite a nearby belian with whom one
has a long-standing relationship unless he was busy (e.g. with other rituals) or special
reasons commanded a different choice (e.g. a belian competent in a curing style not
practiced by the belian in question). In Temiang, where Kakah Ramat enjoyed an
elevated status as the village's most senior and learned belian and most villagers at some
point or another had been “belianized” (benelian) by him, it was imperative to at least
contact him whenever a buntang was held, and so an invitation was passed on to him to
partake in Ma Mar's buntang at least in the capacity as honored guest, an invitation which
he, because of his somewhat detached relationship to Kakah Unsir, would in fact have
been happier not to have received, but which he still felt obliged to accept, if only for the
afternoon of the ritual's last day.
The scope of a belian’s authority is largely a function of the number of human
dependants that he is able to accumulate (the core group tends to consist of his close
relatives and neighbors), a fact which at least initially restricted Ma Putup's authority as
a belian in Temiang, at the same time as the little social capital that he had provided him
with those opportunities to perform the rituals that he did get. Apart from his affiliation
with Kakah Unsir's family, who because of it felt more obliged than others to employ him
at the same time as they also had most to gain from his belianship, two other relations
were significant in this respect. First, his relation to Kakah Ramat, with whom he had
asked to study, and as a result received an opportunity to perform in a few of his rituals
in the capacity of (senior) disciple, and who, unlike most villagers, openly recognized Ma
Putup's belian skills. Second, his relation to his wife Nen Bujok's and her dead sister Nen
Pare's classificatory and adoptive father Ma Lombang, who was the person who had
asked Ma Putup to perform Ma Mar's buntang and, in the capacity as manti, taken
responsibility for its arrangement, since he regarded himself as the “trunk” or
“foundation” (puun) of Ma Putup as well as of Ma Mar (by way of extension from Nen
Bujok and Nen Pare), and therefore saw it as his task to integrate the two men (who both
were originally outsiders) into the village. Thus social capital was a factor simultaneously
impeding and prompting Ma Putup's belian career in Temiang.
In this analysis of belian authority, I have so far mainly examined its sources and
constitution. A few words need to be said also about what it consists of, that is, about the
nature of the influence that the belians wield, which leads us to the question of why
someone like Ma Putup or Kakah Ramat would choose to become a belian in the first
place. In studies of Southeast Asian shamanism, this is a question which has often been
answered with reference to the socially acceptable role that shamanism offers socially or
psychologically deviant personalities (e.g. Bernstein 1997; Sutlive 1992), an explanation
which has only a limited applicability among the Bentian where most belians command
considerable respect also outside of this role and do not suffer, more than others, from
socio-psychological abnormalities. Other Southeast Asianists (Atkinson 1989; Tsing
      Today, an additional reason for this negative correlation between belianship and political office163
is —  besides the work load and perhaps certain unexpressed notions of propriety —  the fact that there
is a pressure on government officials (and anyone wishing to command influence beyond the
community) to convert to a government-endorsed world religion (agama), such as Christianity or
Islam.  
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1993), have answered the same question primarily with reference to various political
incentives for shamanship, especially “leadership,” loosely understood. Atkinson and
Tsing have both studied dispersed swidden cultivators closely resembling the Bentian in
terms of social organization and they both regard a pursuit of political authority and an
ambition to create communities, or followings of dependants residentially concentrated
around the shaman, as integral to the shamanic enterprise. Among the Bentian, I do not
find that belian authority amounts to much political authority, or very much authority of
any other sort outside the sphere of belianship. There is, in fact, a negative correlation
between belianship on the one hand, and high manti status or occupation of government
office such as village leadership, on the other. Belians are simply too busy to lead
community affairs, it is said (in contrast, the warahs, who are engaged in their occupation
somewhat less frequently, more commonly combine their position with political office),
and it seems that ambitious men vie for either religious or political authority or at least
end up principally obtaining just one.  With regards to residential concentration of163
dependants, belianship may perhaps be of minor benefit, although I have found no
evidence that swidden clusters generally are concentrated around belians (cf. Atkinson
1989:270-72), or that belians are more engaged in this pervasive Bentian pursuit than
other elderly men. And even though house (lou) leaders, who in that capacity are regarded
as manti, quite frequently are belians, they are also usually male elders, which, in this
connection, matters more than belianship.  
However, due to knowing and mastering things which others do not know or master,
belians do usually enjoy some level of prestige on account of their occupation (especially,
of course, if they know more than other belians), which is in itself quite an important
motive for belianship. Because of their spirit familiars, ancestral connections, language
skills, and what they have done for people, belians also command at least some degree
of respect, which, apart from psychological benefits, may grant them certain social
advantages such as gifts, assistance or compliance from others, although not political
authority. For instance, Kakah Ramat, who in addition to being a renowned belian was
also an elder with an eminent moral reputation, commanded considerable respect, and if
there were any person in the village which its two foremost manti, Ma Lombang and Ma
Bari, would hesitate to command (siu) or forbid (kelamen) in any matter, it was Kakah
Ramat. 
Yet another alleged benefit of belianship is that belians are said to be especially
desired by women, a reputation that they owe to their assumed knowledge of love magic.
      Some of these post-ritual prohibitions are temporary, others permanent. Every ritual is followed164
by a few days-long prohibition for the patient from leaving the house where the ritual was held, and a
similar or briefly longer prohibition for people not taking part in the ritual from entering the house
(for the duration of which the peeled inflorescence of the areca palm, mayang sepoon, is hung outside
the entrance of the house). Those who receive treatment are also frequently assigned special food
prohibitions lasting either for their whole lives or the duration of their illness. 
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Their skills in magic are also said to provide them with another odd reputation, that is,
one for a proficiency in sorcery. Even though belians generally are expected to act
unselfishly for the common good in accordance with an ideal associated with the
ancestors, it is recognized that they hold through their spirit connections and knowledge
of spells and esoteric techniques the power not only to protect themselves and their
families, should it be needed, but also to hurt others. This is regarded as particularly true
for belians practicing belian sentiu, an increasingly popular curing style employing
downriver, Kutai Malay speaking spirit familiars, which is regarded as especially
effective for combatting sorcery (which is feared today except from fellow Bentians, but
from recent non-Bentian migrants to the area). Rather than being something negative,
however, this reputation of the belians may, as Atkinson has noted for the Wana shamans
(1989:274-76), actually serve their interests, by contributing (through fear of retribution)
to the above-mentioned respect and favors that they tend to receive.  
Even though it does not translate into very much power outside their office, the
influence that the belians wield in their capacity as belians is considerable in itself.
Having, with the warahs, a near monopoly on institutionalized contacts with supernatural
agencies, and thus mediating most of the interaction between spirits and people, they are
in an important position to influence people's lives. Rituals are commonly proposed by
belians, and like the manti, on whose initiative rituals are also frequently held, they are
likely to suggest their arrangement when it lies in their own interest to do so, and may
dismiss or defer them when it does not. The belians also determine postritual restrictions
(pali) which the patient and other ritual participants should observe.  Thus, belians164
make an important difference in people's lives. From an emic point of view, the greatest
difference that they make relates, of course, to the illnesses and misfortunes which may
be cured or prevented as a result of their agency. Kaharingan Bentians take their
dependence on belians for granted and their mediation in various sorts of difficult
situations as imperative. As among the Wana, “[t]he idea of having a loved one die
without the care of a powerful shaman is grievous” (Atkinson 1989:290). And through
the notions of the soul, in whose traffic the expertise of belians is indispensable, a
dependence on the belians is, in Atkinson’s (1989:119) words, “built into the very
constitution of the person.” 
Very similar notions and conditions that relate to the belians pertain also to the
warahs, who limitations of space prevent me from considering more extensively here.
The souls of dead relatives should receive the proper treatment of a warah (or actually
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of several, as it takes at least two to perform a gombok) to insure their satisfaction in the
afterlife (and thus, indirectly, their descendants well-being). Among the differences
between belianship and warahship, the pay (upah) of warahs is somewhat higher (but
their performances are also more demanding as well as more infrequent), and that a
special source for their authority is their expertise on death, which others, including
belians, tend to be afraid to deal with, and which gives them, as spirit connections do for
belians, a reputation for having particular soul strength (tokeng juus). Like the belians,
the warahs are highly respected, perhaps slightly more so than the average belian. Among
the Benuaq where mortuary ceremonies are more elaborate, the relative status of
warahship is even higher, as it is among the Ngaju, famous for their month-long tiwah
mortuary rites, where the status difference between priests (basir) and shamans (balian)
is vast (Schiller 1997). Another important source for the status and authority of the
warahs is that they are regarded as particularly knowledgeable about ancestral tradition.
Like buntangs, the similarly liturgy-centered gomboks contain extensive chant materials,
which means that the warah must obtain considerable knowledge of chants, as well as
origin stories, which are performed mainly during gomboks and buntangs. The warahs
also have an unparalleled knowledge of the identity and kin relations of the recently dead
in a community, as the deceased's dead relatives are always invited to take part in
gomboks.
Ancestral, Object, and Protecting Spirit Authority
Most of my discussion relating to Ma Mar's buntang has so far concerned mainly one
aspect of it, the soul retrieval attempt. Soul retrieval, however, forms only a rather small
part of the buntang, and not a particularly characteristic part. The buntang is an
essentially collective ritual, and that most of its activities regard thanksgiving and
supplication, which in distinction to curing activities (bekawat), are performed less for
the benefit of a particular identified patient than for the benefit of the sponsoring family
as a whole. While buntangs usually include curing activities, they are simultaneously
expected to be joyous collective festivities, particularly on the Day of Hanging up the
Ibus Stripes, when special decorations are constructed, and important protecting spirits
arrive along with the “headhunt skull” (brought from the forest where a mock headhunt
is staged), as well as on the climactic final day of the ritual. On these two days the
principal animal sacrifices are made and the meat served with rice in rows to the
participants who at certain points in the ritual program start “yelling and yodelling”
(nyelele nyelayau), crying out in penetrating voices said to signify the festive mood that
      Also indicating the ideally festive character of the ritual, buntangs were formerly associated165
with drinking and various special games. Interestingly, Bentians used to drink alcohol (tuak,
fermented sugar palm wine) on festive occasions, particularly buntangs, but stopped drinking
altogether some time in the early part of the twentieth century, allegedly because of the evidenced
disadvantages of alcohol (especially fights). Similarly, various indigenous games used to be played in
connection with rituals but have today become obsolete or rare (an exception is some of the games
played as amusement for the souls of the dead during secondary mortuary rituals), as is the case with
some genres of music and song performed outside the context of ritual. What this indicates is that
what we could call Bentian “secular culture” generally has witnessed a degree of atrophication during
the last couple of centuries, at the same time as ritual traditions not only persist, but even appear to
have diversified in the same period.
      It should be recognized here that I owe my translation of ulun tuha one as “the elders of bygone166
days” to Briggs (1988:327) who uses this formulation to translate a concept used by the Chiapas of
Mexico to designate their ancestors.
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should ideally prevail.  From the Day of Hanging up the Ibus Stripes onward, collective165
ritual action involving a greater or lesser number of the participants (expressing their
support for the patient and/or the sponsoring family) also occupies a prominent place in
the program activities. During this second part of the ritual, the manti of the house is also
likely to give one or several speeches (prior to some of the main collective meals and/or
in connection with the distribution of plates as rewards for ritual work at the conclusion
of the ritual) in which he thanks the participants for their assistance. 
In the remaining part of the chapter I will focus on some aspects of religious authority
whose significance in the buntang reflects particularly its collective orientation and its
concerns with thanksgiving and supplication. These are the complexly interconnected
authorities of the ancestors, the protecting spirits, and the various objects used in the
ritual. The ancestors have already received much consideration in this chapter, but mostly
in their malevolent aspect rather than in their capacity as benefactors. Apart from being
protecting spirits addressed with offerings and appeals in the buntang, Bentians regard
them as the source of most that they know. Had it not been for the ancestors, typically
referred to as an anonymous collectivity by the term ulun tuha one, “the elders of bygone
days,”  people would not be who they are today, is a basic tenet repeatedly expressed166
in various formal and informal circumstances. The ancestors, or ancestral
origin/precedence, is also the single most referred to source of legitimation for various
kinds of action and states of affairs in everyday discourse. This holds true for most
everything conceived as indigenous (e.g. agricultural practices) and especially for
customary law and ritual. When asked about the significance or purpose of a particular
ritual practice, Bentians typically point to its ancestral origin as its sole or ultimate
meaning. 
The importance of the ancestors is closely connected with a fundamental Bentian
notion that the origin (asar) of practices and things has to be traced back or at least
recognized in order to enable their proper use or appropriation. This notion is exemplified
      The fact that people in some villages in connection with the initiation of rattan cultivation in167
the nineteenth century brought rattan seeds from Pasir (rather than take them from plants in the
forest) for the reason that rattan cultivation originated there, represents a striking illustration of this
notion. Other, somewhat more prosaic examples are the recitation by the warah in ritual of lines of
past teachers allegedly going back to the first warah that practiced gombok, and the recitation of
genealogies of spirits in various contexts of rituals.
      Like much mythology elsewhere in Southeast Asia (cf. Endicott 1970; Gibson 1986; Smedahl168
1989:54-58), the Luangan tempuun postulates an anthropomorphic origin for most things in the
world. In these stories, the entities whose origins are related came in most cases into existence as a
result of the transformation of particular ancestors into them upon death.
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by various events and conventions,  but perhaps most prominently by the mandatory167
recitation in grander rituals of tempuun recounting the origins of the sacrificial animals
and plants used as construction materials for the ritual paraphernalia, a practice whose
ancestral orientation is reflected by the anthropomorpic origins of these animals and
plants  and the ancestral origins of their use in ritual (also recounted in the tempuun),168
as well as by the fact that the activity takes place by the longan. The notion is also
exemplified by the already mentioned concept of puun (from which the word tempuun
is derived) which, besides tree trunks, designates individuals, groups or houses standing
in a position to others as trunks to branches (pakaak) or tips (lai), that is, in a founding
relationship. Indicating the social implications of such a position, puun is also a verb
meaning “to own” or “take responsibility over.” The authority of both the ancestors and
the elders is to an important degree justified by the notion of puun.
The recitation of tempuun can also be taken to indicate the fundamental importance
of material prestations and certain objects in ritual, without which rituals would be, as
Bentians see it, hopelessly incomplete. While chants generally are considered to be the
most instrumental aspect of ritual action, the material setup of rituals is regarded as
absolutely indispensable for most kinds of ritual action performed. For non-belians, the
animal sacrifices and ritual paraphernalia are usually also the subject of much greater
concern and explicit discussion than the words of the chants (which in performances
often are barely audible), reflecting the recognized expertise of belians with respect to
the chants, and the greater conspicuousness to the participants of the sacrifices and ritual
paraphernalia in performance, but also the considerable expenditures and workload which
the animal sacrifices and making the ritual paraphernalia frequently involve. However,
it is not only certain major, performatively prominent material ingredients of ritual, such
as the sacrificial animals or the longan, that have such importance. Indeed, the same often
goes for many less salient material aspects of ritual, some of which may in fact be
absolutely crucial, as was demonstrated during the drought of the swidden year of 1997-
98, when thick smoke from Bornean forest fires enveloped much of Southeast Asia, and
the resulting shortage of sticky rice (pulut), which is a basic ingredient of the
inconspicuous food offerings (okan penyewaka) used in “paying respect” (besemah) to
 I was told that spirits can simply not be contacted without these offerings, and that the latter may     169
not be replaced by any substitutes. In addition to the shortage of sticky rice, a scarcity of ordinary rice
also contributed to the absence of rituals at the time. Because of the extreme drought, few Bentians
were able to obtain any rice whatsoever from the harvest in 1998. Even though most people managed
to buy most of the ordinary rice that they needed for household consumption from outsiders (in
distinction to sticky rice, which was generally unavailable for sale), they were unable or unwilling to
obtain the amounts required to feed the participants in larger rituals. The fact that very few rituals
were held in the period becomes especially remarkable if we consider that in many villages, in an
ordinary year, hardly a week goes by without some ritual being held. 
 One explanation for the need of material mediation in ritual was already suggested by the Dutch     170
colonial officer Jacob Mallinckrodt (1974 [1925]) with respect to the Lawangan of the middle Barito (a
Luangan subgroup related to the Bentian), among whom the millenarian Nyuli movement held sway in
the early 1920's. As the principal reason why this movement developed among the Lawangan rather
than among their Ma'anyan and Ngaju neighbors, Mallinckrodt proposed a greater ancestral orientation
and less developed religious beliefs and institutions on the part of the Lawangan which he argued made
them more strongly compelled to comply with precedent and thus less prepared to adapt to the social
changes imposed by the Dutch at the time (settlement in nucleated villages, taxation, forced
participation in road construction projects). He then illustrated both these features of Lawangan religion
with an alleged dependence among the Lawangan on what I have here called “material mediation,”
especially by the mandatory use, as a means of contacting spirits, of ancestor skulls and other “fetishes”
(such as the bamboo figurines referred to in Ma Putup's chant). In so doing, Mallinckrodt essentially
meant to suggest that the religious beliefs of the Lawangan were on a lower evolutionary level than that
of their neighbors, and that their inclination for material mediation was a reflection of this. In contrast
to Mallinckrodt, I will not be concerned with understanding Luangan  material mediation in ritual as an
expression of primitiveness. Some of  Mallinckrodt's observations regarding the Lawangan, on which
he based his arguments, notably also appear to have been invalid in the first place. For example, he
claimed that the Lawangan recognized only one kind of “higher beings,” known collectively as
duwata/dewata, among whom no division of labor existed, and that religious specialization among the
Lawangan was only rudimentary, all claims that are contested by information that I have received from
present-day Lawangan informants who described Lawangan religious beliefs and practices as
essentially similar to that of other Luangans. Also, his suggestion that the Lawangan used “fetishes”
only for mediation (in contrast to people on a higher evolutionary stage among whom they had also
acquired the function of protection) lacks grounds. Among Luangans, skulls and material objects are, as
we shall see, associated with protecting spirits (pengiring) as a result of which they indeed have a
protective function.
218
spirits in all rituals, almost completely prevented rituals from being held in many Bentian
villages.  The Bentian also seem to be particularly rigid concerning the ritual169
paraphernalia in comparison with many of their neighbors among whom rituals in this
respect often have become significantly downscaled. Some ritual objects that they use —
e.g. the ancestor skulls and the headhunt skull — are used despite a stigma of
primitiveness being attached to this use. Obviously, ritual objects have a significance
which makes it difficult to do without them (or even to replace them with substitutes).
What is it about objects which makes them so important? Why this essentiality of
material mediation in ritual?  Addressing these questions can tell us something about170
why ritual objects are authoritative, as well as what kinds of authority they transmit.
Before proceeding, it is essential to first recognize that there are many types of objects
used in rituals and that their use may be authoritative for quite different reasons.
Furthermore, some of these objects are attributed with values which make them
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authoritative in themselves, so to speak, whereas others are not associated with any such
values, even though their use nevertheless may be essential. The first category mainly
consists of relatively enduring objects, mostly what I have called ancestral objects, while
the other is predominantly represented by various more or less impermanent ritual
paraphernalia — most of which are constructed anew for every ritual, and typically
discarded afterwards — as well as by the similarly non-enduring sacrificial animals.
Characteristic for buntangs is that a particularly large number of both enduring and
impermanent material items have to be assembled.
Basically, the authority of ritual (and other) objects reflects, I propose, the importance
of reciprocity discussed earlier. Ritual objects are authoritative because they have a
special capacity to index relationships in which some of the actors represent givers,
others receivers. This is basically a function of their sensate substantiality and autonomy
with respect to people (and spirits) which makes them particularly well adapted to serve
simultaneously as extensions of and mediators between them. Furthermore, it is, in some
societies at least, including the one considered here, somewhat difficult to maintain in the
long run an important relationship without exchanging anything substantial, that is, either
objects or services (in contrast to just words), and the same principle evidently applies,
assumingly by way of extension, to Bentian relations with spirits as well. Significantly,
Bentians refer to rituals as “work” (awing) connoting the fact that they represent services
and prestations to spirits and demand expenditures and efforts from the people. It seems
it would also be less plausible to expect something substantial in return from the spirits
— and that is arguably why Bentians most basically enact rituals — if nothing of the kind
was first offered to them. Thus, despite the declared instrumentality of chants, there is
clearly a limit to how far rituals can rely on words alone. Objects are needed to
complement or substantiate words as is indicated by the fact that besemah, or the paying
of respect to spirits, may not be carried out before the appropriate offerings have been
made ready (e.g. on the first night of hastily initiated curing rituals). In other words, it is
clear that objects, as a category of phenomena, possess a particular and distinct authority
among the Bentian, comparable to, but slightly distinct from, that of words. Both words
and objects are obviously seen as essential to ritual; words especially in being regarded
as what is instrumental, objects in particular in being regarded as a kind of necessary
foundation.
All objects used in rituals do not represent offerings in a strict sense. Many elements,
like the ibus stripes which are dyed in red and yellow and suspended on a rattan vine (uen
awoi) intersecting the length of the house where a buntang is held, serve primarily to
decorate and mark the ritual setting, or frame particular activities in it. However, like the
various spirit houses accommodating rice paste figurines (some representing the senders,
some the receivers), or like the ritual work itself, such elements are nonetheless explicitly
dedicated to the spirits and thus actively fulfil the representing-mediating function
      The ancestral objects should be distinguished from what might be called ancestral valuables171
like gongs, old Chinese jars which are used as payment in customary law exchanges (e.g. as fines or
marriage payments). Many ancestral objects such as stones and pieces of wood, the ancestor skulls,
and the longan have of course never been part of such exchanges and have no recognized value in
them. However, some objects, like  pearls and tiger teeth, have been acquired in trade and it is also
perfectly possible for an ancestral valuable such as a gong to become an ancestral object, if someone
starts to use it as such in ritual, and it is withdrawn from exchange.
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described here. Yet other ritual objects, that is, the so-called ancestral objects (pusaka),
are objects which may in fact be categorized as being exempted from exchange.171
Nevertheless, these objects, which are the most authoritative of all ritual objects, also
signify as well as mediate a relationship, indeed, a relationship of a particularly valuable
kind.
I shall say a few words about the ancestral objects which, unlike other ritual objects,
can be seen to constitute sources of authority in their own right. This is the result of the
fact that they are considered to be equipped with a capacity to engender what in the
literature has commonly been referred to as potency (e.g. Errington 1989; Kirsch 1973),
understood here as an inherent ability to generate, by way of mystical means, a general
well-being, associated with such elementary values as health, fertility and prosperity.
Storing (ngona) the ancestral objects is therefore regarded as beneficent, although one
should regularly feed them during buntangs with blood from the sacrificial animals in
order to realize this beneficent potential. One reason for the authority of these objects is
their association with the ancestors. Being manufactured, found, procured or used by the
ancestors, or even corporeally part of them, these objects — including the longan, the
ancestor skulls and such things as tiger teeth (belin timang), pearls (manik, lemiang) and
strangely shaped stones and wood — typically represent the ancestors both iconically and
metonymically. In a sense they thereby also represent, if we are to accept Godelier's
(1999) analysis of similarly used and valued ancestral objects in other societies, “the
sacred,” understood as “a relationship humans entertain with origins, with the origins of
themselves as well as of everything around them” (1999:179). Imposing a “primordial
debt” on the living and disguising the fact that it is they who produce the society in which
they live, this relationship glorifies and exteriorizes, and thus makes unassailable to
critique what Durkheim (e.g. 1995[1912]:16) called “the authority of society.” It is this
authority which is reflected in the ancestral object, which in Godelier's words forms a
“visible synthesis of everything a society wants to present and to conceal concerning
itself” (1999:174, orig. italics). 
Even though the association of the ancestral objects with the ancestors explains much
of the authority of the former, and some of the latter, the principal reason, as Bentians see
it, for the potency of the ancestral objects is not this association. To a higher degree this
property of these objects instead reflects their more direct and spatio-temporally
unmediated association with certain protecting spirits who are believed to animate or
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reside by them. A most basic quality of ritual objects in general (including the sacrificial
animals) is that they are not mere objects, but are associated with unseen agencies
(spirits) or other invisible aspects or counterparts (“souls”). This imaginary aspect of
these objects is absolutely vital, and at least with regards to the spiritual agencies
associated with ancestral objects, which were often described to me as ajaib (I.
miraculous), I would be inclined to agree with Godelier that “the symbolic is indeed
‘preceded’ by the imaginary” (1999:123), and that “spirits of things” of the kind that we
have discussed here, contrary to what Lévi-Strauss argued for hau and mana, are not
empty signifiers “in [themselves] devoid of meaning, and thus capable of receiving any
meaning at all,” but, instead, fundamentally connected to a primary (imaginary) signified
(Levi-Strauss 1987b:55, quoted in Godelier 1999:18). Thus the protecting spirits
associated with the ancestral objects, for example, are not only symbols of ancestral
authority but regarded as subjects from whose agencies the potency associated with these
objects stem. True, some kelelungan are counted among these protecting spirits; more
precisely, the ancestor skulls are associated with the kelelungan of those persons to whom
they once belonged. To that extent the ancestors are also directly responsible for the well-
being that tending these objects may confer. However, in so far that they are, it is
obviously not in their symbolic capacity, but in their capacity of being emically “real” or,
perhaps rather, “super-real.” 
More important than the kelelungan, however, are the naiyu, a heterogenous category
of protecting spirits sometimes taking human form, sometimes reptilian (e.g. as huge
pythons or as house lizards). It is above all with these beings that the ancestor skulls, the
longan, as well as most other ancestral objects are associated (it is, for instance, these
spirits that the anthropomorphically carved upper ends of the ironwood poles which make
up the legs of the longan represent). A principal property of the naiyu is their desire for
blood, and it is the practice of anointing the ancestral objects with this substance which
is said to be what attracts naiyu to them. This is also true for the potent headhunt skull
(which significantly is not counted among the ancestral objects, even though it, in one
sense, represents one), although in this case the original bloodshed associated with its
acquisition provides an even more important reason for its association with these spirits.
In addition to ritual objects, the naiyu are also associated with special places in nature
(mountaintops, headwaters, waterfalls, etc.) where potency and a strong soul may be
acquired. In fact, the naiyu — whose voice thunder is said to be — are essentially
associated with potency, so much so that if an object is potent, it can be said to “have
naiyu” (naan naiyu) even if that would be so only because of being associated with some
other spiritual agency. In a sense, the naiyu are potency, and it is for this reason at least
as much as for protection that people and communities attempt to attract them as personal
or communal protecting spirits, or temporarily tap their potency by cultivating good
relations with them through rituals.
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Potency, Concentration, and Social Oneness
 
As among other Southeast Asians, concentrating potency is an important cultural
institution in Bentian society. However, rather than being envisioned as an all-pervading
“cosmic energy” of the kind described for the South Sulawesians by Errington (1989) or
the Javanese by Anderson (1972) and Keeler (1987), potency among the Bentian mainly
comes in the more concrete form of endless numbers of naiyu and other protecting spirits.
In further contrast to these people, the Bentian pursuit of potency is an almost exclusively
ritual and predominantly collectively organized pursuit, generally less esoteric in
character. To a very high degree, it is concurrent with the supplication activities
performed as part of buntangs and (to a lesser degree) other rituals. The objective of these
activities is to obtain potency by cultivating good relations with the spirits, particularly
the protecting spirits (pengiring). Similarly, if anything concrete was obtained through
the apparently rare instances of Bentian headhunting, it was naiyu, rather than the by now
infamous category of “soul stuff” (zielestof) devised by Adriani Kruyt (1906). Indeed, it
is doubtful if we can talk about accumulation of soul among the Bentian. Unlike among
the ToLuwu studied by Errington, where sumange' denotes not only the soul, but also a
widely disseminated potent energy, associated, unevenly, with people as well as objects,
and constantly transferred between them, the Bentian concept of juus covers only “the
soul,” not potency. There is, for instance, no juus concentrated in the longan, where the
concentration of powerful naiyu, however, is the strongest, just as that of sumange', in
South Sulawesi, is densest in the royal regalia. The soul can admittedly be hardened by
various events or activities, as it may be weakened or lost as a result of others. And the
state of the soul may  be affected by the protecting influence of the protecting spirits. In
that respect there is a connection between souls and potency, albeit a less straightforward
one than there appears to be in the more potency obsessed (and hierarchic) state societies
of the region.
Despite the differences, however, there are also some obvious similarities with
regards to potency and concentration between these societies, on the one hand, and the
Bentians, on the other, similarities to which the enigmatic longan in particular bears
witness. One such similarity is represented by the notion of some sort of a center, within
society, that represents a principal source of (endogenous) authority (the ruler and the
regalia in the former case). Establishing such a center is precisely what “erecting the
longan” is all about. Holding a buntang amounts to constructing a temporary center of
activity (e.g. a house, ideally a lou) where invited people and spirits gather. Within this
ritual space the longan represents the inner center, the place where most of the most
central ritual activity takes place, and where most of the most potent spirits congregate,
who are either spirits of the ancestors (including the belians' spirit familiars) or highly
authoritative heavenly spirits originating as ancestors (including some heavenly naiyu and
      This observation contests, we may note, Errington's statement that “[t]he political geography172
that potency constructs for [Southeast Asian] hill-tribes is an outward-looking one” (1989:300). Even
though much authority in Bentian society, as we shall see in the next chapter, is exogenous, at least as
much is internal and conceived to be so. Similarly, against this background, Atkinson's (1989:226)
analogous characterization of shamans as people who concentrate exogenous authority for the benefit
of the community appears somewhat problematic if applied to the Bentian case. Despite their position
at the periphery of the Southeast Asian state, the Bentian regard themselves as occupying centers of
their own, including both their family lou which represents their personal source of ancestral
authority and the central Luangan area which represents the collective source of indigenous tradition.
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the above-mentioned seniang), or spirits of the house and its sacra, in other words, spirits
who in some sense or another represent the local, the domestic or the indigenous (by
contrast, forest and other foreign spirits, including those of the headhunt skull, tend to be
addressed at the threshold of the main door, or, if suspected of soul theft, by the patient).
Thus potency, which as this indicates is predominantly endogenous,  is quite172
literally concentrated in buntangs. But even when buntangs are not held, the longan, as
a symbol of identification for a housegroup and its continuity with the past, represents a
node of spatio-temporal unification. As such it reflects a basic aspiration in society, that
of being united with one's relatives and preferably also residentially concentrated with
them under one roof, an aspiration which is particularly close at heart to the manti, but
which to some degree concerns all people (at least to the point that everyone would
probably subscribe to it in theory). This aspiration, represented also by the physical form
of the longan, (i.e. by the connection of its legs at the base) is counteracted by countless
centrifugal tendencies beginning from swidden cultivation and marriage, but it forms
nevertheless a preeminent moral ideal in Bentian society of the same order as that of not
breaking one's ties. Its attainment, along with such things as prosperity and many
children, also constitutes a goal in itself, indexing socio-material well-being. In so far as
concentration takes place, as it ideally should, in a lou, accomplishing it conforms to
what Errington calls “centeredness,” a state which she sees as “ultimately moral as well
as practical and beneficial, for to be close to the center is to be close to the ancestral
potency that brings peace, fertility, safety, and effectiveness to the world” (1989:139).
Concentration need not, however, be localized at a center to be beneficial, although it is
likely to be more beneficial if it is. As among the Ilongot, gathering together (berinuk,
bekekoke) is intimately associated with obtaining strength, and it provides a standard
means of “confronting external threats and unexpected afflictions” as numerous
traditional narratives bear out (Rosaldo 1980:121).
In order to illustrate the supplication process among the Bentian and the importance
of concentration in it I have included an excerpt from a chant from Ma Mar's ritual which
was presented by Ma Putup on the ritual's final evening in connection with Makan aning,
Offering Cooked Food to the Clean Ones, a supplicatory activity addressing the
kelelungan together with the seniang, both of whom, in authoritative distinction to other
protecting spirits, only accept cooked food offerings. Chants with rather similar contents
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were delivered in connection with Ngulas pusaka, Anointing the ancestral objects with
blood, and Makan utek layau, Feeding the headhunt skull, when favors of the same type
were requested from other protecting spirits (principally naiyu) with different dietary
predilections. The appeals made in the chant are notably expressed in botanical and
zoological metaphors but they concern, of course, people. As is typical, they are preceded
by a characteristically elaborate description of the offerings (in this case, cooked food)
the elaborateness of which may perhaps be taken to indicate, besides an aspiration to
poeticize, the importance of their substantiality. 
Offering Cooked Food to the Refined Ones
1  receive the rice served in rows
2  accept the accompanying side dishes
3  delicious meat and tasty vegetables
4  together with the heart of the fat cucumber [domestic pig]
5  the liver of the wildboar fostered [domestic pig]
6  chicken feet bowed like the puai plant
7  jawbones like open fishing sieves
8  tails ramifying like the potai tree
9  heads in segments like durian fruits split open
10 flat thighs like blades of axes
11 ribs like the splinters of basketwork
12 oooo-aaah-eee-eee
13 as an ending to the booms of drums
14 finishing the clink of the gamelan
15 as an ending to the merry clamor    
16 finishing the jocular singing
17 on this particular evening
18 as a conclusion to the purchase of souls
19 finishing the exchange of life forces
20 reporting requests addressed to you
21 accounting appeals swiftly delivered
22 addressing you kelelungan souls 
23 you the clean ones
24 Olo Seniang Bulan [different seniang, as in lines 25-28)
25 Itah Seniang Otur 
26 Kawit Seniang Kengkeng
27 Baritu Ebok Jangking 
28 Seniang Samat Sahut 
29 as a sign that we ask for the patient to recover
30 wish for the illness to heal
31 for the souls to return, 
32 the life forces to come back
33 that we want to get stronger and still stronger
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34 want to get taller and yet taller
35 ask for you to erect the bodily hairs
36 ask for you to harden the spurs
37 that the ali fish become many, the ruai fish numerous
38 everyone becomes old, lives a long life
39 all the women become vigorous like rattan
40 all the young men vigorous like the manau rattan
41 their children fine and healthy
42 the ali [fish] gather many in one place
43 the ruai [fish] gather many in one house
44 the stems of the betung [bamboo] form arches
45 the balo [bamboo] grows in clumps
46 the trunks of the lenayup [tree] amass
47 the trunks of the semeluang [tree] throng
48 ask for the strangler fig to branch profusely
49 the nansang [tree] to extend its branches
50 beginning from now on
51 continuing hereafter 
52 let everyone become old, live a long life
53 all the women become vigorous like rattan
54 all the young men vigorous like the manau rattan
55 their children fine and healthy
A special reason for the positive value attributed to social concentration is that it is
closely connected with social concord, which in its turn is conversely associated with
supernatural danger, described in terms of “heat” (layeng), soul weakness, and
susceptibility to spirit attack. Socially confrontative or otherwise sensitive action is often
regarded as very dangerous in these terms among the Bentian, typically not only for the
offenders but also for any people affected (for which reason one may, for instance, be
fined simply for arguing in someone else's house, an offence called turak daya,
“splattering blood”). By contrast, social concentration, which like “ancestral language”
is above all the business of senior men, holds the potential of bringing health, prosperity
and strength, all things which one hopes to receive through supplication addressing the
spirits. 
Social oneness is thus a fundamental quality of concentration, just as it is a basic goal
of the buntang. This oneness is reflected not the least in the formats of the chants and
other ritual action, which almost exclusively can be categorized as monological in
character (this observation parallels that of Kuipers [1990:137-166] who found
monologue to prevail in a category of Weyewa rituals which he calls “rites of
fulfilment”). Just like expressions of dissension, dialogue is virtually absent from the
official program of the ritual, whether referring to the belian chants or the speeches of the
manti. The belian speaks in the voice of the ancestors, and he speaks for an ostensibly
undivided community, as one for all. Perhaps nowhere in the ritual is this constellation
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clearer than when he is left to himself reciting origin stories by the longan, the central
point of articulation in the ritual, reduced to a deferent and unassertive embodiment of
his role, simultaneously representing both. Whatever cleavages and animosity there may
be in the sponsoring family or the audience more generally, they are treated as if they did
not exist. In a sense, there is also no proper negotiation taking place: the spirits are
offered and the spirits receive, the participants give and the participants receive (however,
what each party “really” receives is an altogether different matter, determinable only at
a later stage). What holding a buntang in a very basic sense comes down to is making an
abstract statement of unity, and submitting people and spirits, everyone invited, to this
statement, without really giving them a chance to contest it, at least not within the official
program of the ritual (possessions, absences and the like, however, may express
contestation outside it). It is the show of the sponsoring family, nevertheless, and it is
they who are recognized to stand to benefit most from the ritual, just as it is they who
pay. Even though the official goal of the ritual is the cultivation of the sponsoring family's
relations, by placing them at the center it also conspicuously attests to their existence as
a distinct and semi-autonomous social entity. Needless to say, this fact is often an
important consideration when buntangs are arranged, even though considerations of this
kind, because of their potentially divisive implications, tend to remain outside the ritual's
official, relation-affirming agenda. 
In Ma Mar's buntang, social concentration was also relevant, on several different
levels. As already indicated, various social concerns were highly significant for this
particular buntang, as they usually are. Foremost was the consecration of the new family
constellation of the sponsors, and its ritual recognition was deemed essential not only to
ensure good relations with the spirits — among whom the protecting spirits of Kakah
Unsir's house and the recently dead ancestors of the family were especially relevant in
this respect — but also with the living members of Kakah Unsir's family, including, in
particular, Nen Pore's brothers Ma Kerudot and Ma Unsir who mainly stayed out on their
swiddens and appeared somewhat disengaged with their source family, maintaining
stronger connections with their wife's and children's families, respectively, both of whom
lived in other villages. Strengthening the internal cohesion of the housegroup was also
a general concern addressed by the buntang, desired in particular by Kakah Unsir who
wanted to see his children and grandchildren (anak opo) unified in his house in a
collective effort serving to enhance the welfare of all and that of Ma Mar more
particularly, as well as that of Kakah Unsir himself (whose eyesight and body aches were,
as said, tended to in the ritual).
In addition to these principally internal social concerns of the family, there were also
a number of more external ones, for which relations beyond it were crucial. As I
mentioned earlier, the status of Kakah Unsir's housegroup as one of the four principal kin
categories in the village and its somewhat strained relation to the other ones were
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important social concerns addressed by the ritual. With respect to these matters, the
concrete participation of those associated with the group, but also of others recognizably
not, formed essential objectives of the ritual. The people of Kakah Unsir's house and
those of Ma Mar's (who, after Ma Mar had moved in with Nen Pore, had become even
more integrated than before) were relatively poor as well as somewhat low-ranking socio-
morally (not the least because of their internal marriages), and they had a reputation of
sticking to themselves and not sufficiently contributing to common village affairs. Kakah
Unsir as the principal elder and only self-confessing manti of the two houses was
regarded as “crazy” (kuto), and his loud and persistent claim to descendence from a past
leader said to have founded the village was ridiculed.
Against this background, the arrangement of Ma Mar's buntang formed a complex
socio-political statement regarding Kakah Unsir's housegroup and its relation to the rest
of the village. It aimed to manifest their status as a discrete social entity worthy of others'
respect and endowed with the capacity to mobilize both the economic and social
resources necessary to hold a buntang, at the same time as it sought to improve their
deteriorated relations with the rest of the village. Despite their detachment, most people
in Kakah Unsir's downriver part of the village were, in fact, united with the rest of it in
sharing a common concern for the integrity of the (unofficial) village as a whole as well
as by an ambition to once again become independent from the neighboring village of
Datai Munte to which it now administratively belonged (they had already once succeeded
in this, but then lost their autonomy again). Significantly, there was one person who
actively functioned as an unifying link between the two village parts (which were
separated by a tiny brook), namely, Ma Lombang, the manti who arranged Kakah Unsir's
ritual as well as delivered the speeches given during it. A younger brother of Nen Pare's
and Nen Bujok's father who had been a village leader of Temiang while it was still
independent, and a vigorous manti himself, Ma Lombang had a personal interest in
arranging Ma Mar's buntang (such things being what the manti characteristically do) just
as he had in defining himself as the “trunk” or “owner” (puun) of his nieces and their
husbands (Ma Mar and Ma Putup) and thereby assuming responsibility for them (taking
responsibility or bertanggung jawab, I., being a paradigmatic manti activity, especially
under the influence of New Order rhetoric). However, he was also playing out a
“community agenda,” one which made participation in Ma Mar's buntang politically
motivated, in addition to being morally obligating (which ritual participation, as relation-
affirming and relation-supportive behavior, always to some degree is, lesser or greater
depending on the closeness of one's relation to the sponsors and the gravity of the
potential obstacles, aur, that might cause one not to participate). 
Despite these important incentives for participation in the ritual, however, Ma Mar's
buntang was a rather small one. It succeeded in gathering the family (i.e. the people of
Kakah Unsir's and Ma Mar's houses) but participation beyond the family was quite
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meagre, a fact reflecting the usual absence of this ritual’s sponsors from the rituals of
other villagers. There was a sense that the ritual was not really a success in this respect,
a sense which permeated the atmosphere which was not very festive and fraught with
irritation among the sponsors. Contributing to this sense was the compromised
participation of those people whose presence was most desired in this respect, the
village's foremost belian, Kakah Ramat, and its foremost manti, Ma Bari, who only took
part for one and two evenings, respectively. Making his appearance on the ritual's fourth
night, Ma Bari, who privately complained about the participation pressure, excused
himself for not having appeared earlier by referring to a kerosene lamp that had suddenly
gone out, an incident interpreted as an inauspicious sign preventing him from leaving his
house which would, however, quite likely have been ignored under other circumstances.
As this incident indicates, there are limits to what ritualization can do, and religious
authority (in this case in the form of an omen) may even be used against those relation-
affirming purposes for which it is usually and ostensibly put into use. Nevertheless, the
same integrative aspirations and ideological praise of collective values to which kinship
was seen to add up are clearly fundamental in the religious realm, and it is perhaps
especially along those lines that we should pursue the significance of the buntang and of
Bentian religious authority more generally. 
Conclusion: Ritualization as Authorization
In this chapter I have been looking at some rather diverse aspects of religious authority
(authority pertaining to or deriving from relations with supernatural agencies), including
belian authority, ancestral authority, various sorts of spirit authority, and the authority of
the special language and objects used in ritual. Common to all these varieties of Bentian
religious authority is that ritual is the medium through which they are predominantly
expressed, as well as through which people purposively put them into use through
ritualization, that is, by arranging a ritual in response to some perceived problem or other
concern frequently having supernatural as well as social ramifications. In order to
approach Bentian religious authority in action,  I have analyzed a particular kind of ritual,
the buntang, and as an illustration of the buntang, a particular instance of it. This
undertaking first led me to describe the remarkable complexity of this multiprogram and
multipurpose ritual as a kind of groundwork serving to facilitate a more thorough analysis
of the incentives and implications of arranging such rituals. Since ritualization itself
forms an important strategy of authorization, two principal concerns that I have had in
analyzing the buntang have been with what, more exactly, it is that ritualization does in
this case, and why it is authoritative. 
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Beginning with what ritualization does, I proposed that one of its most fundamental
effects is the translation or reformulation of whatever concerns that motivated it (illness,
farming conditions, social problems) into a discourse of souls and spirits. There are many
important implications of this process which characterizes not only the buntang but also
all other religious rituals performed by Bentians. One such implication is that it
contributes to a process of entextualization — also brought about by various aspects of
formalization, including formalized ritual language — identifying particular rituals as
instances of ancestral tradition, and thereby imbuing the performance with the authority
of that rather sacrosanct institution, the importance of which the particular ritual
simultaneously serves to confirm. Another is that it enables indirect or implicit address
of sensitive issues, especially various social concerns, which as a rule receive almost no
explicit consideration in the ritual. Going hand in hand — especially in the buntang —
with what I have termed an “anonymization” of the people and conditions which the
ritual addresses, the translation into soul and spirit discourse effects a thorough
displacement of the original concerns, a fact which entails that it is actually inappropriate,
strictly speaking, to refer to this process as translation: what takes place in the ritual does
not have such a straightforward relation to what it responds to. As Bell has eloquently
argued, “[p]eople do not take a social problem to ritual for solution.” Instead, “[p]eople
generate a ritualized environment that acts to shift the very status and nature of the
problem into terms that are endlessly retranslated in strings of deferred schemes”
(1992:106). This characterization of what ritualization involves is apt also for purposes
of describing the buntang, especially if we consider the extensive redundancy
characterizing this ritual, in which a majority of the program activities form primarily so
many variations on one or another of its basic themes — thanksgiving, supplication,
curing — adding up to a complexly ramifying traditional statement of a much more
generalized kind than the concerns which occasioned it, but which may nevertheless, as
we have seen, be quite complex and ramifying themselves.
Thus ritualization in the case of the buntang has the effect of, in a sense, creating a
world apart, a world in which the dominant mode of communication is performative
(illocutionary), rather than referential (locutionary) or instrumental (perlocutionary).
What is stated in the ritual is not direct expressions of what people believe, think or feel,
but rather, conventionalized restatements, or, in Tambiah's (1985b:132) words,
“stereotyped conventions...[which] act at a second or further remove...[and] code not
intentions but ‘simulations’ of intentions.” It is, in fact, very much from the fact that they
themselves represent such conventional actions, and thus reenactments of ancestral
tradition, that buntangs basically derive their remarkable capacity for authorization,
including even authorization of conditions violating the principles of that same tradition
such as non-marital sexual relations or parallel cousin marriage. 
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Through ritualization, individual voices and individual fates are cast in a common
collective mould, as when women cry at funerals, wailing loudly according to a highly
stylized, formalized pattern, or when buntang participants — dedicating the sacrificial
animals to the spirits — throw pig bristles and chicken feathers over their heads with a
characteristic wrench of their wrist. This does not mean that important personal concerns
and intense emotions may not be behind such conventional action, despite the
nonindividual (traditional) expressions that they may appear to take. Similarly, while
distanced in a sense, the buntang is in many respects intensely engaged with the everyday
world. For instance, its performative orientation reflects a vitally existential concern,
namely, that of obtaining some measure of what I have called existential or performative
control, that is, a degree of certitude with respect to where things stand and what to do,
a condition which is in fact especially important in situations when there are few or no
courses of instrumental action available to the actor to improve his predicament —
situations in which rituals may be more useful than science (Jackson:1998:23-24).
The logic of the “drama” of soul and spirit discourse is also taken from everyday life.
Being basically about obligations to, and exchange with spirits, the buntang mirrors —
and reinforces — the significance of these phenomena in the social world. The latter is
also concretely present in the ritual and addressing it is something which arranging a
buntang necessarily does already by the fact that locals cannot avoid hearing about it and,
given the great value of ritual participation, respond by either attending or
(conspicuously) not attending. Something which ritualization in the case of the buntang
in a very concrete sense does is effect some degree of social concentration — of the host
family as well as of the guests — and this, too, is a recognized general objective of the
buntang, providing a means to obtain well-being, including further social concentration
beyond the ritual occasion. Thus, the conventionalization of  individual concerns which
the buntang involves is parallelled by the social integration of what are otherwise rather
dispersed communities and kin groups, thereby providing a second sense in which
ritualization amounts to what we might call an “imposition of society.” It was in order
to evoke this very fundamental function of the ritual that I opened this chapter with
reference to the longan, which, in its capacity as a multi-dimensional center of a “ritual
of concentration” — concerned with the concentration of souls, potency and social capital
— metonymically indexes the ritual (as the Bentian also recognize, when they refer to
holding a buntang as “erecting the longan,” nerek longan). A third sense in which the
buntang amounts to an “imposition of society” becomes immediately apparent if we think
about what enters the discourse associated with the ritual, that is, the belian's chants and
the speeches given during it. This is the domain of social, relation-affirming values:
reciprocity, respect, tradition, concentration and unity. Hardly anything is declared which
would involve a forthright contestation of these values. Moreover, the consistently
monologic form that this discourse takes — in the case of the chants as well as the
      This observation is notably somewhat at odds with Sellato's view that there does not in Borneo173
exist any widespread ancestor worship or ancestor cult strictly speaking (1989:43; 2002; but see
2002:1), as well as with what appears as a general attempt by him to downplay the importance of spirits
of the dead in indigenous religions and rituals in Borneo (Sellato 2002). Rather than seeing, like
Sellato, that the importance of ancestors or spirits of the dead has been exaggerated in Borneo, I would
be inclined to concur here with Wadley (2000) that an aspect of religious life generally overlooked in
Borneo studies (beyond the context of secondary mortuary rituals) is the importance of the ancestors. In
the Luangan case, at least, the keeping and the regular ritual “feeding” of ancestor skulls (in buntangs),
and the presence of special rituals (gombok mpe selimat, kwangkai) held to install a “selected few” of
the spirits of the dead as protecting spirits, also motivate use of the term “ancestor” (rather than just
“spirit of the dead”) in the specific, narrow sense advocated by Sellato (2002:1-2,14). And even though
it is true that the spirits of the dead among the Luangan in many ways are treated as “just another sort of
spirit” (Sellato 2002:15), the ancestors (or forebears in general) do collectively represent a special, and
major source of authority, the influence of which stretches far beyond the religious realm.
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speeches — further underscores the same point, as does the transfer of voice or agency,
from ordinary people to belians, that ritualization involves.
What arranging a buntang on a very basic level involves is thus an assertion of, in
Durkheim's phrase, “the authority of society,” a fact which becomes yet more evident if
we turn to what the ritual does through its program activities. Emically speaking, one of
the most important aspects of the buntang is that it invokes and brings to the fore the
spirits, who are agencies whose importance at other times is mostly latent. In doing so
(e.g. through the soul search, or through Nempuk  pali, ascending the pali spirits) the
buntang reminds people of the spirit-induced sanctions of a number of taboos regulating
elementary norms of social conduct, the upkeeping of which is, along with the
arrangement of rituals in order to recompense for violations, one of the most important
consequences of spirit authority, especially with regards to the authority of the blis, or
malevolent spirits. Among the spirits which the buntang invokes are also the highly
authoritative protecting spirits (pengiring) — most of whom, as an expression of their
special authority, may not be addressed during other rituals — including the celestial
seniang who regulate the interconnected moral and natural orders of the world, the naiyu
who represent the principal source of potency in society, and the ancestors to whom the
Bentian say that they owe everything they know, and with whom, in fact, all protecting
spirits are more or less closely associated, either in terms of origins or roles in the ritual,
making the buntang into something of an ancestral cult in disguise.  Through its173
thanksgiving and supplication activities, the buntang celebrates and represents the
ancestors and the other protecting spirits as in various respects providing the foundation
of the lives of the ritual participants, and the latter as being irrevocably indebted to them,
a matter receiving particular force by the general social importance of the principle of
precedence, epitomized by the concept of puun, as a grounds for authority. Culminating
in the anointment by blood of the ancestral objects at the longan, and the offering of
select cooked food to the seniang and the kelelungan, the ritual merges the authority of
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society with that of the sacred, or as Bloch would have it, articulates the former with a
“transcendental order” (cf. Bloch 1987; Bloch and Parry 1982).
Apart from thus elevating and thereby exteriorizing the authority of society, the
buntang simultaneously contributes to make it part of the natural order of things as it
does with respect to religious authority. Because of the frequency with which buntangs
and other rituals are arranged, ritualization has, I have argued, been sedimented as a
“natural attitude of everyday life.” Contributing to this sedimentation is the extensive
redundancy and condensation of the buntang, promoting, in particular, a solid
internalization of its basics. As personally lived tradition, ritualization itself is seen as a
natural thing to do, a fact which in its own right, or because of the properties of what
Bourdieu (1977:170) calls “doxa,” accounts for much of its own ability to authorize. 
Turning to this second basic question that I have posed with respect to ritualization
(why it is authoritative), other factors are also relevant; some, like anonymization and
formalization, because they establish the ritual as ancestral tradition. Of particular
significance is ritual language which is perceived to be the most instrumental aspect of
ritual action due to representing the original words of the ancestors. Formalization
additionally functions to make ritualization authoritative in a somewhat different respect
by generating a code and a set of general conditions inhibiting contestation. Restricting
expression to correct traditional expression, it narrows competence for expression as well
as limits the content and form of what may be expressed into what is congruent with
relation-affirming and non-confrontative values (e.g. monologue). A related factor
working to inhibit contestation is the transposition, at least on the overt plane, of what
is expressed (whether by nonverbal ritual action or by the chants) from the sphere of
particular indexical statements into that of conventional non-propositional enactments,
a process which serves to take ritualization beyond the realm of the debatable (at least as
regards its indexical, if not yet its conventional dimension). As Bloch has articulately put
it: “You cannot argue with a song” (1974:71), and a song is, to an important extent, what
the buntang is, symbolically speaking. In fact, a song, or more precisely, a particular
rhythm and melody played by drums and gongs, is also the only literal meaning which
the word “buntang” has, apart from a designation for the ritual. This musical piece, which
forms something of a signature rhythm/melody of the buntang, played intermittently
during the ritual on spontaneous initiative from the participants without connection to the
belian-led ritual activities, expresses, like the nyelele nyelayau calls, the festive ambience
expected to prevail, but also the kind of “collective effervescence,” (or what comes
closest to it in Bentian society) taken by Durkheim (1995) to most directly express and
arouse his famous conscience collective.  
Even though the oscillation in Bentian society between dispersal and concentration
is probably less extreme than it was among the nineteenth century Australian tribes, and
the excitement associated with congregation less intense, the ultimate source of the
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authority of the rite, if there ever was one, may well be the same in both cases: the moral
community. At its base, religious authority is moral authority. It is, in Durkheim's
(1995:224) words, “but one aspect of the moral influence that society exerts on its
members” (kinship authority being another, I would add). It hereby follows that religious
authority, like kinship authority, does not primarily have a rational or utilitarian
foundation; rather, deference to religious authority has, in Weber's terms, a “value-
rational” basis, as was also Durkheim's (implicit) point regarding the authority of society
more generally (1995:208-216). Thus ritualization is authoritative because it commands
what Durkheim (1995:209) calls “genuine respect,” the ultimate objects of which are, in
this case, the values (e.g. reciprocity, concentration, and precedence) with which Bentian
rituals, and buntangs in particular, are associated.
The most immediate objects of respect invoked by the ritual are not values, however
— no matter how concrete these may be in this case in terms of everyday relevance —
but instead the above-mentioned spirit authorities including the ancestors, and certain
sacred objects representing them. More than an epiphenomenon, the spirit authorities
themselves contribute to the authority of ritualization, as well as contributing to the
authority of the values which they sanction. It is, at least, from the spirit authorities'
assumed blessing (its absence being only potentially and tentatively establishable ex post
facto by untoward developments) that ritualization, in combination with the fact that it
represents ancestral and hence uniquely authoritative action, is perceived to derive its
capacity to authorize (social relationships, residence shifts, etc.). Spirit authority is also
a factor inhibiting contestation of ritualization in so far as the spirits can be taken to
support ritualization, which they usually can, at least in the case of the buntang, since this
ritual, whatever its more concrete objectives, represents an attempt to repay and honor
them. Thus ritualization per se is difficult to criticize — and ritual participation difficult
to resist — even though one may well disagree with some of the indexical purposes
behind a particular instance of ritualization, a condition which accounts at once for much
of the strength as well as the weakness of ritualization.
As Bell (1992:218) observes, ritualization “does not assume or implement total social
control; it is a flexible strategy, one that requires complicity to the point of public
consent, but not much more than that.” What the buntang can do is state a particular
world view, and usually also, granted subscription to that world view, bring people
together. Also, if people, for instance, have decided to move, marry or live together
outside matrimony, it has the capacity to consecrate this. But, if they do not want to, it
cannot make people move, marry or live together. Nor can it, as Bell notes, “turn a group
of individuals into a community if they have no other relationships or interests in
common” (1992:222). And as our example has shown, it cannot guarantee the
materialization of collective effervescence. Thus Weinstock's (1987:97) characterization
of Kaharingan as what “weaves the societal thread that binds the community from life
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through death [italics added]” is appropriate not only in highlighting the centrally
important integrative function of the religion, but also in providing a sense of the delicacy
of this medium of integration.
 Thus my understanding of political authority is, in a sense, close to conventional anthropological     174
understandings of the concept, that is, it relates to what Hoebel (1958:225) calls “the political
organization”: “that part of social organization which controls relations between groups within the
society in terms of  the societal whole ... [or] of the members of the society qua society in their contacts
with other societies.” However, the fact that I say “authority which is exercised by or derives from
encompassing institutions” indicates that political authority in my view may also apply to intra-familial
relations, a fact making it somewhat wider than conventional anthropological understandings. However,
a view that institutional power exists within households is held also by others (cf. Blanton 1995).
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5. Political Authority: Leadership, Law, and Government
Influence 
Introduction
This chapter considers “political authority,” that is, authority which is exercised by or
derives from encompassing institutions or their representatives. By “encompassing
institutions” I mean institutions which are concerned with the organization of supra-
familial affairs, including inter-familial, communal and supra-communal ones.  What174
I call political authority is a complex category which may perhaps most simply be defined
negatively, in contrast to the types of authority discussed in the previous chapters, as
“secular authority derived from beyond the sphere of kinship.” Political authority is not
to any significant extent exercised by belians, or at least not by belians in their capacity
as such, and those who principally exert it (i.e. the manti) do so not only or primarily
from a position defined by kinship but in a more specialized capacity. However, this is
not to say that political authority is not at all affected by kinship or religion; indeed, as
we shall see, political authority is in some significant respects sanctioned by kinship and
religious authority.
The principal focus of this chapter is on leadership in that it is particularly concerned
with the authority exercised by the manti, but it also examines authority that other local
people exert over each other or themselves and authority that non-locals exert over locals,
in so far as it qualifies as political in the sense outlined above. Besides mantiship, adat
or customary law, which is formally exercised mainly by the manti on special occasions,
but informally frequently self- or other-imposed by virtually everyone in everyday action,
also forms another centrally important political institution analyzed in this chapter, as
does the government, for which the above characteristics of adat equally apply. Together,
these three institutions also form what could be called the trinity of Bentian political
authority. They are closely interconnected institutions, each of whose local importance
has tended to reinforce the others — and thus they cannot fruitfully be studied separately.
     
      In a somewhat rare attempt at systematization, a high-ranking Benuaq manti made the following175
classification of manti ranks: manti (“housegroup heads” or manti who share community leadership
with others), manti mento (“solitary manti,” i.e. community leaders), manti tatau (“great manti,” who
possess supra-community authority or at least renown), and tatau tagas (“great manti who occupy an
official position”).
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A general feature of political authority is that it is relatively exogenous in derivation,
at least as compared to kinship and religious authority which may be regarded as
predominantly indigenous and local. The local significance of mantiship, adat, and the
government each also reflect the importance of the wider world and a long-lasting
historical process of generally increasing regional and local integration which will be
discussed in some detail in this chapter. This process has been far from smooth, however,
and it has not, in many people's view, yet progressed very far. Compared with other
peoples in the region, the Bentian are still unusually weakly integrated, both in respect
to their “internal” and their “external” relations. This fact represents a condition and a
stigma which has thoroughly shaped their understanding of themselves as well as their
relations with others. Understandably, it has also restricted the exercise of political
authority among the Bentian at the same time as the exercise of political authority has
been essentially concerned with altering this condition.
Mantiship through History
The word manti has two somewhat distinct referents: elders acting as spokespersons or
leaders of particular housegroups or other family units, and people recognized as
community leaders. The manti thus form an essentially heterogeneous category; there are,
as many Bentians would be eager to affirm, manti of different ranks and dignity.  Over175
time, the meaning of the term, and the nature of mantiship, have also varied. Analyzing
mantiship, it is therefore necessary to begin by clarifying what it is that we are dealing
with, a task which I will address by going back in time and tracing the development of
the institution. I will present a history of mantiship, which serves not only to illuminate
the past, but also the present: despite having varied in importance historically, most of
the historical functions of the manti that I describe remain important today. Having done
so, I will provide an analysis of mantiship in the present situation, pivoting around a
discussion of the authority of three manti whom I came to know well during my
fieldwork. After that I will discuss the concept and the institution of adat, concentrating
especially on the meaning and application of adat in practice. Finally, I will address the
topic of government authority and other government influences, paying particular
attention to questions arising from the Bentian's precarious predicament of being weakly
integrated politically.
     
 It is quite likely that the same wide application of the term “mantri” also occurs among the     176
Ma'anyan, although Hudson (1972, 1978) is not explicit on this point. He reports, however, that lewu'
families, structurally equivalent to (albeit perhaps slightly smaller than) Bentian housegroups, have
leaders and spokespersons performing similar tasks as those performed by the Bentian manti (Hudson
& Hudson 1978:223). It would come as no surprise if Ma'anyans would refer to these leaders as
“mantri” as well, and we may most certainly assume a certain overlap between them and those
individuals who are referred to as “mantri” on account of acting as adjudicators in adat cases. It seems
that other Dayaks too employ or have employed the term “mantri” in this general sense. Rousseau
gives “mantri” as a local term for elder and describes elders as individuals who play a prominent part
in political activities (decision-making, adjudication) (1990:175, 194-95).  The use of “mantri” in the
sense of leader is undoubtedly ancient. For the Barito region in the late eighteenth century, the term was
used by the Dutch sergeant F.J. Hartman (see Leupe 1864) to refer to Dayak (Dusun) as well as Malay
237
Mantiship before Integration with the Kutai Sultanate
Bentians told me that in the far past they used to be more equal (rata, M.) than what they
later became. Then, I was told, everybody was a manti. Exactly to how far back in time
these statements were intended to apply was not clear; what was clear only was that they
referred to a period preceding the distribution of titles to Bentian leaders by the sultan of
Kutai from some point in the nineteenth century. What was also made clear was that they
referred to a period when residence was highly dispersed and people had not yet settled
in permanent villages, but lived “in the forest” (saang laang) alternating residence
between swidden houses and small dispersed “longhouses” (lou). At this time the scope
of leadership would usually be restricted to leadership over the typically closely related
two- or three-generational families (aben) who would gather in one of these lou. Not
infrequently, a lou would even have several manti, in which case the authority of the
manti in question might be restricted to just one of the component families of the house.
The statement, misleading if taken literally, that “everybody was a manti” referred to an
ambivalently valued condition in which every family, or at least every housegroup, had
their own manti, who would not submit to any other.
I was told that the term “manti,” like that of “tatau” which I shall discuss below, was
an indigenous one, unlike the titles (temanggung, mangku, singa, etc.) which were
conferred to leaders by the sultan of Kutai in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.
However it seems likely that it was originally adopted as a result of outside influence,
more precisely as a result of direct or indirect contact with the sultanates who from about
the seventeenth century prescribed an administrative order in which menteri was a
designation for local leaders charged with the task of administering customary law (adat).
As among the Ma'anyan where mantri designates knowledgeable elders who serve as
adjudicators in adat-law cases (Hudson 1972:46), early Bentian manti were also elders
who administered adat, but among the Bentian, at least, the term had a wider application,
also pertaining to the elders in question in a more general capacity as
leaders/representatives of particular families or houses.  This is not to say that such a176
(Banjar) leaders.
     
 Regarding the distant past we may only speculate, as oral history generally goes back only a couple     177
of centuries at which point it starts to merge with the mythology of the early ancestors. The first,
generally very brief references to the Bentian and other Luangans in the literature date back to the same
period. Nevertheless, it seems, as earlier argued, quite likely that the Bentian’s way of life is quite
ancient. However, even though all information that I have been able to obtain from informants suggest
that the Bentian, like other Luangans, have been swidden cultivators for very long (as does the central
cultural importance of rice in Luangan ritual, and the complexity of the latter), the claims by Weinstock
(1983a:74) and Knapen (2001:98) that the Luangan or Luangans used to be hunters and gatherers
possibly up until the nineteenth century, cautions us against hastening to conclusions on this point.
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position could not have been indigenous to the Bentian. On the contrary, even if the term
were new, self-appointed family heads may well have been acting in the same capacity
since long before, in so far as their social organization and basic way of life had not been
significantly different.  The fact that most family and housegroup manti are elders who177
stand in a puun relationship to their followers attunes well with Bentian and general
Austronesian notions according to which elders should “take responsibility over” their
followers/descendants (anak opo). A more or less formalized code of customary law was
also likely exercised by the same category of people even before the introduction of adat
and the manti concept. Nevertheless, these concepts probably became more self-
conscious and objectified, especially in their capacity as custodians of customary law.
The early Bentian manti thus primarily acted as housegroup heads, as many of them
still do, a task which included, in addition to representation of their subjects in adat
matters, distribution of use rights to lands previously cultivated by the housegroup's past
and present members, arrangement of the members' marriages, custodianship of the
ancestral valuables of the house, and the organization of various daily activities.
However, the responsibility of the housegroup manti was not restricted to internal
housegroup affairs; it also comprised regulation, in cooperation with others of their kind,
of the common affairs of the inhabitants of the usually several lou who together
constituted a named subgroup or community with a distinct, carefully demarcated
territory. Negotiation with other such subgroups over, for instance, community
boundaries, was also an activity in which these manti engaged, and in such activities
some principle of selection presumably operated, restricting the number of manti
involved. However, above the housegroup level early Bentian manti authority was
essentially shared and collective. In this respect, the Bentian situation resembled that of
the precolonial Melanau of coastal Sarawak, among whom “[t]he administration of the
adet [adat], and therefore the political control of the village, always had been in the hands
of a group [my emphasis] of aristocratic elders” (Morris 1978:51). This indicates the
fundamental fact that, similar to the Melanau, “leadership ... was not formalized as a
permanent office, and there were no single political chiefs who ruled villages as of
personal right” (Morris 1978:51). 
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Unlike among the Melanau, however, the early Bentian manti were not what Morris
(1978:48) labels “aristocrats,” a “rank” which the Melanau interestingly term ”menteri.”
As family leaders, the Bentian manti came from and were part of the families that they
represented, who were not ranked according to an encompassing stratification system
similar to that of the Melanau or such Dayak groups as the Kayan (Rousseau 1978) or the
Maloh (King 1978b). In other words, the early Bentian manti were not elected from, nor
did they together represent, a particular, distinct stratum. In a structural sense, their
authority over their subjects was based not on a position of class difference, but rather on
one of kinship relatedness. It was on account of being related to the inhabitants of a lou
—  particularly in the capacity of elder (tuha) and “trunk”/“owner” (puun) — that the
position of a manti as their leader and spokesperson was legitimated. 
Now these observations should not lead us to assume that the Bentian used to be fully
egalitarian, any more than the famously egalitarian Iban, for example, ever were so
(Sather 1996). Even if every, or most, “extended families” had a manti, and there existed
no institutionalized authority above the housegroup, there certainly existed some status
differences between the manti, and between families as well. For example, some manti,
famous till this day, no doubt held more influence in community and inter-community
affairs than did others. With respect to such affairs, those manti who most directly
descended from the ancestor(s) who had founded the community by first clearing land
in the area which was to become its territory were likely at an advantage over other manti
in the community, not the least because of the advantage that this relationship entailed
with regards to their role as custodians of previously cultivated lands (as it meant that
they were likely to manage an especially large reserve of such lands). In an often cited
report on the social organization of the longhouse societies of Sarawak, Edmund Leach
(1950:61) noted that “political authority,” in both what he called the “egalitarian” and the
“stratified” societies of the region, “rested with a small group of related families the
members of which had a more direct linkage to the ancestral founders of the house (or
village) than other members of the community.” The same situation likely prevailed at
least to a degree among the Bentian as well, where one lou within a community was
commonly regarded as puun in respect to the others. However, other factors such as
eloquence and persuasiveness of speech, knowledge of adat, and not least importantly,
ambition, probably mattered at least as much for such relative manti authority, which was
predominantly acquired. For ambitious manti lacking cognatic descent linkages to
community founders, marrying into such a lou also constituted an option compensating
for such genealogical shortcomings.
Yet another and absolutely essential factor with respect to manti authority was the
number of the followers which a manti could draw upon in the capacity of lou leader and,
to a lesser degree, by way of kinship relations transcending lou boundaries. Social capital
is crucial to a manti in many ways, and I will say more about this shortly. Here I want to
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draw attention not only to the established truism that control over manpower (rather than
land) was the basis of leadership in Southeast Asia (e.g. Reid 1988; Wolters 1982), but
also, and more specifically, to the importance of kin relations for the accumulation of
followers. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the force of kinship obligations, loosely
defined, provides a singularly valuable resource in Bentian society, and this is, or at least
used to be, no less true for leaders than for other people. In fact, given the organization
of Bentian society, it was practically impossible for early Bentian manti to obtain a
greater amount of social capital without what might be called “adequate kin resources.”
This does not just mean plenty of kin relations, which practically every Bentian has, but
especially such kin resources as to which relatively few equal or stronger competing
claims could be made by other manti. Most important in this respect were the people who
made up one's own housegroup, and especially one's own and one's close relatives'
descendants over whom relatively strong vertical claims of authority could be made, due
to puun status. This means that manti with many children were privileged, a fact which
partly explains the common practice of polygamy (and possibly some instances of
adoption) among the manti. However, many personal descendants were scarcely enough
in so far as the achievement of a greater degree of “relative” manti influence was
concerned. For such influence, in particular, close collateral relations, especially those
with siblings, appear to have been crucial, both in themselves, but also for the reason that
one's siblings' children count almost as one's own and thus are particularly likely to act
as one's “followers,” a concept whose closest Bentian counterpart significantly is the
metaphorically used term anak opo, which literally means “children and grandchildren.”
Because of inter-manti competition, obtaining a greater degree of manti influence
demanded the backings of a relatively populous lou of one's own, just as one would not
likely be considered a manti in the first place if one did not have at least a minimal
housegroup to represent (e.g. in customary law negotiations or in community meetings).
This condition, coupled with the structural significance of sibling sets for Bentian lou,
meant that belonging to a sibling set, the larger the better, was something of a prerequisite
for influential mantiship (more distant relatives were more likely to act as followers of
other manti with whom they were more closely related). Most past as well as present
influential manti that I heard of also had several siblings, which notably is something
which not all Bentians, because of the low birth and high infant mortality rates, are
fortunate to have.
An additional and most important reason why a manti would benefit from having
many descendants was that he, by arranging their marriages, could strategically expand
his network of followers or create alliances with other influential manti, thus enhancing
his own status. Having many descendants or a large following more generally was also
essential because the accumulated agricultural surplus and workforce thereby acquired
could be employed for the arrangement of grand buntangs, a crucial source of manti
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status — and in itself a principal means of mobilizing social capital. Last but not least,
social capital was necessary in order to obtain forest products (rattan, resins, etc.) for
trade (with itinerant Kutainese/Buginese traders, or Bekumpais settled on the Teweh), as
well as for the arrangement of roing, that is, formalized “exchange visits” carried out by
large groups of men to other, often quite distant communities (e.g. in Pasir, on the
Teweh). As it was through trade and these roing expeditions — which were characterized
by reciprocal gift-giving between ideally allied units — that the Bentian mainly obtained,
besides salt, cloth, kitchen utensils and other necessities not produced locally, their
“traditional valuables,” that is, the objects (e.g. jars and gongs) which circulated in their
adat economy as fines, ritual work rewards, and marriage payments (or which have, in
some cases, been set aside as ancestral objects, pusaka), engaging in such activities was
imperative for the manti. In the first place, such objects formed visible wealth, stored in
their lou, and hence significantly contributed to their status. Yet more important, the
traditional valuables were required for the practice of several central aspects of mantiship
such as the sponsoring of rituals and marriages, and the payment of fines or other debts
of followers or other people. The last-mentioned practice had a special significance in
that it sometimes placed some people, who thereby became labelled ripen, in a relation
of debt-bondage to the manti who acted as their benefactor. Paying back this debt by
doing swidden work and performing other tasks, these individuals would significantly
add to the social resources (and status) of their patrons. So would another category of
“servants” or “slaves” — labelled batang ulun in distinction to the debt-servants — who
were bought from other communities, typically in connection with roing expeditions.
Raiding probably also constituted an occasional source of human and material resources,
although more often it formed a source of depletion of such resources, since the Bentian,
in the period between the late eighteenth and late nineteenth century, were subjected to
recurrent, and sometimes quite devastating attacks by the numerically superior, and
apparently much better organized Pari Dayaks (Bahau, Modang). 
That some early manti were considerably more successful than others in amassing
valuables and social capital is testified by the allegedly indigenous term “tatau,” a word
designating “great manti” (manti solai) with particular connotations of wealth and social
resources. Bentian trade with outsiders enabling accumulation of valuables (which were
not produced locally) had likely been going on for several centuries, thus some general
economic differentiation as well as some manti status differentiation had probably
already developed before integration with the Kutai sultanate gained momentum in the
nineteenth century, a fact which may slightly mitigate the statements that the Bentian
were “equal” (rata) until then. Among neighboring Luangans on the Teweh river, where
trade with downriver people is known to have been extensive since long ago (e.g. see
Hartman 1790 in Leupe 1860; Schwaner 1854), some particularly great manti are said to
have constructed special buildings (petiling), raised on very tall posts, for their unmarried
This local intensification of trade, like that in Kutai as a whole, reflected a more general, regional     160   
intensification of trade, which took on speed especially from the 1820s with the founding of Singapore
and a rapidly strengthening Dutch presence in south Borneo  (see. e.g. Alexander 1992:210; Healey
1985:7; Knapen 2001:380, 383-85; Walker 2002:25; Wortmann 1971b:6). Before this, the trade of the
interior with the outside world had been much less extensive (see e.g. Knapen 2001:374-375, 390;
Sellato 2001:38-39). Thus, the local processes were ultimately prompted, or at least significantly
stimulated by, more global ones.
     
 The people of Temiang, the one community where I stayed the longest time, owned only about a     179
dozen water buffalo as was the case with neighboring Datai Munte. Unfortunately, I did not stay for a
sufficient period of time in those villages which had the greatest number of water buffalos, in order to
explore in depth the animal's significance under such circumstances.
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and secluded daughters, a mythically celebrated practice demonstrating, besides their
fathers' elevated status, incipient tendencies to class endogamy (the daughters were
secluded because they were reserved for marriages with other manti).
Nineteenth Century Transformations in the Bentian's Social and Political Economy
In the nineteenh century, however, the situation changed significantly in many ways,
leading to increasing stratification. In the first place, trade itself greatly intensified with
an unprecedented influx into the interior of itinerant traders — particularly Buginese (cf.
Tromp 1887), but later also Banjarese (Magenda 1991:3).  This followed the expanding178
inland control of the sultanate, as well as the developing tributary relations of the Bentian
with the sultan, who was visited by roing-like groups led by manti in Tenggarong, the
royal capital. Of central significance in this connection was rattan, with the growing
demand stimulating rattan cultivation. As a result of the regional and local intensification
of trade, the availability of valuables increased, enabling (and probably also prompting)
further differentiation. A major new category of wealth first acquired by Bentians at this
time — mainly through roing expeditions to Pasir — was the water buffalo. This animal,
generally rare in interior Borneo, but kept in the hundreds in some small Bentian
communities,  soon became both a paramount status marker of the manti, sacrificed and179
fed to guests during larger rituals (mainly buntang and secondary mortuary rituals,
gombok), as well as an important item in the adat economy, involved especially in larger
transactions. The introduction of the water buffalo into the ritual and adat economy of
the Bentian at this time was certainly not incidental but indexed concurrent changes
taking place in their more general as well as social economy. The intensification of trade
went hand in hand with an increasing stratification, causing transformations in a broad
range of sectors of society. 
An important driving force with respect to these changes was the Kutai Sultanate
which, especially during the active reign of Sultan Aji Muhammad Sulaiman (1850-
1899), distributed numerous titles to upriver tributary leaders (cf. Wortmann
     
 Wortmann (1971a:54) notes that “the 19th century saw such an indiscriminate awarding of them     180
[i.e. “lower titles”] that their prestige became grossly devaluated.”
     
 The Dutch may also have been indirectly responsible for the implementation of this policy in     181
Kutai, by having instructed the sultanate to perform it (see Fried 1995:56). 
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1971a:54),  at the same time as it attempted to concentrate dispersed populations in180
permanent villages, and to relocate them to more accessible locations along navigable
rivers, policies which the Dutch had begun to implement already in the late eighteenth
century in the Barito region (Knapen 2001:88-89, 250).  Motivated by the interests of181
developing taxation and district (wilayah) level administration in upriver areas, these
developments were encouraged by the slowly progressing pacification of the interior
(sanctioned by the Dutch as well as by the Kutai Sultanate), and the now annual royal
ritual of Erau to which representatives of upriver peoples were invited to pay tribute and
stage ceremonies. The titles, substantiated by a letter (surat) and an emblem (seluit)
depicting the Kutai coat of arms, served to represent that the title-holders occupied an
office (pangkat) and thus were authorized by the sultanate to lead and to collect tribute
(later, taxes) in particular villages. Hence they were sought and acquired by many
ambitious manti who because of their interest in obtaining these titles had a strong motive
to establish villages as well as to recognize, in at least some contexts, the sultanate's
claims to authority over the interior. In this respect, the Bentian situation resembled that
in Semporna, coastal Sabah, where peripheral leaders also received titles from the sultan
(of Sulu) through letters with the expectation that they “would collect tribute ... [and]
make periodic visits to the court seat of Jolo,” and where the authority that they thereby
gained, meant that they “had an interest in preserving ... the authority of the sultan”
(Sather 1997:39-40).
Nevertheless, much of the remote interior, including the Bentian area, remained in
reality far beyond the effective control of the sultanate, and the Bentian, who did not have
a tradition of nucleated villages (or village leadership), were quite slow to respond to the
demands for village settlement and tribute/taxation. Contacts with the sultanate were
frequently minimal, in part because of the distance (one to two week's travel, one way),
but also because of a desire to preserve their autonomy. As noted by Carl Bock
([1881]:147) during his 1879 journey through the Bentian area, there existed “a strong
objection to being governed by, and taxed for the benefit of, a Malay ruler.” Many
Bentians at this time apparently took pride in not being suaka (“tributary,”
“subordinated”), a word which still today, despite frequently expressed subscription to
the sacrosanct New Order value of unity, has derogatory connotations. Other factors
which probably also hampered more intense downriver contacts and settlement in villages
were frequent epidemics — in the face of which dispersion (and isolation) were perceived
as the best defense — and trade connections with the Teweh area on the other side of the
 Considering that Dilang Puti had 387 inhabitants in 1939 (Jongbloed 1939), the number reported     182
by Bock was likely an exaggeration, even allowing for several subsequent epidemics, which Bentians
often present as the main reason for their low population numbers today. Certainly all these people were
not normally resident in the four to five lou of the village. It seems more likely that the number given, if
in some sense factual, was meant to include all the people over whom the leaders of the village in some
theoretical sense (e.g. on the basis of a sultanate letter) regarded themselves as having authority, for
example, all the people of the Lawa river basin, or all the people of the district (wilayah) of Bentian
Besar. According to numbers of controleur Jongbloed, the total population of the Bentian villages
existent in 1935 was 2164 people. Today Dilang Puti's population consists of some seven hundred
people, including many in-married individuals and government officials of diverse ethnic origins.
 This is not to say that the establishment of a village in Dilang Puti, and the fact that it was here     183
rather than elsewhere in the Bentian area that the greatest Bentian manti emerged, can be accounted for
by sultanate influence alone. Reference has to be made also to some other  factors, of which I will first
note two which both indicate the historical importance of trade and exchange for mantiship. First,
Dilang Puti is located furthest downstream of the Bentian villages, at the last (normally) continually
navigable section of the Lawa, thus in a particularly favorable position for trade and other contacts with
outsiders (even today, government officials or other people who visit the Bentian area, usually go no
further than Dilang Puti). In the second place, many of the village's founders came from a local group
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Mahakam-Barito watershed outside of Kutai. On at least a couple of occasions, envoys
of the sultan were killed by Bentians resisting what they perceived as attempts at
exploitation (cf. assistant resident Weddik, 1849:133, who considered that the sultan
oppressed the Bentian, along with the Benuaq and the Bongan). Because of the
remoteness of the Bentian area, violence, or the threat of violence, in the form of attacks
from the Pari or other Dayaks also persisted until the turn of the twentieth century,
contributing to a general disinclination for contacts with outsiders.
The first Bentians to establish a still-existing village, as well as more firm contacts
with the sultanate, were probably those of Dilang Puti, the present-day subdistrict capital,
which was founded early in the second half of the nineteenth century. Here were the most
influential leaders ever to have ruled among the Bentian, with claims not only to village-
wide, but even to district-wide authority. Not long after its establishment, Dilang Puti was
already a remarkably large settlement, comprising a large open space and several
sizeable, longhouse-like lou, later connected through long stretches of ironwood
walkways (so that the inhabitants would not have to walk in the dirt on the ground around
the houses where a large number of water buffalo were kept). According to Bock
([1881]:141) it was the “largest and neatest village” which he had seen in Kutai, with an
alleged (but probably exaggerated) population of as many as 1800 people.  As Bock's182
description makes clear, the inhabitants of the village were — unlike the population
further upriver — allies of the sultan already at the time of his visit. The connection with
the sultanate had probably played at least an indirect role in the establishment of the
village, as it did with respect to the government-sanctioned authority encompassing the
upriver communities in the area that the village's leaders later claimed (but these claims
were not much more than nominal in practice, except in the case of the closest
neighboring villages).  Endorsement in the form of recognition from the sultanate meant183
(Rempangan) which in the mid-nineteenth century was known as one of the richest in the Bentian-
Teweh area. Prior to its establishment, these people had bought, in two stages, the land where the
village is located from its previous inhabitants (the Tementang, a Benuaq subgroup) for the remarkable
price of two times one hundred  jars (antang) and one slave. As this indicates, local initiative and
accomplishments achieved independently of the sultanate also played an essential role with respect to
these developments. Before moving to Dilang Puti, the village’s inhabitants had lived in an unusually
large longhouse in a nearby location called Dilang Tonoi. However, besides reflecting leadership
ambitions, the concentration of a large number of people (from several  local groups) in this longhouse
and location was a response to the general disorder that the region was in at the time. Practically all
local groups or communities (benua) were resettling, moving downstream, according to an at this time
typical pattern characterized by each group moving “one step” downriver, thus coming to occupy the
territory of  its closest downriver neighbors. On top of that, the Pari and rebel groups from the Barito
river raided the area (see Tromp 1889:282) and some local groups were in conflict with the Sultan. 
Epidemics also frequently afflicted the area, and as a result of one, the inhabitants of Dilang Tonoi were
forced to leave their longhouse and move to Dilang Puti.
     
 An occasional presence of sultanate troops in the area (for example, accompanying Bock on his     184
journey) in the second half of the nineteenth century, made military support appear plausible. Even
though I do not know if such support ever materialized, other military-backed government interventions
(including punitive actions) reportedly did occur.
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that the leaders' authority was imbued with something approaching state authority,
entailing an external and obviously powerful source of legitimation which at least
theoretically could be drawn upon for military support.  The establishment of a village,184
as a result of the spatial concentration which it entailed (at least occasionally), logistically
facilitated, in turn, a more effective leadership over large populations than what had been
possible when settlement was more dispersed. 
However, it was still to take about half a century before the other Bentian
communities established villages. Even though there were many leaders who claimed to
have received titles from the sultan in most communities (in fact, there were often several
in the same community), these leaders did not usually, because of the internal
competition between them, enjoy enough authority to gather followings large enough to
establish villages, and in many cases, they probably also lacked the ambition. An example
here is provided by the early village of Lendiong where Knappert in 1903 encountered
some five to six leaders who possessed “grand titles” which had been bought from the
sultan's envoys (mantri!), and where the most prominent and “principal” (algemeen)
leader had not yet been able to rebuild the village's sole and desolate lou, despite a
government order issued to this effect six years earlier (Knappert 1905:627). In the 1920s
and 1930s, when all presently existing villages finally had been established (plus a few
which have subsequently been dissolved), most villages consisted of several, in some
cases up to twelve or more, lou, each with its own longan and manti, many of whom
would not recognize the ultimate authority of anyone else. Testifying to such defiance are
the facts that some villages were subdivided by the Dutch administration into a number
     
 The villages in questions were Sambung, Tende, and Randa Empas which were subdivided into     185
Sambung 1 and 2, Tende 1 and 2, and Randa Empas 1, 2, and 3, respectively, because some of their
manti would not defer to anyone else.
 The existence of such forest lou gradually diminished and almost disappeared in the New Order     186
era (1965-1998) when government efforts aimed at concentrating people in villages intensified.
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of autonomous subvillages,  and that many housegroups with their manti continued to185
stay away from the villages in more or less independent (but officially unrecognized)
forest lou until recently.  Bote ene erai blai, “don't build one house,” was a warning that186
I was told was expressed by some Bentians at this time — implying that the members
from several housegroups should not all settle in one lou when taking up village
residence — out of concern for the conflicts that would often arise from such
concentration. 
Despite the strong internal competition, however, some manti managed to attain some
measure of influence over entire communities even before settlement in villages, and they
increasingly did so afterwards. In addition to increasing wealth, the titles, and a
government expectation (established at least at the time of Knappert's visit) that villages
should have one principal leader, such influence reflected the introduction in the second
half of the nineteenth century of the communal nalin taun ritual which the Bentian learnt
from the Benuaq who performed it in Tenggarong as part of the program of the royal
Erau ritual. Like the introduction of water buffalo, whose sacrifice is mandatory in the
nalin taun (in addition to a large number of pigs and chickens), the development of this
ritual, an elaborated version of the buntang, was interconnected with the progression of
several concurrent processes, including the regional integration of the sultanate as a
whole as well as the local integration and increasing stratification of the upriver peoples
concerned. Being performed both downriver and upriver, the ritual served to promote the
sultan's interests in increasing his upriver subjects' trade and tributary contacts with him,
as well as the mantis’ interests in accumulating followers and acquiring external
legitimation of their authority.
According to the view of some older people in the villages where I did fieldwork, the
nalin taun originated among Benuaqs on the upper Bongan (Nyungan), a tributary of the
Mahakam, where it was first arranged to “treat” (nalin) incest/too close marriage
(sumbang), which had incited a solar eclipse (olo kelom), a highly inauspicious sign of
impending misfortune resulting from disturbed relations between “the low ones down
below” (rena uwa), that is,  people on earth, and the heavenly seniang (who act as
guardians of sexual relations, as well as of the natural cycles). Later these Benuaqs, or
others who had learnt it from them (possibly Ohong river Benuaqs), performed this ritual
in Tenggarong, the royal capital, initially, one informant told me, because the sultan, in
order to keep the royal blood pure, himself had commited sumbang. After awhile the
     
 At least upriver, sumbang remained and still remains an important issue addressed by nalin taun,     187
although not the principal one. Correspondingly, such nalin taun which are primarily concerned with
“treating incest” are sometimes terminologically distinguished from other nalin taun by being referred
to as nalin olo (lit. “to treat the day”). On the Teweh river, where nalin taun is only performed rarely
and in a limited number of communities, the format of the nalin olo is somewhat distinct and the ritual
lasts only one day.  
247
ritual became regularly performed in Tenggarong for the general benefit of the sultan and
his kingdom as part of the Erau. Then, as in most cases when arranged upriver, it served
primarily as a combined purification/supplication ritual concerned especially, as
expressed most popularly, with “making fruits ripen, honey abound, wild boar flock, fish
swarm” (adi bua mua, wani murek, bawi japi, kinas jelur), or in other words — as
suggested by the ritual's name, the literal meaning of which is “to heal the year” — with
favorably affecting the course of the natural cycles.  However, as suggested above, it187
is clear that the nalin taun simultaneously also served other, more sociological purposes.
In connection with the performance of the ritual in Tenggarong, small amounts of
husked rice colored red and yellow (boias mea lemit) were distributed to leaders of
tribute-paying Dayaks who took part in the festivities. Back home these leaders stored
this rice in special yellow pouches (yellow being the color of the sultanate) signifying
their status as legitimate, tribute-paying leaders, and reused it in local nalin taun for
which they themselves acted as the principal sponsors. Apart from thereby (by means of
the red and yellow rice) compounding the sultanate's authority with local religious
authority, the institution of the nalin taun simultaneously worked to legitimate (by
external authority) the local leaders' authority (including, apparently, their authority to
initiate a nalin taun). Still more important, from the point of view of the local
sociological significance of the ritual, was the fact that the nalin taun, unlike pre-existing
Bentian rituals, was considered to be a community ritual, arranged for the benefit of and
requiring contributions from all or most families in a community. Thus the manti who
took responsibility for a nalin taun in effect acted as a community leader (as well as
demonstrated great wealth through his personal expenses for the ritual), while the
community, in its turn, made manifest its identity and unity as a community, typically
before an audience including the formally invited members of another community, to
whom entertainment and traditional valuables were offered with expectations of
equivalent returns presented in connection with a counter-ritual. In so doing, the nalin
taun functioned in several mutually reinforcing ways to support the twin ambitions of the
sultanate and many of the manti to establish concentrated village residence and village
leadership — a fact which perhaps explains the coincidence, among the Bentian, of the
greatest popularity and magnitude of the ritual with their early phase of village residence.
One way in which the ritual did so was by “naturalizing” the leadership of the sultan and
the sponsoring local leaders. From the perspective of the sultan, for example, the nalin
     
Bathing, incidentally, on chairs made of a cultivated yellow bamboo with green stripes (bekuan)     188 
associated with the royal court, is also an important element of the nalin taun.
248
taun made, like the royal bath among the Merina of Madagascar, “royal power an
essential aspect of cosmic social and emotional order” (Bloch 1987:294).  Moreover,188
by having upriver people perform nalin taun in Tenggarong, the sultan can be seen to
have appropriated or tamed upriver energy in a way analogous to how the Merina kings
tapped the wild fertility of Vazimba autochthonous spirits in their royal rituals (see Bloch
1987:94-100).
Besides nalin taun, which were held quite rarely (only once in a decade or so), other
rituals also contributed to the status of aspiring manti at this time, especially those rituals
in which water buffaloes now began to be sacrificed, but in principle any rituals during
which large numbers of guests were fed. Especially important in this respect were large-
scale buntangs and secondary mortuary rituals (gombok). Elaborate versions of the latter
(gombok mpe selimat, kwangkai) were introduced or at least became much more common
in this period, another fact reflecting the increasing status ambitions and material wealth
of the manti. Among at least part of the Benuaq, who today are well-known for their
extended and costly kwangkais, these rituals notably represent a nineteenth century
innovation which they learned from the Bentian (until this time they had reportedly
performed only a rather simple form of secondary mortuary ritual, setanggih). Another
aspect of mortuary rituals testifying to growing status concerns at this time is the
construction on graves of stupa-like, many-storeyed monuments of planks (batur), and
the painting with special abstract designs of coffins and sarcophagi used for the storage
of exhumed bones: these practices were either reserved for the manti or permitted only
if certain minimal ritual requirements were met (e.g. the construction of a given amount
of batur storeys required a specific amount of ritual expenses). The common practice of
storing the exhumed remains of ancestors in precious jars possibly also reflects these
concerns, or at least bears witness to the close connection that existed between the
acquisition of status and the attainment of wealth through trade or other exchange, as
does the fact that jars used for this purpose were smashed in order to prevent their reuse
(see Knappert 1905:624).
Typically, those manti who were most ambitious and successful in terms of gaining
supra-housegroup influence were also responsible for the construction of an extraordinary
large lou (lou solai), which often was intended to serve as the center (pusat) of the
community, or even house it in its entirety, at least for the duration of large-scale, status-
enhancing rituals, and especially those  (i.e. nalin taun) which symbolically incorporated
the community's members. For the construction of such lou, the socio-material resources
of the manti involved were probably essential prerequisites, as Miles (1964) argues was
the case with Ngaju longhouses, the virtual paucity of which he interprets as an indication
 Significantly, the outstanding Ngaju longhouse described by Miles (1964) was also built in the          189
1890s by two ambitious men who had become extraordinarily rich by engaging in travel expeditions to
Singapore.
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of the great social (and natural) resources that building them required. Interestingly, the
largest, most durable and most longhouse-like multi-family houses that I have heard of
among the Bentian appear to have been constructed in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, an indication, I hypothesize, of the increasing socio-material
resources available to the manti at this time, and of their concurrent efforts, supported by
the government, to establish villages and village leadership.  Also, before the late189
nineteenth century, ironwood, which as Miles (1964:54) notes is a scarce resource whose
extraction requires extensive collective labor, had not been used as a house construction
material by Bentians — lou and farmhouses alike being made of perishable materials and
frequently rebuilt — an indication of the then emerging pattern of establishing permanent
settlements. Furthermore, it appears that the sultanate supported the construction of such
large lou among the Bentian at this time as a stage in village development, and many
Bentian villages also originally consisted of one lou, even though these lou usually were,
as noted above, supplemented before long by several others. Later, under Dutch or
Indonesian rule when villages had already become established, it became expected that
each village should have one lou which served as the adat longhouse (lamin adat) of the
community, that is, as the place where major events pertaining to adat in the community
were to be arranged and presided over by the government-recognized kepala adat (head
of customary law).  
An example of a very large lou preceding village establishment is found in Dilang
Tonoi where the founders of Dilang Puti lived concentrated prior to founding the latter
village at a nearby location. This apparently very longhouse-like lou was, according to
Bentian standards, exceptionally large, allegedly housing several hundred inhabitants
originating from several different communities, and divided into different sections
according to subgroup identity. It is possibly this lou (but more probably a predecessor)
which plays a prominent role in a story which I shall present soon, a story which was told
to me by Kakah Ramat, the old and respected belian of Temiang discussed in the
previous chapter. I present this story because it illustrates some crucial aspects of
mantiship — especially, the importance of valuables and exchange for mantiship — as
well as gives us some sense of how the Bentian themselves, in their own words, conceive
of what it means to be a manti, particularly a great one.
Judging from a comparison of various elements of oral history, the events related in
the story — principally two roing visits between two Bentian communities — occurred
sometime around the mid-nineteenth century, so obviously this is primarily a description
of historical mantiship, even though many features of mantiship illuminated by the story
are still characteristic of the manti — and some of these will be essential for my analysis
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of the institution. The events in question apparently took place before any proper villages
had been established among the Bentian, even though the communities concerned notably
are referred to by the present-day names (Dilang Puti and Lendian) of the villages which
their members later founded. The two protagonist manti of the story apparently also
functioned as the leading manti of their respective communities, or at least as their two
most prominent ones. As indicated by the story, these manti had a status above the
ordinary, as seen in the narrator's shifting use of the word manti, sometimes used more
narrowly in the sense of community leader or great manti (as in “news had it that Dilang
Puti had a manti, too”), sometimes more broadly encompassing both great manti and
ordinary housegroup heads (as in “forty people, including many manti.”). Another
expression of the extraordinary status of these manti is the indirect description of the size
of the Dilang Puti lou — indicated by the size of its manti's compartment, the number of
chicken cages associated with the house, and the amount of drinking water daily
consumed — noted by the narrator as being something remarkable. The similarly noted
cleanness of the food served to the guests, and the use of spices in it — assumably
unusual at the time of the events described, as it still is in some places today — can
probably be taken to illustrate the same thing, and possibly also as a suggestion of an
usually high degree of downstream influence on the community concerned. Dilang Puti
was, as already remarked, soon to become something of an ideal community among the
Bentian in the sense that it was here that social concentration, government contacts, and
mantiship materialized most fully.
The story is part of a longer story which I overheard Kakah Ramat tell to relatives one
evening and then asked him to retell for a recording. The full story links together several
rather widely separated episodes pertaining to intergroup relations of several different
Bentian communities. The principal unifying element in these episodes is provided by a
woman called Sentoa who directly or indirectly plays a role in each episode. For this
reason I have called it  “The story of Sentoa.”
Recounted here is the initial episode which comprises about one fourth of the total
story. As can be noted, the narrator occasionally commented on aspects of the story,
turning to me. I have also put in a few explanations in brackets where deemed necessary
in order to clarify aspects of the remarkably economical text, but otherwise I have
avoided additions in an effort to preserve as closely as possible the character of the
original which is strongly marked by the oral mode of its presentation.
The story purports to be a true story, but the inclusion of a number of standard
elements typically part of stories of this kind suggests that certain details represent
elaborations serving primarily as rhetorical devices, intended to dramatize and create a
concrete feeling on the part of the listener for the events described (entering a longhouse
in the capacity of guest, taking part in a buntang, etc.). The purpose is more to tell a good
story — in a way that resonates with popular Bentian understandings of what may be
For some unclear reason, a belief formerly existed among Bentians that the manti were          190 
particularly likely to suffer from certain forms of ringworm.
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assumed to have taken place — than it is to recount events exactly as they happened
under the particular circumstances concerned.
The Story of Sentoa    
Long ago, while still in the age of the ancestors, the Tueng [people] had a manti. Titled
Kiai Mentimei. That Kiai was the manti of the Tueng of [what is now] Lendian [village].
In those days neither would visit the other. From Tueng they wouldn't visit us; we
wouldn't visit the Tueng. To Dilang Puti we wouldn't go visiting. From Dilang Puti they
wouldn't go visiting to Tueng. Except if you would roing. You see, back then, if you said
Tueng, that was faaar-away. Dilang Puti, far away. Sambung [neighboring village of
narrator], far away.  
At that time, news had it that Dilang Puti had a manti, too. [Named] Tebolela. Thus
Kiai gathered his followers, in order to roing. They were not a few people: forty! So they
departed from Tueng. They walked for a whole day. Already late afternoon, they
encountered a swidden. No people in sight. They continued. Then they came upon a lou.
They asked: “Is your house under a pali?” [post-ritual or other interdiction involving a
prohibition to enter] They saw that there was a young maiden present. Covered in lejon
ringworm [an affliction associated with the manti, indicating that she was the daughter
of one].  “No, there's no pali.” They ascended into the house. As soon as they got inside190
the young woman rolled out the bahau [grand rattan mat] for them to sit on. They sat
down. Then she walked into the amin [family compartment]. The next moment she
reappeared with offerings to receive the guests. The welcoming offerings of the ancestors
were complete with areca palm nuts, betel leaves and tobacco laid out on a brass plate.
“There...” she handed it over. “Ah...” they received it. They chewed [betel] and smoked.
Then they asked: “Where are your mother and father, where are the others?” 
“Out!. Out harvesting fruits, yields of the rivers. Some have gone scoop-fishing.
Others are out to collect areca nuts and betel leaves.” 
“Okay.” 
She went back into the amin. A short time passed. Then she came out again. Said:
“Join me, let's go inside.” They entered into the amin. Four house posts broad, four floor
sections deep [unusually large]. A wall covered the entire front and there was a door at
the point of entrance. As they got inside they saw that food was laid out in rows. She
said: “Drinking water is set out. Ground chili is set out. Rice with condiments.”
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Everything was clean and the food had been prepared using spices. They ate. When they
had had their fill they went outside. She gathered the plates. Quickly she was finished.
Late afternoon, the peeping sounds of chicks. “I have to go and lock them up [for the
night].” She descended to the ground in order to cage chickens. One hundred cages!
[indicating an unusually large and wealthy house] Well, she had some caging to do. One
over here, another over there. One by one she grabbed them, put them in their cages, and
she didn't get them mixed up, even if there were a lot of them. Eventually she was
finished. She ascended again. Went to bring water. Four or five times she went to bring
water. In the days of the ancestors betung and tolang [bamboo] were used to fetch water.
Well, and some used flask gourds as well. 
Already evening, her seniors started to arrive. Arrive, arrive, arrive. A lot of people.
Small-talk commenced, connections were established. All sorts of matters were
discussed. For the length of that one evening. The visitors told their news, the hosts did
likewise. Until it was time to sleep.
After that it was time for her kin and family to gather the followers from other houses.
For a buntang. Eight days and eight nights. The hosts challenged the roing [party].
Treated them as guests. Sprinkled fragrant rice flour water on them and rubbed turmeric
on them. Played games and had a good time. Sung love songs and staged dances. When
the program was completed they sacrificed water buffaloes, pigs and chickens which
were offered to the guests along with valuables. Cloth, blowpipes, gongs and jars.
Accepted! Wasn't that what they [the roing] had set out to look for? Wasn't this guy
[Kiai, their leader] a manti?
Then morning came. They ordered the young woman to go and keep watch on a
swidden [against marauding animals]. To go to a swidden over there, one which was
along the road leading to the village, the very same swidden that had been crossed the
other day [by the roing]. So she went to keep watch over that swidden. Meanwhile they
continued talking and talking. When noon came they packed their things, all that they had
received, and then went on their way. The roing [party]. When they arrived at the
swidden, the manti ascended to the house. 
“I here climb up to you. Well, I want to take you with me.” 
The name of that woman was Sentoa [also the name of some small and agile forest
birds]. 
“Oh, please don't,” she said, “I'm afraid they would be looking for me.”
“That's nothing to worry about,” he said.
Thus they argued back and forth for a while. She lost, that woman. She gave in to the
proposal to become his wife. What else could she do, in front of someone so ambitious,
so forceful, so cunning. Said she: “Well, it's up to you, if you take full responsibility.” “I
take responsibility,” he said. So they went on their way. Across the path they left a
blowpipe, unfolded a piece of cloth. In addition left a gong on the ground. A gong which
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had in fact just been presented to the roing [its usage here therefore being not quite
proper, but admirably resourceful all the same]. Thereafter they continued, until they
reached Tueng.
Sink the account of the roing, float the account of the mother and father, the family
and kin of the woman. As Sentoa didn't return in the evening, they became worried.
When night came they started searching. Went to the swidden. No, no one there. Then
they walked along the road leading in the direction of the guests, the roing. Saw that there
was a blowpipe across the path, a cloth suspended, a gong. “Oh,” they said, “she's been
taken away by Kiai, here's the confirmation.” They returned [home]. Gathered in the
evening. At dawn they went on their way. Forty people as well, including many manti.
The manti [of them all] was Tebolela.   
It happened that some people over there were out hunting. Came upon them on the
path. They quickly ran back to the village. Said: “There is a group from Dilang Puti,
many people.” Said the villagers: “Ready!” They caught a water buffalo, a bull, in front
of the lou. Right therafter those others [from Dilang Puti] came. They were going to
attack, raid, and so on. Said the manti of the village:
“Don't. Mercy. Here, we offer coconut palms to stab, areca palms to stab. Chickens
to dart, pigs to spear. A water buffalo to anoint your feet with.”
Well, and so they did. Killed the water buffalo and the rest. Only then would they
[from Dilang Puti] ascend. 
In the evening food was prepared, set out in rows. After they had eaten, negotiations
were held. The negotiations led to results, a settlement was reached. A manti wedding
was to be held, with appropiate compensations according to rank. Teleun Doi, Kawit Siit,
Lempang Danan, Batu Anak Jurang Kasai, Seluk Pusu, Lampin Poo [epithets for
individual valuables given in compensation: gongs, jars, blowpipes]. Enough! Without
even mentioning the other stuff [i.e. those valuables constituting the bride wealth proper].
A gong named Selingur Uet served as the head of the other stuff. Those objects were
intended to lift the woman, in compensation for her no longer coming and going morning
and evening. Not just for her no longer doing ordinary women's work, carrying and
fetching things, working on swiddens, doing housework, and so on. But for no longer
making visits and doing things like that, for example, like when there is something for
which there needs to be a speech, someone that should be seen about something,
participation is required [e.g. in other people's rituals], or when the people have to be
assembled. 
“Okay.” So the negotiations were finished. The yields were brought off. The water
buffalo, the gongs and jars with various names. The Dilang Puti people returned. Well,
and Kiai stayed in place. With that woman. Time passed and passed but she wouldn't
become pregnant: alei! [a plant used as a contraceptive drug which may cause infertility].
No children. Well that was the end of that. But the marriage was good, nevertheless.
     The occurrence of sao dala ulun, “one's wife getting abducted by someone,” is infamously     191
common among the Bentian, and it is reported to have been especially common among the manti in the
past, perhaps for the same reasons (see below) that were effective in motivating Kiai to abduct Sentoa
(who was unmarried).
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Extensive swiddens, spacious houses, challenge rituals (nuak), communal work (pelo):
life in consonance with the manti profession (pekerjaan manti)!
Ambition, Enterprise, and Exchange 
Thus ends the first section of “The story of Sentoa” (at this point the story proceeds with
some rather different events among some entirely different communities) which I will
now analyze at some length before concluding this historical discussion of the manti.
Sentoa, it is perhaps appropriate to begin by noting, was quite a woman, perhaps not so
much in terms of beauty — whether she was beautiful or not is not revealed by the story,
only that she had ringworm — but in terms of her other qualities. These included not only
those typically associated with women (adeptness in house and swidden work), regarding
which an exemplary diligence on her part is imparted through the description of her
serving food and caging chickens, among other things, but allegedly also a capacity to
perform certain tasks normally associated with men, and with the manti in particular,
such as assembling the members of the community, representing the family, forwarding
important messages, and delivering speeches, characteristics which no doubt reflected the
fact that she was the daughter of a manti. The latter qualities in particular, the text
suggests, warranted her family to request an unusually large marriage compensation for
her (in addition to the special, but not unique, circumstances leading up to her
marriage),  and supposedly these qualities also, along with her other merits, provided191
some good reasons why Kiai, the manti of Tueng, would have wanted her for a wife.
Being a manti he was in a position to benefit particularly from having such a multi-
talented and enterprising partner.
Historically women appear to have played a more prominent public role in Bentian
society than they do today — in line with a general trend in much of Southeast Asia (e.g.
see Reid 1983). This is true in particular for the wives of the manti who were called, at
least under certain circumstances, by the special term ayang. Women could also become
manti in their own right and a fair number of women manti are reported to have existed
up until the early twentieth century. Even though the great majority of the manti always
was represented by senior men, the occupation was, and is, open to anyone, at least as far
as housegroup mantiship (the sultan appears not to have granted titles to women, and no
woman has, as far as I know, ever occupied the government posts of village and adat
head). Unlike belianship, mantiship is not associated with special initiation rites or the
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like. Rather, one becomes a manti if one persuasively acts like one, that is, leads and
represents housegroups, participates actively in community or other public affairs
(particularly those that can be categorized as pertaining to adat) — and thereby becomes
acknowledged as one. In this respect, the Bentian situation is basically similar to that of
the Etoro of New Guinea among whom “a man is a tafidilo [their counterpart of the
manti] if people say that he is” (Kelly 1993:18).
The one activity in which a manti should engage so as to become regarded as a manti
that is most extensively described in our story is involvement in that curious institution
called roing. Some interesting characteristics of it emerge in this description. This form
of exchange seems to have been quite conventionalized and formalized (e.g. typically
accompanied by ritual) as well as fairly carefully orchestrated in accordance with
classical Maussian principles of gift exchange (e.g. ostensibly disinterested generosity,
delayed returns, see Mauss 1990) rather than represented as a case of outright trade of
valuables (even though bartering between individuals relating to personal transactions
could take place “in the background” of the principal activity, in the manner of gimwali
conducted during kula expeditions: see Malinowski 1922). Thus Kiai and his company,
when they appeared in Dilang Puti, could expect with reasonable probability to be treated
with hospitality, as well as to be offered valuables, even though they were apparently
uninvited and had as yet presented nothing themselves; doing such a thing, however,
demanded the resources to counter such a prestation on a later occasion, otherwise shame
and return of the objects received, and possibly retaliation and fines, could be expected.
This fact limited this activity to those capable and brave “men of prowess” (Wolters
1982) who had the means for this — as well as for arranging such an undertaking in the
first place. Primary prerequisites for these men were, besides initiative and courage,
substantial socio-material resources. Thus, leading roing expeditions was a mark of
mantiship, as was the possession of the valuables acquired through roing. The taken for
granted association of valuables with mantiship is wittily expressed in our story by the
narrator's rhetorical question “Wasn't this guy a manti?” given as an (unnecessary)
explanation as to why Kiai would accept the valuables and set out to roing in the first
place. 
Some other features of mantiship suggested by the story are those referred to through
the poetic characterization of what leading a “life in consonance with the manti
profession” entails: “Extensive swiddens, spacious houses, challenge rituals, communal
work.” These features, which notably characterize the manti as compared to ordinary men
not so much exclusively as in degree, were proposed by the narrator as examples of the
good life which Kiai allegedly was able to lead, despite the fact that his wife proved
infertile (which testifies to the fact that children, even though loved and socially
important, are not absolutely everything in the Bentian scheme of things; indeed, as
remarked earlier, having them cannot be taken for granted). Sentoa's infertility (which
     
 The fact that Sentoa’s infertility was indicated to be the result of her use of a plant used as a     192
contraceptive suggests that she had had sexual relations with other people before her marriage with
Kiai.
     
 A word sometimes used in this connection was kemoyuan (“desire,” “aspiration”) typically     193
contrasted with kemampuan (I., “ability”).
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further makes it clear that we are not dealing here with a woman who may be seen as a
mere object)  nevertheless constitutes something of an anti-climax with respect to Kiai's192
until then mainly successful appearance in the story; it has the effect of bringing him
down to the level of ordinary mortals as it were: he did not get away with just everything.
However, despite this drawback, and despite the fact that he had to (but also, could afford
to) pay a rather hefty compensation, he fared, all in all, very well, and it is precisely his
bold and self-aggrandizing acts as a courageous and “big” man — and hence a manti —
which provide much of the verve of the story, as they provide also the storyline,
technically speaking (it is through his actions and the consequences of his actions that the
story unfolds). The one act which is ultimately important in this respect is, of course,
Kiai's “robbery of Sentoa” (alternatively classifiable as a case of elopement). There is a
certain beauty to how events fall his way: a certain grace, to which his bricolage-like
inventiveness in using some of the valuables that he has just received as token payment
for Sentoa contributes.
These observations bring us to something important with respect to how mantiship
is regarded by Bentians. When I asked people about what it is that makes a manti or sets
someone apart from other people as one, the answer was usually not any particular kind
of qualities or resources such as knowledge of adat, wealth or extensive kin networks —
indeed when I suggested so, this was sometimes emphatically resisted. Instead, ambition
or “will-power,” or perhaps more exactly, to borrow Nietzsche's (1968) expression, “the
will to power,” was proposed as the distinguishing feature of the manti.  Even though193
perfectly true in a sense — ambition and zeal were preeminent attributes not only of Kiai,
they characterize many present-day manti as well — this opinion reflects, it seems to me,
not primarily empirical reality, but rather, ideology. These qualities are, in other words,
valued in society, and identified as characteristics of the manti not so much because they
are empirically observable as because they are ideal characteristics. A clear indication of
the ideological status of the characteristics in question is the narrator's suggestion that
Sentoa gave in to Kiai's “marriage proposal” (which in itself represented ruthless
ambition on Kiai's part) because these characteristics attracted her to him (“What else
could she do, in front of someone so ambitious, so forceful, so cunning”). A rather simple
explanation of this ideological valuation of these features is that they are seen to
contribute to making the leadership of leaders characterized by them efficient; it is
recognized, in other words, that it is (at least in some contexts) goal-rational for leaders
to be forceful and zealous. More significantly, however, it seems to me that this valuation
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represents what appears as a strand of egalitarian ideology which serves (in a sense
somewhat paradoxically) an important role in legitimizing mantiship by making manti
status appear to be justly acquired and theoretically attainable by anyone. And finally,
when I say ideological rather than empirical, I do so because of the difficulty to dismiss
the fact that ambition alone was probably never enough for the attainment of manti status
— all those other qualities did matter — and especially not from the mid- or late
nineteenth century onwards when social conditions in Bentian society had changed so
much that an earlier fairly egalitarian situation — in which the above-mentioned aspect
of egalitarian ideology plausibly first developed — had turned into a nearly stratified one,
characterized by semi-hereditary mantiship.
The Development of the Great Manti and a Degree of Stratification in Bentian Society
A fundamentally important effect of the distribution of titles by the sultanate in the
nineteenth century was a tendency for mantiship to become increasingly hereditary.
Gradually, a pedigree including title-holding became almost a prerequisite for claims to
manti status and the word manti came to be nearly synonymous, at least in some usages,
with “title-holder.” This tendency was not only a development that was aided by the
practice of distributing titles, but also one that reflected explicit expectations to this effect
by the sultanate (stated in the letters which established the rights of the manti to their
titles). In addition, such developments as the increasing wealth of the manti, and an
associated, increasing desire to control “the flow of valuables” in and out of communities
— which the manti, in their capacities as adat-law adjudicators and roing leaders, were
singularly well-positioned to do — presumably also contributed to the tendency. At the
time when the events described in the story took place, this development was likely
already under way, at least in some communities. At least one of the two protagonist
manti was a title-holder (as were a few, but probably not yet very many, manti in some
other Bentian communities), and they both evidently possessed great — indeed, as the
story suggests, unusally great — wealth and social capital. Apart from her afore-
mentioned qualities, there is, I suggest, another feature of Sentoa which may explain why
Kiai would have wanted to marry her. This is the fact that she was of manti descent. 
As connections through descent become important, so do connections through
marriage. For the great manti of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it was
common to marry women from families of other great manti from other villages, as
seems to have been a dominant pattern among the so-called aristocracy in the so-called
stratified Dayak societies (e.g. see Rousseau 1979:226, 1990:89). Even though there does
not seem to have existed an explicit rule prescribing rank endogamy, or a practice
conforming precisely to this ideal, frequent marriages between manti families (both
     
 My notions here of diffusion of authority from influential manti to their family members resemble,     194
we may note, the South Sulawesian notions of diffusion of semangat from leaders to followers (or
objects with which the leaders come into contact) described by Shelly Errington (1989). Wolter's
(1982:6) contention that by being close to one of the “men of prowess,” his followers’ “spiritual
substance...would participate in his, thereby leading to rapport and personal satisfaction” [orig.
emphasis], expresses the same idea. Not surprisingly, the appeal or “attracting pull” of particular manti
among their followers may, as I will explain more fully later in the chapter, also be described by
Bentian along similar lines, more precisely, in terms of a spirit-induced “potency” or “ability to rule”
(kekuasaan, I. or pengewasa) possessed by the manti in question. When talking about diffusion of
authority from leaders to family members here, however, I primarily mean an entirely social process
which does not presuppose notions of transmission of any particular substance, tangible or intangible.
Notably, I did not encounter any explicit notions about such a process among the Bentian, even though
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beyond and, more commonly, within communities) without doubt represented status-
consciousness and strategies to concentrate wealth and power. Special adat regulations
for the manti — apparently stipulated and certainly implemented by the manti themselves
— also served to distinguish the manti (or the “real” ones) from other people (high fines
and marriage payments, for instance, served to restrict manti status to the wealthy). More
obliquely, special body gestures by subordinates aimed at expressing respect (in
connection with the handing over of cigarettes or other concrete objects, for instance),
special seating during rituals (toward the center of events) — and of course, the privilege
to give speeches on such occasions — as well as recurrent special mention of the manti
as a separate category in belian chants, are examples of other social institutions serving
to set the manti apart. Such institutions — most of which are, to a lesser or higher degree,
operative still today — reflect a social order which is not entirely egalitarian, and such
an order also characterized the Bentian by the turn of the twentieth century, when the
level of hierarchy in their society probably reached its height. 
Already for some time, the position of leading manti for a community had become
commonly inherited from father to son, or from older brother to younger, and this pattern
continued in the early villages when leadership over entire communites became formally
established, as it did with respect to the position of “head of customary law” (pengurus,
kepala adat) which progressively replaced titulary mantiship when distribution of titles
by the sultanate ceased towards the end of Dutch rule (the last title was given around
1940). Because of this trend of hereditary mantiship, and the previously discussed
tendency to rank endogamy and rank-specific adat regulations, there would appear to be
some grounds to conclude that mantiship at this stage had become, besides an individual
position or status, a stratum. Another observation adds critical support for such an
inference. This regards a tendency for the authority of prominent manti to diffuse
outwards to their closest family members so that they, too, if only to a degree, become
imbued with it, in the sense that they, in comparison with ordinary people, command
somewhat more respect, and possibly even compliance (should they request something
from someone, for instance).  Indications of such diffusion is the (now in some respects194
they do, as said, associate authority and spirit-induced potency.
259
obsolete) use of the term ayang for the wives of the manti, and the fact that a manti's
brothers may on occasion be referred to as manti themselves (even though it is recognized
that they are not really manti in their own right). Quite naturally, a manti's brothers and
other close collateral or older kin will also not consider themselves to be significantly
lower than him, or defer much to him. On the contrary, throughout history, outright
competition between brothers for mantiship has been common and was a major source
of fission within families and communities (a famous example is provided by the two
manti brothers Kakah Pagu and Kakah Pulang who had their two finest water buffalo
bulls fight each other, allegedly resulting in their community splitting into two, with each
part going different ways to found new villages under the leadership of one of the
respective brothers). 
Such diffusion of authority to the close relatives of influential manti must have
become more consequential when community leadership developed and a large number
of people, apart from their own kin, became subordinated to those manti who became
community leaders. At this time, more than before, manti authority became something
else than kin authority, while simultaneously the relatives of these manti — precisely
because of their kinship relations — acquired a special “class” position and came to share
in a special kind of authority not available (unlike housegroup manti authority) to most
people in the community. At this stage, then, the notion of an upper stratum in Bentian
society would seem particularly warranted. However, such a stratum would only have
comprised certain manti and their families, and the boundaries by which they were
separated — by way of special adat regulations and marital relations — from other manti,
and thus from the rest of the people, were apparently very diffuse, as well as permeable.
The term “manti” did not really designate a rank but rather a position, or to be exact,
several distinct ones. Also, no very clear and formalized ranking system appears to have
encompassed the society as a whole. Even though there existed one or several categories
of “slaves,” and apparently certain regulations restricting them from “marrying up,” these
restrictions were evidently not absolute, and at least one case reported to me related the
transformation of a person's status from slave into manti. Unlike among the Benuaq,
where a somewhat greater degree of hierarchy developed, no special term for commoners
appears eto have been used by the Bentian (my informants did not recognize the Benuaq
term merentika as having been used by the Bentian). For this reason, and also because of
the small difference in general lifestyle between the manti and other people (for example,
most manti, including most community leaders, were not exempted from swidden work),
I am uncomfortable with Fried's general claim that the Bentian “possessed an aristocracy,
commoners, and slaves,” all the more so, as she contends that this was the “traditional”
situation, and implies that these categories constituted classes (1995:6).
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In a few large communities, however, and especially in Dilang Puti where Fried
worked, there emerged some community leaders who possessed rather exceptional
influence, as well as unusually great social capital (including slaves) and wealth. Such
great manti and their families apparently enjoyed particularly high status, higher than that
of ordinary community leaders, in distinction to whom they were sometimes referred to
as “tatau.” Other distinguishing features of these great manti were that they with few
exceptions practiced polygamy (often with more than two wives) as well as virilocality
(which the somewhat special marriage of Kiai and Sentoa exemplifies). Under their
leadership, the practices of community and cooperative work (pelo, beru) are reported
to have been particularly strong, and for their more immediate benefit some amount of
corvee labor appears to have been performed, enabling the manti’s partial or total
disengagement from agriculture (cf. Fried 1995:51). Some nalin taun that these leaders
arranged lasted several months, bearing further witness to their extraordinary status and
socio-economic resources. Their positions, which seem always to have been legitimized
by relatively high-ranking sultanate titles, were also particularly likely to be passed on to
their brothers and sons as indicated by one of the meanings of the term tatau that was
communicated to me: “manti with manti ancestry.” Another meaning given for this term,
also illuminating, was “manti with supra-community influence,” a meaning sometimes
applied more restrictively to the leaders of Dilang Puti, to whom Fried (1995:51) refers
as “paramount chiefs,” and who sometime in the early twentieth century acquired the
government position of kepala adat besar or “district head of customary law” which they
still hold today (Titus Pantir 1990:1). One manner in which the largely nominal
supravillage authority of these great manti is said to have been instrumentally operative
was in their capacity as a kind of ultimate authority on adat, having a final say in matters
that were not resolved on lower levels , as had analogously ordinary community leading
manti. Throughout history, the role of the manti as keepers of adat has remained integral
to all manti, whether tatau or housegroup heads: mantiship was thus never all about
exchange and adventure as the story of Sentoa may suggest.  
The actual power of the tatau, however, as well as that of other community leaders,
was nevertheless somewhat limited; at least, it was always mitigated by other factors.
Fried asserts, for instance, that “the tatau [apparently referring to both present and past
tatau] cannot force people to lend land” (Fried 1995:103). In other words, they had no
legitimate authority to intervene in what was generally or at least ultimately an internal
housegroup affair. In fact, like lower-ranking housegroup manti, the community leading
manti held little direct power over people who were not part of their own extended
family; their influence over such people was always mediated by the latters' personal
housegroup manti. The community leading manti could thus not do very much without
the compliance of these manti, and the possibility that the latter and their families could
leave the community should they find the leading manti's command unacceptable put
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important checks on his authority. Many families who for whatever reasons preferred to
keep to their swiddens and forest lou were little influenced by the community leaders in
any case, whether community members or not.
The fact that the greatest manti developed in Dilang Puti and some other relatively
large Bentian communities also indicates that the authority and status of the community
leading manti correlated with the size of the community, as it did with the extent of
contact with the government (a factor which itself correlated with community size). Many
Bentian communities have been very small, and in such communities, where most people
are closely related in multiple ways, no very great manti, and so no very great social
differentiation between the manti and the common people, developed. Generally
speaking, no very great hierarchy emerged among the Bentian. This, I hypothesize,
ultimately reflects their relative remoteness, dispersion and comparatively limited
integration with the larger society. Conversely, that a higher degree of hierarchy
developed among the Bentian's downstream Benuaq neighbors — along with a still
persisting tradition of weeks-long secondary mortuary rituals (kwangkai) and months-
long nalin taun — can be taken as an expression of the Benuaq's greater residential
concentration, greater engagement in trade and more extensive tributary contacts with the
sultanate. Similarly, the reported existence among the Benuaq (e.g. see Hopes 1997a:16;
Massing 1983) of a “rank” in between the manti and the merentika called penggawa
(which apparently encompassed both war leaders and the manti's advisors, and which,
like “manti,” probably did not designate a rank, but a position) presumably testifies to the
same thing (and perhaps also to a greater involvement in warfare and headhunting): as
in the case of “manti,” a cognate of the word penggawa (punggawa) was used as
denomination for certain Kutai administrative officials and, in addition, for a category of
Buginese military officers associated with the sultanate (see Dari Swapraja1979:134;
Magenda 1991:7, 22). Presumably, the very same processes that generated stratification
in the case of the Bentian — among which we should probably count indirect influence
from the Kutai books of law (adat) which explicitly ordained ranks and rank endogamy
— were effective among the Benuaq, too. Traditionally, the social organization of the
Benuaq was probably very similar to that of the Bentian — characterized by dispersed
settlement, generally small lou, housegroup mantiship, etc. — as it indeed still is to some
degree.
This leads me to suspect that the Benuaq, who are a rather heterogeneous group, may
in fact not have been that different from the Bentian even while they were integrated with
the sultanate (or under the command of the Dutch). Probably their stratification system
was not as developed in practice, at least not everywhere, as we may be induced to
believe by the ethnographic reports, which seem, in many cases, to be biased by an
unrepresentative use of high-status informants and the tendency of local historiography
to formalize. Consequently, classifying them, then, as has been common in local
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ethnographic reports, as stratified, or as a class society, seems to me somewhat
unjustified, and it certainly would be unjustified in the case of the Bentian. On the other
hand, neither the Benuaq, nor the Bentian, were ever entirely egalitarian, at least not in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so classifying them by that term seems
also somewhat inappropriate. Rather than hierarchical or  egalitarian, it would perhaps
be appropriate to classify these societies as intermediate — or better, indeterminate —
entities. At least, it is clear that their social structure, like that of the Kachin of highland
Burma (Leach 1954), has been historically, and locally, variant, and that this variation has
to a significant degree reflected their historically and locally variable politico-economical
articulations with the larger region of which they have been part, a fact complicating a
long-standing practice in the Borneo ethnography to categorize the island’s societies as
either egalitarian or stratified.
Mantiship in the Age of Independence
Between the early nineteenth and the early twentieth century, Bentian society underwent
a process of increasing hierarchy, involving the emergence of “great manti” and incipient
stratification. This process coincided with and was stimulated by a process of increasing
socio-political integration, affecting both the Bentian's internal and external relations. The
latter process of increasing integration has continued and even accelerated since the early
twentieth century; the trend of increasing hierarchy has not, however. On the contrary,
since the closing decades of Dutch rule, the degree of stratification and the power of the
great manti in Bentian society have gradually decreased, and the Bentian have become
more egalitarian, once again. Several factors have contributed to this development, and
like those which earlier gave rise to increasing hierarchy, they seem mainly to consist of
different forms of external influence. 
First, the institution of slavery died out in the first few decades of the twentieth
century as a result of pressure from the colonial government. This, of course, significantly
reduced hierarchy by removing, along with the legitimacy of an ideological categorization
of some people as lacking full personal autonomy, what might be called the underclass
in society. From some point in time it also became “prohibited to pronounce the word
slave,” so that openly referring to someone's slave ancestry became (and remains) taboo.
In addition, the end of slavery entailed a significant loss of social capital for those
(actually relatively few) manti who had owned slaves. The power of community leading
manti declined yet more when the distribution of titles ceased and the era of Indonesian
independence began. Even though they retained much respect and unofficial authority,
these manti now lost much of their official authority as their formal status was generally
reduced to that of kepala adat, a position whose jurisdiction under the national
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government is limited to internal communal affairs or such affairs as pertain to customary
law or tradition (which the belian and warah tend to have a lot to say about in practice,
however). Formerly, to be sure, the chiefly authority of title-bearing community leaders
had also been conceived of in terms of adat authority — by the Bentian as well as by the
sultanate. Then, however, the adat concept was wider and encompassed also that part of
the political field in which supreme authority is now held by the village head (kepala
desa) — to whom the kepala adat is also considered ultimately subordinate (even though
it was the other way around initially, from the inception of the office by the Dutch in the
early twentieth century until title distribution discontinued).
The transfer of power from the manti to the kepala desa represents a general trend
whereby the government has attempted to reduce the power of indigenous leaders and
replace it with state power (the institution of kepala adat has been described as an office
designed to “shelve gracefully the hereditary chief,” Rousseau 1990:198). The function
of the kepala desa is also predominantly one of imposing and regulating national law,
that is, it is not to a very high degree “discretionary” in character. Representing the state,
however, the kepala desa is authorized to call on the police to enforce his command, and
he is also in a position to invoke the agency of the subdistrict head (camat) —
prerogatives which indeed ensure a certain authority for the usually fairly young, literate
and modernization-minded men who hold the post. The kepala desa may, for instance,
defer unresolved, intracommunity social conflicts to the government. As has been noted
by Peter Just (2001:126), and demonstrated at length by Anna Tsing (1993), in the
Indonesian periphery the government and the police are typically not very interested in
intervening in such affairs, but the threat of reporting some matter to them nevertheless
represents a frequently employed means of persuasion at the disposal of village heads,
as well as of elders, and even of ordinary villagers lacking the formal legitimacy to
handle such matters.
Despite their reduced official responsibilities, however, the kepala adat and other
manti continue to wield considerable informal authority, particularly in the sphere of adat
and with respect to conflict resolution. By far most conflicts in the villages are dealt with
internally; like the Dou Donggo of Highland Sumbawa (Just 2001:126), Bentians are
loath to assign legal matters to the government because its principles and procedures are
largely unknown and uncontrollable; also, reporting unresolved matters to the
government suggests that they are not capable of maintaining order on their own, thereby
motivating government intervention which is generally resented for fear of loss of local
autonomy. Typically, conflicts are dealt with in formal but unofficial hearings involving
several manti, often, but not necessarily, the kepala adat. If not settled through this
procedure, they may be taken to the kepala adat to resolve in his official capacity, in
which case the resolution of the affair is nevertheless still likely to involve collective
deliberation by several manti (as it did in Udin's case), even though it is the kepala adat
     
 Interestingly, Just (2001) translates musyawarah as “consensus,” a translation indicating the strong     195
association between such meetings and a consensus orientation that seems to exist throughout
Indonesia.
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alone who makes the final, registered verdict. Many types of more or less formalized
public negotiations — in which the manti tend to be the principal speakers (and become
regarded as manti largely as a result of being so) — are presently identified by Bentians
as musyawarah (I.), a concept advocated by the government as an aspect of Pancasila
ideology, and this kind of consensual decision-making obviously represents an
indigenous ideal among the Bentian too.  Apparently, it was observations testifying to195
the frequency or importance of such gatherings which induced Weinstock (1983a:116)
to describe present-day Luangan leadership as “fluid and shared among the senior
members of the community,” a description which also alludes to the fact that among the
Luangan, including the Bentian, important decisions of communal concern tend to be
made collectively by people who mostly occupy no official leadership positions. Even
though probably always important, such forums may, as a result of postcolonial structural
transformations of official local leadership and influence from the political culture of the
Indonesian government, have become somewhat more important today than they were
during the heyday of manti power in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Quite
certainly, a manifest egalitarian ethos which currently informs many Bentian attitudes
towards social life reflects postcolonial influence, even though this ethos no doubt also
in part represents an older ideological substratum, one which presumably predates
integration with the sultanate. Among the more recent influences promoting such
dispositions we should count not only official injunctions imposed by the government,
but also what might be called  revolutionary nationalism, for example, those early
republican-nationalist slogans which stated that, in the age of independence, everybody
should “sit equally low, stand equally tall” (duduk sama rendah, berdiri sama tinggi, I.),
thereby implying that all old hierarchies, whether “feudal” or colonial, should be
eradicated.
Despite these trends, however, some present-day manti clearly enjoy higher status
than most other manti, and these manti also tend to be particularily influential in their
communities. Today as well, if the meaning of the term “manti” is requested, it is usually
“community leader,” or alternatively, kepala adat, that is given as an answer, even though
the word is also used in the sense of “housegroup head” and “adjudicator” (an example
of its use in the latter sense is Udin's letter in Chapter 3 in which he refers to the elders
who imposed a ban on him from leaving the community as manti). This semantical
primacy of manti with supra-housegroup influence, or what some of my informants
referred to as “the real manti” (manti bene), undoubtedly reflects the historical heritage
of the era of the community leading manti — “when the manti (or at least some of them)
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really were manti” — but surely also the importance of official positions for legitimate
authority in the present situation. In the present situation, government regulations, even
though much contested in private, have assumed an unprecedented validity, or at least
pertinence, among the Bentian, and official authority possesses a special legitimacy,
enforced as it is by government law. Thus there are, despite the disappearance of the great
manti, significant differences in authority and status between those people who are
referred to as manti today, and not all of them are equally likely to be regarded as manti.
Three Present-Day Manti
In order to give a more concrete picture of mantiship in the present situation, I will now
present three manti who were among those whom I came to know best during my
fieldwork. Apart from exemplifing mantiship today, this presentation serves to illustrate
the diversity of the manti and to draw attention to the variety of factors which are
constitutive of manti authority, many of which I have already discussed, but some which
I have not and which I will analyze in some detail after this presentation. The discussion
of adat and government authority which will conclude the chapter will provide still more
information on some crucial factors constituting mantiship. Conversely, when discussing
these subjects, I will refer back to aspects of my manti examples.
Ma Bari
Ma Bari was the roughly seventy years old man in whose lou I lived for most of my
fieldwork, and with whom we already became acquainted in Udin's story. Ma Bari was
the widely recognized but unofficial leader of Temiang. Temiang being officially
regarded as a hamlet of Datai Munte, his formal status was only that of “neighborhood
head” (ketua RT), a position which annoyed rather than pleased him. On account of this
position he was often invited to Datai Munte for official meetings but rarely went except
when they specifically concerned Temiang or it stood in his obvious interest to do so.
However, when he went he was treated with respect by the villagers and as an equal by
Ma Busek, the kepala adat and principal official leader of Datai Munte (which lacked a
kepala desa at this time). This respect, I presume, was due to him in large part in
recognition of his status as a leader, and also, out of respect for (albeit not in actual
acknowledgment of) his community's claims to sovereignty. In practice, Ma Bari's status
was very much that of a community leader, both in and out of his community. 
 Anderson (1972) criticizes the use of the charisma concept (including Weber's own) as “reifying”     196
(thus, as entailing the mystification, rather than the elucidation, of what it purports to describe), for
which reason he resorts to putting the word in quotation marks. More specifically, Anderson (1990)
also points out that Weber's understanding of charisma is “acultural” and “suprahistorical,” involving a
notion of a phenomenon independent of the norms and ideas existing in the particular societies in which
it arises, a notion which is “very difficult to fit with the overwhelming bulk of the ethnographic and
historical record” (1990:81).
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His status as a community leader derived (at least in his own community) in no small
part from his ancestry from its founders, and from the fact that he owned and occupied
the “grand lou” (lou solai) of Temiang — the village's center where most larger rituals
and adat meetings were held. Equally important, he was Temiang's foremost adat expert,
its unofficial kepala adat. He was the one who would initiate lawsuits (perkara) and most
consultative meetings (musyawarah, berinuk) in Temiang. Descending from the founders
of the village, there was also plenty of land in his custody over whose cultivation he
would be consulted in his capacity as informal kepala adat. In addition, he was centrally
positioned in the overlapping kinship networks of the villagers, a fact further adding to
his relevance in their lives and thus providing him with plenty of social capital. Together
these properties were enough to make Ma Bari the most obvious candidate for leader in
Temiang, and indeed highly qualified as such.
However, the authority of Ma Bari, which was remarkably apparent (i.e. in how
people treated him), could not be understood without reference to what might be regarded
as his personal charisma, more precisely, certain aspects of his demeanor as expressed
in interactions with people. His soft but clear voice, his utterly slow and deliberate
movements, his steady gaze — all contributed to give him a composed and commanding
outlook. Albeit thin and frail, and rather short, his presence was always strong.
Predominantly serious — making jokes and showing feelings mainly in the company of
his grandchildren — his appearance usually meant business, not play. He was also
regarded as being just and righteous, as well as “responsible” (bertanggung jawab, I.).
He sometimes seemed rather grim to me, but he obviously represented a moral ideal. If
use of the concept is justified (see Anderson 1972, 1990), Ma Bari really had “charisma,”
even though of a somewhat particular kind.  196
One quality of Ma Bari which critically contributed to his authority, as it did to a
greater or lesser degree for every manti, was his skills in using the “language of the
ancestors,” the indirect, highly metaphoric and parallellistic mode of communication
characteristic of adat negotiations and other formal discussions, including the belian
chants employed for communication with spirits. These language skills were of course
an aspect of Ma Bari's active practice of adat leadership which had refined them. But he
also employed them upon opportunity outside this context, thereby, apart from
demonstrating his suitability for adat leadership, making his words and views
authoritative in his interactions with people.
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Another characteristic of Ma Bari that I noticed was his tendency to utter explicit
commands or other forms of what Searle (1976) termed “directives,” a category of speech
act which Michelle Rosaldo (1982) has explored in depth among the Ilongots. Quite often
I witnessed him sit down with one of his two sons or one of his grandchildren or their
husbands (including Udin), and occasionally someone in his own generation, in order to
“order them to do something” (siu), for example, build a canoe, go hunting, make a
swidden in some particular location, or stay in place. He would also sometimes, more in
passing, so to speak, issue commands, prohibitions or instructions addressed to various
named persons during his occasional “evening monologues.” This behavior served to
tacitly confirm his superiority over those individuals at the same time as it enabled him
to exert the influence expected of him as a manti. In addition it served to confirm his
manti status in another, more straightforward respect, since commanding people, like
using ancestral language, is something which especially the manti do. 
Despite that it was largely through observation of Ma Bari that I came to think of the
manti as people who issue frequent commands, we would not get the correct overall
picture of him if we were to think of him as someone who was particularly eager to order
people around. On the contrary, Ma Bari was clearly less characterized by a propensity
to utter directives than some other manti were (including, apparently, some past “great
manti,” who were described in precisely such terms). It was largely as a result of the fact
that I lived in his lou and saw him daily for much of my fieldwork that I made the
association. Outside his own house, Ma Bari would, in fact, give explicit commands only
rarely. In lieu of his reputation as the leader of Temiang, he was also often absent on
many “public occasions” (i.e. rituals), even when most of his fellow villagers were
present, and when he was present, he tended to keep quiet, except when he was called
upon to make speeches. Even in his own house he would generally talk little, and he was
always subdued. Despite this low profile, however, he was very obviously respected,
even in his absence. In contrast to what most people had to put up with, no jokes or
depreciative talk about him ever seemed to occur behind his back. I also never witnessed
anyone contest his view or authority in any matter, whether in his presence or absence.
Ma Bari, in the spirit of Weber's (1978:53) understanding of the word, generally
demonstrated his authority precisely by not having to use it.  
The most powerful expression of the respect and authority attributed to Ma Bari
which I witnessed was the extensive collective concern demonstrated when he suddenly
got seriously ill in June 1996. Ostensively suffering from stomach pains, sometimes
making groaning sounds from within his mosquito-net, where Bentians who get ill tend
to stay secluded for most of the time, the precise scientific nature of the gastro-intestinal
or other somatic disorder from which he suffered remained unknown to me. That the
condition was serious soon enough became evident to everyone, however, as he stopped
eating and continuously got weaker despite a series of curing rituals that were quickly
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arranged for him. An unusually large number of people took part in these rituals, and
many participants, including not only the patient's closest relatives, seemed more affected
than usual under such circumstances — talking little, appearing sad and miserable — the
general mood being palpably gloomy. The efforts to cure Ma Bari culminated in a
prolonged buntang lasting two weeks (for an extended analysis of this ritual, see
Herrmans n.d.), into which several “self-sufficient” curing rituals were integrated.
Together with the previously arranged curing rituals it made him the object of three
weeks of uninterrupted ritual activity (and immediately before he got sick, another
buntang had been held by another family in his house, adding further to the length of
continuous ritual activity in the village). In these rituals all in all over a hundred people,
including relatives of Ma Bari and other people from neighboring Datai Munte,
participated for at least part of the time, and many stayed and slept over for much of the
time in Ma Bari's lou. For most Temiangers, ordinary life was to a greater or lesser extent
suspended for this period, many not being able to leave the village despite plans to the
contrary — I myself, for instance, was requested not do so — because of the notion that
extensive participation contributes to the success of rituals. Through both the extent and
intensity of the participation, and the amount of animal sacrifices made in the attempts
to cure him, it was obvious that Ma Bari's health was of genuine as well as
noncompulsory concern for virtually everybody in Temiang. In part this reflected the
importance of his relations with individual villagers, but it also reflected the fact that he
had in a sense become symbolic of Temiang, with people sometimes referring to it as his
community. The village's well-being, including its possibilities of ever achieving its long-
desired autonomy from Datai Munte, was regarded as being contingent on Ma Bari's
well-being, a fact which also reflected the dilemma that he had no clear successor
candidate or, at least, that the most obvious one (Ma Lombang) was not considered
satisfactory by all. Plans were even made to hold a nalin taun for Ma Bari, indicating that
the problem at hand was indeed regarded as being of community concern. Ma Bari started
to recover just prior to the completion of the buntang, however, being able to sit up on
its last day, and although he got completely well and could begin to walk about only
months later (a consequence, possibly, of the fact that his son-in-law brought a
government health worker to medicate him) the conclusion of the buntang facilitated a
relative disengagement from the affair for most people affected. 
Ma Lombang 
The next manti whom I will discuss is Ma Lombang, a man who like Ma Bari was
introduced in Chapter 2 (occupying several roles in Udin's story) and discussed again in
Chapter 3 in the capacity of the manti who led Ma Mar's buntang. After Ma Bari, Ma
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Lombang was Temiang's second ranking manti. In the 1970's, while Temiang was still
indepedent, his older brother Ma Resa had been a village head (kepala desa) and the most
high-ranking manti of the community, a fact which contributed to Ma Lombang's self-
image and his ambitions for mantiship. 
Ma Lombang was known as a very keen manti, too keen, in many people's opinion.
He took every opportunity to speak at formal and informal gatherings, and his wide kin
network ensured that there were plenty of such occasions. He was also the most senior
warah (“death shaman”) in his community as well as in neighboring Datai Munte, and
so he was fairly often called to lead gomboks. On these occasions, too, he would love to
speak along with the host and other manti. Like Ma Bari, whose senior he was by a few
years, Ma Lombang was well-versed in the “language of the ancestors.” In many respects,
however, Ma Lombang was the opposite of Ma Bari. His loudness and assertiveness
contrasted starkly with Ma Bari's quiet and reserved comportment. It seems to me that his
behavior in this respect did not serve to augment his authority. On the contrary, it was
probably counter-productive, and in combination with the fact that he often wore
traditional dress (loincloth, headcloth) it even made him an object of ridicule among
some people, particularly among the youth of Datai Munte where he frequently went, not
only on duty as a warah, but also sometimes in place of Ma Bari as a representative of
Temiang, or for various more private “business” ventures. It seems to me that what
authority Ma Lombang had, rested not so much with his appearance as with his
“objective qualities,” that is, with what beyond anyone's doubt he knew and had mastered
in terms of death rituals, water buffaloes, customary law, local history, and people's kin
relations — which undeniably was a whole lot. His own practical kin connections as well
— besides his theoretical knowledge of others' kin relations which he had acquired as a
warah — was extensive, and formed another important factor generating authority for
him, if not always a similar degree of respect (see Fig. 1 for an illustration of some of Ma
Lombang’s kin relations).
The foundation of Ma Lombang's kin connections, in its turn, rested not so much with
the objective extent of his kin relations (which was not that unusual, in a small
community which had been strongly endogamous for a very long time) as with his
eagerness to engage with and thereby bring these dormant relations to life. He did, for
instance, a remarkable amount (considering his age) of what Tsing (1993:130) calls
“traveling politics,” a practice which she identifies as essential for the authority of the
Meratus counterparts of the manti, visiting relatives and attending rituals both near and
far in order to keep up his relations and ask his relatives for services or offer them his.
As a family manti, Ma Lombang was indeed very influential, even though he did not
possess a lou of his own, nor did he usually have many relatives staying under the roof
of his single-family  village house, which was located next to Ma Bari's lou.
Compensating for this, however, he went to live with his relatives: an ambulatory elder
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now staying with his son (Ma Bure), now with his present wife's grandson-in-law (Ma
Bubu), now with his first wife's grandson-in-law (Udin), now in his cousin Ma Bari's lou
(where various of his relatives periodically resided). Beyond residential connections and
the fact that he was primarily associated with the upriver part of Temiang where his
house was and where he had married two sisters of Ma Bari in succession, Ma Lombang
also, as seen in the previous chapter, played quite an active role as a manti for many
people in the downriver part of the village, including his late brother's children, Nen
Bujok and Nen Pare, and their husbands, Ma Putup, Ma Mar and Ma Sarakang (the last-
mentioned also Ma Lombang's sister's son), as well as Nen Pore (Ma Sarakang's wife
before Nen Pare) and Nen Pore's older brother, Ma Unsir (Nen Bujok's husband before
Ma Putup) — a role which was motivated by the fact that he could claim — directly or
indirectly — a position as puun to each and every one of them, as he could with respect
to Ma Bubu and Udin as well.
Another important factor explaining this “downriver orientation” of Ma Lombang in
Temiang (in addition to the genealogical connections) was precisely his association with
Ma Bari's house which meant that he could not wield as much influence upriver as he
would have liked without contesting the recognized superiority of Ma Bari — which he
never did, even though he eagerly stood in for him when given the opportunity, such as
on the occasion when Ma Bari was ill, during which he assumed a conspicuously active
and visible role in leading most collective proceedings in the village. Inter-manti
competition thus contributed to Ma Lombang's downriver orientation at the same time
as it reduced his influence in Temiang as a whole; on the other hand, his influence in
downriver Temiang was aided by the lack of a strong manti in this part of the village
(since Nen Pore's father, Kakah Unsir, was no longer respected as such because of his age
and mental condition, and none of the middle-aged men associated with his lou yet
exhibited much inclination to act as manti themselves). 
By being actively involved in the affairs of the people of the downriver part of
Temiang at the same time as he himself was primarily associated with the upriver part,
Ma Lombang also occupied a kind of intermediary position which enabled him to
perform an important integrative function for the community by binding these somewhat
detached sections of the village together. Although considered to sometimes act in his
own interests (e.g. by relying on the food resources of the younger relatives among whom
he interchangeably stayed), it was nevertheless obvious that Ma Lombang generally acted
— and did a lot — for his relatives and the common good. He also did much to make his
relatives and fellow villagers (who were, mostly, in one way or another, his relatives)
behave as kin toward each other. In Michelle Rosaldo's (1980:68,182) words, Ma
Lombang really “knew kinship,” that is, to use a terminology applied earlier in this study,
knew and respected the meaning of “kinship as a moral code,” striving to make his
dependants and villagers in general act in accordance with the “twin principles of respect
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and reciprocity” constituting it. To give a few examples, Ma Lombang frequently took
part in perkara, musyawarah and other more informal gatherings, where he worked to
resolve and prevent interpersonal conflicts. He also took a distinctively active interest in
trying to integrate “outsiders” in kin networks and the village as a whole, such as myself
and Ma Putup, the idiosyncratic belian discussed in Chapter 3. In addition, as our
previous encounters with him indicated, Ma Lombang often arranged buntangs and other
rituals, and he took, as befits a manti, a very keen interest in marriages and weddings (in
fact, he played a leading role both in the preceding marriage negotiations and the practical
arrangements of each of the three weddings that I witnessed during my fieldwork). In all
of these ways, Ma Lombang epitomized important aspects of what it means to be a good
manti — serving his kin and his community — which still somehow was not enough,
however, to grant him full respect by all, or a status similar to that of Ma Bari.
Ma Busek
If Ma Lombang was a lower-ranking manti than Ma Bari, then Ma Busek, the close to
seventy years old kepala adat of Datai Munte who led the lawsuit against Udin, clearly
was a higher-ranking one (which is not to say that he necessarily was the more highly
esteemed, however). Ma Busek occupied a real government post (in a real village several
times larger than Temiang) and was in that respect, unlike Ma Bari and Ma Lombang, a
“real manti” (manti bene). In the absence of a kepala desa in Datai Munte (a result of
disturbed relations with the subdistrict administration who had discharged the former
office holder and not yet appointed a new one), Ma Busek was also the village's principal
official leader, and no doubt — even though his authority was contested by many — its
single most influential manti. In addition, Ma Busek represented the third generation of
a series of distinguished manti who had led Datai Munte for over a hundred years. Before
him, two of his significantly older brothers had acted as the two previous kepala adat
(which during their time in office was still a post superior to that of kepala desa), and
constituted two of the very last title-holding manti in the Bentian area. Before them, his
father, and before him, his grandfather, had acted as renowned title-holding community
leaders. Ma Busek's legitimacy to his post — and his authority in general — derived to
a considerable degree from this circumstance. In fact, many people said that they had not
wanted him to get the job; contrary to the currently proper procedure, he had, I was told,
not been elected to it, but just assumed it upon the death of his older brother.
Significantly, however, people had not dared to speak against him, precisely, some of
them said, because of his ancestry, which thus served to authorize, if perhaps not  fully
legitimize, his occupancy of the post even in the case of those who were adversely
disposed to his leadership.
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Ma Busek's ancestry authorized his position in several different ways. In the first
place, it made him entitled to it, regardless of whether or not he was popular. Albeit most
influential in the era of the great manti, notions which postulate that leaders should be of
manti descent and succession to leadership hereditary still retain, despite influence from
government-prescribed administrative procedures and “anti-feudal” nationalistic
ideology, a certain degree of popularity, and may even be attributed status as adat or
legitimate tradition, at least by some people. In the second place, something about Ma
Busek, which I think was mainly his ancestry, instilled in most people (with the exception
of a few other manti) considerable respect, or perhaps, awe, as a result of which they
tended to be more or less uneasy in his company, and would at any rate not speak against
him. This “attitude of deferral” was, I assume, due in large part to the kind of general and
diffuse uncertainty which seems to be more or less universally experienced by inferiors
confronting superiors. More specifically, however, it probably also reflected fear of
bunsung (misfortune provoked by lack of respect), a sanction which primarily applies to
junior-senior relations but is transposable to relations with the manti, who even when not
their subjects’ “trunks” (puun) are still regarded as a kind of elder. To some degree, the
largely hereditary deference that Ma Busek aroused also seemed to derive from his
custodianship of the ancestral valuables (pusaka) and “regalia” (semerem), believed to
be associated with powerful protecting spirits (pengiring), that he had inherited from his
predecessors. Interestingly, it was precisely through the deceitful acquisition of some
such objects, his opponents told me, that his ancestors had originally acquired their
kekuasaan (I., “ability to rule”) and subsequent manti status. 
However, even though much of Ma Busek's authority directly or indirectly reflected
his ancestry, not all of it did. Another important factor which greatly contributed to it, and
probably contributed to keep him in power as well — even while it simultaneously
formed a major source of discontent with him — was his real and perceived connections
with the government and the “outside world” in general, including some timber and other
companies (perusahan) that operated in the area and were themselves to an important
extent associated with the government, acting as “development agents,” pembina desa,
on its behalf. During my fieldwork, he would spend much of his time on the veranda of
his modern-styled house looking out for cars — trucks or jeeps — from the nearby
transmigration and logging company camps that would possibly arrive at the village. Not
only had he some important business connections in these places, he had many relatives
resident there as well. It was here, too, that his general interests were, rather than with
traditional village life or forest-related subsistence activities (in fact, I learned later that
he had moved there). His worldly as well as spiritual orientation were to the outside
world. Like many other Bentian kepala adat, Ma Busek was a (former) school teacher
(the families of high-ranking manti have usually been among the most well-educated
among the Bentian). Like most present-day kepala adat, he was also a Christian. As a
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kepala adat, however, he was nevertheless rather special. He openly held Kaharingan
practices and so-called traditional life in general in very low regard, and he even claimed
extensive ignorance of local culture. In a speech that he made during a gombok, for
instance, he professed, rather outrageously, not to know the destination of the two souls
of the dead that are escorted to their “afterworldy abodes” during the ritual. Clearly, he
did not really know as little as it may have seemed. Part of his ignorance was undoubtedly
insincere and political: he wanted to appear ignorant, thereby demonstrating his
“forwardness” (kemajuan, I.) and lack of respect for the old and primitive ways. This, in
its turn, reflected the fact that he was, like the New Order government, intensely
development and modernization oriented. He wanted to see the culture and ways of life
of his people radically transformed, and he supported the development projects conducted
by companies in the village among whose goals were getting the villagers to engage in
government/company sponsored cash crop cultivation or other labor activities, and
gradually give up swidden agriculture.
By holding the kind of views that he did, it was of course to be expected that Ma
Busek would be supported by the government, and indeed he was, at least by its closest
local allies, the timber companies. This probably also contributed to the respect that he
commanded as well as made it seem unrealistic that he could be discharged from his post
(particularly when considering the government's at that time largely uncontested authority
and influence over local affairs, and the local presence of police and army personnel
known to be loyal to the companies and their causes). However, Ma Busek's views in this
respect simultaneously made him unpopular with most villagers, a majority of whom did
not share them or at least not affirm them to a similar extent. Partly for this reason, his
authority was also much contested, especially in issues where there was significant
disagreement with him, but also more generally outside the sphere of customary law, in
which his expertise as a kepala adat was squarely located. For instance, Ma Busek was
not very succesful in getting villagers to pen their pigs or tie up their water buffaloes,
despite continuous efforts at “instructing” (mara) them about the importance of such
things on public occasions. Similarly, he generally failed in trying to force villagers to
keep their gombok rituals short and in accordance with the schedule so that they would
not interfere with various work activities (or the celebration of Independence Day —
something which would have been very inappropriate in his view). And he could not
prevent a large number of villagers from resisting the nearby logging companies' claims
to land over which these villagers held traditional rights. In his absence, people also
frequently opposed him or tried to work against him. Thus his authority was clearly
limited, despite the attitudes of deference that he aroused. 
In the field of customary law proper, on the other hand, Ma Busek clearly held a good
deal of authority, particularly of a certain legal-rational kind, in Weber's sense. He was
experienced and astute, having presided over a large number of legal cases in the capacity
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of his office, and these qualities seemed, despite his unpopularity otherwise, generally
appreciated by the villagers, as appeared to be the case with his judgments in such affairs,
too. Thus, even though he did not know adat in general, he knew customary law, and
through his practice of it he had acquired a capacity for conflict resolution, which is a
task regarded by Bentians as one of the most essential of the manti. Nevertheless, this did
not suffice to make him popular (albeit it did contribute to legitimize his position as
kepala adat) in large part precisely because he did not know — and, more importantly,
did not respect — adat otherwise. By doing such things, for example, as demanding,
during a buntang held to welcome a mining company to the village, that the water buffalo
to be slaughtered, for reasons of safety, be killed straight out and not, as in the adat way,
tied by a long rattan rope to a blontang sacrifical pole and allowed to charge against its
spear-sporting killers, it was argued that he did not have the ancestors' support, a
principal source of legitimacy and authority in Bentian society. 
Probably more decisive for Ma Busek's unpopularity, however, was another sense in
which he “did not know adat” (beau tau adet), namely on account of not consistently
acting in accordance with basic moral values and the best for his community, and thus
not as a good manti should. According to the most serious allegations, he had sold out
his community by taking bribes or compensation  in exchange for granting the logging
companies rights to community lands, which, when implemented, had involved the
destruction of some villagers' rattan gardens. According to widespread opinion, he
generally put his own interests first, and many considered him deceptive. He was also
conspicuously wealthy but perhaps not equally redistributive. It was impressions such as
these which represented the most frequently voiced expressions of discontent with Ma
Busek, and probably also the most basic source of his unpopularity. Indeed, should
opinions about his moral character have been different — or should he at least not have
taken the companies' side against villagers in some matters — his other shortcomings
might well have been overlooked.
Moral Virtue and Social Worth
I shall now turn to a discussion of factors which are constitutive of manti authority,
drawing particularly on my manti examples. A factor which is especially well-illustrated
by these examples is something which might perhaps most concisely be referred to as
social or collective worth. As in the case of the elders carrying out much of the informal
leadership of Ilongot local groups (cf. Michelle Rosaldo 1980:185-88), there is a basic
assumption regarding the manti that they are in a sense, or should be at least be, caring
for their subjects or “children,” using their superior knowledge (which is largely, but not
entirely, a function of seniority) to prevent conflict, promote cooperation, and generally
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organize local life in accordance with the common good and an ideal of community
harmony. This assumption pertains to those manti who are community leaders as well as
to those who are housegroup heads (for the latter not only in the sphere of the family but
also beyond as they are expected to contribute to community leadership). Precisely this
factor can also largely explain the high esteem enjoyed by Ma Bari and the ambitious
involvement of Ma Lombang in interpersonal “politics,” even though his personal interest
in enhancing his manti status was regarded as another impetus in this respect. Conversely,
Ma Busek's perceived failure to work for the good of a substantial part of his community
deprived, for the very same reason, him of much of his authority and potential esteem.
The existence of these notions regarding the role of the manti has some profoundly
important consequences in Bentian society. First, to borrow Raymond Kelly's (1993)
phrase, it contributes to a “fabrication of a hierarchy of virtue,” and second, largely as an
effect of the first consequence, it serves to legitimize the position of the manti. In a study
which is very useful for an understanding of the Bentian, Kelly (1993) has drawn
attention to the importance of differential moral evaluation (as opposed to, for instance,
differential access to wealth) in the construction of inequality among the Etoro of Papua
New Guinea. It seems to me that what I here call “social worth” performs a function
rather similar to the aspects of virtue that he investigates among the Etoro, that is, it
facilitates social differentiation by way of differential moral evaluation. The superior
status of the manti is predicated upon the assumption that they are somehow more
virtuous than ordinary people, more precisely, on account of having provided more for
them than vice versa, or more than they have provided for their community (the emphasis
here shifts according to whether we are talking about housegroup heads or community
leaders). As is the case with the Etoro, generosity is a central component of the Bentian
“system of moral evaluation.” In contrast to the Etoro, however, among whom the
contribution of leaders consists primarily of “normative life-force donations” (Kelly
1993:478), the contribution of the manti is most essentially made up, as is apparently that
of Ilongot elders, of what might be called social knowledge or “kinship knowledge,” that
is, knowledge of the kind that I attributed to Ma Lombang above. In other words, the
manti contribute not so much to life in general as to social life. Unlike the Etoro case, it
is not the “cosmological system” which forms “the source of morally evaluated social
differentiation” among the Bentian, and thus “the locus of social inequality,” but rather
a more secular, politico-ontological value-system embodied in adat. By contrast,
however, the morally elevated position of the belian can be seen as largely
cosmologically derived, and based on contributions of  “life-force” or health. That said,
the legitimacy of the authority of the manti is nevertheless much perceived in an idiom
     
 This also holds true in respect to the authority of the ancestors, to whom the Bentian consider that     197
they owe their entire existence.
     
 I am referring here to such conditions as the material basis of kin relations, and the density of     198
overlapping kin ties.
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of nurturance and parentage (or rather, grandparentage),  a fact which does not lack197
justification, many manti having concretely “provided for” (molum) those people whose
“trunks” (puun) they represent.
At its base, then, the authority of the manti is very much a moral authority,
legitimized by what they do or are expected to do for their subjects in the capacity of
being particularly knowledgeable and skilled for the purpose (e.g. on account of their
speaking skills which form a principal instrument of conflict regulation and the
organization of cooperation). Intimately associated with it is a notion that their services
should benefit the common good as opposed to more narrow personal or kin interests. In
this respect the manti resemble the leaders and legal experts of the strongly egalitarian
Tiruray of Mindanao, the kefeduwan, regarding whom there exists, according to Schlegel
(1970:61-64,122-23), an ideal that their goal is not to try to win legal cases on behalf of
their followers, but rather to work collectively toward making everyone's “gallbladder
good” — a formulation which literally applies also to the Bentian, among whom “a good
gallbladder” or aseng buen, metaphorically designates “good feelings” (and is stated as
a general goal of a wide range of activities, including perkara). Such a notion of the
common good is likely rather ancient, even though it may have been reinforced by at least
two centuries of influence from precolonial, colonial and postcolonial governments
which have prescribed community leadership and greater local integration. Like the
notions which postulate that the proper social order dictates that there should be some
people set apart from others who are to specialize in the regulation of social affairs (i.e.
as manti, or kefeduwan), this notion may well derive from a deep-seated and empirically
corroborated assumption as to its necessity or advantage given the conditions associated
with the way of life of the peoples discussed.  In other words, there is what could be198
called a value-rational basis of manti authority, a kind of ontological foundation
embedded in social practice, upon which its legitimacy ultimately rests. I am thinking
here particularly of the “inchoate and shared understandings on which the diffuse
reciprocity of daily living depends,” which, in Michelle Rosaldo's (1980:177)
conceptualization, is something with which senior Ilongot men's knowledge of social life
resonates, thereby authorizing their interpretations of it. But such a hypothesis is
supported also by Peter Just's (2001:129-31) conclusion regarding Dou Donggo elders'
(doumatuatua) authority which he says is principally made up not of traditional or
charismatic (or legal-rational) authority (although it is, he notes, to a limited extent
composed of all three Weberian authority types), but on the doumatuatua's  “ability to
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evoke and invoke values deeply held and broadly shared” (i.e. “collective
representations”). Since this, as he infers, can be said to make doumatuatua authority
“more Durkheimian than Weberian,” his conclusion adds yet further support for my
notion of the value-rationality of manti authority. In my view, manti authority, like the
authority of ritualization, rests ultimately upon certain basic relation-affirming values or,
in two formulations of Durkheim's, “the moral community,” and “the authority of
society” (see Durkheim 1995). 
With the institution of mantiship basically representing a kind of moral leadership,
it follows that the moral qualities of individual manti should form a measure of their
suitability as manti, as was indeed the case with the three manti discussed above. Also
relevant in this respect is the moral performance of the manti outside their strictly defined
official or unofficial offices, such as Ma Bari's tendency to engage extensively — despite
his age and frailty — in physical work activities, especially swidden work, a tendency
which much affected, and in a sense legitimized, his somewhat limited participation in
some public events. Ideally, a manti should form a model of moral conduct, and it is an
advantage if he can act as a provider beyond the sphere of social knowledge. Preferably,
he should also — at least in small communities where a greater degree of social
differentiation never developed — be one of the people.
Given the centrality of moral virtue, “disinterestedness,” or perhaps more to the point,
“a style of disinterestedness,” is an advantageous quality of a manti. A manti should
ideally not, at least not ostensively, act out of self-interest (virtue and self-interest may
go hand in hand, and quite often do in these kinds of redistributive moral economies, but
this should not become too obvious). Hence it is not, for example, legitimate for a manti
to hold a buntang only to aggrandize himself (indeed, discussions with informants
established that even inauguration of leadership may count as a somewhat improper
motive in this respect), there should, at least officially, be some other motives as well,
such as repayment of debt to spirits for recovery from illness or compensation to the
spirits for illicit marital unions. A factor which contributes to this ideal of
disinterestedness is that the manti, as custodians of adat, are regarded as representing the
ancestors, and the proper and most persuasive way of appropriating the latter's authority
is deferential and self-depreciating conduct. Since the ancestors represent a moral ideal,
intimately associated with all the good that they have done for their descendants,
ancestral authority is itself to an important degree a kind of moral authority, rather than
just a form of “traditional authority.”
Against this background, Ma Bari's low profile of leadership was seen as a merit,
indexing his disinterestedness and ancestral connections, and thereby contributing to
much of the palpable respect and extensive authority that was given him. The problem
with Ma Lombang, on the other hand, was that — despite his frequent references to the
ancestors, and his efforts at promoting the best for his community and community
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members — his loud and assertive style was all too assuming, and his ulterior motives
too manifest. His style of leadership and appearance did not confirm his virtuosness, nor
persuade of his ancestral support, even though his extensive traditional knowledge in
various fields was invaluable to Temiangers. Ma Busek, finally, represented a case apart,
being rather at odds with the notions of moral virtue and social worth discussed here.
Denouncing ancestral tradition, he made it clear that his authority was not ancestral in the
sense outlined here, although his personal ancestry did augment it. His leadership,
however, demonstrates that a manti must not base his authority solely on moral
performance; indeed, other qualities may complement the latter, and are to some extent
requisite for all manti.
The Spiritual Aspect of Mantiship
Whether or not someone succeeds as a manti is dependent on many factors. One factor
is what we might call “the spiritual aspect” of leadership. As Bentians see it, in order to
have an ability to rule, a manti needs, in the first place, to have the spirits' support, or in
Christian Bentians' views, God's. Lacking an ability to rule, or otherwise failing in his
mantiship, he is likely to be regarded as lacking the spirits' support. Such a notion of the
spirits' support may primarily represent a form of speech, a way of explaining successful
or unsuccessful rule retrospectively. But it is about much more than that. Indeed, the
ability to lead is to some extent considered to represent spiritual agency in itself, more
precisely, help from the manti's personal protecting spirits, or those of his lou or of his
village. Many of the spirits offering such assistance are associated with the various
ancestral objects (pusaka) described in Chapter 4, including the longan. Some of them
are associated with some particular pieces of ancestral objects (e.g. small wooden
figurines, strangely formed pieces of wood or stone, etc.) which are called semerem and
expressly identified as being endowed with a capacity to facilitate or promote leadership.
As already mentioned, it was specifically through the acquisition of certain semerem that
Ma Busek's ancestors were regarded as having originally obtained their manti status,
indicating that the possession of certain objects may sometimes — at least in Bentian
discourse — be decisive in enabling mantiship. Some spirit associated ancestral objects
(particularly tiger or clouded leopard teeth and the ancestor skulls) may be useful for the
manti in a very specific way, namely, as paraphernalia during perkara, in which case they
are known as penyentuhu. In this context these objects primarily serve the function of
sanctioning the judicial process, particularly selected aspects of it such as oath-taking, in
connection with which they are employed to punish deceptive participants (cf. Hopes
1997b:95-99 for such use among the Benuaq; Peranio 1959:8 and Rousseau 1988:82-82
for the use of animal teeth for oaths elsewhere in Borneo). However, these objects  may
     
 Belians and manti typically being different persons, we do perhaps not have as clear-cut a case     199
here as among such peoples as the Etoro or Dou Donggo (Kelly 1993; Just 2001) among whom the
political or secular leader is typically also a spiritual leader — or such peoples as the Wana and
Meratus (Atkinson 1989; Tsing 1993), among whom the shaman is often a political leader — but spirit
support nevertheless forms a factor of some importance in Bentian understandings of the constitution of
manti authority.
     
 As already indicated, however, the state of having many protecting spirits is nevertheless closely     200
associated with the state of having a hard soul, making too rigid an attempt at separating these
conditions from each other is misleading.
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also be used during perkara with the covert and somewhat illegitimate purpose of
“making one's own party win” (ene pihak nyawa meneng).
Semerem, penyentuhu and other objects associated with spirits are said by Bentians
to have kekuasaan (I.) or pengewasa, a word which I have already glossed as “ability to
rule” but which is sometimes, such as in this context, better translated as “magical
power” or “potency.” As noted above, Bentians apply these terms also to powerful manti,
in which case “authority” (besides “ability to rule”) probably renders their meaning more
accurately. The association between these somewhat divergent meanings of the terms,
and the association between the different types of referents that they involve (manti,
objects, spirits), serve to make manifest the spiritual aspect of manti authority. They also
suggest an important reason, in addition to various social purposes, for the manti to
arrange buntang rituals which is that the protecting spirits demand regular ritual attention
including, in particular, ulas, feeding in the form of anointment by blood from the
sacrificial animals, in order to release their beneficent influence.  Something which also199
points to the spiritual aspect of manti authority is the fact that the hardness of a manti's
soul (tokeng juus) may be regarded as causative of, or at least as covariant with,
successful rule. However, in Bentian discourse, the pursuit of potency revolves not so
much around the accumulation of soul or soul stuff (cf. Errington 1989; Kruyt 1906), as
around the accumulation of protecting spirits (especially naiyu).  Yet another indication200
of the spiritual aspect of manti authority is perhaps the now obsolete notions —
implicated in the story of Sentoa and recorded by Knappert (1905:625) — that it was seen
as characteristic of the manti to suffer from certain forms of ringworm.
Having kekuasaan, however, is not only about potency and the support of spirits.
Although it typically has some “mystical connotations,” what is often described when this
term is used with respect to a particular manti is something which approaches what Max
Weber had in mind when he wrote about “charisma.” In other words, perceived
“authority” or “ability to rule” is reflected in aspects of the manti's appearence, his
manner of being and acting. This is a kind of “spiritual authority” as well, in another
sense of the word, and it is by no means unrelated to the first type; indeed, it is often the
manti's appearence (particularly if combined with the storage of potent ancestral objects
and the sponsoring of frequent or lavish rituals) that suggests that he has the spirit's
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support. The concept of tokeng juus or “a hard soul” may also be used, like the
Indonesian/Malay word semangat (“soul”), to signify certain characteristics of a manti's
appearance — e.g. fortitude, composure, zeal — which suggest that he has authority. As
in the context of gift exchange, there is clearly a connection here between “the social”
and “the spiritual,” or between psychological characteristics and perceived supernatural
ones. This was of course realized by Max Weber as well, who saw charismatic authority
as typically associated with perceived magical power. 
One manti whose appearance I already claimed was an important factor contributing
to his authority is Ma Bari. In his case, I proposed that certain aspects of his demeanor
bestowed upon him a special dignity which made him authoritative. Indeed, it seems to
me that through them he exhibited — in his own somewhat drab and rustic way — many
features of the prototypical behaviour of the regents of “traditional” Southeast Asian
polities. For him, as for such figures, traits like silence, stillness, and non-action were
probably functional in addition to characteristic. They conveyed calm, containment and
control, and generated an impression of effortless authority (cf. Anderson 1972; Errington
1989; Geertz 1980). Rather than a connection with royalty or other forms of external
authority, however, Ma Bari's charisma indicated being at one with the ancestors to
Temiangers. By contributing to his “low profile of leadership” they contributed to the
impression that he had the proper attitude for appropriating their authority.
Ma Bari's authority, then, was not merely moral, but also charismatic, and the two
aspects worked to mutually reinforce each other. In the case of other manti, the situation
was quite different. Some did not obtain their authority from moral performance,
although most would do so, to a degree, at least, within the group of their most immediate
kin. Others, in their turn, did not seem particularly charismatic, and those that did often
displayed a different kind of charisma than Ma Bari. Many, like Ma Lombang, were
undoubtedly charismatic in a sense (exhibiting certain traits in extreme or manifesting
characteristics unusual in society), even though their charisma may not have been very
effective in enhancing their authority. Ma Busek could also be said to have possessed a
certain charisma, at least his personal presence tended to be met with conspicuous
deference. Preconceptions regarding his person which reflected his ancestry, on the one
hand, and his office and connections with the outside world, on the other, may perhaps
have been more instrumental than the actual traits that he exhibited, but certain aspects
of his behaviour certainly contributed to the deference that he inspired (as an indication
of this, his slightly younger brother did not begin to arouse a similar measure of
deference). Central amongst these aspects of Ma Busek's behavior were an apparent
fearlessness and self-confidence. He behaved as if he expected people to automatically
comply with him. As another side of the same thing, he seemed rather arrogant and
generally uninterested in other villagers and what they thought. To give an example,
during a wedding ceremony that I witnessed, Ma Busek, in the presence of all the guests
     
 A somewhat similar argument has been put forward by Michael Vischer (1996) in a discussion of     201
the concept of precedence as a principle organizing hierarchic relations between territorial domains. In
this context as well, Vischer demonstrates, puun status, associated with dominant territorial domains, is
negotiable, and significantly influenced by social as opposed to strictly genealogical considerations. 
For similar findings with respect to Highland Balinese “ritual domains” (banua), see Reuter (2002).
     
 The term of “stretching” is appropriate here only in so far as the primary referents of puun are     202
genealogical ascendants. However, if the primary referents are social providers or caretakers instead, or
if both types of referents are equally primary, then it is, of course, misleading.
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gathered, straightforwardly asked the hosts, with whom he was not closely related, for a
portion of smoked game (i.e. “private food,” distributed by hunters to relatives and
neighbors, not food served during ceremonies), a demand which few would have had the
confidence to make in such a situation, even though there exist some notions that the
manti, as community benefactors, are entitled to demand a little more than other people,
and which indeed represented somewhat inappropriate behavior. Such conduct served to
confirm the “preconceptions” that his ascribed status involved (i.e. by making him appear
as somehow above other people), thus making it acquired to an extent.
Manti status is of course, on the whole, generally acquired, and ambition is, therefore,
to some degree a necessary quality of all the manti. An excellent example in this respect
is Ma Lombang's puun relations which clearly were established much as the result of his
own agency. As this example also indicates, puun status itself is always to some degree
subject to negotiation, as is the case with inherited status as well.  Theoretically201
speaking, everyone simultaneously has a multitude of puun, and the concept may, as Ma
Lombang's example illustrates, be “stretched” (if that is an appropriate concept here) to
apply also to affinal puun.  In practice, however, only a few of one's potential puun will202
function and be regarded as one's puun: those who are willing (and called) to take the
social responsibility — which implies that the concept should be seen as a metaphor for
social parentage as much as one for genealogical progenitorship. As I noted in my
analysis of the story of Sentoa, a discourse on ambition also legitimizes mantiship by
making manti status appear theoretically attainable by anyone having the will to power.
As I pointed out in that context as well — with reference to the example of Kiai —
ambition is frequently regarded as a positive feature of the manti, even though it clearly
is not always so, as Ma Lombang's case shows. The fact that ambition or a will to power
is sometimes regarded as a positive feature of the manti whereas at other times it is not
points to a contradiction in how Bentians valuate mantiship. It seems that there exists two
opposite types of charisma that a manti can favorably exhibit: one, exemplified by Kiai
and, to some extent, Ma Lombang and Ma Busek, centered on fortitude, zeal and,
sometimes, wealth, which is typically associated with notions of spiritually endowed
potency and soul strength, and another, displayed for instance by Ma Bari, centered on
such behavioral features as composure, dignity, and deference, which is typically
282
associated with such recognized attributes as adat knowledge, ancestral support and
moral virtue. This, by itself, makes it clear that mantiship is not a homogenous insitution,
and in particular, that the profile of different manti may be very different, and that their
authority can be very differently constituted.
Authoritative Speech
An important aspect of a manti's ability to rule is his language skills, particularly his
ability to use the “language of the ancestors,” an ability which Ma Bari and Ma Lombang
had developed extensively. As argued in Chapter 4, use of this language — which is
marked by stylistic devices such as metaphor and parallelism, and a generally
“roundabout” (mengkelotes) mode of expression — tends to involve the adoption of a
special, authoritative code distinct from everyday speech. It is most fully developed on
certain, formal occasions — whose formality it much contributes to — including, on the
one hand, religious rituals, in which the belians and warahs are its principal practitioners,
and, on the other, lawsuits (perkara), consultative meetings (musyawarah), and other
occasions belonging to the sphere of customary law, within which it is the manti that
principally employ such language. Customary law being essentially about conflict
resolution or conflict prevention, the characteristic indirectness of ancestral language is
in this sphere particularly useful in enabling indirect address of sensitive issues, a
property commonly associated with legal language and oratory in the Southeast Asian
ethnography (e.g. Keane 1997:135; M. Rosaldo 1980:194,198; Schlegel 1970:67).
However, ancestral language may also be incorporated into everyday speech and used in
unmarked informal situations, something which especially the manti (more so than the
belians) are prone to do. Like the North Sumatran “authoritative maxims” studied by
Bowen (1991:139-168), such instances of ancestral language use (which prominently
include proverbs) tend then to be “set off from surrounding speech through pauses and
special intonation contours” (1991:144). In further correspondence to these maxims, they
will in such contexts function as what Bowen (1991:143, paraphrasing Dell Hymes 1981)
calls “breakthroughs into authority,” lending the speaker and his statement the authority
of something transcendent of the situation (e.g. ancestral tradition).
Apart from ancestral language, other aspects of language use may also significantly
contribute to a manti's authority. In the case of Ma Busek, his profuse use of Indonesian
and the vocabulary of the state administration served this purpose, as it did in fact with
respect to most manti, albeit usually to a more limited extent. In the case of such
language as well, “breakthroughs into authority” were achieved or attemped (often rather
ineptly) in much the same way — and style — as they were in the case of ancestral
language. 
     
 In this and most other above respects, siu and sake contrast to a significant degree with Ilongot     203
“commands” (tuydek) and “requests” (bege). Among the Ilongots there is apparently no comparable
social institution in which directives are performed in a similarly salient, formalized and straightforward
way. Rosaldo also noted that “Ilongots ... tended to correct my efforts to perform directives that began,
‘I forbid’...” (1982:216), an observation which certainly would not hold true among the Bentian (as my
examples of the use of siu indicate). Interestingly, she attributes the disinclination for such language use
among the Ilongots to a “general reluctance to assert unequal bonds in words,” a reluctance which is not
present among the Bentian to the same extent, even though they are probably not radically less
egalitarian than the Ilongots. Rosaldo's findings nevertheless permit her to suggest that “where the
Ilongots may differ most significantly from ourselves [i.e. in terms of the use of directives], is that, for
them, overt direct formulae are not construed as harsh or impolite [orig. emphasis],” an observation
that also struck me among the Bentian. This observation she interprets — insightfully and with great
relevance to my Bentian material — as reflecting the fact that Ilongot “directive use is seen as having
less to do with actor-based prerogatives and wants than with relationships affirmed and challenged in
their ongoing social life (1982:216).
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Another somewhat different example of language use which I mentioned in
connection with my presentation of manti examples is the rather frequent performance
of what Searle (1976) called “directives.” I am thinking here, in particular, of the making
of commands, which is something that I identified as contributing to manti authority, an
observation conforming to Rosaldo's finding that Ilongot “‘inequities’ are articulated and
negotiated by the social uses of commands” (1982:208). The effectiveness of this practice
among the Bentian may be better appreciated if it is noted that by “making commands,”
I do not mean just any instance of issuing what is by implication a command, but a very
particular way of making an in all respects very transparent command. Like “asking
someone for something” (sake), discussed in Chapter 3, “ordering someone to do
something” (siu), represents a “framed” activity in Goffman's (1974) sense, something
much more than an instance of language use only analytically separable. Siu, like sake,
is a social institution emergent — emically and etically — as a distinct activity in the
predominantly undifferentiated flow of other activities, a special form of action
characterized by a distinctive blend of formalization and straightforwardness. Siu is
usually performed according to a fairly standardized process, one which is followed
closely in the case of sake as well. The person who issues the command will typically
directly face the addressee, usually seated on the floor in front of him, and often after
having gone to meet him — or better, having sent for him — indicating that he has
something on his mind. At the heart of this framed activity — frequently initiating it —
is a typically short and clearly articulated sentence which in condensed form constitutes
the command, syntactically constructed so that it begins with the first person pronoun
followed by the verb which defines the activity as a whole, as in aap siu ko Lodot na
nontong boias la aap (“I order you Lodot to bring me rice”) or aap siu ka tia na
nyangkum belian la ume Ma Kerudot (“I order you ‘children’ to attend the ritual at Ma
Kerudot's swidden”).  As in these examples, this sentence also tends to address the203
recipient(s) of the command explicitly (typically by use of the second person pronoun
      
 Unlike siu, which is mainly used by the manti, or by seniors addressing juniors, sake, or “asking     204
someone for something,” is typically used among status peers or by inferiors addressing superiors.
Besides their differing “status-sensitiveness” — reflecting the different degrees of “politeness” by
which they address the recipient and to which they seem to presuppose his or her compliance — there
are, we may note, some additional features of siu and sake which may help explain their contrastive use.
As seems to be the case among the Ilongots, commands typically regard services whereas requests
predominantly regard objects (see Michelle Rosaldo 1982:224-25). Commands also, as Rosaldo notes,
tend to require, in contrast to requests, physical movement by the recipient, and she notes also that they
tend to be “concerned with finite, easily realized sorts of labor” (1980:224). Against this background, it
becomes further clear why siu is particularly typical of the manti, and sake, by contrast, represents a
more “egalitarian” directive. The manti, who organize and sponsor man-power demanding work and
ritual activities, are typically in particularly great demand of services, especially of such services which
involve physical labor (which they themselves, being old, are able provide only a small amount).
Ordinary people, on the other hand, tend in relative terms to be in need particularly of objects and
material resources, while the manti, in their turn, typically possess more objects and material resources
than others (and are expected to be able and willing to disburse of such assets to a greater extent as
well).
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combined with a kinship term, the addressee's personal name, or his teknonym), a feature
functioning to further facilitate its reception.
One very interesting consequence of siu is that by commanding someone, one in
effect puts oneself in a position in which one has the right and the ability to command the
other person. Performing siu is therefore clearly not appropriate for just anybody; juniors
will certainly not command their seniors, at least not if in a generation above them (a
similar status asymmetry is not implicated by the use of sake, which thus, unlike siu,
forms a status-insensitive directive).  Indeed, performing siu is appropriate mainly for204
the manti and other elders, and particularly when they stand in a puun relation to the
recipient of the command (although the latter is not an absolute requirement for a manti).
Thus “ordering someone to do something,” like making commands in general, is a
relative privilege of the manti (and of elders), and as such, I argue, it plays an important
role in manifesting their authority — and thereby, in Rosaldo's (1982:208) terms, in
“articulating and negotiating inequity” (i.e. in constructing it). In fact, like such
conventions as recurrent special mention of the manti as a separate category in belian
chants, siu appears to me as a good example of the kind of routine everyday practices that
Bourdieu (1977) and phenomenologists regard as instrumental in inculcating people's
sense of the order of things, including, as in this example, the social order.
Along with siu there are a number of other directives which typically are used by the
manti, and which like siu presuppose status asymmetry, and arguably, reproduce it. These
include matuk, “to instruct,” and klamen, “to forbid.” Matuk is often performed in much
the same formalized way as siu and sake, the idea here essentially being that the manti
or elder who is doing the instruction shares his knowledge or gives valuable advice about
some particular subject or more concrete concern to the less knowledgeable or well-
advised recipient of the instruction,  who in this case is likely to be significantly younger
than the instructor. Klamen, in its turn, does not represent so much of a separate, framed
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activity in its own right (but, even though I did not witness it performed as such, I
surmise it may well turn into one on occasion). Prohibitions were, however, rather
frequently and ostentatiously voiced by the manti, and it seemed to me that even more
often than they forbade someone something, many manti made statements as to the effect
that they did not forbid someone something, thereby nevertheless making an implicit
statement that it stood in their power to issue a prohibition, but without putting their
authority to test as they would have done if they had actually made one. 
Framed performances of directives are not the only special institutions in Bentian
society whereby a manti may establish his status by speaking. Several other ones are at
least as prominent, and formalized. I am referring here to the speeches (presa) made in
connection with weddings and religious rituals, including Christian ones, as well as
various other public happenings, including those associated with the Indonesian
government. But I am thinking also about the somewhat less formal, but nevertheless
formalized, “monologues” that the manti perform typically in the evenings and among
their most immediate kin, addressing miscellaneous concerns but especially work and
other everyday activities. Finally, I am thinking about all those formal gatherings
expressly convened to deal with matters pertaining to the field of customary law, in
which most manti present typically express their opinions or otherwise speak at length
about the matters discussed. 
In all of these situations the manti will put into use more or less — depending on the
formality and social importance of the occasion — their special language skills, typically
employing aspects of ancestral and government language extensively and eclectically, and
commonly adding hierarchic directives for instrumental or expressive effect. Their
potential success in establishing their authority is very much a function of how well they
perform in this respect, and so is the influence that they may or may not be able to exert.
This becomes particularly clear if we realize that the manti, like Tiruray or Dou Donggo
leaders (Schlegel 1970:66; Just 2001:116), have no absolute coercive power, lacking the
possibility to employ legitimate force in order to compel compliance with their opinion
or even with their verdicts in perkara (recalcitrant offenders may be threatened with
submission to the government authorities, however). What power they have may in fact
lie, as Rosaldo (1980:177) has observed it to do in the case of Ilongot elders, less in the
actual regulation of social life than in its interpretation. Through the above-mentioned
prominent public occasions, however — in which talking skills are central — the manti
do enjoy a relative monopoly in defining social reality, or in Kelly's (1993:508)
formulation of Etoro leaders' prerogatives, “in the social construction of situational
realities.” Like the authority of ritualization, manti authority can thus be characterized as
largely “performative.” As such, however, we should not depreciate its importance. As
among the Etoro, “[e]ngendering shared perceptions of a social situation is conducive to
collective agreement concerning the course of action to be followed” (Kelly 1993:508).
     
 As my characterization of adat as a “secular politico-ontological value-system” may indicate, I do     205
not, in contrast to much scholarship in Southeast Asia, regard the religious dimension of adat as
overwhelmingly important. In particular, I am somewhat uneasy with a notion of adat as “cosmic law”
(see e.g. Hopes 1997b:4). Even though Bentians perceive that adat is protected and created by the
celestial seniang, and that human action, in the case of transgression of adat, may adversely influence
conditions in nature, there is no good reason to suggest that Bentian adat primarily serves to preserve a
cosmic order, and even less so, that it is concerned with, as a popular scholarly argument has it, 
maintaining a balance between people, on the one hand, and supernatural forces, on the other (see e.g.
Hudson 1972:45; Walker 2002:21). Rather, adat among the Bentian primarily represents an institution
of social law concerned with regulating interpersonal relations (which to some extent is supported by
supernatural sanctions) . Only secondarily is adat concerned with relations with supernaturals, this
being predominantly the field of belian (ritual).
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Hence, the manti are indeed in a rather strong position to influence social life, even
though their power, in a strict sense, could be characterized as limited.
The Authority of Adat
Speaking and speech-making are factors of central significance in the constitution of
manti authority. No matter how skilled a manti is in expressing himself, however, in
order to be compelling and authoritative, what he says must also make sense to his
listeners. In other words, not only the form, but also the content of his speech matters, as
do the implications of his statements, which preferably should appeal in some respect to
the listeners, or at least, be acceptable. What this means, basically, is that the manti's
speech — and his other actions — should be compatible with certain preconceptions that
his listeners have, including not only their basic understanding of the world, and their
notions of what's right and wrong, desirable and undesirable, etc., but also, their views
about the exigencies and practical possibilities applying in a given situation. In a general
sense, this is very much a question of correspondence to basic values, of value-rationality
(although efficiency, or goal-rationality, is also a factor). A manti is supposed to regulate
social life in accordance with such universally acknowledged values as unity,
concentration, respect, and reciprocity, and he should, preferably, act in accordance with
the ideal of social worth outlined above, as well as in a way suggesting that he has the
“spirits' support” (e.g. by exhibiting such features, expected particularly of the manti,
which indicate that he has kekuasaan).
Now, a good part of these basic values, which are central among the “preconceptions”
with which manti action should be compatible, come down to essentially one thing,
namely, adat.  Adat, in other words, is largely congruent with what I earlier referred to
as the “secular politico-ontological value-system” that forms the source of morally
evaluated social differentiation among the Bentian.  Being, as I have proposed, “the205
perhaps most sanctified of all Bentian notions,” adat obviously is highly authoritative.
     
 A good example of the authority of adat in this respect, valid for the Bentian as well as the Kayan,    206
is what Rousseau (1990:196) among the latter has identified as a “sense of  finality of judicial [i.e.
adat] decisions. An illustration of this sense among the Bentian is Udin's consideration of the manti's
decision to prohibit him from leaving Temiang as incontestable (expressed, for example, in his letter, in
which he noted that “the way to proceed is already closed, there is no way out anymore”).
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Claiming that something represents or is consistent with adat is a powerful argument, and
hardly any Bentian, no matter how modernization-minded, would openly admit to
opposing adat. Even though what represents adat in a given situation is in fact frequently
contested or unclear (cf. Tsing 1993:152), there is in Bentian public discussion an almost
universal and strong consensus as to the acceptedness of adat: though one may debate
what adat is or should be, that one should abide by it is taken for granted.  As Tsing206
also notes, “assumed in adat talk is the compelling nature of adat's authority for all those
under its command” (1993:128). A basic reason for this sanctity and the authority of the
concept is the deeply rooted values for which it stands. 
The adat concept has several slightly different, but related and overlapping meanings,
all of which are relevant to the Bentian in different contexts. Perhaps most essentially,
however, adat stands in Bentian conceptions for customary law and the associated
practice of plate exchange. As such, adat contains the rules and standards which make
up what is perceived as an indigenous legal code, and its institutionalized application by
the manti. Now, various instances of tradition and custom are also — as is commonly the
case throughout the Indo-Malaysian region — referred to as adat, particularly those to
which the rules of this legal code apply, even though these instances are perhaps not adat
per se, strictly speaking: they are adat, not in themselves, but in the sense that they
conform to, or are prescribed by, adat rules. Such instantiations of adat include a very
wide range of customary behavior: farming and forest-use practices, ceremonial
procedures, various formal and informal interactional routines, etc. Not just any instance
of customary behavior represents adat, however: there is far from a perfect fit between
adat and tradition. Strictly speaking, only authorized tradition, that is, custom validated
by adat-law, qualifies as adat. This is something which was several times pointed out to
me by my informants, who in order to illustrate this point typically made a distinction
between adat, on the one hand, and kebiasaan (I., “habit,” or “unsanctified custom”), on
the other. Essentially the same distinction was documented for the Tiruray by Schlegel
(1970:28) who in addition mentions a couple of other qualifications as to what counts as
adat proper, valid both among the Tiruray and the Bentian. As he observes, only such
customary behavior which is “normative,” i.e. which “includes the idea of ‘ought,’” and
which “bears upon respect for other people” (or for spirits, we should add) represents
adat (Schlegel 1970:28). Consequently, such practices which are of no moral and social
consequence such as idiosyncratic personal habits are not adat in the sense outlined here.
     
 Plates are, as already noted in Chapter 3, distributed on a wide variety of occasions which are    207
conceived of as belonging to the sphere of adat. Most importantly, they provide the principal currency
in which compensation is paid in connection with lawsuits and marriages as well as that in which
various rewards (upah, temai) are given for ritual work and other forms of valuable assistance between
kin.
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What the above-mentioned properties of adat indicate is that adat, as a legal system,
is not just any random collection of time-established tribal truths and precedents handed
down by the ancestors, but rather an institutionalized morality — and a set of congruent
practices aimed at regulating social life in accordance with this value-system. Roughly
the same point has also been made for Indonesian adat in general by Clifford Geertz who
criticizes the Dutch ethnographers who codified adat for misrepresenting it as mere
custom, as “at best quasi-legal, a set of traditional rules traditionally applied to traditional
problems” (1983:208), when it in fact represents, in his view, an “indigenous sense of
justice as social consonance,” aspired to in practice through adjudicative procedures
serving to enact — and exemplify in themselves — “publicly exhibited social agreement”
(1983:209-10).
Taking Geertz’s observations a little further, it could be argued also that adat
authority does not as much represent “traditional authority,” as it represents what I have
called value-rational authority, and this is also a point that I want to make here, congruent
with my conclusion of the value-rationality of manti authority. In my view,  the sanctity
and persuasiveness of adat do not primarily reflect the authority of the past or
precedence, but rather, as Schlegel (1970) and Just (2001) have argued for Tiruray and
Dou Donggo customary law, the degree to which it corresponds to — or to which its
practitioners succeed in making it correspond to — the basic morality and the shared,
taken for granted values of the society. In the Bentian case, these values consist mainly
of the same relation-affirming social values that I  identified at the heart of kinship
ideology and ritual. In other words, it is being in resonance with these values, including
that of community harmony, that Bentian adat, as an institution essentially owes its
authority. However, adat should not be seen as a mere epiphenomenon of these values.
As a set of practices, made up of the various consultative and adjudicative meetings led
by the manti and the ubiquitous system of plate exchange,  adat largely functions to207
celebrate and thereby strengthen them.
Besides expressing morality, adat also promotes morality, thereby contributing to
create the preconditions of its own authority. One thing which it obviously does in this
respect (through manti-led negotiations as well as plate exchange) is promote cooperation
and coexistence by way of  regulating socially disruptive sentiments. Adat thus serves
also in a very concrete way to maintain the society whose values it promotes. Another
very important effect of adat is that it promotes what could be described as a particular
“moral economy” among the people under its command: a mode of exchanging resources
     
 Respect, in the sense of interpersonal respect, is also identified by Schlegel (1970:28-29) as    208
something which adat among the Tiruray basically serves to sanction. Even though this is true also for
the Bentian, even more fundamentally than it promotes respect, adat among them (and perhaps among
the Tiruray, as well) seems in my view to promote interpersonal connectedness,  that is, the
maintenance of relations.     
 I heard reports describing this situation for Benuaqs and Teweh Luangans, as well as for the    209
Ngaju. Presumably it also pertains elsewhere. For the Ma'anyan, Hudson (1972:45) notes that adat
payments were mainly made in cash already in the 1960s.
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and services guided by such principles as respect, reciprocity, and responsibility.  The208
most persuasive evidence for the existence among the Bentian of such a moral economy
is the system of plate exchange, which the Bentian are known to practice particularly
actively. The fact that Bentian belian, warah, and manti are usually paid in plates, and
not in cash as I was told that their counterparts nowadays predominantly are among other
Dayaks in southern Borneo, represents one instance of how the Bentian adhere, not only
to an “adat economy,” but also to an associated moral economy, which in the case of
their allegedly less traditional Dayak neighbors, representatives of these groups
complained to me, has been largely replaced by one associated with cash economy.  The209
Bentian's relative predilection not to sell game but to distribute it, typically widely,
among their relatives and neighbors, on the other hand, and statements (by Bentians, as
well as outsiders) such as “if you go to Bentian, you don’t need to pay for rice” (aser ko
la Bentian, beau nek moli nahii) indicate that their adherence to this moral economy is
by no means restricted to those formalized exchange procedures which constitute the adat
economy, but that it represents a much wider phenomenon including various, typically
informal, exchange activities, which make up the “everyday redistributive economy.” 
The Bentian's adat economy can thus be observed to go hand in hand with — and it
no doubt helps to sustain — a general kinship orientation, or in other words, a
commitment to what I have glossed as kinship ideology (which is something that may
pertain to relations with non-relatives as well as relatives, providing that they are close).
Such a kinship orientation seemed central also to what Bentian and non-Bentians alike
had in mind when they characterized the Bentian — which they often did — as clinging
strongly to adat. The Bentian's extensive use of kinship terms for address (said to have
become much more restricted among their neighbors), together with their practice of what
I have called a moral economy and the comparatively great general “respect” (hormat,
I.) that they are known to show their relatives, represented commonly proposed examples
to this end. In a sense, kinship is also what adat is all about: if there is an ultimate
aspiration embodied in adat, it is an aspiration for all social relations to become like kin
relations as they are ideally conceived: persistent, reciprocal, and respectful. Conversely,
there is in itself really no such thing (i.e. an ethno-domain) as “kinship” among the
     
 This, as I suggest, is my observation; as local ideology has it, there is really nothing outside adat.    210
Even nature is said to follow adat, although in this case it is not Bentian adat, but the adat of natural
phenomena. In a way, this ideology has the effect of naturalizing adat, making it easier to accept it by
making it seem inevitable, and thus contributing to its authority. However, it would nevertheless be a
mistake to accept it at face value. Not only is adat often uninvoked; conditions often arise which breach
adat, and in so far that no one invokes adat in order to redress such conditions, they may well abide.
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Bentian: in so far as the ideology which I have proposed that it consists of is expressly
attributed to something, it is to adat.
Engaging Adat
So far, I have been painting what could be characterized as a rather rosy picture of
Bentian adat. According to this portrayal, it is an institution which expresses and serves
to promote a number of basic, relation-affirming moral values as well as a moral
economy, and it succeeds remarkably well in doing so, judging from the Bentian's
comparatively strong adherence to adat. In essence, we may note, this is a representation
little at odds with an old-fashioned functionalist analysis — particularly of a
Durkheimian sort.
As with ritualization, the picture is not entirely that simple, however. Even though
adat's existence and its practical application in Bentian society functions to give voice
to and no doubt also to some degree to promote a particular morality — what I have
called a moral economy — the importance and use of the concept and institution in
Bentian society can certainly not be explained by reference to moral orientation alone.
In the first place, the Bentian, being only human, do not always follow adat, and there is
not an adat for every situation. More importantly, even when they follow adat, they do
so not for the sake of adat or tradition alone, or because of having been pressed to do so
by their moral conscience, but for a multitude of highly varied motives, only some of
which could be characterized as moral or relation-affirming, and some of which are
outright divisive or otherwise contrary to the spirit of adat. 
In an important sense, adat does not exist unless it is activated. Whether in its aspect
as theory — comprising various directives, interdictions, maxims, etc. — or as practice
— made up of formal negotiation, adjudication, and ceremonial exchange — it is only
when it becomes engaged, that is, when called upon or put into operation in practice, that
it really affects people. Similarly, only then is the authority of adat taken to authorize
something, whatever that may be. Thus the lives of Bentians do indeed, despite
occasional indigenous statements to the contrary, take place to some extent outside adat,
which could be described figuratively as a certain frame that people may or may not
choose to superimpose on what takes or has taken place.   210
     
 That an authorization of relation-affirming or social values is always to some extent the result of    211
the application of adat is a consequence, among other things, of a never-failing outspoken acclamation
of such values in the speeches (and most other talk) of the manti which accompany formal adat affairs,
and of the manti’s efforts to collectively work towards such outcomes of adat negotiations which
accord with these values. Also, as we shall see later, there are aspects of adat such as ceremonial
exchange which work in somewhat more oblique ways to extol and hence promote these values.   
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The fact remains, however, that the Bentian quite frequently impose this frame over
their affairs: quite often references to adat are made and a social problem submitted to
adat negotation, and remarkably often formal speeches by the manti and ceremonial
exchange of plates are part of events. Why? What is it that adat is taken to authorize on
such occasions — and how is it it taken to authorize it? Why the urgency to call upon
adat in such circumstances — and why is it that it is authoritative then?  In one respect,
all of these questions have to some degree been illuminated, namely, indirectly through
discussion of manti authority. The intimate connection between the institutions of adat
and mantiship — like the Tiruray kefeduwan, the manti are not just any self-chosen
leaders, but leaders conceived as such essentially in their capacity as legal experts
(Schlegel 1970:58) — together with the necessity for the manti to actively establish their
authority in competition with other manti, already go some way toward answering these
questions, especially with respect to “what it is that is authorized,” and “why adat is so
frequently engaged.” Another answer already proposed is the basic moral values upon
which I have claimed that adat is based and this factor not only contributes to an answer
to the question of “why adat is authoritative” but also to “what it authorizes,” since
authorization of these values is always to some extent an effect of — even though not
always a motive for — the application of adat.  Yet another previously suggested211
answer is that the authority of the ancestors: the intimate association of the ancestors with
adat — experienced, perhaps most acutely, by means of the “ancestral language” in
which adat is predominantly expressed — contributes significantly to adat's authority.
However, ancestral authority alone cannot, anymore than “the weight of tradition,”
or moral orientation, account for the Bentian's propensity to engage adat; not even the
manti's power interests, even though in my experience often forming decisive incentives
in this respect, can explain all of the cases of application of adat. A great variety of
motives are at play when adat is engaged. In order to suggest some such motives, and to
convey some understanding of the complexity of motivational and social articulations
which typically characterize even a single instance of adat application, I will proceed by
presenting an example of adat use. Through this example, I intend to illuminate such
aspects of the dynamics of adat which a functionalist or consensus oriented approach
would be unlikely to expose. I have already provided one example which illustrates, in
depth, the process of engaging adat: Udin's story, which comprises a number of different
instances of adat negotation, plate exchange, as well as invocation of adat principles (e.g.
 Water buffaloes appear to be an important source of conflict (and a common subject of lawsuits)    212
also elsewhere in Southeast Asia. See e.g.  Bowen  (1991: 148);  M. Rosaldo (1980:186).
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postmarital residence rules). This example answers many of the questions posed above,
and it should be taken as a complement to the one presented next. 
Like Udin's story, the present example, which features two of the three manti
presented above, centers on a lawsuit (perkara). However, in contrast to Udin's case, this
perkara concerned a minor and much less consequential offense — not amounting to as
much in the way of preceding and ensuing developments outside the case — so it can be
said to represent a minor affair. As such it is perhaps also somewhat more representative
of the majority of lawsuit cases. Being “a case of water buffaloes” (perkara kerewau), it
certainly dealt with a subject which is a popular one for perkara: water buffaloes are and
have probably always been, besides a source of status and a major exchange object, a
major source of conflict.  For all of these reasons they are a favorite subject of212
discussion among the manti. And with expanding government control of the Bentian area,
and increasing outside and local resentment to the traditional and still predominant
custom of allowing the animals to range free, the popularity of this subject has probably
only increased.
A Case of Water Buffaloes
Seeming very upset — screaming and walking about at a fast pace — Ma Buno, a
middle-aged belian who had married into Temiang some twenty years ago, came one late
afternoon to Ma Bari's lou in order to demand compensation from some of his close
affinal relatives and longtime fellow villagers whose water buffaloes had entered his
swidden field and damaged some of his rice plants. A couple of days later a small-scaled
perkara was arranged, one which gathered only the principal parties involved — all in
all six people — and was over and done with in a couple of hours. Ma Bari, in his
capacity as leading manti and (inofficial) kepala adat in the village, presided over the
perkara, which was held after dinner in his house, but represented at the same time also
one of the accused. The other accused were Ma Lutar, Ma Kerudot, and Ma Buren — all
Ma Buno's wife Nen Kiding's first or second cousins — as well as Ma Lombang, Nen
Kiding's mother's brother, who especially after Nen Kiding's mother's death claimed a
puun relationship with Nen Kiding (and thus indirectly with Ma Buno) as he did with so
many other people in the village (see Fig. 1 for an illustration of kinship relations except
for Ma Buren and his family who have been excluded for reasons of space). 
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Most of the talking during the perkara was done by Ma Bari who spoke for much of
the time about previous perkara that had addressed the same matter, making particular
reference to the size of the fines paid then, and thus attempting to base his judgment on
precedence. Ma Buno also described the damages done and tried to promote his case,
arguing that, in the present situation, water buffaloes should be tied in accordance with
government regulations and not be left to roam free as in the olden days. After about an
hour's rather slow oration, Ma Bari hastily concluded the case and made the verdict. He
himself had to pay two dozen plates, which reflected the fact that two of his water
buffaloes had entered Ma Buno's field twice. Also, so had two of Ma Lutar's water
buffaloes: therefore it was determined that he, too, should pay two dozen plates to Ma
Buno. In Ma Kerudot's case, two animals had also entered Ma Buno's field, but only
once; hence he had to pay one dozen plates. In Ma Buren's case, one water buffalo had
entered Ma Buno's field once; consequently he had to pay six plates, as was Ma
Lombang, although in Ma Lombang's case one water buffalo had in fact entered Ma
Buno's field twice.
The verdict thus established a kind of general logic, but from the point of view of this
logic, Ma Lombang paid too little, an inconsistency which was not officially addressed
by Ma Bari (but which appeared to slightly disturb him upon my inquiry about it), and
which probably reflected the fact that Ma Lombang was Ma Buno's classificatory father-
in-law (tupu). For this reason it was somewhat improper for Ma Buno to demand
compensation from Ma Lombang, who according to the cultural logic could be expected
to become insulted as a result. Precisely in order to vindicate this, Ma Buno also had to
pay three plates to Ma Lombang as an “excuse” (pengampun pengade) for fining him.
Thus, in sum, Ma Buno received only three plates from Ma Lombang. In addition, Ma
Buno also had to pay one plate to Ma Lutar and Ma Buren each, in recognition of the fact
that sometime earlier one of Ma Buno's own water buffaloes had once entered their fields
— without, however, having decimated their rice, hence the scanty compensation. This
rather insignificant instance of buffalo encroachment would have probably remained
unaddressed had Ma Buno not fined Ma Lutar and Ma Buren. Since he did, however, it
would have been somewhat less than fair not to recognize it. Finally, Ma Buno also had
to pay Ma Bari two plates as a reward for presiding over the perkara. This reward (temai
pengurus) was simultaneously identified as serving the purpose of offsetting any spiritual
(and perhaps social) tension arising from the lawsuit (bemeng palin besarah besagi). All
plates were delivered on the spot, with small pieces of turmeric (jomit) placed on top of
the piles, representing a gesture aimed to cool (merengin) the hot relationships between
the people involved (turmeric is a basic ritual element used for “cooling purposes” in a
variety of settings), but given also in order to be applied to the stalks of the rice plants of
the affected swiddens, because otherwise, according to Ma Bari, rice would not grow in
these fields. 
      There are some reservations which apply to this statement. Under certain circumstances, the213
plates can indirectly enable replacement of material  losses or expenditures. In the first place, they can
— within Bentian communities — be used as payment for goods or services which can alternatively be
paid for with money (e.g. hunting dogs procured from co-villagers, or belian curing and other forms of 
adat assistance). In the second place, the plates substitute, as is well recognized, for other valuables
such as gongs or jars which often represent the currency in which fines and other adat payments are
nominally expressed ,particularly in the case of larger sums; if plates cannot be produced when adat
payment is due, then such valuables (or at least money), which have a rather high monetary value on the
external or regional market, have to be provided instead. As these examples indicate, being in
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On the other hand, no special consideration was given in the verdict to the fact that
it was Ma Buren's big bull who had led the others into the field, as well as likely caused
more damage than the others, and certainly most psychic distress, since this bull was
known to be so malicious that Ma Buno said he had feared for the safety of his small
grandchildren who together with their parents lived with him and his wife on his
swidden. Some practical measures were taken to prevent continuing annoyance caused
by this animal, however. Ma Lombang volunteered to tame it. For this purpose it would
be tied for some time to a house post beneath Ma Bari's lou, while Ma Lombang would
bring it salt, and make it inured to people, applying his expert knowledge on water
buffaloes.  
Of Plates and People 
Perhaps most conspicuously, Ma Buno’s perkara  highlights the Bentian's practice of
plate exchange. As observed above, plates change hands on a wide range of occasions
which are considered  to belong to the sphere of adat (in part precisely because of the
plate exchange which to Bentians symbolize adat).  In many cases, the value of the plates
transacted is materially insignificant and clearly subordinate to the symbolic aspect of the
transaction which is crucial in all cases. The practice evidently is not only about
compensation in material terms but rather represents an instance of what can be called
a symbolical economy. Whether it functions to compensate for services performed (e.g.
curing, adjudication), injuries to person or property (e.g. to one's riceplants), or resources
forfeited (e.g. children wedded) — it does so primarily psychologically, not
economically. A good example here is the plates given to Udin, after his perkara, so as
to make his “feelings good” (aseng buen, lit., gallbladder good) when having to stay in
Temiang. Seldom does the value of the compensation really stand up to, in economical
terms, the losses or expenditures that it purports to cover (which often are not really
measurable). Even when it does, the compensation is inalienable in the sense that the
plates cannot be sold — they can, in principle at least, only be used by being put into
continuing circulation in the adat economy — and thus do not provide true compensation
in the sense of enabling actual replacement of the losses.  213
possession of a large amount of plates can affect the size of one's other economic resources. The adat
economy thus does not constitute an entirely insulated, but rather a semi-autonomous realm. 
     
 In a very similar case among the Ilongots, making such charges were notably also seen as     214
incongruent with expectations about proper behavior between kin (see M. Rosaldo 1980:186). Among
both  Ilongots and Bentians, sueing someone is seen to amount, in Rosaldo’s (1980:190) terms, to
taking positions on “opposing sides,” or in Bentian terminology, to dividing into different “parties”
(pihak, imang), thus publicly exhibiting division in an explicit and public manner inconsistent with the
notions of unity by which relatives are ideally characterized. However, it also permits, as Rosaldo
(1980:191) has remarked, “interested adults to make political use of  feelings that ordinary dealings [in
societies strongly characterized by an ideal of non-confrontation and significant material interpersonal
interdependence] encourage them to set aside.”  
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In Ma Buno's case, the compensation that he received — even though not that
substantial — may in fact have corresponded unusually closely, in material terms, to the
losses that it served to recompense. Nevertheless,  it was not primarily the aspect of
material compensation that motivated him. In the first place, the losses — which
represented only a very small portion of his rice plants — were not so great that he would
really have needed to seek compensation; his capacity to provide for his family had been
impaired. Indeed, it somewhat puzzled me that Ma Buno did seek compensation in the
first place. Why was he not satisfied with just reporting the matter to Ma Bari or some
of the other owners of the water buffaloes involved? Why did he have to sue his relatives
and bring the affair to court? This seemed to me somewhat inconsistent with general
Bentian notions of how close kin should treat each other, as well as with the general
cultural tendency to avoid direct social confrontation.  Clearly also, this indicated that214
something other than community harmony or the preservation of kin relations was at
stake here: adat was engaged not primarily for relation-affirming purposes. 
Why, then, was adat engaged in this case? What was Ma Buno's anger about and
what motivated him to make such a large affair of what in fact most people would, as I
was told, have been willing to overlook, or at least, have been content to respond to with
less radical measures? The first thing to know when attempting to answer these questions
is that Ma Buno had already once before had trouble with one of the water buffaloes now
involved: a few months earlier Ma Buren's bull had attacked one of Ma Buno's water
buffaloes, without, however, having caused any injury to the latter. Clearly, Ma Buren's
bull played a central role also in the present case. It was above all this animal which
irritated Ma Buno and particularly this one which he claimed was a threat to his
grandchildren. Ma Buren's bull was, in fact, a problem also for other villagers, especially
those who resided in the village proper where it had for some time been rambling about
after dusk, destroying plants, enclosures and disturbing people's sleep (I myself, for
example, along with the other people dwelling in Ma Bari's lou, woke up several nights
when the animal foraged in the garbage beneath the building, occasionally thrusting its
horns against the houseposts). Considering that Ma Buren had been indolent or at least
ineffective in his efforts to control the animal's movements, taking the affair to court may
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in fact have represented for Ma Buno a more or less necessary measure in order to make
an end to the trouble caused by this animal, and I know that Ma Bari, at least, was
motivated by the possibility of such an outcome of the perkara when agreeing to hold it.
Other motives were probably more compelling for Ma Buno, however, as indicated
by the fact that he had insisted on a perkara even the first time he was troubled by Ma
Buren's bull, when the latter had yet to become a more general problem in the village.
Then also Ma Buno had appeared at Ma Bari's lou noisily expressing his anger (even
though Ma Buren did not stay there). Then, however, Ma Bari had managed to calm
down Ma Buno by having Ma Buren catch the animal. Also, the fact that Ma Buno had
sued not only Ma Buren but also other relatives whose water buffaloes had entered his
rice fields indicates that there was something else motivating him in this respect. Given
that their animals had not previously caused Ma Buno any trouble — or anyone else, for
that matter — and that they, in addition, were regarded to have only followed Ma Buno's
bull, these people had not exhibited a similar degree of indolence as Ma Buren, and could
not fairly be said to deserve getting fined. In this connection it should be noted that the
traditional practice to have the water buffaloes roam free was still the dominant one in
the village. Unlike among, for example, the Gayo of northern Sumatra, there is no maxim
stating that: “[b]uffalo are kept in corrals, rice fields are penned in” (Bowen 1991:148).
Instead, neither buffaloes nor rice fields are typically enclosed, a situation inevitably
entailing some accidents on occasion, and necessitating some degree of  forbearance,
especially between kin. 
As I saw it at the time, Ma Buno's insistence to take the affair to court, as well as his
anger — which was probably what prompted this insistence, rather than any rationally
conceived arguments — most immediately reflected the facts that he was particularly
sensitive to offenses, and had some particular reasons to be touchy about water buffaloes.
Thus, his reaction reflected his personal history, particularly the fact that he was a rather
ambitious man who sought influence through a variety of channels — he was a popular
and fairly traditionalistic belian while at the same time active in the national Civil
Defence Corps (HANSIP) and in the implementation of several government development
programs — in combination with sometimes being left out of the management of
important collective matters and not always getting his fair share of common or
exchanged goods and resources (a result, in part, of his non-local origins, and his
tendency to reside on his swidden field, outside the village nucleus). These circumstances
made him, along with the rest of his family, harbor quite strong attitudes of distrust and
envy towards other villagers, and predisposed him to react strongly to slights and wrongs.
They also made him disinclined to let the affair be settled without taking it to perkara —
as they made him feel that doing so would imply that people could offend him and get
away with it.
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Ma Buno's participation in government-organized activities, on the other hand (which
may in part have been prompted precisely by his experiences of being disadvantaged),
predisposed him to react strongly to concerns relating to water buffaloes, which were an
important target of local government politics at the time. Probably because of how his
sense of self-worth and his perceived possibilities of wielding influence in his community
were bound up with his role in such activities, rather than because of a commitment to
government politics per se, Ma Buno was keen to invoke selected aspects of government
rhetorics and ideology, and recently he had even begun to observe the directive that water
buffaloes should be tied or corralled, despite the inconvenience that this meant for him,
considering that he owned three of these animals himself. Against this background, the
damages and distress caused him by his relatives' water buffaloes became particularly
hard for him to bear, representing not only encroachments on his rice field but insults to
his person, reminders of the indifference of others to the goals to which he had committed
himself.
What was most primarily at stake for Ma Buno, then, in taking the affair to court, was
not community interests, but his personal honor or integrity, and perhaps to some degree,
his grandchildren's safety. Indeed, in my interpretation, his demands for compensation
most primarily represented an attempt at obtaining symbolical redress of what could be
described as “offended amour propre,” a state which Just (2001:116) has identified as
a principal motive for litigation among the Dou Donggo, and which also represents an
important incentive for engaging adat among the Bentian, albeit nare aseng, “hurt
gallbladder,” rather than “love for the self,” represents the Bentian expression. The
Bentian, in fact, often engage it for other purposes — and sometimes with quite other
effects — than relation-affirming ones. I would not go as far here as Just, who contends
that “public admission of the moral asymmetry of the disputants ... is the real currency
of the Dou Donggo moral economy” (2001:116). Like him, however, I do think that
lawsuits — and plate exchange — play an important role in expressing and shaping the
moral standing of people, and that they derive much of their sanctioning power precisely
from this function (cf. Just 2001:127). Thus, there is another side to adat, one which may
in fact be as integral to it as the one that has mainly been considered so far. Even though
basically, and in many instances very conspicuously, serving (and functioning) to
promote social integration and unification — through explicit celebration of such values
by the manti in their speeches, for instance, or by various ritual usages such as the use of
turmeric in Ma Buno's perkara which convey the same message — the application of
adat also inevitably functions, and sometimes consciously serves, to promote social
differentiation — and social dissension. The traffic in plates makes asymmetry visible by
establishing who are the haves and the have-nots, the generous and the not-so-generous,
and the worthy and the unworthy. Because of its recurrent enactment and salience in
everyday life, this traffic also makes giving and receiving, and not-giving and not-
  
 Atkinson (1989:267) takes the fact that past Wana adat leaders (basal, and their descendants) had     215
to pay higher adat payments than other Wana as a kind of evidence (in addition to Wana claims to this
end) “that the code originated under the hierarchical conditions imposed by the sultanates.” For the
Bentian, additional support for a hypothesis on the introduction of adat from the sultanates is provided
by the origin story of adat (see Hopes 1997a:110), in which the seniang besarah, from whom mankind
learned adat, teach the use in certain contexts of adat of red and yellow rice — given also by the Sultan
of Kutai to tribute-paying leaders. 
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receiving, pressing and ever-present concerns. Besides regulating socially disruptive
sentiments, the system of plate exchange functions, on account of  spotlighting concerns
of reciprocity, to nurture such sentiments. 
 Because of its economic aspect, adat also enables, somewhat like ritualization, a
possibility to act in contravention of adat — and get away with it. If the required
payments are made, then what has been done can often be made undone, and improper
conditions made legitimate. As the example of Kiai indicates, you can sometimes — or
at least the manti of the past could — behave almost as you please — immorally, and in
blatant breach of proper adat — as long as you are able to buy yourself out. Adat, then,
not only embodies such principles as maintenance of relations, community harmony, and
respect for kin, but also those such as the “right of the mightiest.” The ones who have had
most to win from the institution of adat in society are, of course, the manti. Adat
represents the foundation of manti authority in society, providing them with their
occupation as well as their legitimacy to act as leaders. The fact that the manti, in
accordance with special adat regulations, used to have — and to some extent still have
— to pay higher fines than other people is not at variance with this proposition, but rather
represents another kind of support for the principle that adat operates to set the manti
apart from the rest of the society. Formerly, adat also served to set another category of
people apart by stipulating the conditions whereby one would obtain slave status — the
principal one being the inability to pay adat fines and other debts. To the extent that the
Bentian ever lived in a class society, it is obvious that adat contributed significantly. The
differentiating aspect of adat may perhaps not seem that pronounced among the Bentian,
having always been to some degree counterbalanced — and concealed — by its
communalistic and harmonizing aspects, which provide the official guise of adat, at least
today. Observing other, more hierarchic societies, however, it becomes evident that “the
other side” of adat by no means has to be as suppressed as it is among the Bentian. In the
sultanates, for sure, adat was always something altogether different in this respect.
Assuming that adat was first intentionally practiced by them, and only later taken over
by the peoples of the interior, we may infer that this aspect of adat has been crucial to it
from the very beginning.  215
Even though no doubt functioning to lessen its impact, the suppression of  “the other
side of adat” among the Bentian has, we may observe, the effect of allowing divisive,
competitive and other individualistic or narrow kin interests to be expressed in what is
     
 Notably, I could not among the Bentian obtain an informant able to recount the origin story of adat     216
for a recording, suggesting that adat objectification, along with manti power and regional integration, is
and was more developed among the Benuaq than among the Bentian.
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perceived as a relation-affirming idiom, and in a way which is in fact often less
confronting, and at least more indirect, than dealing with some matter outside adat (here
again, it is pertinent to make reference to such matters as the use of turmeric in Ma
Buno’s perkara, which have the effect of  foregrounding the relation-affirming aspects
of taking an affair to court). For Ma Buno, going to court was also in several respects
preferable to addressing the accused directly; had he done so he would presumably have
been dangerously agitated, in the case of Ma Buren whose bull was the principal object
of his anger, or more or less ashamed, in the case of the other accused (notably, a
markedly shameful or apologizing deportment also characterized Ma Buno throughout
the perkara, see Plate 7). To Bentians, adat negotiation essentially represents a form of
knowledgeable deployment of speech and reason by those rehearsed in adat, and as such,
an inherently non-violent, controlled, and relation-improving (“cooling,” in the local
terminology) procedure for dealing with things. Indeed, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia,
the existence of adat is commonly legitimized by the proposition that without (or before)
adat, a state of social disorder and unchecked violence would prevail (cf. Atkinson
1989:268; Schlegel 1970:127,134). Thus, in indigenous conceptions, adat is closely
associated with order and control. As such, it is also closely associated with leadership.
The close association of adat with leadership is made clear, for instance, in the origin
story of adat in which the mythological hero Kilip pleads for the heavenly seniang
besarah to teach humankind adat and in this connection declares: “The villages have no
mantiq [manti], leaders. Each house is without a family head, so that all live in constant
disturbance and without peace” (Hopes 1997a:108), thereby suggesting that this state, in
itself, is tantamount to disorder, and, conversely, that leadership is essential to adat (and
perhaps, that there was no leadership before adat).  Recounting how Kilip goes to learn216
adat from various spirit teachers from whom he only obtains bits and pieces but no
coherent, overall understanding of the meaning and purpose of adat before he meets the
seniang besarah (the “seniang of negotiation”) who are presented as the true guardians
of adat, the origin story of adat also allegorically expresses the often invoked principle
that adat can only be legitimately learned from its rightful owners, and after requisite
adat payments have been made, thus serving to maintain the power of those who already
have it.  
As Bentians see it, then, adat represents the proper way of resolving conflicts. Indeed,
there exists a notion that a problem is not really solved if it has not been subjected to adat
negotiation. Even though this ideal is frequently disregarded in practice — leaving
problems to “eventuate” or “transpire” representing a common strategy of problem
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management (see Chapter 3) — it is nevertheless sincerely regarded by most as an ideal
in principle, and failure to comply with it is often experienced as unsatisfactory and
disturbing, not the least because of the everpresent threat of supernatural sanctions
ensuing from tapen, the breach of social norms. To some extent, adherence to this ideal
probably represented a concern also in the present case, at least for Ma Bari, who was a
man particularly concerned with good form and the observance of adat, and who, when
consenting to hold the perkara, probably did so in part because of experiencing Ma
Buno's behavior and that of Ma Buren's bull as adding up to a sufficient enough violation
of adat so as to require a counterbalancing response in the form of formal adat
negotiation. 
That the ideal of engaging adat would appeal to the manti is perhaps not surprising,
but that it would also be more widely and, on the whole, rather sincerely shared requires
explanation, and begs the question of what is it about adat or its place in society that
generates this ideal. To some degree, this question may be answered by reference to the
fact that the Bentian, for some reason which is not entirely clear — perhaps it could have
something to do with the relatively strong centrifugal forces operating in their society —
are remarkably form- and formalization-minded, that is, unusually strongly inclined (e.g.
in comparison with their neighbors) to ritualized patterns of action and interaction, as
well as characterized by a very general and fundamental concern with good form. To the
extent that an explanation along these lines is valid, then the fact that adat represents
good form can indeed explain a good deal of its appeal, which thus needs not be only a
function of its instrumental value, but may to as high a degree reflect its expressive
merits. Such an explanation does not yet account for why adat represents good form in
the first place — a condition which can, however, be accounted for by such factors as the
recurrent exaltation of adat by the manti, the resonance of adat with deeply held social
values, and its celebrated association with the ancestors. However, it seems to me that
certain qualities of adat's form may themselves significantly contribute to the experience
of adat as good form — as well as to its appeal more generally. 
In the first place, the fact that adat typically is highly formalized — indeed,
particularly formalized even in the context of Bentian society — is clearly important in
this respect. Against the background of the Bentian's general preoccupation with form
and formalization, this aspect of adat's form would seem to make it only logical for them
to be attracted to adat and inclined to regard it as good form. More specifically, the
almost unexceptional association of formalization with the application of adat also works
to authorize the latter in the same ways in which it works to authorize ritualization. For
example, adat discourse is highly structured, so contestation of it is made difficult and
a perception of it as following a cultural script is encouraged, thus authorizing it by way
of “entextualization.”
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Besides formalization, another prominent and, from the point of view of our present
problem, very important attribute of adat's form is that it is conspicuously “roundabout”
(mengkelotes). Not only is ancestral language — the principal medium of adat —
characterized by this feature, but so are, to a lesser or higher degree, most instances of
self-conscious enactment of adat, verbal and other. In fact, among the Bentian (as
apparently among the Tiruray, see Schlegel 1970:43), doing things “the adat way”
essentially means doing them in a roundabout or circuitous way, for example, killing a
water buffalo according to a complex ceremony and prolonging its expiration by
delivering a multitude of non-fatal stabs. The almost obligatory practice of serving food,
or minimally betel and cigarettes, prior to conducting important adat business
(exemplified in the story of Sentoa) further illustrates this aspect of adat's form. Besides
being regarded as adat — and ritualized in its own right (e.g. through special bodily
gestures) — this custom has the function of  “framing” the subsequent proceedings as
something important, as adat, and of creating the impression that adat is so important so
as to be properly approached only indirectly. A similar, more or less pronounced, framing
and authorizing effect also results at other times when an adat-abiding action assumes
a saliently indirect, elaborate or otherwise articulate form, as in the example of water-
buffalo killing. Indeed, this is a common — almost inherent — property of action of this
sort, and as such it is not restricted to the narrowly conceived sphere of adat, but is also
a potential quality of similarly shaped action outside it, such as the framed performances
of directives investigated earlier in this chapter.
Indirectness in a stricter sense of the term is also a feature of adat's form. Adat
discourse often only indirectly,  by way of metaphor and allusion, represents the social
conditions which it describes and responds to. Also, conflict resolution and other adat
proceedings are typically carried out by the indirect, nonconfrontational method of
mediation (e.g. see Rosaldo 1974 for similar observations in another Southeast Asian
context). In these ways indirectness works to promote the perception of adat as good
form. Because unveiled confrontation and uncontrolled emotional outbreaks are regarded
as vices with potentially dangerous supernatural consequences, this feature of adat's form
speaks directly to some basic Bentian values. Indeed, it seems to me that the indirectness
of adat, as well as its roundaboutness, may to an important degree represent control: both
features have the effect of creating the impression that the process of adat application is
conducted in a composed and deliberate manner. In addition, both these features have
another advantageous effect in making discourse and action with which they are
associated appear “refined” (halus, I.), thus functioning, in this respect as well, to set adat
off from other discourse and action as positively different.
A final prominent characteristic of adat's form is its aspect as economy, that is, the
tendency of adat application to take the form of, or at least be associated with, ceremonial
exchange. As already observed, the practice of adat frequently involves plate exchange,
302
to such an extent that the white plates have become symbolic of adat. Indeed, so
commonly is such exchange associated with adat negotiations and other important social
procedures, that it is quite justified to claim that what engaging adat essentially “is about”
is translating a social problem or other social condition into an “economic affair” (as I
argued is the case with ritualization — with the exception that this process primarily
translates the conditions to which it responds into a matter of spirit-human rather than
social exchange). It appears also as if ceremonial exchange, more than embellishing adat,
is essential to it in the sense that the procedures to which such exchange is attached
would not be perceived as fully proper and authoritative (ratified, so to speak) unless they
are at least concluded by it. In fact, in indigenous conceptions, plates are seen as the
substance (isi) of adat procedures rather than as an aspect of their form.
My intention here is not so much to stress the association of ceremonial exchange
with the practice of adat, however, as to try to uncover the underlying rationale of this
association, and so obtain some insights into how this feature of adat's form contributes
to adat's appeal — and authority. As with formalization, roundaboutness, and
indirectness, there are certain qualities of ceremonial exchange which make its
association with adat seem essential. One category of such qualities specifically reflects
the use of material objects in ceremonial exchange and has in fact already been discussed
indirectly in connection with the analysis of Kaharingan rituals in Chapter 4. I am
referring here to those properties of material objects identified as having the effect of
making ritualization authoritative. Many of these properties function to make ceremonial
exchange indispensable in adat procedures for roughly the same reasons that rituals are
regarded by Bentians as hopelessly incomplete and ineffective without an appropriate and
sufficient material setup (i.e. of offerings and other paraphernalia). In brief, ceremonial
exchange is imperative because objects are performatively essential, and ceremonial
exchange, and adat, derive much of their authority from what objects “do,” in
illocutionary terms, and from the fact that the latter have — as Mauss already realized
some eighty years ago — a special capacity to index social relationships (see Mauss
1990).
Ceremonial exchange essentially serves to communicate something about social
relationships, suggesting that its significance cannot be reduced simply to a function of
the properties of the objects used. There is also something about the actual practice of
exchanging plates that contributes to its importance and thus to that of adat. What this
is seems to me to be nicely summed up in a comment by Webb Keane on Sumbanese
marriage exchanges, which he interprets as representing “a vigorous working through of
the implications that people are, or should be, embedded in social relations with others
(both living and dead) and ... that these relations are inseparable from their material
entailments” (2002:71). In other words, I suggest that ceremonial exchange is consonant
with a couple of very basic Bentian values and life experiences, namely, that of affirming
     
 Additional reasons why ceremonial exchange is compelling are the notions of supernatural     217
retribution and remuneration sanctioning it. As noted in Chapter 4 there exists certain notions according
to which participation in social interaction is in itself conducive to obtaining a stronger soul (especially
when such interaction involves the transfer of some form of resources or services), while conversely,
failure to participate in interaction may count as tapen, i.e. a “breach of norms of sociality” subjecting
the persons concerned to soul weakness or loss.
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one's relations and that of sharing one's material resources, and it is in large part because
of being expressive of these fundamental aspects of Bentian ideology and ontology that
the practice — and by extension, adat in general — is experienced as proper and hence
compelling.  It seems to me that Bentian plate exchange, by virtue of its form,217
communicates — at least as much as the Balinese cockfight (Geertz 1972) — something
fundamental to its practitioners about themselves, and that this communication — which
in Rousseau's, (1998:118) terms is tacit rather than didactic — affects them at least as
much as any explicit exposition of the same messages in discourse. At any rate, this
aspect of adat's form testifies in yet another, subtle way to the thoroughly value-rational
character of adat, which is perhaps what most basically makes adat appear as “the
appropriate thing to do.”
The reason that adat is seen as imperative and authoritative by Bentians, then, has a
lot to do with the expressive qualities of its form. Its engagement invokes “the world
according to the Bentian” or at least, their idealized visions of it. Their inclination to
frequently call upon adat indirectly also reflects the importance of its expressive qualities
due to their preoccupation with good form. To a greater extent, however, this inclination
probably reflects adat's versatile ability to respond authoritatively to a wide range of
indexical or practical concerns, in particular, its capacity to authorize various social
conditions, including both conditions which accord with the celebrated collectivist and
relation-affirming ideals of the society and those which do not, but rather, reflect
differentiating or divisive aspirations. In relative contrast to ritualization whose
importance is predominantly illocutionary, the importance of engaging adat is as much
perlocutionary as illocutionary, as the case of Ma Buno's perkara demonstrates: while the
official outcome of the perkara responded only to Ma Buno's symbolic concerns,
unofficially it also fulfilled Ma Bari's more practical objectives of having Ma Buren's
unruly bull tied up, and the social disturbance associated with Ma Buno's discontentment
quelled. Such practical, causal-instrumental consequences of adat application are no less
essential to the institution than the values that it enshrines; indeed, even more primary
than promoting any particular values, adat can be said to promote sociality, practical co-
existence. Notwithstanding the remarkably strong “adat orientation” observed to prevail
among the Bentian, they are, as we know, a remarkably practical people in some respects,
and there are sometimes practical priorites which outweigh the imperatives of adat.
Keane (2002:71) proposes that marriage exchanges, because of the values that they
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embody, represent to the Sumbanese “the distinctiveness of human self-worth,” a
comment which, I think, rings no less true in the Bentian context. However, even though
adat generally is highly imperative to the Bentian, it is not that imperative that it cannot
be done without at times — indeed, even marriage ceremonies may, as we have seen,
sometimes be omitted. This does not mean, of course, that the Bentian look at themselves
as somewhat less than human, even though they do often see themselves as somewhat
less ordered than others. It shows, however, that there are limits even to the authority of
adat, and that the notions of good form with which it is associated are ultimately not as
important to the Bentian as the concrete social existence that adat most basically
functions to regulate.
The Impact of the Government
The reader should now be in a better position with respect to understanding why adat is
authoritative, what it authorizes, and why it is, after all, relatively frequently engaged.
Leadership ambitions, injured amour propre, the ideals of non-confrontation, relation
affirmation and resource circulation, as well as certain formal features of the application
of adat, along with its recurrent celebration by the manti and others, and the fact that its
practice itself generates “socially disruptive sentiments,” are principal factors which all
in multiple ways illuminate one or several of these questions. In addition, there is one
more factor which is extremely important. I am referring to government influence, which
will be the subject of the rest of this chapter, first, in terms of the impact that it has had
on the Bentian's relationship to adat, and then, in its capacity as an authority in its own
right and as a source of authority in Bentian society.
The Impact of Government Influence on Adat
In discussions of adat in recent studies of Indonesian societies, the term is most popularly
talked about in the sense of tradition, especially in the sense of government-sanctioned
tradition (e.g. see Acciaioli 1985; Bowen 1991; Kipp and Rodgers 1987; Pemberton
1994; Spyer 1996; Volkman 1990). As such it is often associated with a depoliticized,
standardized ethnicity or regional identity 
promoted by the state, and it is considered to have been to some degree reconstructed or
constructed in response to state expectations, in the process having become objectified,
performance-oriented, and reduced in scope. Here I will not discuss at any greater length
this notion of adat, as it has already been described so extensively elsewhere, but also
since it has not, it seems to me, gained quite the same significance among the Bentian as
 In the last few years, however, since the establishment of the transmigration site in the midst of the      218
Bentian area in 1995, a number of Bentian belians have occasionally been invited to this site to perform
cultural performances in the form of abridged belian rituals in connection with the celebration of
Independence Day (or other festivities).
     
 The tradition of planting rice in the mementian fashion has become something of an ethnic marker     219
for the Bentian. However, the custom is not performed for outsiders and it has not become objectified
or aesthetically refined in response to the expectations for minority groups to have a distinctive
tradition. Even though it may be performed today with these expectations born in mind, it is enacted for
altogether different reasons and has developed and probably also spread entirely independently of them.
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it appears to have done in many other parts of Indonesia. On account of their remote
location, the Bentian are rarely called upon to stage “cultural performances” in
government administrative centers, and they are not included among those selected
upriver groups who regularly carry out cultural performances during the Erau festival in
Tenggarong. Historically, until today, they have also rather rarely been visited by
government officials, so consequently the institution of welcoming dances is poorly
developed among them, in contrast to some of their neighbors.  Nevertheless, most218
people have heard about other groups' cultural performances or witnessed them on
television, and they have to a certain extent internalized the expectations for minority
groups to develop an objectified, narrowly cultural tradition, which has resulted in them
sometimes feeling inferior vis-à-vis those whom they consider to have a more
“developed” or aesthetically refined tradition. All the same, no significant revision or
invention of tradition seems so far to have occurred among the Bentian (cf. Hobsbawm
1983), and it cannot be said that tradition has become very objectified yet.  219
All this does not mean that the present national or the previous colonial and
precolonial governments have had little impact on adat among the Bentian. On the
contrary, they have had an enormous impact on adat — in the sense of customary law.
Adat in this sense is, as said, presumably exogenous in origin and has to a significant
degree developed in response to government expectations, and government-endorsed
local aspirations for leadership and integration. Most certainly it has also become
significantly more objectified in response to government expectations of order. To both
the sultanate of Kutai, which recognized adat yang teradat as a system of governance
valid in the Dayak areas outside the sultanate proper (see Widjono 1991), and the Dutch
who, spearheaded by the so called Leiden School, attempted to codify the adatrecht of
the different Indonesian peoples (and protect it from Islamic influence where possible),
adat represented a vehicle by which order was to be established in the communities in
which it still held sway — and until independence, government influence therefore
generally aimed and functioned to strengthen rather than weaken the institution —
notwithstanding that certain colonial demands and dictates weakened or obliterated many
particular aspects of adat in the sense of tradition. 
     
 Except in the constitution (article 18), adat is given recognition also in the Basic Agrarian Law of     220
1960 (article 2), the Village Government Law of 1979 (article 2), and in the Interior Minister's
Regulations no. 11 of 1984 and the Interior Minister's Instruction no. 17 of 1989. A new law of 1999
(no. 41) also explicitly recognizes adat. Basically, these sources state that adat should be recognized in
so far that it does still apply and that it does not contradict national interests. See e.g. Martinus Nanang
1998; Sellato 2001:112; Warren 1993.
     
 An example suggesting to what extent, at its extreme, adat among the Bentian can be a question of      221
customary law rather than of distinctive tradition (tradisi) was provided to me by Ma Kesaling, an
outspoken minor manti who was assertively active, like a number of others, in “defending the society”
(mempertahankan masyarakat, I.). Disappointed, presumably, by my expressed intent not to primarily
investigate or get politically involved in “the issue of the companies” (masalah perusahan), but in
religion (Kaharingan) and culture (kebudayaan), he, the first time I met him, reminded me to never lose
sight of adat while pursuing these lines of research. By “adat” he then and generally meant, it soon
became clear to me on this and a number of later occasions, primarily the rules regulating forest
resource use, or as he expressed it, the forest itself. As he also noted, the forest was “the basis of adat”
(dasar adat, I.), indeed of the entire existence of the Bentian.
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After independence, on the other hand, this can perhaps no longer be said to be true.
In the postcolonial period, and especially during Suharto's New Order regime, a rather
totalitarian imposition of a standardized national order (belying the national slogan of
“Unity in Diversity”), and its extension, in the name of development, also to the nation's
so called “adat societies” (masyarakat adat) — despite a de facto recognition in the
constitution and a number of other government laws of a conditional legitimacy of adat
law in such societies  — has meant that the institution inevitably has lost some of its220
practical significance — among the Bentian, as elsewhere in Indonesia. Notwithstanding
the continuing acknowledgement in Kalimantan of the institution of kepala adat, the
government prescribed system of village administration (aparat desa) holding ultimate
official political authority and the three-partite subdistrict leadership of army, police, and
administrative government personnel, has been implemented here as well, with the
consequence that the function of adat has tended to become reduced to consultation and
the management of internal social affairs (see Martinus Nanang 1998).
However, even though the aparat desa has gained some ground at the expense of
adat institutions, and various customs and aspects of village organization have been
altered to conform to government expectations, Bentian kepala adat and other manti do
still hold much unofficial authority, and deal with a majority of social and political
matters in their communities in accordance with adat and without intervention of the
government or even the aparat desa, at least in those communities located at a distance
from the subdistrict capitals. Ordinary people also often invoke adat principles as guides
for behavior (even though it is not rare for them to invoke government regulations as
well). Consequently, adat among the Bentian is still predominantly a question of
customary law rather than one of distinctive tradition,  and as such it continues —221
somewhat like Carol Warren (1993) argues that adat institutions do, under an overlay of
     
 As indications of this continuing practical power of adat among the Bentian we may mention, for      222
example, their propensity to subject social conflicts to adat negotiation, and the extent to which what I
have called a moral economy still operates among them.
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goverment institutions, in Bali — to hold considerable practical power.  Against this222
background, the observation of Patricia Spyer (1996:28) and others (see e.g. Bowen
1991:149) that adat in postcolonial Indonesia “has become increasingly bereft of power
as it is redefined to codify highly limited aspects of ‘traditional’ sociocultural life” does
not seem entirely valid for the Bentian. In the first place, such a redefinition of adat has
not occurred to a very significant degree among them, and in the second place, it is
doubtful to what extent adat among the Bentian really can be said to have suffered from
an increasing loss of power, especially if we look at the developments during the past
two decades.
In the 1980s and 1990s, adat among the Bentian, and in interior Kalimantan more
generally, can in fact be said to have become more, rather than less, important, both in
the sense of being powerful and pressing. This development is due principally to two
factors: the concessions by the government to timber and mining companies, and so
called “Industrial Forest Plantations” (HTI) as well as transmigration projects of forested
land in present or past use by the local peoples, and the increasing importance and
legitimacy of a discourse on indigenous or adat peoples' rights, most enthusiastically
circulated by national and international NGOs, but also increasingly taken into
consideration by government agencies. In the Bentian's case, the threat — occasioned by
their remote and dispersed residence and their general reputation as primitive and
backward (terbelakang, I.) — of forced resettlement or other extensive government
interference in local affairs having the effect of reducing autonomy, can also be
mentioned as an important factor here, as can timber company-provided village
development projects (bina desa) aimed at introducing — often with little consideration
of indigenous preferences — new forms of commercial agriculture and animal husbandry
in place of traditional ones. However, the single most influential factor among the
Bentian in this respect is probably the ruthless appropriation and subsequent clear-cutting
by timber and forest plantation companies of thousands of hectares of their lands planted
with rattan (and other crops such as fruit trees), and their extensively NGO supported
attempts at resisting or revoking this appropriation, and demanding compensation (ganti
rugi) for the losses (see Fried 1995 for an extended discussion of these events). 
In the Bentian's efforts to maintain control over their land resources (focused on
petitions to various government agencies), but also in local discourse concerned with
these assets or the possibility of maintaining some degree of political autonomy vis-à-vis
the government (and its local collaborators, the companies), adat has in the past two
decades served as a key concept whose validity has to an important extent been expedited
 As Bernard Sellato (1991) has remarked, government seminars or symposiums (held at every     223
administrative level) on various social and cultural questions became in this period a remarkably
popular element of Indonesian political culture. As he observes (1991:77), a principal objective of
arranging these seminars was, no doubt, to promote local support for national policies and  “an official
discourse” on the issues discussed (as well as to develop the tourist potential of local cultures). But as
he also notes (1991:78), through these seminars “an evolution of the official attitudes towards
traditional land rights can be felt.” 
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by the limited official legitimacy — however small, technically — that adat has had
through acknowledgement in laws and the institution of kepala adat in Kalimantan.
Indeed, all along, even during the most oppressive phases of the New Order era, adat has
provided, at least to some extent, a legitimate forum for the negotiation of indigenous as
opposed to government issues — as well as a facade behind which it has been possible
to vent what would strictly speaking be government issues. But in the 1980s and 1990s,
the legitimacy of adat did grow additionally, in part because of NGO-led promotion of
minority peoples rights and increasingly open discussion of these in the press, but also
because of a more sympathetic government stance toward adat (or at least, a growing
concern with it), expressed, among other things, by increasingly popular government
“seminars on adat” (seminar adat), where, in at least one, an educated Bentian author
presented a paper serving to defend Bentian land rights (see Fried 1995:140-45; Titus
Pantir 1990; also Sellato 1991:82).  In the period of burgeoning democracy toward the223
end of the New Order, and especially after Suharto's fall in 1998, the situation has — as
newspaper sources clearly bear out — still further changed to adat's advantage. In a new
law of 1999 (no. 41) it is explicitly stated that communities qualifying as masyarakat
adat (adat societies) can claim tenure rights to forested village lands, although the
government still retains ultimate ownership of all forested land (see Sellato 2001:112).
Because of the above-mentioned developments then, adat among the Bentian has
become imbued with a new urgency, and consequently it is probably more talked about
now than ever. Indeed, to a significant degree the Bentian's present-day propensity to
engage adat — whether for the sake of negotiation with outside agents or for internal
concerns — reflects these developments. In other words, adat's importance today — and
presumably to some extent its authority as well — is by no means only a function of the
resilience of the indigenous institutions and value system, but to a significant degree, a
condition generated by external influence. Perhaps most importantly, by threatening to
reduce local political autonomy and control over material resources, the government and
other outside agents such as the companies have set in motion a development whereby
the concept of adat has become unprecedently politicized (even while a certain
depoliticization of the institution of adat has simultaneously occurred as a result of the
development of local government institutions at the village and subdistrict levels). The
Bentian's invocation of adat rights, together with the representation of their rotational
system of rice and rattan cultivation as ecologically sustainable and market-oriented
     
 This is not to say that adat among the Bentian has long been associated with a self-consciously     224
perceived ethnic identity. Such a category developed, as I argued in Chapter 2, only recently, and adat
has so far only rarely been discussed in strictly ethnic terms. 
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(promoted by both themselves and local and international scholars, e.g. Budiono 1993;
Fried 2000; Mulya 1993; Weinstock 1983b) has also proven an ultimately rather
successful strategy, in that they have received the International Goldman Environmental
Award and other forms of economic assistance from non-governmental national funds,
as well as won some trials against the companies and had some of their appeals to the
government affirmed. Consequently, there is, I think, presently little reason to surmise
a very sudden demise of adat among the Bentian.
In addition to posing threats to the political autonomy and material resources of the
Bentian, another way in which government influence, past and present, significantly has
contributed to adat’s present-day importance is by way of making legality an all-
important concern in their lives. As a side-effect of the growing importance of
government law, the status of adat as law — and, more specifically, its status as the local
counterpart of national law — has become increasingly important to its validity, and what
little actual legal legitimacy that it has enjoyed in national law has played an important
role in this respect as well. At least in the outspoken arguments that constitute their
defense of adat, the legitimacy of adat among the Bentian derives to an important extent
from its perceived legality, that is, from the fact that it holds the status as Law among
them. But also in their perceptions more generally, it is, I would argue, this fact as much
as adat’s correspondence to traditional practice or any values which gives adat its
legitimacy to them. In that respect, political authority, and government authority even
more than adat authority, among the Bentian can indeed be said to be legal-rational. Also,
positions recognized by the government are often seen as more valid than others.
One more, superficially paradoxical, consequence of external influence on Bentian
adat which should finally be noted is that its association with indigenous tradition has
become increasingly entrenched. Even though it probably originated and has to an
important extent developed in response to government expectations and other influences,
adat among the Bentian has for a long time — if not necessarily from the very beginning
— been intimately and eminently associated with the ancestors and local ways.  It224
seems that what Spyer (1996:28) calls “the inherently cosmopolitan character of its
origin” has not manifestly affected adat's conceptualization among the Bentian. Unlike
the Wana, they do not regard adat as a historical importation from their former sultanate
sovereigns (see Atkinson 1989:267), and they are not like some of Tsing's informants
(see Tsing 1993:29-31) concerned with attributing it — for the purpose of authorization
— to an exogenous source (e.g. the famous fourteenth-century Javanese kingdom of
Majapahit, “post-Majapahit Banjar kingdoms,” or the national government). Instead,
 The curing ritual in question also represented a minor thanksgiving ritual; it was given, in part, in     225
order to honor and present offerings to the spirit helpers (mulung) of the patient (Ma Kerudot) who was
a belian, which explains why a speech was held in its connection (ordinary curing rituals typically do
not feature formal speeches). 
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Bentians typically, as is probably the norm in Indonesia, contrast adat with the
government — or exogenous authority more generally — and they often go to great
lengths in emphasizing adat's indigenous origin — commonly going back to the very
earliest mythological heroes, who are believed to be still living, invisibly, in the ancestral
homeland at the center of the Luangan area. Even though the manti, and to a lesser
degree, other Bentians, critically depend and typically eclectically draw on both, in the
general Bentian scheme of things, adat and the government (the latter typically referred
to as pemerintah, “the government,” for short, regardless of whether referring to past or
present governments) represent two antithetical authorities, associated, respectively, with
two contrary sets of values (the one socio-centric, the other ego-centric), life courses
(tradition and modernity), modes of economy (a “moral” and a capitalistic), and geo-
cultural spheres (the upriver and the downriver world, or “the local” and “the foreign”).
As such, they are sometimes pitted against each other, in which case the outcome is often
unclear. An example of an occasion when adat emerged as victorious from such a
confrontation is provided by the concluding speech of a curing ritual held in December
1996, a speech which was given in connection with the distribution of  rewards (plates
and meat) for ritual work at the conclusion of the ritual.  This was a rather long speech225
which Ma Unsir, the man who gave it, did not agree to shorten even though Ma Buno,
the belian who had led the ritual, was already very late for an important meeting with
government officials related to the granting of a loan to the village. In this case, adat
authority in the form of traditional obligations and adherence to correct form (and
perhaps, vanity and concerns with the spirits on the part of the speaker) can be said to
have triumphed over government authority and what we might call the practical-
economical concerns involved. Ma Buno had to wait until the end of the speech — or at
least did so — despite the inconvenience that this meant for him. However, on nearly an
equal number of occasions, the outcome was rather the contrary. The government, is
crucially significant in Bentian society, and the importance of government authority as
a guiding motive for action was very much in evidence during my fieldwork.
The Government as an Authority and a Source of Authority 
Despite the persistence and recent resurgence of the importance of adat among the
Bentian, the significance of government influence — including government authority —
has continued to increase, as it has generally done for the last few hundred years, in
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connection with a process of increasing Bentian integration with the larger society. I have
already described the impact of government influence on the Bentian, particularly with
reference to the manti: if adat can be described as a cornerstone of manti authority, then
the same is true also for the government. In precolonial and colonial times, titles and
various symbolic tokens (emblems, special clothes, red and yellow rice, etc.) provided
by the government represented critical support for ambitious manti in their leadership
ambitions, and thus significantly contributed to a development of greater local integration
and stratification, associated with increasing residential concentration. Historically,
government interaction has functioned to objectify and solidify the institution of
mantiship (and that of adat), and the ostensibly encompassing authority of the
government has provided a principal source of authority which especially the greater
manti have tapped for purposes both of legitimating their positions and of authorizing the
particularities of their rule. In the present situation as well, national rhetoric provides an
important source of authority frequently invoked by the manti in their speeches. And as
among the Meratus, claiming that some particular ruling or advocated course of action
represents government principle — even when there exists no such principle having even
a remote bearing on the case at hand — is a common strategy of authorization, which, as
Tsing (1993:30) observes, has the consequence of “reaffirm[ing] state authority as a
prerequisite for political speech while silencing those without claim to a state
connection.” The institution of kepala adat notably still grants an important advantage
to some manti over others even though not to the extent that it, and the institution of
titulary mantiship before it, did in the past. 
The Bentian have also adopted many ideas and social institutions promulgated by past
and present governments, and many people have internalized government ideals to the
point that they have become personal aspirations. One example is the notion of a supreme
God (tuhan yang mahaesa) which as one of the principles of the state ideology is
incessantly promulgated by the government through its complexly ramifying politics of
religion. It was particularly in response to these politics,  more specifically to threats of
communist labelling and discrimination in the education system, that adherents to
Kaharingan in the province of Central Kalimantan conducted their successful fight for
recognition of their religion, which has resulted in a  far-reaching rationalization of the
religion,  including the promotion of Ranying Hatalla Langit as the Kaharingan
counterpart of the Almighty. Even though such far-reaching rationalization has only been
of marginal significance among the Bentian, and a supreme God had yet to become
important in Kaharingan ritual, the notion of a supreme God has become centrally
important in discourse (as demonstrated, for example, by Ma Putup’s wedding speech),
as well as to some extent in mythology, and even in the popular, non-ritual beliefs of
some Kaharingans. And despite the fact that this development is to a certain degree the
result of influence from Muslims and Christians (particularly among those Bentians who
 From a sociological point of view, there is, of course, nothing controversial about this proposition,     226
in so far just as the governments who have acted as the Bentian’s overlords have to any significant
degree represented development agents. A fundamental aspect of  “modernization” is, as  Weber and
Simmel already understood, a process of expansion of an all-encompassing rationalized order. 
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have become Christians themselves), the discoursive importance of the concept seems
to me to primarily reflect the influence of government politics, particularly among the
non-Christians, for whom the legitimacy of their religious practices and beliefs is a
crucial question.
Analogous to this development toward recognition of a supreme God is a
development toward a common national identity. A national identity is something that
many Bentians today, as in most places of Indonesia, eagerly profess, at least in
discourse. Declarations of national loyalty have become part and parcel of most public
occasions, no matter how irrelevant they may at times be to the local concerns primarily
under consideration. Another related, but perhaps less obvious, effect of government
influence is the development of ethnic identity. Even though an ethnic identity is still
very weakly developed among the Bentian, the fact that it exists at all (whether in the
sense of identification with the category “Bentian” or that of “Dayak”) is primarily the
result of government influence (i.e. in the form of exonymic usages of the terms in
question in administrative discourse, and establishment of administrative districts
reflecting ethnic divisions, and more recently, government sponsored or endorsed
transmigration or forest product exploitation spurring consciousness of common interests
among the inhabitants of the Kalimantan interior). 
Among the most influential government ideas to which the Bentian have been
subjected are those of development (pembangunan) and progress (kemajuan). Indeed,
most government expectations can theoretically be — and have often been in practice —
conceived of in terms of these very general concepts, which have been extensively
internalized (as already pointed out, most or possibly all Bentians primarily see benefits
from such aspects of “development” as roads, health care, electricity). On the whole, in
defiance of any romantic Western illusions, the Bentian also want to become modernized
or “developed.” In fact, there exists to my knowledge no people in Kalimantan like the
Badui of Java (cf. Wessing 1977), the Bali Aga of Bali, or the Sakuddei of the Mentawai
Islands (cf. Schefold 1988) who have made it a principle and an institutionalized practice
to resist modernization. 
Besides “development” and “progress,” another, almost equally influential and much
internalized  government idea to which the Bentian have been intensively subjected is
that of  “order” (I., aturan or keterbitan).  “More order” seems to me to represent, in an
analytical sense at least, the principal message, not only of the New Order government
with which it has often been expressly associated, but of all governments that have
claimed authority over the Bentian.  226
 Adat notably also represents an important example of an institution which Bentians want to make     227
more ordered (e.g. objectified) because of this government ideal of order, and which they, in part, hold
on to precisely because it to them represents an “icon of order” (of an indigenous kind). Adat has
presumably been closely associated with order in local conceptions since its introduction, but this
association probably became even stronger (or at least more conscious and urgent) during the New
Order era, as a result of this preoccupation of the government with order. In this era, many Bentians
came to see adat as a primary means by which they could establish a minimal degree of required order
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In the New Order era, “to order” (mengatur) marginally integrated communities
represented an expressed state policy in a  way very similar to the objective to develop
them, and an allegation that such societies were “not yet ordered” (belum diatur)
represented a principal ground for government intervention (cf. Tsing 1993:28). The
problem with primitive peoples, as the New Order government saw it, was that they did
not have enough order in their lives: primitiveness was synonymous with insufficient
orderliness. What “order” referred to in this connection was a rather wide variety of ideal
arrangements, ranging from the field of political administration to religious beliefs and
daily life in the domestic sphere. Reporting on a situation resembling that of the Bentian,
Tsing (1993:92,108) has described how bathing and meal-taking routines in resettlement
villages in the Meratus mountains represented targets of government ordering, as well as
how locals perceived the government’s Family Planning Programme (Keluarga
Berencana or KB), locally focussed on the distribution of contraceptive pills to be taken
daily, as aiming at the same goal (the pills representing, in Tsing’s, [1993:104], words,
“an icon of bureaucratic order”). Even though the Bentian have not been subjected to
resettlement, the irregularity of meals and other daily routines such as agricultural and
ritual activities represented during my field work a source of annoyance for some village
heads and other modernization-minded villagers who had internalized the government
discourse on order. Bentians involved in the government-prescribed village
administration also tried to enroll people in the Family Planning Programme even though
they did not necessarily share the goal of limiting reproduction (reproduction rates being
very low, most  Bentians, on the contrary, wanted to see more children in the
communities). An implicit issue here was personal discipline; it was understood that what
the government wanted was a new type of (modern) individual, self-disciplined and
orderly. What was also at issue, however, especially for the village heads, was
administration. As government representatives and office holders responsible for
implementing government order in, and compiling statistical data on, the villages, it very
much stood in their interest to have their communities comply — at least on paper, so to
speak — with the various forms of order advocated by the government.
The administrative order itself represents one of the most intensively encouraged
instances of government-promoted order. Initially primarily concerned with the
occupation of prescribed leadership offices, the implementation of taxation schemes, and
the codification of adat,  government expectations regarding administrative order have227
in the eyes of the government, in a situation in which they did not have the means, because of their
marginality, to live up to the standard expectations that the government had in this respect of the
citizenry. As these Bentians saw it, as long as they had adat, they had at least some order: with adat
they could pass as civilized in at least some elementary sense — even if they would perhaps not pass as
fully modern citizens — and thus avoid government intervention. 
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become increasingly extensive and now include detailed procedures for decision-making,
set out most comprehensively in the Village Government Law of 1979. A crucial feature
of this government-prescribed administrative order is the registration of the population
in specific villages and the division of village populations into discrete and numbered
households (I., kaka). An important objective of the government seems always, but
increasingly, to be to have people, and their possessions and activities, firmly located in
place, not only for administrative reasons but for exemplary ones as well. It is for this
reason that dispersion and mobility — and swidden cultivation which involves both —
counted among the principal anathemas of the New Order government (and this of course
also helps to explain the fact that mobility is, as Tsing, 1993:155, has noted, a defining
feature of the suku terasing, i.e. those “isolated populations” which the government has
identified as in need of particularly intensive development guidance). The exemplary
aspect was also an important reason why the New Order, as Pemberton (1994:5) has
argued, attributed such great importance to the staging of national elections, as was, I
assume, the restriction of inter-village movement imposed upon the Bentian at the time
of these events. This restriction was invoked when Udin, almost six months prior to the
national elections in 1997, finally left Temiang for his home village, and was made an
example of unlawful conduct by the newly-appointed and strongly government-
supportive village head of Datai Munte (Temiang was one of its official hamlets). The
new village head did this in a wedding speech,  which principally consisted of an attempt
to explain to villagers the importance of procuring identity cards. Another expression of
the importance of this exemplary aspect is the significance attributed by the New Order
and earlier governments to such outward features of order as the alignment of village
houses in neat, numbered rows, the fencing of villages and gardens (kebun), and the
penning or corralling of animals. As a consequence of a rather strong government
emphasis on such outward or “ritualistic” aspects of order, what the issue of order
primarily seemed to be about for many Bentians was the management of appearances,
that is, a concern for satisfying the government’s desires through superficial compliance.
However, the significance of the issue was by no means reduced to “appearances” for all
Bentians; like the ideal of development, the ideal of order had become genuinely affirmed
and a matter of deep, intellectual concern for many people. As an example of this —
which also illustrates how extensively government notions of order had, in Habermas’s
(1975) terms, “colonized” most sectors in society — we may take the views of the young
belian Mancan who saw the rationalization of religion occurring throughout the
 In the past, entire Luangan communities are also reported to have fled the Dutch by taking up     228
residence in inaccessible locations. 
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archipelago as a thoroughly positive development, and complained that unlike on Java,
where the government had already “developed the ancestors” (membina leluhur, I.),
religious beliefs in Kalimantan were not yet perfect (belum sempurna, I.) as they had been
subjected to too little government guidance.
Among the government-promoted social institutions adopted by the Bentian, foremost
in importance is that of the nucleated village. Although at first actively resisted — and
until this day still passively resisted by at least some Bentians — this non-indigenous
institution, promoted by precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial governments alike,  now
plays a significant part in all Bentian lives. Even though village buildings, as among the
Meratus, may be empty, or single family houses populated with extended kin groups (see
Tsing 1993:104), many families have built and live in modern “development houses.”
Similarly, even though many families “cultivate dispersal as a form of autonomy” and as
a means of “staying away from the state” (Tsing 1993:48, 53),  a majority — including228
most manti and older people who have a particular interest in development — probably
advocate, at least in theory, a greater amount of village as opposed to swidden residence.
Alongside the inherent practical advantages of dispersed residence for swidden
cultivators and a presumably ancient desire for autonomy among conjugal families and
the young, there has also long existed a local ideal of concentration (see Chapter 4),
which no doubt has encouraged the Bentian’s adoption of this institution. Nevertheless,
it is clear that their attitudes toward village residence have become increasingly even
more affirmative over time and that this change reflects government influence, as does
their present-day consternation over dispersion, which is often equated with dissension
and strife. 
From the Bentian’s point of view, the injunction to concentrate in villages is
intimately associated with another government demand, namely that of establishing unity
(persatuan I.), an objective which has long constituted a local ideal, but which with the
Pancasila politics of the postcolonial period also became a strongly government-
promoted one (along with such associated concepts as musyawarah, “public
consultation,” and gotong royong, “collective cooperation”), especially under the
stability-obsessed New Order regime. During my fieldwork, village concentration also
represented, as many Bentians had come to see it, one of a limited number of ways
(recognition of a supreme God being another) in which they, as marginal citizens, could
(and should) respond to the government’s call for national integration (persatuan
nasional). All this is not to say that opinions about village residence in this respect were
not ambivalent. Village life, like modern life more generally, was commonly seen as
characterized by politik, that is, by devious or generally strategic schemes of action
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designed to advance narrow self-interest (cf. Keane 2002:2). Notwithstanding such
critical assessments of the consequences of village settlement, however, there existed a
somewhat utopian view among the Bentian of residential concentration as tantamount to
unification, and a notion of government authority as fundamentally concerned with social
unity. The Bentian’s tendency to advocate social concentration and unification also
represented a perceived necessity: given the possibility of government intervention in the
case of failure in these respects, there is a notion that communities now, unlike in the
past, have to stick together if local ways of life and some degree of local autonomy are
to be retained. It is recognized, in other words, that “in the era of independence,” social
life can no longer go on quite as before; at least a higher level of social integration has
now to be maintained. Indicating the extent to which these notions have become
internalized by many Bentians, I was presented with the “Story of the rotten porcupine”
(kesa tetung boto) on a number of different occasions. This story was told me by
informants who were either critical or ambivalent about the lack of centralized rule in the
past and the condition of not yet being “held by the government” (tenegen pemerintah).
It served to illustrate, in particular, the problems associated with manti pride and
housegroup autonomy.
Once the Tementeng people had a lot of manti. Hence the saying Tementeng
temenggung turu, “Tementeng with seven temanggung” [temanggung is one of the
titles which the sultanate awarded to Bentian leaders]. Once, these manti were out
in the forest on their own. There they caught a porcupine which they were going
to eat. However, there was a problem. There was no one to cook it for them. The
manti argued for a while but not one of them was willing to lower himself so much
as to do this. Thus it came to pass that the porcupine ended up rotten, and there is
the saying Tementeng tetung boto, “Tementeng of the rotten porcupine.”
As these examples of government influence indicate, the Bentian have far from
always resisted the government and its authority, instead, they have about as often
welcomed it. Not only do they embrace many aspects of the ideals which the government
has promulgated, but they also regard the government as an agency which has the
potential and the responsibility for implementing many of these ideals among them (as
Mancan did, with respect to religious beliefs). This to some extent explains the authority
of the government among them. The government is authoritative to them, both because
they feel that it has the power (through the police and the military) to enforce far-reaching
compliance with its regulations, and because it, in their view, has the ability — at least
theoretically — to bring about certain things that they desire, especially coveted aspects
of development (as manifested on television and, to some extent, among downriver
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societies — even though not yet so much, as they frequently complain, among
themselves). 
Ma Busek, the modernization-minded head of customary law of Datai Munte who
formed one of the three manti examples discussed earlier in this chapter, provides the
ultimate example of the Bentian's tendency to embrace modernization and their
inclination to accept the authority of the government (the previously-mentioned village
head of the Datai Munte would also make a very good example). As we know, Ma Busek
even advocated such government ideals — broached by the timber companies who on
behalf of the government acted as development agents in his village — as that swidden
cultivation should progressively be given up and replaced by more modern and ordered
means of subsistence. He was also eager to have his community abide by local
government (kecamatan) demands that major rituals (i.e. those involving water buffalo
sacrifice) should be reported to, and authorized by permits issued by, the police (in this
case the security police, or SATPAM, of the neighboring timber company). For this and
other reasons, he also attempted to restrict the frequency and length of rituals, particularly
of secondary mortuary rituals, for instance, by lecturing to this end in the speeches that
he was invited to give during these rituals in his capacity as head of customary law.
Ma Busek was, however, rather extreme in this regard. Even though many people
supported (more or less actively) one or another aspect of government policy — such as
Ma Buno did with respect to the injunction that water buffalo should be tied or corralled
— and frequently claimed to act as spokespersons of the government, most Bentians did
not willingly submit to the government in the above-mentioned respects, nor in many
others. However, even though they did not, they nevertheless generally took — as already
suggested by the wedding speech which gave me the idea to write about authority — the
authority of the government as a more or less inevitable fact of life to which they in some
way or another adjusted. At least no one contested the legitimacy of government authority
directly, notwithstanding that many people sometimes resisted particular government
injunctions in practice, or defended practices which conflicted with government
principles. And when people resisted government injunctions, they typically did so by in
one way or another appealing to, and thereby acknowledging, government authority. 
One example of how Bentians applied authority associated with the government, even
when they in effect contested it, is provided by a speech given by Ma Bari (the unofficial
kepala adat of Temiang) at a secondary mortuary ritual in Datai Munte which he was
invited to give in the capacity as one of the major manti in the area, and as a relative of
the deceased. On this occasion (preceding the water buffalo sacrifice), Ma Busek and
another manti of Datai Munte also gave speeches and a large audience had gathered,
including many residents from the nearby timber company and transmigration settlements
(mostly Bentians and Benuaqs who had volunteered to move there from nearby locations,
but also a fair number of Javanese, including police and other government officials). In
 In her Raiding the Lands of the Foreigners (2003) Danilyn Rutherford argues that authority in     229
Biak is generally foreign, that is, derived from spheres beyond the local world, and typically based on
some degree of monopoly of access to such spheres. More specifically, she argues that Biak authority is
based on the fetishization of the foreign, a concept which I shall discuss further below. Even though her
argument clearly is applicable to much political authority in circulation among the Bentian, it is not, as
we see in this connection, applicable to all of it.
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contrast to Ma Busek, who complained over delays in the ritual schedule (reflecting
difficulties to catch the water buffalo to be sacrificed), and reminded participants that
ordinary activities in the village should continue to run despite the progress of gombok
rituals — just as the country had never ceased to function despite the recent death of the
president's wife — Ma Bari spoke for the legitimacy of local adat and water buffalo
sacrifice, and he talked about his own village (Temiang) and Datai Munte as if they were
two autonomous, equal entities even though the former was officially regarded as a
hamlet of the latter. Ma Bari explained that sacrificing water buffaloes was a pan-
Indonesian custom (an argument which probably reflected a discussion with me a few
nights earlier over a picture of water buffalo sacrifice in Janet Hoskins' 1993 monograph
on the Kodi of Sumba) which tradition and proper respect for the ancestors all over the
country demanded be performed in so far as resources allowed, which they did now. Ma
Bari was also conspicuously dressed up for the event:, wearing a batik shirt (as customary
for Indonesian men on formal occasions) and a traditional headcloth (laung), neither of
which he usually wore. And even though he employed the national language and
government rhetoric to a much lesser extent than Ma Busek (a result not only of choice
but also of more modest skills in this respect)  he nevertheless used them about as
extensively as he could, as probably any present-day manti would have done in the same
situation. 
In so far as Ma Bari was authoritative on this occasion, however — and I believe he
was, although this is something which I cannot say for certain — it was not primarily the
result of his application of government authority (which was unimpressive in comparison
with Ma Busek's use of this resource, and may even have appeared crude to the visitors).
Neither was it in any other respect a function of being what Rutherford (2003) has called
“foreign” — at least not from the point of view of his own people (although from the
perspective of the visitors, it may to some extent have been that).  Rather, his authority229
in the situation probably derived most essentially from what could be called his
“persistent indigenousness:” his refusal to renounce such local customs and values (e.g.
intergenerational reciprocity and respect) which he regarded as right and proper — and
his courage to stand up and defend them in a way which was nevertheless
accommodating and measured.
Even though Ma Bari's speech was not intended or construed as a critique of the
government per se, it is clear that through it he contested certain local government ideals.
Unlike in Toraja land, mortuary rituals and water buffalo sacrifice had at this time in this
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part of Kalimantan not yet become unambiguously accepted as adat spectacles, but were
rather seen as indicators of a failure to adopt a world religion (agama) or wholeheartedly
affirm development (pembangunan), the ultimate goal of the government. For that
reason, Ma Bari's speech was by no means unprovocative, and even though some
Bentians had on rare occasions performed more confronting and dangerous actions —
such as those men who tried to stop the logging of rattan cultivated lands by confronting
bulldozers in barricades (see Fried 1995) — it was nevertheless unusually confronting.
In contrast to such actions as Ma Bari's speech and the protests against the timber
companies — neither of which represented direct criticism of the government —
Bentians most typically responded to government and other outsider agent demands and
actions, if not like Ma Busek by outright affirmation, then at least by outward
acquiescence — or inconspicuous avoidance. An example in this respect is the intense
Bentian inhibition — experienced all too often by myself — to discuss openly or admit
altogether the present or past existence of any such aspects of local culture which were
or had been strongly condemned by the national government or its predecessors, such as
headhunting, slavery, polyandry, or farmhouse residence (cf. Spyer 2000:200 for a
description of similar attitudes in Aru). That these aspects of local culture would be
suppressed was additionally motivated by the fact that they are perceived as prohibited,
and associated with primitiveness — and regarded as such not only by the government
and downriver people but also by many Bentian themselves. The discourse on
primitiveness — variably focused on such attributes as wildness, animism, backwardness,
and lack of order — has deeply influenced Bentian notions of self-identity, and it has
probably also been a major factor promoting Bentian submission to government
authority. Generating feelings of inferiority, it has played a crucial role in promoting
conversion to a world religion, for example, and it has also augmented desires for getting
access to various amenities and services associated with modern life.
Attitudes vary between individuals, of course, but on the whole, Bentians have, it
seems to me, a fundamentally ambivalent attitude to government authority. They affirm
and want to adjust to some government expectations, while they resent others. They also
generally want some degree of government involvement in at least some spheres of their
lives — even though, on the other hand, they would prefer not to lose too much
autonomy. One type of government involvement which they are particularly keen on
having consists of the annual subsidy (Inpres Bantuan Pembangunan Desa) which the
government grants to villages all over the country, and some other subsidies or forms of
assistance granted particularly to “isolated” or “left-behind” villages (desa terpencil, desa
tertinggal). In order to obtain these and other forms of material assistance, the Bentian
actively, and quite frequently, try to attract the attention of the government, in particular
by petitioning (e.g. through formal letters) the various government agencies responsible
in the different cases, but also by making impromptu demands whenever opportunities
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arise. Such an opportunity arose in November 2002 when the provincial governor passed
through their area in order to inspect the condition of the interprovincial road, and
representatives of several Bentian communities stopped his retinue of 28 cars in order to
present gifts of rattan mats and coconuts — and make requests for economic assistance
to be used for the purchase of rice and the restoration of the decaying grand lou (rumah
adat) of their villages (Kompas 2002). Ironically, in such contexts, including this case,
it has typically been the Bentian’s condition of being less developed than other peoples
which has provided the proposed basis for their requests — a condition which in other
contexts is something which they desperately want to conceal from the government. The
same condition has notably also induced feelings in Bentians of being the object of
government discrimination — given the relative lack of development in their area as
compared to other areas — as well as feelings of injustice — given the relatively great
outflow of resources from their area through outsider exploitation, and the rather
restricted flow of revenues back into it. These sentiments also nourish their desires to
obtain such assistance. However, it is clear that the Bentian’s eagerness to demand
assistance from the government (and, occasionally, from the companies operating in their
area) is not only motivated by their desire to get  “their fair share.” It also reflects a more
straightforward desire for modern things and facilities in themselves, as well as, to some
degree, diminished “communal self-reliance” (in its turn reflecting expectations that, in
the “age of independence,” certain services should be provided by the government).
Indeed, it seems to me that there exists among the Bentian a fair incidence of what Sellato
(2001:124,133), in reference to another part of  East Kalimantan, has described as
“‘assistance’ mentality” — which is not to say that their propensity to seek assistance is
not motivated by a range of other factors as well, including aspirations to overcome the
stigma of primitiveness. One example of  “assistance mentality” is precisely the above-
mentioned requests made to the governor, and the fact that many villages have been
unable to mobilize local resources to repair their grand lou, in part because of
expectations that they might get government assistance for this purpose.
To an important extent, the Bentian’s ambivalent attitude towards the government
also reflects the often inconsistent relationship that the government has with them. At
times the government makes rather dictatorial and difficult demands on them, requiring,
for example, that they give up important cultural practices, or surrender their lands to
timber or plantation companies, while at other times it claims to protect their adat or
offers them sizeable endowments, sometimes even without request. Different
governments have also often had different, sometimes contradictory opinions with respect
to different socio-cultural institutions in Bentian society — mantiship and longhouses
providing cases in point. There is, nevertheless, some consistency in how the government
acts towards the Bentian, indeed in how all the different governments that over time have
represented their overlords have acted toward them, a consistency that may perhaps also
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explain their tendency to refer unspecifically to past and present governments as “the
government” (pemerintah), a tendency which has notably influenced my own analysis of
the institution.
Past and present governments have been marked by an authoritarian attitude in their
dealings with the Bentian, and the communication has mostly been one-way  from them
to the Bentian. At the same time, all governments have been characterized by a rather
irregular and marginal concern with the Bentian, and a limited presence in their area,
conditions which principally are a result of the distance of the Bentian area from
administrative centers, the difficulties of transport within it, and its low population
density. What the government will do next with respect to the Bentian, and what it really
stands for in relation to them, or in other respects, has, at least from the Bentian’s point
of view, typically had little predictability and transparency. Besides inconsistencies in
government policy, this fact again reflects the Bentian’s relative remoteness, and the
marginal presence of the government in their area, circumstances which critically
influence the Bentian’s relations to government authority more generally.
Besides sustaining their marginal and undeveloped condition — as well as the
comparatively great autonomy that they enjoy — a centrally important consequence that
these circumstances have is that Bentian notions about the government’s expectations and
orientation often represent mere assumptions, and not infrequently, misunderstandings.
The restricted communication and day-to-day interaction with the government also entails
a situation in which claims to government authority are often unauthorized in practice and
its use frequently is at variance with the government’s intentions. The same conditions
furthermore encourage what could be described as the “fetishization” of government
authority,  an attribute of its use investigated in another marginal Indonesian society by
Rutherford (2003). As employed among the Bentian, government authority indeed
frequently has a rather fetishized or talismanic character, that is, it is applied in a more
or less self-referential manner with little constraint in moving between different contexts,
as if possessing an intrinsic potency, and its appeal is, to a significant extent, a function
of its alien aura and associated inscrutability — all factors which reflect the absence of
the government. To some degree, it is also precisely the fact that attempts to invoke
government authority (e.g. calls on the police) often remain disregarded which generates
such fetishized use of authority. As Rutherford, commenting on Freud’s understanding
of the term, has observed, the fetish, born out of unfulfilled desire, “works all the better
because it fails” (2003:21). Such failures, then, are not total failures, but, rather, partial
successes, involving some kind of  “secondary gratification.” In the Bentian’s case, the
fetishization of government authority enables them to borrow for their own purposes (for
use among themselves) a certain measure of the authority of the absent government —
which would otherwise be lost to them. Such use of government authority may indeed be
quite effective — in that some people become persuaded to do or believe certain things
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as a result of others’ application of it — even while it often is unsanctioned. The fact that
the absence of the government enables what we could call a rather creative use of its
authority also enables the latter’s domestication, involving among other things,
adjustment to local expectations of what is authoritative. Often — as in the case of Ma
Bari’s above-mentioned ritual speech — the purpose of the use of government authority
is indeed to defend or legitimize local ways or views in the face of government demands
threatening them. 
Principal examples of fetishized government authority used by the Bentian are
government rhetoric and the national language, which to Bentians are closely associated
with the government. As Ma Bari’s example also illustrates, these resources may be used
in contravention of government policy, and they are used in a wide variety of contexts far
beyond the political field in order to authorize matters which the government does not
seem to have anything to do with. A good example of  extensively used fetishized
national rhetoric is the concept of the almighty God (Tuhan yang mahaesa). This concept
seemed to me to be often used more or less purely “for effect” (an effect resulting from
its metonymic connection with official discourse) with little sincerity in the sense of
commitment to monotheism — as when Ma Putup invoked the concept in his wedding
speech, where it, in fact, served to promote his attempt to defend the official legitimacy
and practical relevance of Kaharingan religion and ritual. Sometimes, however, fetishized
government authority does not seem to play any obvious authorizing role, as, for
example, when children mimicked national rhetoric in play, or when adults addressed
dogs in Indonesian, two somewhat curious practices which caught my attention during
fieldwork. Another example in the same category is that Ma Putup had inscribed,
apparently mainly for his own amusement, the words Alat Pembangunan Desa (I.,
“Village Development Device”) on a blowpipe dart container that he kept in his
farmhouse, explaining that the container held darts that he shot at monkeys marauding
in his ricefield. Despite appearing to have no straightforward instrumental purpose,
however, such instances of  fetishization of government authority can be observed to
constitute expressive action, more precisely, they involve what we might call a
“therapeutic meditation” over precisely those disconcerting features of government
authority that call for its fetishization, such as its unpredictability and opaqueness, or
what Rutherford with reference to “the foreign” on the Indonesian margins more
generally has called its “irreducibly inexpressible experience” (2003:20). Common to
such expressive actions was also that they typically amounted to some sort of parody of
the government (this was obvious, for instance, in the teasing yet official-sounding ways
in which Indonesian was used in the above cases) at the same time as they enacted the
problematic, asymmetrical relationship that the Bentian have with their rather
authoritarian, yet absent, overlords. Often, as in the case of Ma Putup’s dart container,
such actions also in some oblique sense played with the notion of primitiveness imposed
 In this connection it may be interesting to note that an informant of Tsing’s among the South     230
Kalimantan Meratus described them as “the chickens of the government” (1993:103).
An essentially similar interpretation of the function of the fetish in a general context has been made     231
by Michael Jackson  (1998:75-82). Jackson regards the fetish as “an instrument of existential control.”
As he puts it, “through the fetish one magically regains control over a situation in which one’s mastery
was undermined or lost. The fetish makes a person feel more ontologically secure and restores self-
confidence ... because it mediates a passage from powerlessness to empowerment, from passivity to
activity” (1998:81).
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upon them by the government, or in some other respect “tried on” the government’s
perspective vis-à-vis themselves (talking Indonesian to dogs, for instance, can be seen to
have involved a kind of juxtaposition of the government’s authoritarian relation to the
Bentian with that which they entertain vis-à-vis their dogs, a kind of  “play with
positions,” stating that the Bentian are like dogs to the Indonesian government.)  For230
these reasons, these examples of  “expressive fetishization” may well have involved some
degree of what we might call “psychological empowerment” — a kind of temporary
“victory through wit” — even though perhaps not providing any true social authorization
(like the Balinese cockfight, they would, of course, change nothing in that respect).  231
Another example of  fetishization of government authority, is the belian sentiu, a
curing ritual to which I have already made reference. This ritual, which is largely
conducted in Kutai Malay (and sometimes Indonesian), and features spirit familiars,
ceremonial practices, offerings and paraphernalia associated with the royal court of the
Sultanate of Kutai borrow aspects of (primarily past) government authority, and it seems
reasonable to infer that its increasing popularity relates to the expansion of the social
universe of its practitioners and their increasingly frequent encounters with government
authority. During larger sentiu rituals large temporary shrines (balei) conceived of as
miniature “palaces” (keraton) function as focal points of the ritual activity, much of
which is aimed at expressing submissive devotion (semah). Belian sentiu originated only
in the early twentieth century, but has since spread widely among East Kalimantan
Luangans, often at the expense of older forms of  Luangan curing so that in some places
it has entirely replaced these. Among the Bentian, where it has been performed since the
1970s, the spread of the ritual has coincided with an unprecedently strong pressure on
them to adopt a world religion (agama) along with other attributes of civilization, and,
more recently, bourgeoning attempts at rationalization of the indigenous religion (for an
extended analysis of the ritual in this context see Herrmans 2004).  For Bentians, the
ritual also stands, when contrasted with other rituals, for downriver ways — and more
specifically, a downriver aesthetic — a feature which is said to make it especially
appealing to the young but which also significantly contributes, in my interpretation, to
its general authority in the society. At the same time, however, the ritual is very much a
local construct, devoted to local concerns, as indicated by the fact that many of the Malay
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chants featured in it are verbatim translations of the Luangan chants of older forms of
ritual. Like Wana and Meratus rituals, which both also invoke aspects of government
authority, (see Atkinson 1984 and Tsing 1987, respectively), belian sentiu can thus be
said to “incorporate the power of state models yet maintain the distinctive features of the
local society” (Bowen 1991:262-63). The fact that it invokes, in accordance with a
widespread pattern in marginal Indonesian societies, a government absent in both space
and time should not be regarded as peculiar here, as such distant borrowing of authority
may in fact be particularly well-adapted to the task of advancing such double agendas.
Despite the overt preoccupation of belian sentiu with past forms of government
authority, however, it is as much a response to present-day urgencies associated with the
agency of the current government. Like the Meratus dewa ritual, which addresses Banjar
Malay spirits and spirits associated with past east coast sultanate courts,  it would seem
tempting to interpret belian sentiu as a form of  “ritual accommodation to the state,” more
particularly, as a “magical” attempt to satisfy the state’s prominent ritualistic demands
for subservience and civilized manners by way of appeasing refined non-local spirits
with, among other things, elegant downriver style dancing and food offerings (see Tsing
1993:77,94-96,203; also Herrmans 2004). Even though no informant ever said as much,
such an interpretation would certainly make sense in the light of state expectations and
state relations among both the Bentian and the Meratus, as would Tsing’s conclusion
(1993:102) that such “ritual offerings of submission” are “intended to evade a more
costly disciplinary regime,” that is, a more systematic government interference in local
affairs, causing loss of autonomy. It still seems plausible that belian sentiu, which in
comparison with other rituals is particularly concerned with illness caused by downriver
spirit agencies, represents, at least in part, a response to uncertainties and vicissitudes
arising from authoritarian and unpredictable government rule (and other distressing
“downriver” expectations), in other words, that it represents a means of coping with
exigent socio-political anxieties, making the shaman of such rituals, if not quite, in
Tsing’s (1993:85) words, someone who “manage[s] regional terrorism,” then at least
someone who deals with disconcerting external influence.
The example of belian sentiu and my discussion about fetishization should not be
taken to mean that all the influence of the government on the Bentian has been
significantly transformed through an empowering process of domestication, however, or
that it has not caused any loss of local autonomy or distinctive features of the local
society. Only some Bentian encounters with the government have taken place within
what Tsing has called a “creative space of misunderstandings” (1993:31). Many times
government influence has affected the Bentian in a rather straightforward way, and over
time, local society has significantly changed in response to this influence, as a
consequence having become deprived of much of its former autonomy. The fact that the
Bentian take government authority for granted amounts to more than a deferent or
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accommodating attitude. Already by itself, it tells of the fact that they are now in a
seemingly irrevocable sense “subservient” (suaka) to the government — there was a time,
however, when they, as they themselves remember, were not, when government authority
was straightforwardly resisted.
Conclusion: The Dual and Historically Variable Character of Bentian Political
Authority
In this chapter I have investigated the exercise and constitution of political authority, a
concept which I define as authority concerned with the organization of communities and
other supra-familial affairs. I have been primarily interested in what I have identified as
the three principal institutions, or the trinity, of political authority: mantiship, adat, and
the government. A special concern throughout the analysis has been how the integration
and general articulation of the Bentian with the larger world and the influence of
exogenous factors have affected their conceptions of, reactions to and uses of political
authority.
Mantiship is a somewhat heterogeneous institution whose character has varied
historically, along with the structure of the society as a whole. Before integration with the
Sultanate of Kutai, leadership among the Bentian was mainly restricted to housegroup
leadership: the manti primarily acted as heads over a typically small number of swidden-
making families who on occasion (e.g. at times of ritual) came together in small
longhouses (lou). The position of the manti at this time was largely conceived of in terms
of kinship; its legitimacy derived from the manti being related to and representing the
“trunk” or “source” (puun) of these families. However, the institution of mantiship was
also closely associated with the exercise of adat, and had probably been so since its
inception: the manti negotiated conflicts and other affairs (e.g. marriages) between and
within housegroups in accordance with what is, at least today, a highly sanctified code
of customary law. Besides family heads, the early manti thus represented a kind of legal
expert, and besides kinship connections (ascribed or acquired), their knowledge of, and
skills in, applying adat represented a principal source of authority for them, as it still
does. Furthermore, charisma, in the sense of potency (kekuasaan) and as an expression
of ancestral or other spirit connections, was another important factor in this respect, as
was the display of status and the mobilization of followers through ritual, and the
accumulation through trade or formal exchange expeditions (roing) of the traditional
valuables which formed the principal medium through which adat affairs were negotiated
and resolved.
In the nineteenth century, however, in conjunction with the development of trade and
tributary contacts with the sultanate — including title distribution by the sultan to local
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leaders — and some important local developments partly induced by these contacts such
as the establishment of nucleated villages, the construction of durable, “communal”
longhouses, the introduction of water buffaloes and rattan cultivation, and some ritual
innovations, a semi-hereditary community leadership gradually emerged — while at the
same time the society as a whole became increasingly differentiated. At the turn of the
nineteenth century, the power and social capital of some of the manti were much greater
than that of others, and greater than they had ever been for their predecessors — or than
they were to become for their successors. Indeed, for a short time, especially in larger
villages in which the leaders received special labor prestations and their families enjoyed
a special authority, and special adat regulations applied to the manti, a degree of
stratification can even be said to have existed among the Bentian (even though the term
“manti” never really designated a rank, but only a position). However, with the
abolishment of slavery and the progressive introduction of a new political structure
alongside the old by the Dutch in the early twentieth century, and with the abolishment
of titulary mantiship and the local appropriation of nationalistic, anti-feudal ideologies
in the postcolonial period, the great manti lost the legitimacy of their overlordship along
with most of their special authority at the same time as Bentian society once again
became more egalitarian. Today, the office of kepala adat remains as a vestige from the
era of the great manti, providing some of their descendants with a special authority —
although radically reduced in comparison with that of their forefathers.
The Bentian of today clearly do not represent a very hierarchical society. It would, I
believe, be incorrect to regard them as ranked, in the manner, for instance, that their
Benuaq neighbors have typically — and, in my opinion, somewhat stereotypically —
been regarded as ranked. This is not to deny that, for a restricted period of time, the
Bentian, or part of them, approached such a state. On the other hand, the Bentian have
possibly never been totally egalitarian. In the first place, the manti — whether
housegroup heads or community leaders — have probably always been shown noticeable
respect. In the second place, status differences between the manti probably always
existed, even before integration with the sultanate. Today, at least, there are manti of very
different status, and most Bentians subscribe, despite acknowledged affirmation of an
egalitarian ethos associated with the era of Independence, to a view that mantiship should
persist. Indeed, most even concur, if generally somewhat ambivalently, with the view that
there should exist a head of customary law and a village head holding ultimate authority
over everybody else, and that leadership legitimately can — or even should — be
inherited. Thus, leadership has not only been objectively variant, the Bentian are also
unsure as to what the ideal leadership structure would be like. Leadership should be
carried out in accordance with adat, on that, most would agree. But people have differing
views in respect to what kind of leadership successful implementation of adat requires,
not infrequently reflecting the personal interests of the speaker. Illustrations are the
      Strictly speaking, Borneo and others societies are, of course, never essentially egalitarian or232
hierarchical; inequality and equality being, as Alexander (1992:208) and Armstrong (1992:205) have
noted, “culturally constituted,” these qualities are not primordial givens. Rather, societies are
typically —  almost essentially, it would seem —  flexible social constructions, capable of far-
reaching and rapid transformation, not least in Borneo.
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opinions of Ma Busek — who was an official kepala adat of great manti descent — and
those of Ma Lombang — who represented an ambitious family manti — on the
prevalence of polyandry in upriver communities. According to Ma Busek, this practice,
which he deeply deplored (not surprisingly, considering the articulation of his interests
with the government's), had never been adat, and the fact that it was practiced in the
upriver communities, unlike in his own, indicated that there was no single, strong leader
in the upriver communities able to supervise adherence to adat. According to Ma
Lombang, on the other hand, this practice (towards which he seemed to hold a rather
neutral attitude) represented adat in the upriver communities but not in his own, a
condition which in his view primarily reflected the fact that in the upriver communities
several manti ruled together in cooperation, making them, unlike their downriver
counterparts, strong enough to maintain this adat (on account of enabling them to resolve
the problems — such as conflicts between jealous husbands — likely to arise from it).
As suggested by these statements of Ma Busek and Ma Lombang, and as my results
more generally bear out, Bentian society cannot comfortably be classified as
“hierarchical” any more than “egalitarian,” but is more appropriately regarded as an
intermediate — or better, indeterminate — entity, one which has, like its Kachin
counterpart (see Leach 1954), oscillated between a more egalitarian and a more
hierarchical mode, a movement determined, most decisively, by the historically and
locally variable politico-economical articulations of the local society with the larger
region. This observation calls into question a dominant tendency in the Borneo
ethnography (which, ironically, was spurred by Leach's 1950 report on the longhouse
societies of Sarawak) to classify the local societies as either stratified or egalitarian, a
tendency which, as Armstrong (1992:194) has remarked, amounts to a view of these
societies as “essential types” and as “historically static.”232
Through its regional approach, my study also exposes another limitation which, as
Alexander (1992:208) has observed, characterized the studies effectual in establishing
the stratified-egalitarian dichotomy in Borneo (i.e. Freeman 1970; Geddes 1954; Morris
1953), namely, their tendency to regard “the political structure ... [as] functionally related
to the conditions of agricultural production in essentially autonomous economies” (my
emphasis). Furthermore, through my analysis of the institution of mantiship — and its
double function as housegroup and community leadership — the present study argues that
there are basic affinities between the political systems of the so-called egalitarian and
stratified societies (e.g. what Leach 1950:61 coined the “house owning group”), a fact
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which also, like the historically and locally variable character of Bentian leadership,
challenges the division of Borneo societies in these terms. Another fact which leads to
the same conclusion is that ideals of hierarchy as well as equality, on the one hand, and
ascription as well as achievement, on the other, combine to provide legitimacy for the
institution of mantiship.
Besides a historically variable tendency for mantiship to be hereditary, there has
probably always existed a tendency for it to be predicated on the principle of precedence
both within housegroups in which puun status legitimizes the authority of house heads
over their “descendants,” and on the level of communities (benua) in which certain manti
held a superior status because their lou ranked as the puun of others. Although such status
is in reality often acquired to a large extent — as illustrated by Ma Lombang's
relationships to his “followers” — it serves to make the authority of those who hold it
appear legitimate and inevitable by suggesting that it is a function of its holders' positions
in a “natural,” unalterable hierarchy. Another example of hierarchy serving to legitimize
the authority of the manti is what I, following Kelly (1993), have called a “hierarchy of
virtue,” more precisely, a system of “differential moral evaluation,” which postulates that
the manti deserve their positions — and the society needs them to hold them — due to
their superior knowledge and generosity in the field of social relations. This is another
sense in which mantiship is about “kinship.” According to this ideal model, which in
contrast with precedence is locally understood in terms of achievement rather than
ascription, mantiship is about organizing local relations in accordance with the goals of
the common good and communal harmony, and a number of elementary “relation-
affirming values” such as reciprocity, respect and responsibility over kin. At the same
time, however, differential moral evaluation stimulates social differentiation and
facilitates the cultivation of potentially divisive status and power interests by the manti.
Manti authority is in that respect a double-edged sword, and this aspect explains a certain
aversion or ambivalence that many Bentians during my fieldwork expressed (in private)
with respect to the institution. More generally, as well, Bentian political authority has
what I have called two sides. This is true even of adat towards which I never heard
anyone express aversion or ambivalence. The principles and maxims, the adjudicative
and consultative meetings, and the system of ceremonial exchange, of store-bought white
plates which constitute this almost inviolable institution express and promote community
harmony and so-called relation-affirming values, as well as what I have called a “moral
economy.” The system of adat simultaneously serves, through its aspects as an economy,
and by providing a corpus of legitimate but restrictively accessible knowledge, to
maintain power with the powerful. Also, adat provides the means for compensating for
injured amour propre and other offenses to individuals. It thus seems that the
maintenance of practical co-existence represents, as in the case of ritualization, a kind of
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ultimate goal of adat, pursued, if necessary, at the expense of the other values with which
it is associated.
While several distinct notions of hierarchy thus play an important role in legitimizing
manti authority, a presumably ancient egalitarian ideology holds an at least equal
importance in this respect. This ideology consists of such notions as the principal
distinguishing feature of the manti is not any special quality or ability not shared by
ordinary people but, instead, the manti’s ambition or will to power. These notions may
be compared with King's (1985:130) statement that “[r]anks ... according to Maloh
[another Dayak group] ideology, did not emerge as the result of the human lust to power
... rather, they were endowed by God.” In contrast to such a way of seeing things, the
Bentian notions discussed here suggest that mantiship is at least theoretically attainable
by anyone (or by any housegroup head, at least), and they acknowledge that competitive
status interests constitute an important motive for power. Also, they legitimize mantiship,
not by reference to a superindividual order, but through individual characteristics, more
precisely, an inner forcefulness or fervor — often described in terms of soul strength
(tokeng juus) — a capacity which makes some men — like Kiai, the protagonist manti
of our story — particularly capable as leaders. Thus this ideology also serves, like the
principle of precedence, to naturalize the authority of the manti.
Another thing which this “ideology of ambition” does, in conjunction with that of
moral virtue mentioned above, is explain my finding of an occurrence among the Bentian
of what I have called two contrary forms of charisma — which are analogous with the
two sides of political authority described above — the one centered on such
characteristics as enterprise, vitality, and fortitude, and the other on such qualities as
composure, dignity, and deference. However, despite the demonstrated importance of
appearance for the authority of individual manti, Bentian political authority is not
predominantly charismatic in Weber's sense, nor is it primarily traditional (even though
the association of adat with the ancestors lends a significant measure of sanctity to it).
Instead, in my opinion, Bentian political authority is most fundamentally what I have
termed value-rational, that is, the legitimacy and appeal of the institutions of mantiship
and adat rest most basically upon a number of deeply shared social values — consisting
of the above-mentioned relation-affirming ones as well as others like consensus, non-
confrontation,  indirectness, and precedence — whose validity in their turn reflects their
recurrent invocation or enactment in daily life, religious ritual, and, not the least
important, the formal occasions (i.e. the adjudicative and consultative meetings, and the
plate-centered exchange procedures) which in local views represent the sphere of adat.
Especially significant in this respect is, I have observed, the omnipresent plate exchange,
which provides a model for how to ideally engage in social relations. The comparatively
strong hold of these values among the Bentian is demonstrated by the persistence of what
I have called a “kinship orientation,” evident not only in their ceremonial adat economy,
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but also in their more informal “everyday redistributive economy” (i.e. in their “moral
economy”), and it is, to an important extent, this kinship orientation which provides the
rationale for the common view that the Bentian cling unusually strongly to adat.
By political authority being value-rational I have not only meant that particular adat
principles and manti actions typically correspond to certain deeply held values, but also
the important fact that the general form which the exercise of political authority takes —
whatever its content in terms of the the particular verdicts and statements made by the
manti in the course of this exercise — is itself value-rational. Thus the system of
ceremonial exchange is authoritative because it is consonant with the Bentian ideals and
commonsense experiences of affirming one's relations and sharing one's resources, and
the consultative and adjudicative meetings conducted collectively by the manti are
authoritative because they represent, in themselves, enactments of what Geertz (in an
attempt to characterize the essence of Indonesian adat), has formulated as a “publicly
exhibited social agreement,” expressing an “indigenous sense of justice as social
consonance” (1983:209-10).
The form of the exercise of political authority significantly contributes to the force
of political authority for another reason as well, namely, in that it tends to be highly
formalized. In the first place, given the Bentian's “form- and formalization-mindedness,”
this aspect makes it correspond to yet another basic value and inclination. More
importantly, however, formalization serves to inhibit contestation. Not only during
perkara and other adat meetings, but also on such occasions as the ritual speeches, the
manti's evening monologues, and siu (the institution of “issuing commands”), the
concrete form which the exercise of authority takes restricts its application and makes
contestation difficult. In Bentian society, being authoritative is thus to an important extent
a function of the structural preconditions inherent in the organization of social action —
as well as of the personal skills of the manti (and other people wishing to be
authoritative) in employing various “authorizing techniques.” Especially for the manti,
a particularly important category of skills in this respect is their talking skills, including
adeptness in using the “language of the ancestors,” the rhetoric and vocabulary associated
with the Indonesian State, and what Searle (1976) termed “directives.”
Value-rationality is thus not the only important factor determining how authoritative
the exercise of political authority is. The basic values that I have discussed are only
sometimes relevant or applicable, just as there is not an adat for every situation (or adat
frequently is indeterminate, as in the case of polyandry). But even when the basic values
are applicable, other, “non-value related” factors are typically also pertinent, and these
sometimes outweigh any values. Besides the more or less successful use of various
authorizing techniques already mentioned, another important factor is the compatibility
of the exercise of political authority with the exigencies and practical possibilities
applying in a given situation. To be authoritative, leadership cannot be entirely utopian,
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it must also to some extent be goal-rational, or at least appear credible. What this means
above all in the present situation is that the leadership should be feasible under the
conditions provided by government regulations and ideology. 
The government is today an authority very much taken for granted, to whose
overlordship the Bentian generally submits, even though they may be critical of particular
aspects of government policy. Consequently, the government is, together with adat, the
principal source of political authority explicitly invoked in Bentian society, and it is as
such incessantly tapped by the manti as well as by other people, in a very wide range of
spheres of action. Since long ago, government support has also provided a crucially
important criterion for legitimacy in the field of leadership, and an important general
consequence of government influence has been an increasing preoccupation with legality
— in the sense of congruence with government as well as adat law — as a yardstick of
the permissible or desirable. Adat, as I have argued, may itself have been introduced by
the Sultanate of Kutai, and it has most certainly become more objectified in reponse to
government expectations regarding administrative order. Adat's present-day urgency is
also in large part a function of the Bentian's relationship with the government, in
particular of the threat to their political autonomy that it involves. Despite this influence
of the government on Bentian adat, the latter has over time become defined increasingly
in opposition to the former, so that they now represent antithetical authorities, associated
with different ways of life and value-systems.
Other important consequences of government influence on the Bentian that I have
discussed are developments toward local and regional integration, residential
concentration, monotheism, nationalism, ethnic awakening, and socio-cultural
rationalization or “ordering.”  However, despite the fact that the government through
these developments has thoroughly and  irreversibly transformed a number of aspects of
Bentian society, it has been relatively absent and done comparatively little in terms of
development in the Bentian area (a result, in large part, of the geographical remoteness
of the Bentian), and what it has done has typically been characterized by a high degree
of unpredictability from the Bentian’s point of view. As a consequence, the Bentian are,
and feel, politically marginalized, a predicament which at once spurs an ambition for
national integration and enables a considerable degree of political autonomy. Another
important consequence — particularly of the fact that attempts to call on the government
often remain unanswered — is that government authority as used among the Bentian
commonly is fetishized: it is invoked flexibly across contexts somewhat as if possessing
an intrinsic potency and, not infrequently, in ways which are at variance with the
government’s expectations. 
The appeal of government authority among the Bentian is to an important degree the
result of its alien and opaque character, although the government’s apparent (but
somewhat seldom realized) potential for bringing about coveted aspects of development
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represents another important factor contributing to this authority. In comparison with
adat, the government also derives its authority not so much from any values such as
representing what Bentians consider right, as from its perceived ability to provide them
with certain things and conditions that they desire (although there are certain policies
associated with the government, such as the ban on slavery and the promotion of village
residence, which they affirm, at least partly, on moral grounds). As I have emphasized,
the Bentian have internalized many government ideals to the point that they have become
personal ambitions, and, in the main, they want to become modernized. This does not
mean, however, that the Bentian’s generally acquiescent attitude toward the government
is only a reflection of the appeal of government authority among them. The Bentian have
a fundamentally ambivalent attitude toward the government. Even though they generally
welcome its authority, they disapprove of many particular views that it holds, such as
those regarding swidden cultivation, and they also resent its overly authoritarian attitude
towards them. To a certain degree, the Bentian’s acquiescence to government authority
is based on a perceived necessity, that is, on the fact that the government has the power
to enforce far-reaching compliance with its regulations, and that it could, in their case
(due to their relatively undeveloped condition, making them classifiable as a population
in need of intensive development guidance), respond to non-compliance with extensive
interventions which could cause loss of Bentian autonomy. Indications of this are an
acute sensitivity to practices disapproved by the government, and the fact that superficial
compliance is typically communicated even when there, in fact, exists some point of
contention.
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6. General  Conclusions
It is now time to sum up the results of this study and to highlight what we have learnt
about Bentian authority, and about authority more generally, from this exploration of how
authority is expressed and constituted in and through Bentian social action in the spheres
of kinship, religion, and politics. I will not reiterate here the findings that specifically
pertain to the expression and constitution of authority within the spheres of kinship,
religion and politics; for these, summaries can be found in the conclusions of chapters
three, four, and five, respectively.
In Freedom and Civilisation (1947), Malinowski set out to investigate the role of
freedom in human society. This led him to consider authority as a phenomenon which
potentially restricts freedom, as well as a fundamental precondition of freedom. It also
gave him occasion to comment on, in a number of passages, what characterizes authority
per se, in “primitive society,” and in human civilization more generally. Among other
things, he made the broad claim that “authority [is] inevitable and indispensable to all
social organization,” and he argued that authority is “necessary for the successful run of
an activity,” with “activity” here, in particular, referring to “concerted” and “purposive”
activity (1947:185,168, cf.167). In other words, he argued, as Hoebel (1958:222) has
acknowledged, that authority is a “functionally universal component of organized social
life.” However, despite this recognition by Malinowski of a generic significance of
authority in human life, the interest of anthropology in authority has, for the most part,
been restricted to political authority. Symptomatic here is Hoebel’s decision, in his essay
on “Authority in Primitive Societies,” to simply leave out of consideration all other forms
of authority except “authority in the application of political and legal sanctions,” even
though he acknowledges that “any comprehensive study of authority would necessarily
require an analysis of the total system of social control” (1958:224-25). Another, related
restriction or bias of anthropological approaches to authority, already evident in Hoebel’s
delimitation of his interest, is, as Knutsson (1967:22) has noted, a tendency to emphasize
such features as sanction and coercion. This tendency is manifest, for instance, in
Raymond Firth’s definition of authority as “the ability to exercise power through the
application of sanctions” (1964:123, quoted in Knutsson.1967:23), and also in
Malinowski’s definition of political authority as “the legally vested power to establish
norms, to take decisions, and to enforce them through the use of sanction by coercion”
(1947:248). As the other side of the same coin, the question of authority has in many
anthropological understandings tended to become reduced to one of power, especially,
to one of legitimate power, an indicative example here being Bohannan’s (1958:3)
definition of authority as “institutionalized power.”
In contrast to such restrictively political or institutional approaches to authority, this
study has conducted an exploration of authority in a “total” or wider sense, as a generic
      For an example of an approach explicitly contrary to the one that I am taking here, see Knutsson233
(1967, especially 1967:24).
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aspect of social life beyond relations of domination and social control. In further contrast
to an earlier dominant anthropological approach to authority, it has not proceeded from
a preconceptualized understanding of authority as it functions in institutionalized Western
settings.  In other words, I  have adopted a maximally broad conception of authority —233
encompassing, among other things, authority relevant in situations of “self-authorization”
— and I have attempted to describe authority as I encountered it through a systematic
exploration of authority in three broadly defined  fields of social life in a society which
might seem like a rather unlikely candidate for an authority study, considering the
relatively uninstitutionalized and unobjectified character of authority present in it, and
which was not even initially chosen for an authority study in the first place. Nevertheless,
I have still had certain preconceptions with respect to what I set out to seek. It was from
the outset my aim to look for authority from an action perspective. My principal concern
has been with authority as it is expressed and embedded in social action, particularly in
what I have called “processes of authorization.” Thereby, my intention has been to
explore certain very basic aspects of authority in Bentian society, namely, what is
authoritative, what is authority used to authorize, how is it used, and why is it effective?
What, then, have been the gains from adopting this approach to authority? What has
it revealed about authority and what has it revealed about the society concerned? A
principal benefit, as I see it, is that it has involved  a close-range investigation of the
motives and  reasons why people submit to authority, something which, as Steven Lukes
(1987:64) has noted, Weber’s analysis of authority fails to do, in spite of its other
benefits. However, my approach to authority has also enabled a better understanding of
certain aspects of the constitution of authority which structural approaches have only
poorly illuminated. By focusing on how authority is used in practice — itself a principal
benefit of this approach — it has brought attention to certain properties which it is
advantageous for authority to have in order for it to be effective. Taken together, these
properties suggest that authority is complexly embedded in society, and thus that we need
to know society in depth in order to know authority. More specifically, they indicate that
the form and organization of action in society, are especially important factors in this
regard. Being effectively authoritative is to an important extent a function of the manner
in which authority is presented through action, and of the way in which situations and
relations in which it is communicated are organized.
 One aspect of the form and organization of action which has emerged in this study
as especially influential in facilitating authority is formalization. As we have seen,
formalization is a rather conspicuous aspect of Bentian action, influential in all of the
three principal analytical fields explored. Indeed, since such a great proportion of all
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exercise of authority among the Bentian involves some aspect of formalization, it would
be warranted to classify Bentian authority as “largely formal,” a feature which
Malinowski (1947:186) attributed to “primitive authority” in general. What Malinowski
primarily had in mind was the observation that authority in so-called tribal societies tends
to be conventionalized in the sense of conforming to “well-defined, traditionally
established rules of procedure” (1947:186). This observation, as we have seen, is valid
also for the Bentian, for instance, with respect to the formal discussions through which
customary law is exercised, for ritual, or for the framed performances of requests and
orders that I have analyzed. As I have demonstrated, formalization in these and other
contexts is not merely a convention, however, but a kind of authorizing device,
sometimes strategically employed, which serves to promote the interests of the user or
other people, and augment the users’ and the occasion’s authority. As I use the word here
it also involves other aspects than adherence to convention or prescribed form, and it
refers to a phenomenon much more complex than the one alluded to by Malinowski. 
By adhering to prescribed form, formalization promotes an identification of the
activity and situation affected as an instance of a more general phenomenon (e.g.
tradition) — or, in other words, amounts to what I in a loose sense of the term have called
“entextualization” — which has the effect of imbuing the particular action and situation
with the authority that is attributed to the general phenomenon. In the senses of what
Irvine (1979) calls “emergence of a central situational focus” and the “invoking of
positional identities,” formalization works to insure the reception of what is
communicated, and serves to set this off from unframed messages as something
important. With respect to what she calls  “increased code structuring” and “code
consistency,” on the other hand, it serves to establish a code of communication which
makes contestation of what is communicated difficult — as a result of effectively
limiting, as Bloch (1974, 1975) has observed, what can be said. Through these aspects,
formalization also restricts application of the practices which it makes authoritative since
performing them requires, because of the elaborate form which it imposes on them, skills
which mainly those trained for this purpose have (i.e. the manti, or housegroup and
community leaders, and the belians, or “shamans”). This effect is, in fact, partly the result
of all the discussed aspects of formalization in that they each in their own way contribute
to draw special attention to what takes place and confer on the situations in which
authority is exercised a formal air, thereby deterring people lacking self-confidence and
adequate prior experience of speaking on such occasions from playing a too prominent
role in them. Formalization can be, however, and indeed is to quite an extent, used by
ordinary people on other occasions than those which constitute official authority use, both
as a strategy (as Udin did in and through his letter to his relatives), and out of concern
with good form. Belying a stereotype of Southeast Asian hill tribe peoples “as direct, loud
and straightforward” (see Errington 1989:293), the Bentian are remarkably form and
      A similar argument has been advanced by Michael Jackson who identifies as a characteristic of234
premodern societies a tendency for “disavowal of the subject” as a source of authority and authorship.
As he explains, this tendency “reflects a social order where cooperation is essential to survival and
competition inimical to communitas. Power must be shared — and the so-called group ethic can thus be
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formalization minded, and these are not qualities solely of the powerful or the dominant
in society, even though formalization seems to be intimately associated with authority.
Entextualization, in my applied understanding of the concept, represents another
aspect of the form and organization of action which facilitates the use of authority. As
just suggested, entextualization is, in fact, principally an effect of formalization.
Increasing code structuring and code consistency, for example, function to enable
identification of particular instances of authority use as manifestations of a recognizable
cultural script (e.g. adat) which these instances themselves reproduce. However, there
are also other, more specific aspects of the form and organization of action than the ones
mentioned above which contribute to this process. Two closely related such aspects,
which I have analyzed in several different contexts, are the indirectness and
roundaboutness of formal speech and action which serve, as we have seen, in addition to
enabling delicate address of sensitive issues, and lending a highly valued quality of
refinement to such action, to associate the users of authority with the ancestors, who form
a principal source of spiritual authority in Bentian society. Other aspects that I have
analyzed which have much the same effects, are the use of reported speech, and the use
of parallelism and other poetic devices.
Now, besides functioning to associate the particular with something more general,
something else that such aspects of the form of action involving entextualization do is
that they tend to function as decontextualizing devices, that is, they suppress, in some
sense, the particular. Perhaps most important, what they do in this respect, is to de-
emphasize the agency of the persons instigating or performing the actions in question,
a fact which itself promotes the process of entextualization. Still another and crucially
important effect that they have in so doing, which also facilitates the association of the
particular with the general in its own way, is an exteriorization of the authority invoked
through such action: authority comes to be seen as external to the person and the
immediate social context by or in which it is exercised, another quality which contributes
to making it difficult to contest the agent who exercises it. 
A general characteristic of Bentian authority is, in fact, that it is construed as external
in this respect. It is typically seen as deriving from — and it is legitimized with reference
to — a source beyond the person or persons who exert authority, such as the government,
the spirits, the ancestors, or adat. This aspect of Bentian authority is, of course, more than
the result of ongoing processes of exteriorization; it is the result of what might be called
a deep-seated socio-centrism which influences and characterizes most fields of social life
among the Bentian.  In the view of this basic ideology and ontology, individual234
read as a positive affirmation of interpersonal relationships”  (1998:59, orig. italics). 
      This requirement is, of course, as I have already noted, a requirement not just of Bentian235
authority. Rather it is, as  Simmel (1964:184), argued, a quality of authority per se that it must have an
element of  “super-subjective significance.” Nevertheless, this requirement seems to me to represent,
among the Bentian, the most generally applicable criterion of what Lukes (1978:640-41), borrowing a
concept of Hart (1961, chap VI), refers to as “rules of recognition,” that is, generally recognized social
norms for what may count as authoritative.
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subjectivity is not a source of legitimacy of action — unlike in the modern Western world
where the self is commonly seen as something of an ultimate foundation of agency,
indeed, in a sense, as the highest authority, over which no external authorities are to reign
(cf. Connolly 1987:12-13). Rather, it seems that the legitimacy of Bentian authority, like
the premodern authority that Hannah Arendt (1958) argues has become lost in the modern
West, is seen to derive from something beyond individual subjectivity.
What this something beyond individual subjectivity consists of among the Bentian
varies considerably, however, the only absolute requirement being that it should be
collectively valued.   A common feature of it is, nevertheless, as I have argued in235
respect to authoritative words, that it is “transcendent of or distanced from the everyday
here and now.” To an important extent, it is what Rutherford calls “the foreign” which
provides the sources of Bentian authority, that is, it is often seen as derived from outside
the local society. Particularly influential in this respect are past and present governments,
but the downriver world in general also frequently provides sources of authority, for
example, in the form of traditions of literacy and ilmu (magic). However, the ancestors
and the ancestral past, which also are distanced from, or at least transcendent of, the
everyday here and now, have, until the present, been even more important in this respect,
as has the institution of customary law, and among Kaharingan Bentians an inland
religious tradition associated with the geographical center of the Luangan area provides
another major source of authority. The Bentian’s condition of being marginal to
precolonial coastal polities and the postcolonial state  — a condition which has generated
what I, following Rutherford (2003), have called a “fetishization” of government
authority — and associated perceptions of the Bentian as culturally and politically
inferior to coastal and other interior peoples, have not made the Bentian’s political
geography, in Errington’s (1989:300) terms, entirely “outward-looking,” nor has it
depleted local authority. Even though “foreign authority” is important among the Bentian
— also in that it is, as we have seen, to an important extent constitutive of some forms
of “local authority” such as the authority of the manti and of adat — there does not exist,
as appears to be the case in Biak, a near-total hegemony of “foreign” authority (cf.
Rutherford 2003). In part, this may be a reflection of the fact that the Bentian, unlike
many eastern Indonesian peoples, regard themselves as autochthonous to the region that
they inhabit and that they do not, in mythological or cosmological terms, regard vitality
as originally derived from outside local society. More important, perhaps, external
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influence has not eroded the social practices and values upon which local authority is
predicated.
Another manner in which Bentian authority is commonly exteriorized is by being
attributed to so-called supernatural agencies or forces. Association of authority with
unseen or otherworldly forces is a frequently recognized feature of Asian and, in
particular, of Southeast Asian, societies (e.g. see Pye 1985; Geertz 1980), and is
commonly linked to the capacity not just of strengthening, but also of naturalizing,
authority. Among, the Bentian, this association takes, as I have noted, many forms. In the
form of various “social taboos” (tapen, pali, bunsung, sumbang) sanctioned by the
possibility of spirit attack or misfortune, it reinforces, among other things, kinship
authority, and the authority of adat, which, in addition, is considered to be protected by
the god-like seniang besarah. In the form of ritual it consecrates what I, following
Durkheim, have called the “authority of society” but it also advances the ambitions of
individual agents laying claims to political authority and the varied authorization
concerns of ordinary community members who put this “authorizing device” into use.
Spirit support is the principal resource acquired through association with the supernatural,
whether in ritual or more generally, although accumulation of soul strength and potency
are also factors of some importance both in respect to acquisition of political authority
and in the sense of enabling agency through attainment of “existential control.” However,
the importance of potency or “soul stuff” in Bentian society does not seem quite as great
as it has been described to be elsewhere in Southeast Asia (e.g. see Errington 1989; Kruyt
1906; Walker 2002; Wolters 1982). There is not, for example, a similar obsession with
“read[ing] each other and objects as signs of potency” as there is in South Sulawesi or an
equally pervasive “preoccupation with accumulating it” (cf. Errington 1989:290). The
accumulation of “potency” and soul strength is also, in the first place, principally a ritual
endeavor and, in the second place, it partly represents a metaphorically expressed concern
with problems and aspirations of the self and society. Generally speaking, the religious
dimension of Bentian authority does not seem quite as central as it could appear to be
according to the ethnography of the region. Walker’s (2002:17) identification of the
political cultures of northwest Borneo as “cosmological,” for example, or his view that,
among the peoples in this area, “the natural was a microcosm of a supernatural
macrocosm” seem overstated if applied to the Bentian case. Most essentially, I have
argued in this thesis, Bentian authority is socially constituted, and its articulations with
interpersonal relations and local and extralocal political processes are more important
concerns for Bentians than its articulations with supernatural relations. This is true in
respect to political authority (including the authority of adat), but even ritual, as we have
seen, frequently addresses social as much as supernatural concerns, and the social world
is, of course, the primary reference in the case of the application of kinship authority as
well. Contrasting with religious beliefs and orientations, there is also among the Bentian
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a rather secular “everyday scepticism” in the form of what I have called the “authority of
experience” which, although not elevated to the status of an ideology in public discourse,
is a factor significantly affecting agency. As this tendency indicates, not all authority
among the Bentian is transcendent or exteriorized in the sense of being seen as derived
from beyond personal experience, even though Bentian authority typically is legitimated
through reference to sources outside of individual (and frequently also human)
subjectivity.
An important expression of the social constitution of Bentian authority, and a
prominent general characteristic of it, is that it tends to be associated with integrative, or
more generally relation-affirming aspirations, especially when it is publicly and saliently
exercised, or when it is most formalized. This characteristic is apparent in all the three
principal analytical chapters of this thesis. It was illustrated perhaps most vividly by the
outcome of Udin’s perkara and the subsequent formal deliberations which determined
that he should stay in Temiang against his will because this was in the interests of the
community, but also, in a negative way, so to speak, by his eventual furtive departure
from the village some time afterwards. However, it has been brought out in various other
connections as well. In fact, integrative and relation-affirming values could well be said
to represent the essence of kinship as a moral code as well as that of adat (customary
law). It is also something that the ancestors and the godly seniang spirits in a very basic
and conspicuous sense represent, as well as something that Bentians perceive, even
though somewhat more ambiguously, the manti, and on occasion even the government,
to represent. Another indication of this tendency of authority is the fact that it is
frequently and conspicuously associated with attempts at some form of “concentration,”
including concentration of family and relatives, of vitality and potency in the form of soul
strength, protecting spirits and spirit familiars, and of leadership constituencies and
administrative units. As we have seen, concentration is, in all three social fields
investigated — kinship, religion, and politics — and on all levels of Bentian society —
the individual, family, and community — both a principal generalized strategy for
obtaining authority as well as a goal and a value for whose sake authority is exercised.
Besides this association of authority with concentration, a similarly salient and two-
way association of authority with a range of other socio-centric values provides additional
examples of the tendency of authority to be bound up with integrative or relation-
affirming aspirations. These values — which are frequently invoked and almost
inviolable in the sense that no one would publicly contest them per se — include such
much-discussed and highly authoritative qualities as relation-maintenance, reciprocity,
respect, sharing, non-confrontation, unanimity, and tradition. These virtues are, of course,
centrally important in Bentian society, not only in the application of authority, but more
generally as well — as a condition which in itself contributes in several different respects
to the effectiveness of authority in Bentian society. A particularly significant aspect of
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their importance is that they (including concentration) are, in fact, associated with the
exercise of authority even when authority is not used for integrative or relation-affirming
purposes. Authority is, as has been amply illustrated, by no means always used for such
purposes. But, an important consequence of the invocation and exercise of authority in
Bentian society, regardless of its motives, is precisely that it tends to involve the
reproduction of these values. This is the result of the fact that an explicit celebration of
these values forms an ingrained and constitutive aspect of the rhetoric of the manti, as
well as an integral component of ritual chants, in addition to their being tacitly
communicated by various symbols and practical arrangements associated with the formal
exercise of authority (e.g. by congregation, commensality, plate exchange, and formality).
Thus, relation-affirming values are associated with authority not only because people
aspire to affirm their relations, but also because of how the exercise of authority on public
occasions is institutionalized or conventionalized  in Bentian society, that is, because of
how the relatively invariable form of this exercise expresses these values. This, it may be
noted, thus represents another important aspect of the form of action which contributes
to make Bentian authority authoritative.
Now, what all of this can be taken to express is that Bentian society is highly socio-
centric. In that respect, these findings regarding Bentian authority confirm Malinowski’s
(e.g. 1947:118-121,180) and Hoebel’s (1958:225,227) observation that authority in
small-scale, non-centralized societies tends to be what Hoebel labels “altruistic.”
“Altruism,” in this sense, is indeed a prominent characteristic of Bentian authority. A
major consequence of it is that it functions to instill, in Durkheim’s terms, the “authority
of society” (1995:16), or, a value-system extolling relations and community — as well
as what I call a moral economy, a mode of exchanging resources and services according
to such relation-affirming principles. Conversely, to the extent that authority is perceived
as legitimate among the Bentian, this is largely a question of how well it corresponds to
this value-system. It is resonance with this value-system which, among other things, has
induced me to characterize adat as an institutionalized morality, kinship as a moral code,
plate exchange as a practice serving to regulate socially disruptive sentiments,  and
mantiship as an institution closely associated with the promotion of the common good
— and thus to describe Bentian authority as basically value-rational.
Important as it is, however, this aspect of Bentian authority does not represent the
whole picture — far from it. Bentian authority has what I have called two sides, or a dual
character. Cognatic and affinal kinship, adat, religious authority and ritual, leadership
positions and government connections  — in principle, everything that is authoritative
or provides sources of authority in Bentian society — can be, and on occasion is, used
for purposes of obtaining personal advantage, social differentiation and even social
division, even though when this happens it typically occurs covertly, the actions
amounting to it being what Bourdieu (1977:191) calls “euphemized.” Analogously, a
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description of Bentian society as socio-centric is, of course, not appropriate in all
respects, as suggested by Joseph Weinstock’s (1983a:117) contrary characterization of
the Luangan (of whom the Bentian form a subgroup) as “individualistic by nature,” a
characterization which is justified in some respects, even though it clearly does not
represent the whole picture either. Alongside contrary aspirations, there exist in Bentian
society strong desires for autonomy  — both in the sense of autonomy vis-à-vis the larger,
national society, and in the sense of autonomy vis-à-vis the local society — and for much
of the time many Bentians indeed stay (in comparison with their neighbors, for instance)
rather autonomous — in both senses. An important expression and realization of these
desires is that people, especially young adults, often keep to their farmhouses precisely
in order to evade authority: dispersion, also motivated by subsistence considerations,
indeed represents a principal factor which counterbalances centripetal forces in Bentian
society. There are also strong predilections not to share, to keep things for oneself (not
weakened by the difficulty of doing so). Against the officially sanctioned image of long
rows of plates of rice served to guests stands unacknowledged and covert, but equally
real, practices such as that of nighttime eating.
To some extent, the superficially contradictory depiction of Bentian authority as both
altruistic and individualistic is, of course, nothing but an expression of the fact,
emphatically declared by Malinowski (see 1947:118), that an inherent aspect of authority
is that it involves the potential of abuse, even in small-scale societies where there
typically exists an ideology and certain conditions significantly restricting such abuse
(e.g. the necessity of direct relations between superordinates and  subordinates, and a high
degree of interdependence between them, both conditions which were discussed by
Malinowski 1947:119,121). However, this duality is also a reflection of the existence in
this society of certain sources of authority — such as government authority, potency and
soul strength — which are not primarily, or at least not unambiguously, predicated upon
these socio-centric values, and of certain rather prevalent amoral or self-consciously
immoral aspirations — such as autonomy, amour propre or “will to power” — which are
not publicly recognized as ideals, but which nevertheless represent hidden or suppressed
values, which in their own way contribute to the legitimacy, or at least the appeal, of
much authority in Bentian society.
Illuminating in this respect, is, for instance, the fact that mantiship is in part
legitimated and naturalized by what I have argued is an egalitarian ideology according
to which it is principally ambition or will to power which makes some people want to
become manti, and thus entitled to hold this position (since it makes manti status appear
theoretically attainable by anyone). As we have seen, two somewhat contradictory types
of charisma may also favorably contribute to the authority of the manti: the one is
centered on such characteristics as composure, dignity, and deference, and based on
socio-centric values, and the other is centered on such features as enterprise, zeal, and
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forcefulness, and based upon individualistic (egalitarian) values, as well as, to an extent,
on considerations of goal-rationality. Considerations of goal-rationality also balance any
value-rational considerations in that it is seen that viable local leadership must, at least
to some extent, accommodate government regulations and expectations, many of which
are incompatible with local values, in fact, with both individualistic and socio-centric
ones.  For most people, certain values associated with either the postcolonial government
(e.g. development, order) or with the colonial or precolonial ones (hierarchy) also
represent, to a greater or lesser degree, personal values, or at least aspirations. As I have
observed, a notion, probably originating  in the “era of the great manti,” during which
community leaders received titles from the sultan of Kutai, that leaders should be of
manti descent and succession to leadership be hereditary is still to some extent affirmed,
even though compromised by certain long-standing local and some more recent
government-imposed notions. Rank-specific adat regulations, as we have seen, also used
to promote aspirations for social differentiation, and the institution of adat have all along
functioned to create a position of dominance for the manti in the society, which
individual manti have been using, in varying proportions, for the common good and for
their own interest.  
More than the result of officially unsanctioned aspirations which are at odds with
integrative and relation-affirming ideals, however, individualistic and differentiating use
of authority is also actively brought about by the social production of authority in the
particular society investigated (and in others resembling it), as well as enabled by the
roundabout and ostensibly relation-affirming form that the exercise of authority in it
typically takes. More precisely, the very same processes through which the authority of
society is established — lawsuits, rituals, ceremonial exchange, public discussion —
establish the authority of some people over other people as well as spur these
unsanctioned aspirations, and they facilitate — surreptitiously or by invoking some
higher principle — authorization of actions and situations which are at variance with the
ideals that they purportedly sanction. An example of this is the payment of white plates
which, at the same time as it serves to regulate socially disruptive sentiments and
facilitate cooperation,  functions to reproduce these socially disruptive sentiments as a
result of  spotlighting concerns of reciprocity. Another is religious ritual, which can
tacitly advance status distinctions as a by-product, or be put to use to legitimate
conditions which breach adat as a result of invoking the all-excusing blessing of the spirit
authorities.
What is vital to know about Bentian society is that “distinctions and lasting
obligations,” in Bourdieu’s (1977:195) phrase, are produced at one and the same time,
and by the same means. Establishing dominance or distinction, or generally advancing
self-interest, is a delicate business; it has to be done in and through relations of mutual
dependence, and it has to be concealed as something else, as disinterested activity
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designed to promote the common good. In a way, this is the result of the hegemony of
socio-centric values in the society — making antagonistic values if perhaps not yet, as
Bourdieu (1977:196) would seem to suggest, “unthinkable,” then at least to some extent
unspeakable — as well as of the socio-material conditions which engender
interdependence.  For these reasons, Bentian society, like pre-capitalistic societies in
general, has, in Bourdieu’s (1977:192) words, an essentially “dual economy.” It is at one
and the same time disinterested, or altruistic, and interested, or individualistic — and it
is not only the economy which conforms to this logic, but the social economy as a whole,
that is, all interaction in society relating to the production or distribution of scarce and
valued resources, whether material or symbolic, including authority (cf. Bourdieu
1977:178). An illustrative example, which relates simultaneously to the acquisition of
wealth and authority, is the nineteenth century institution of roing, or formal exchange
expeditions. Roing clearly was “interested” and even somewhat predatory in character (as
was in part also the accumulation of potency through naiyu spirits, which could be
acquired through bloodshed), at the same time as it was presented in an idiom of
voluntary gift exchange and alliance building.  And it is, of course, because of the
hegemony of socio-centric values that the dominant position of the manti is construed in
terms of what I have called social worth or differential moral evaluation: because the only
really legitimate accumulation of capital is the accumulation of symbolic capital.
However, this should not be allowed to conceal the fact that the manti have, at least in
part, what Bourdieu (1977:194) calls “a vested interest in virtue,” or  that “all structures
of inseparably material and symbolic exchange (i.e. involving both circulation and
communication) function as ideological machines whenever the de facto state of affairs
which they tend to legitimate by transforming a contingent social relationship into a
recognized relationship is an unequal balance of power” (Bourdieu 1977:195).
There is, however, little power, especially in the way of coercive power, available to
the manti, or anyone else in Bentian society, even though there are some sanctions that
can be brought into play in order to compel compliance, including the withdrawal of
legal, ritual, farmwork, and material assistance. This is in large part an indication of the
fact that authority in Bentian society — with the partial exception of the authority
exercised by those manti who hold government positions — is mostly exercised outside
positions associated with a right or possibility to employ legitimate force. The ability of
the manti to influence people is primarily based on a relative monopoly to publicly define
social reality (cf. Kelly 1993:508), a prerogative whose usefulness is essentially a
function of their talking skills. This makes most manti rather vulnerable to public
opinion, and critically dependent on what social capital they can obtain through active
effort. In this respect their predominantly acquired authority is very much constituted
through social relations, and it is, as a rule, closely proportionate to the measure of effort
that they invest in their relations. And in this regard, too, their authority requires a value-
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rational foundation (typically made up of both socio-centric and individualistic
components), that is, “it can only be lastingly maintained through actions whose
conformity to the values recognized by the group is a practical reaffirmation of that
authority” (Bourdieu 1977:193).
What all of this testifies to is the already mentioned proposition — which notably
applies to authority in all relations, as well as to the authority involved in processes of
self-authorization — that authority is complexly embedded in society. More precisely,
it suggests that the constitution of authority is embedded, first, in the value-system of the
society, and second, in concrete social relationships and contexts. Authority is, of course,
not only about values. Values are insufficient on their own as determinants of agency (cf.
Parsons 1958:198). This reflects the fact that they are so general that it is not clear how
and to what extent they should be applied in specific social situations — and that they are
often not associated with any concrete, situation-specific rules, as I have observed with
respect to the field of Bentian kinship. But, values generally seem to lack what we might
call a force of their own. In order to become effective, they have to become socio-
materially mediated. As with power or authority, it is their translation into actor-networks
which generates their energy. Convincing evidence on this point is provided by the fact
that kinship ideology sometimes is invoked, whereas sometimes it simply is not, or that
adat has to be enacted in order to become important. Another example that can be
proposed, which deserves special attention because of the importance given to it by Max
Weber, is that of tradition. 
Like kinship ideology, tradition may or may not be invoked. It often is, but nothing
has stopped some Bentians from ceasing to observe it. The fact that in the 1990s many
Bentians, unlike many other Dayaks, continued to practice aspects of tradition, including,
for example, what I have called a moral economy, and others such as polyandry that
entailed a stigmatization of them as “primitive” (and which were not even given
recognition as adat), was not the result of the particularly strong hold that the imperative
of tradition had on them. Rather, it was, as I have argued,  the result of the persistence of
certain social circumstances under which the practice of these aspects of tradition was
motivated or pressing. If these circumstances — which are central, I argue, in shaping the
ontology of those living under them — would cease to exist, the authority of tradition
would be lost, as would that of a whole range of other values which I have identified as
central in Bentian society. For this reason, then, it would seem unwarranted and indeed
somewhat misleading to privilege tradition by classifying Bentian authority as essentially
traditional. Also, tradition is — even though it undeniably represents an important value,
especially in discourse — only one among many values which legitimate Bentian
authority, or motivate Bentian actions, and some of these values, like relation-
maintenance, reciprocity, and sharing — which are, in a sense, what gives tradition its
substance — are no less influential. Similarly, it would be unjustified, I think, to
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categorize Bentian authority as charismatic. In the first place, not all people exercising
authority are charismatic, and in the second place, it is ultimately other values which give
charisma, like tradition, its substance. Moreover, the concept of charisma primarily
accounts only for the authority of certain persons, but not for other authority — the
authority of adat, or ritual, for instance, or that of the government. Thus, it seems that the
authority types that Weber used to describe premodern authority are insufficient for an
understanding of Bentian authority, especially the constitution of authority, rather than
more restrictively with its legitimation. Rather than as traditional or charismatic, it would
seem preferable to characterize Bentian authority as value-rational, a concept which
Weber never developed, even though he notably did, in Economy and Society (1978:36)
talk about “value-rational faith,” alongside the categories of “affectual faith,” “tradition,”
and “legality,” as principal categories by virtue of which “actors may ascribe legitimacy
to a social order,” before, later in the book, introducing his typology of authority types,
from which the value-rational category is missing. However, in order to satisfactorily
account for the constitution of authority in Bentian society, this notion of the value-
rationality of Bentian authority would, as just indicated, need to be complemented with
a notion of its socio-material mediation. It is the presentation of values in concrete social
action, and their articulation through social action with particular people, material
conditions, and practical interests, which determine if and to what extent the individual
actor is influenced by them, and hence, to what extent he or she experiences the sources
of authority which are drawn upon in the exercise of authority, or in processes of self-
authorization, as authoritative.
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Appendix 1: Bentian Kinship Terminology
Terms are given in descending genealogical order, beginning with terms for the most
senior relatives. Terms marked with “A” are only used for address and terms marked with
“R” are only used for reference. Terms not marked with “A” or “R” are used for both
reference and address.
1.    kakah datu: grandparent’s father; grandparent’s parent’s male sibling; spouse’s
grandparent’s father (A)
2.    itak datu: grandparent’s mother; grandparent’s parent’s female sibling; spouse’s
grandparent’s mother (A)
3.    kakah: grandfather; grandparent’s male siblings; spouse’s grandfather (A)
4.    itak: grandmother; grandparent’s female siblings; spouse’s grandmother (A)
5.    uma: father; father’s brother, father’s close male cousin (A); spouse’s father (A)
6.    uma amu: adoptive father (R); father’s brother or close male cousin (R)  
7.    ine: mother; mother’s sister, mother’s close female cousin (A); spouse’s mother (A)
8.    ine amu: adoptive mother (R); mother’s sister or close female cousin (R)
9.    tuo: parent’s elder sibling or cousin; spouse’s parents’ elder sibling or cousin (A)
10.  burok: parent’s younger sibling or cousin; spouse’s parents’ younger sibling or
cousin (A)
11.  tamo: parent’s siblings or cousin (A); spouse’s parent’s sibling or cousin (A) 
12.  tupu: spouse’s parent (R); spouse’s parent’s sibling/cousin (R)
13.  erai butung: sibling (R)
14.  peyari: sibling; cognatic collateral relative; any collateral relative
15.  tuke: ego’s elder sibling; ego’s elder cousin (A)
16.  ani: ego’s elder sibling; ego’s elder cousin (A)
17.  soong tumar (female speaker only): brother or close male parallel cousin (R)
18.  bawén tumar (male speaker only): sister or close female parallel cousin (R)
19.  nuarsinai (or tepesinai): first cousin (R)
20.  nuardue (or tepedue): second cousin (R)
21.  nuartolu (or tepetolu): third cousin (R)
22.  nuaropat (or tepeopat): fourth cousin (R)
23   nuarlime (or tepelime):fifth cousin (R)
24.  sanget: child’s spouse’s parent
25.  bane: husband
26.  sao: wife
27.  meruoi (or meruei): “co-spouse” (in polygamous union)
28.  ruoi (or ruei): spouse’s sibling’s spouse
29a. ayu (male speaker): spouse’s sibling or cousin; sibling’s or cousin’s spouse 
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29b. ayu (female speaker): spouse’s brother or male cousin; sister’s or cousin’s husband
30.   ongan (female speaker only): brother’s or cousin’s wife; husband’s sister or female
cousin
31.   anak: child; same sex sibling’s/cousin’s child (A); child’s spouse (A)
32    anak amu: adopted child (R); same sex sibling’s/cousin’s child (R)
33.   akén: different sex sibling’s/cousin’s child: distant same sex sibling’s child 
34.   benantu: child’s spouse; sibling’s/cousin’s child’s spouse (A)
35.   opo: grandchild; sibling’s/cousin’s grandchild (A) 
36.   inking: grandchild’s child; sibling’s/cousin’s grandchild’s child (A)
37.   piyut: grandchild’s grandchild
38.   alep (aleu): grandchild’s grandchild’s child (?) 
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Appendix 2: Glossary
aben: family, kin group 
adat (adet): customary law; tradition; proper behavior 
balai: shrine in which offerings to spirits are presented
basa mengkelotes: roundabout or indirect language; a positively valued feature of ritual
language and the language of judicial procedures, also regarded as having been
characteristic of the ancestors 
 
belian: ritual expert who officiate at “life rituals” (belian bolum)
belian sentiu: distinct belian ritual style largely conducted in Kutai Malay and influenced
by the ritual traditions of the sultanate of Kutai
benua: village; used both for nucleated present-day villages and the territorially dispersed
settlements of past communities
beru: collective labor, especially of rice field work groups functioning according to the
priniciple of balanced reciprocity
blis: generic designation for principally malevolent spirits or spirits which are addressed
in the capacity as soul thieves in rituals
buntang: multipurpose extended family or house group ritual typically lasting four or
eight days involving thanksgiving, supplication, and curing
desa (I.): nucleated, permanent village; distinguished from the territorially dispersed
settlements of past communities
gombok: secondary mortuary ritual typically lasting seven or fourteen days during which
the souls of the deceased are escorted to their afterworldly locations
juus: soul, the animate principle of living humans and animals.
kaben: generic term for “relative” used both in a narrow sense for cognatic relatives and
in a broad sense including affinal and classificatory relatives 
Kaharingan: a term designating the traditional religion of the Barito group Dayaks,
officially recognized under the name of Hindu-Kaharingan since 1980
kekuasaan (pengewasa): authority; potency; magical power
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kelelungan: the refined head soul of the dead which is escorted to the village of
Tenangkai in heaven during gombok
kepala adat: head of customary law; government office in Kalimantan which among the
Bentian is typically held by descendants of the “great manti “ (manti solai)
kepala desa: village head; salaried government office under the Indonesian government,
only occasionally occupied by the manti
kwangkai (or gombok mpe selimat): secondary mortuary ritual involving exhumation of
the dead person’s bones 
liau: the coarse body soul of the deceased which is escorted to Mount Lumut in heaven
during gombok
longan: certain upright, temporary or permanent, ritual structures serving as places of
congregation for spirits during rituals
longan teluyen: a permanent longan made of ironwood serving as the ritual center of lou
and a place of storage for ancestral valuables
lou: large house serving as residence for several families
lou solai: grand lou; large lou serving as gathering place for an entire village
manti: community leader; house group or family head; adjudicator
masyarakat adat (I.): society which to a large extent still follows customary law and
enjoys a restricted degree of political autonomy vis-à-vis the Indonesian government
masyarakat terasing (I.): term used by the Indonesian government for isolated and
allegedly estranged societies regarded to be in need of intensive development guidance
mementian: a certain style of collectively planting rice characteristic of some Bentian
communities
matek: to instruct someone; like siu and sake a designation for a special, “framed”
situation in which the activity referred to occurs
musyawarah (I.): negotiations, deliberations
mulung: spirit familiars of the belian and the warah
naiyu: heterogenous category of protecting and guardian spirits which animate the longan
and other objects anointed with blood
nalin taun: community purification and thanksgiving ritual lasting minimally sixteen days
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nuak: entertaining and presenting gifts to the formally invited members of another
community (or kin group) during a nalin taun (or buntang)
pali: taboo or restriction; category of spirits enforcing the observance of pali
pemerintah (I.): generic designation for past and present governments
perkara: lawsuit
pengiring: protecting spirits; including, most prominently, the naiyu
penyentuhu: spirit-associated objects used for oath-taking and general assistance in
perkara by the manti
peyari: sibling; collateral relative
pusaka: heirlooms, including a subtype of ancestral objects stored by the longan and
anointed with blood of sacrificial animals during buntang
puun: trunk or source; used of elders and houses (lou) who stand in a structural position
of precedence, and in that capacity hold authority and responsibility over, some other
people or houses, that represent the tips (lai) or branches (pakaak) of the puun
roing: a term designating a category of formal exchange expeditions to other
communities that were carried out by large groups of men in the nineteenth century
ruye: ritual paraphernalia; the material setup of rituals, a central aspect of the latter
sake: to ask someone for something (see matek)
semerem: subtype of spirit-associated ancestral valuables serving to protect political
leadership
seniang: heavenly guardian spirits which regulate fundamental conditions in nature and
society
siu: to order someone to do something (see matek)
tapen: failure to participate in social exchange or the ensuing state of soul weakness and
susceptibility to spirit attack 
tatau: great manti; manti with an unusually wide sphere of influence
tempuun: myths which recount the origins of natural phenomena and cultural institutions;
recited mainly in chanted form during larger rituals (buntang, gombok, nalin taun)
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temangung, singa, mangku etc.: titles that were assigned to Bentian leaders by the sultans
of Kutai
ulun tuha one: “the elders of bygone days”; term designating the ancestors which is
frequently invoked as a source of legitimation in discourse
utek tuha longan: skulls of ancestors associated with protecting spirits that are stored by
the longan and anointed with blood during rituals
utek layau: skull of enemy or outsider also associated with protecting spirits and anointed
with blood during rituals
warah: religious expert officiating at rituals principally engaged with treatment of the
souls of the dead
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